December 19, 2012: The AP Graphs: A Preliminary Discussion, by David Albright and ,
A closer look at the errors and implications of the alleged nuclear explosion yield graph published by the Associated Press
A closer look at the errors and implications of the alleged nuclear explosion yield graph published by the Associated Press
December 12, 2012: Update on Ongoing Construction at the Parchin High Explosive Test Site, by David Albright and Robert Avagyan,
Latest satellite imagery shows construction work continuing with pace at the Parchin test site in Iran.
Latest satellite imagery shows construction work continuing with pace at the Parchin test site in Iran.
November 29, 2012: Significant Changes Made to Parchin High Explosives Test Site, Further Activity Likely ,
Significant Changes Made to Parchin High Explosives Test Site, Further Activity Likely
Significant Changes Made to Parchin High Explosives Test Site, Further Activity Likely
November 16, 2012: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report, by David Albright, Andrea Stricker and Christina Walrond,
ISIS analysis of the figures of enriched uranium, deployed centrifuges, future production capabilities and major developments reported in the IAEA Safeguards report from November 16, 2012.
ISIS analysis of the figures of enriched uranium, deployed centrifuges, future production capabilities and major developments reported in the IAEA Safeguards report from November 16, 2012.
November 15, 2012: Aiding the Physics Research Center’s Overseas Procurements:Role of Applied Science Co. and Akebono Boeki Co., by Andrea Stricker and Andrew Ortendahl
October 26, 2012: United States Prosecutes U.S.-Based Smuggler Working for Iran, by Andrea Stricker and
October 25, 2012: Discouraging Any Iranian Decision to Produce Highly Enriched Uranium, by David Albright, Andrea Stricker and Christina Walrond,
A look into the potential consequences of the Iranian hints that it might produce uranium enriched up to 60% which would qualify as HEU.
A look into the potential consequences of the Iranian hints that it might produce uranium enriched up to 60% which would qualify as HEU.
October 17, 2012: Parchin High Explosives Test Site Activity Still Ongoing, by David Albright and Robert Avagyan,
The tarps previously covering the two major buildings at the Parchin high explosive test site seem to be in the process of being removed.
The tarps previously covering the two major buildings at the Parchin high explosive test site seem to be in the process of being removed.
October 9, 2012: Iran’s Evolving Breakout Potential ,
A major study by ISIS on Iran’s potential breakout scenarios and timelines if a decision to build nuclear weapons is made.
A major study by ISIS on Iran’s potential breakout scenarios and timelines if a decision to build nuclear weapons is made.
September 17, 2012: Revisiting Danilenko and the Explosive Chamber at Parchin: A Review Based on Open Sources, by David Albright and Robert Avagyan,
A detailed look into how and where Danilenko could have contributed to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons efforts.
A detailed look into how and where Danilenko could have contributed to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons efforts.
September 17, 2012: V. V. Danilenko’s Expertise in Explosive Chambers: Translated Selections from the 2003 Book, by Robert Avagyan and
September 17, 2012: Revisiting Vyacheslav Danilenko: His Origins in the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Complex, by Mark Gorwitz and ,
A comprehensive look at the technical knowledge and background of Soviet scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko whose work and expertise might have been put to use in Iranian nuclear weaponization efforts.
A comprehensive look at the technical knowledge and background of Soviet scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko whose work and expertise might have been put to use in Iranian nuclear weaponization efforts.
September 11, 2012: Time for Action on Iran at IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, by David Albright and Andrea Stricker,
The IAEA board should pass a resolution condemning Iran’s refusal to allow an inspection at Parchin and its stonewalling on achieving an umbrella agreement.
The IAEA board should pass a resolution condemning Iran’s refusal to allow an inspection at Parchin and its stonewalling on achieving an umbrella agreement.
August 30, 2012: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report from August 30, 2012 ,
Iran’s Refusal for Access to Parchin Hindering Effective Verification; Little Hope for Structured Agreement to Resolve Issues on Iran’s Past and Possibly On-Going Military Activities; Rate of 20% LEU Production Increases but the Number of Cascades Producing the Material Remains Constant; Number of Installed Centrifuges at Fordow Doubles; Production of 3.5% Enriched Uranium Increases Slightly; Advanced Centrifuge Program Still Troubled and Makes No Visible Progress.
Iran’s Refusal for Access to Parchin Hindering Effective Verification; Little Hope for Structured Agreement to Resolve Issues on Iran’s Past and Possibly On-Going Military Activities; Rate of 20% LEU Production Increases but the Number of Cascades Producing the Material Remains Constant; Number of Installed Centrifuges at Fordow Doubles; Production of 3.5% Enriched Uranium Increases Slightly; Advanced Centrifuge Program Still Troubled and Makes No Visible Progress.
August 24, 2012: New Phase of Suspect Activity at Parchin Site, by David Albright and Robert Avagyan
August 15, 2012: British Bank Accused of Doing Massive Illegal Iran Business: Settles with New York Authorities, by Andrea Stricker and ,
Standard Chartered settles for $340 million in the case of its illicit dealings with Iran worth close to $250 billion.
Standard Chartered settles for $340 million in the case of its illicit dealings with Iran worth close to $250 billion.
August 12, 2012: Major U.S. Sting Operation Arrests Iranian in Nuclear Smuggling Network, by David Albright and Andrea Stricker,
The US Justice Department indicted an Iranian and a Chinese national in yet another case illegal procurement of dual use items for the Iranian nuclear program.
The US Justice Department indicted an Iranian and a Chinese national in yet another case illegal procurement of dual use items for the Iranian nuclear program.
August 1, 2012: Cleanup Activity at Suspected Parchin Test Site Appears Complete: Site Considerably Altered, by David Albright and Robert Avagyan,
Satellite imagery from July 25, 2012 suggests that suspected cleanup activity at the Parchin high explosive site is now complete. No prospect yet of IAEA access to the site.
Satellite imagery from July 25, 2012 suggests that suspected cleanup activity at the Parchin high explosive site is now complete. No prospect yet of IAEA access to the site.
June 20, 2012: Suspected Clean-Up Activity Continues at Parchin Military Complex:Considerable Dirt Movement Near Suspect Building, by David Albright and Robert Avagyan,
Satellite imagery shows what appears to be further clean-up activity a the Parchin high explosives test site where the IAEA suspects Iran may have conducted nuclear weapons related tests.
Satellite imagery shows what appears to be further clean-up activity a the Parchin high explosives test site where the IAEA suspects Iran may have conducted nuclear weapons related tests.
June 15, 2012: Iranian Production of 19.75 Percent Enriched Uranium: Beyond Its Realistic Needs, by David Albright and Christina Walrond,
Iran’s growing stock of 19.75 percent enriched uranium is an increasing source of unease as it further reduces breakout timeframes.
Iran’s growing stock of 19.75 percent enriched uranium is an increasing source of unease as it further reduces breakout timeframes.
June 4, 2012: Is Iran Building a Third Enrichment Plant?, by David Albright and Andrea Stricker
June 4, 2012: Déjà vu at Fordow? What are Iran’s enrichment plans?, by David Albright, Christina Walrond and Andrea Stricker
May 30, 2012: Further Activity at Suspected Parchin Explosive Testing Complex: Two Small Buildings Razed, by David Albright and Robert Avagyan,
Satellite imagery shows what appears to be further cleanup efforts at the Parchin high explosive test site
Satellite imagery shows what appears to be further cleanup efforts at the Parchin high explosive test site
May 16, 2012: Iranian Smuggling for Military Nuclear Programs: From Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group to the PHRC, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
May 16, 2012: The Telexes: Whole Body Counters and the Physics Research Center, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
May 16, 2012: The Telexes: Front Company Kala Naft, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
May 16, 2012: Telexes: Amir Kabir University and Dr. Shahmoradi, by David Albright and
May 9, 2012: Opening the Door to a Solution with Iran, by David Albright and Olli Heinonen
May 8, 2012: New Satellite Image Shows Activity at Parchin Site in Iran, by David Albright and Paul Brannan,
Satellite imagery shows activity at the building identified by the IAEA as a potential military nuclear site.
Satellite imagery shows activity at the building identified by the IAEA as a potential military nuclear site.
April 25, 2012: Case of Three Tinners Set for Trial: Plea Deal Expected ,
The long drawn out case of the Tinners and their controversial role in supporting and bringing down the Khan smuggling network is coming to a close.
The long drawn out case of the Tinners and their controversial role in supporting and bringing down the Khan smuggling network is coming to a close.
April 20, 2012: Internal IAEA information links the Supreme Leader to 1984 decision to seek a nuclear arsenal ,
Internal IAEA information casts doubt on the Iranian Supreme Leader’s claims regarding the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Internal IAEA information casts doubt on the Iranian Supreme Leader’s claims regarding the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
April 10, 2012: A Freeze Today, Not in the Future, to Iran’s 20 Percent Enrichment ,
A critical look at the Iranian arguments for 20% enriched uranium production in view of the needs of the Tehran research reactor and a new, more powerful one planned but not yet announced.
A critical look at the Iranian arguments for 20% enriched uranium production in view of the needs of the Tehran research reactor and a new, more powerful one planned but not yet announced.
April 10, 2012: Early Satellite Image Shows Foundation for High Explosive Test Chamber at Parchin Site in Iran:What was the chamber for?, by David Albright and Paul Brannan,
A March 2000 satellite image of the Parchin site shows the foundation for the test chamber.
A March 2000 satellite image of the Parchin site shows the foundation for the test chamber.
April 9, 2012: U.S. Intelligence Estimates and the Iranian Nuclear Program, by David Albright and Paul Brannan,
Recent media reporting about the U.S. intelligence findings on Iran’s nuclear weaponization program has focused on the relatively narrow technical question of whether the Iranian regime has made the decision to restart an effort to actually build nuclear weapons. The recent reporting shows that the U.S. intelligence community assesses that this decision on restart has not yet been made. However, this reporting does not address the broader question of whether Iran decided many years ago to seek nuclear weapons and put in place specific nuclear capabilities to allow it to do so expeditiously.
Recent media reporting about the U.S. intelligence findings on Iran’s nuclear weaponization program has focused on the relatively narrow technical question of whether the Iranian regime has made the decision to restart an effort to actually build nuclear weapons. The recent reporting shows that the U.S. intelligence community assesses that this decision on restart has not yet been made. However, this reporting does not address the broader question of whether Iran decided many years ago to seek nuclear weapons and put in place specific nuclear capabilities to allow it to do so expeditiously.
March 22, 2012: The New National Intelligence Estimate on Iran: A Step in the Right Direction, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
March 19, 2012: Department 70 and the Physics Research Center: Extensive Interest in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies ,
The activities of Department 70 are in stark contrast to Iran’s declarations. Iran needs to reopen its discussions with the IAEA about procurements related to the PHRC and its activities.
The activities of Department 70 are in stark contrast to Iran’s declarations. Iran needs to reopen its discussions with the IAEA about procurements related to the PHRC and its activities.
March 13, 2012: Satellite Image of Building Which Contains a High Explosive Test Chamber at the Parchin Site in Iran, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
March 5, 2012: Preventing Iran From Getting Nuclear Weapons:Constraining Its Future Options ,
USIP commissioned ISIS report on the possible futures of the Iranian nuclear program and ways to stop it before Iran acquires a nuclear weapon.
USIP commissioned ISIS report on the possible futures of the Iranian nuclear program and ways to stop it before Iran acquires a nuclear weapon.
February 24, 2012: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report from February 24, 2012, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Christina Walrond,
Production of 20% Enriched Uranium Triples; Iran Increases Number of Enriching Centrifuges at Natanz FEP by Nearly 50% and Signals an Intention to Greatly Expand the Number of Centrifuges at Both Natanz and Fordow; Advanced Centrifuge Program Appears Troubled.
Production of 20% Enriched Uranium Triples; Iran Increases Number of Enriching Centrifuges at Natanz FEP by Nearly 50% and Signals an Intention to Greatly Expand the Number of Centrifuges at Both Natanz and Fordow; Advanced Centrifuge Program Appears Troubled.
February 23, 2012: The Physics Research Center and Iran’s Parallel Military Nuclear Program, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Stricker,
Did Iran have a military nuclear program parallel to the civilian program managed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran?
Did Iran have a military nuclear program parallel to the civilian program managed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran?
February 23, 2012: PHRC telex appendix ,
Content of telex exchanges between western companies and Iranian organizations attempting to procure materials for a possible parallel military nuclear program.
Content of telex exchanges between western companies and Iranian organizations attempting to procure materials for a possible parallel military nuclear program.
January 18, 2012: Reality Check: Shorter and Shorter Timeframe if Iran Decides to Make Nuclear Weapons ,
As Iran continues to enrich and increase its stockpile of uranium, the amount of time required to build a nuclear device - if the political decision were to be made - becomes shorter and shorter.
As Iran continues to enrich and increase its stockpile of uranium, the amount of time required to build a nuclear device - if the political decision were to be made - becomes shorter and shorter.
December 8, 2011: No Visible Evidence of Explosion at Esfahan Nuclear Site; Adjacent Facility Razed ,
Satellite imagery analysis of the Esfahan nuclear site in Iran following reports of an explosion in the area that might have affected the complex.
Satellite imagery analysis of the Esfahan nuclear site in Iran following reports of an explosion in the area that might have affected the complex.
November 29, 2011: Vyacheslav Danilenko – Background, Research, and Proliferation Concerns, by Mark Gorwitz and ,
A detailed look at the man allegedly behind Iran’s work on the weaponization of nuclear material.
A detailed look at the man allegedly behind Iran’s work on the weaponization of nuclear material.
November 28, 2011: Satellite Image Showing Damage from November 12, 2011 Blast at Military Base in Iran, by Paul Brannan and ,
Satellite imagery of the blast at the Iranian military base.
Satellite imagery of the blast at the Iranian military base.
November 14, 2011: ISIS
Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part II-- Iran’s Work and
Foreign Assistance on a Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear
Weapon ,
A detailed look into the question of Iranian weaponization efforts mentioned by the IAEA safeguards report of November 8, 2011.
A detailed look into the question of Iranian weaponization efforts mentioned by the IAEA safeguards report of November 8, 2011.
November 8, 2011: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Part 1, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Stricker,
IAEA Details Evidence of Nuclear Weaponization Activities in Violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty; Enrichment at Natanz Continues to Stagnate; Three Cascades of IR-1 Centrifuges Installed at Fordow, Low Enriched Uranium Cylinder Moved to Fordow
IAEA Details Evidence of Nuclear Weaponization Activities in Violation of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty; Enrichment at Natanz Continues to Stagnate; Three Cascades of IR-1 Centrifuges Installed at Fordow, Low Enriched Uranium Cylinder Moved to Fordow
November 4, 2011: Iran Nuclear Issue – Considerations for a Negotiated Outcome, by John Carlson and ,
John Carlson, former Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, has written a paper highlighting the key considerations for a negotiated outcome regarding the Iranian nuclear issue.
John Carlson, former Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, has written a paper highlighting the key considerations for a negotiated outcome regarding the Iranian nuclear issue.
October 18, 2011: Performance of the IR-1 Centrifuge at Natanz, by David Albright and Christina Walrond,
During the past year, the performance of the IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has faltered. Although the average monthly production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has increased to about 150 kg/month, the number of centrifuges needed to produce this LEU has increased disproportionately compared to the previous year.
During the past year, the performance of the IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has faltered. Although the average monthly production of 3.5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has increased to about 150 kg/month, the number of centrifuges needed to produce this LEU has increased disproportionately compared to the previous year.
October 18, 2011: Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges, by David Albright and Christina Walrond,
An examination of Iran’s advanced gas centrifuge machines and how sanctions have impacted Iran’s ability to procure the needed materials to manufacture them.
An examination of Iran’s advanced gas centrifuge machines and how sanctions have impacted Iran’s ability to procure the needed materials to manufacture them.
October 11, 2011: New Satellite Imagery of Iranian Nuclear Sites on Google Earth ,
Over the last several months, Google Earth has posted updated commercial satellite imagery over Iran which includes several nuclear sites including the Arak heavy water reactor and heavy water production site, the Ardakan yellowcake production plant and the Gchine uranium mine and mill.
Over the last several months, Google Earth has posted updated commercial satellite imagery over Iran which includes several nuclear sites including the Arak heavy water reactor and heavy water production site, the Ardakan yellowcake production plant and the Gchine uranium mine and mill.
September 21, 2011: Determining the purpose of Iran’s growing stock of 19.75 percent enriched uranium
September 21, 2011: Natanz Enrichment Site: Boondoggle or Part of an Atomic Bomb Production Complex?
September 20, 2011: Critique of a Recent Breakout Estimate at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)*, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Christina Walrond
September 2, 2011: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Safeguards Report from September 2, 2011
August 4, 2011: ISIS Analysis of Russian Proposal:Ask Iran to Come Clean on Nuclear Weaponization Before Removing Sanctions
July 8, 2011: IRISL and Affiliates Indicted on Financial Conspiracy Charges, by Andrea Stricker and
June 24, 2011: Will Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani lead Iran to nuclear weapons? (Rev. 1), by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Stricker
May 25, 2011: ISIS Analysis of the May 24, 2011 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran, by David Albright, Andrea Stricker and Christina Walrond
April 26, 2011: European Court of Human Rights Rejects Tinners’ Appeal
February 25, 2011: IAEA
Iran Safeguards Report Analysis: Expansion of Natanz Plant Lags; LEU
Production Not as High as Expected; Iran Readying Advanced Centrifuges
for Deployment, by David Albright, Andrea Stricker and Christina Walrond
February 15, 2011: Stuxnet Malware and Natanz: Update of ISIS December 22, 2010 Report, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Christina Walrond
February 11, 2011: United States Indicts Man behind Alleged Multi-Million Dollar Iranian Smuggling Network
February 11, 2011: A Smuggler’s Use of U.S. Financial Systems to Receive Illegal Payments from Iran, by Andrea Stricker and
December 23, 2010: Swiss Judge Recommends Charges against the Tinners
December 22, 2010: Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Christina Walrond
December 21, 2010: The Tinner Case: Time for a Frank, Open Evaluation, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
December 10, 2010: State Department Cables:Stopping Iran’s and North Korea’s Illicit Procurementfor their Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs
November 23, 2010: IAEA
Iran Safeguards Report: Shutdown of Enrichment at Natanz Result of
Stuxnet Virus?Downgrade in Role of Fordow Enrichment Site; LEU
Production May Have Decreased, by David Albright, Andrea Stricker and Christina Walrond
October 26, 2010: Avoiding
the Legitimization of Iranian Enrichment:Better to Discourage Options
Involving the Conversion of Iran’s LEU Stock into Bushehr Reactor Fuel, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Stricker
July 26, 2010: What is Iran’s competence in operating centrifuges?, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Stricker
July 6, 2010: Man Suspected of Illicit Nuclear Trade to Iran Found Guilty ,
An update and supplemental documents on the case of Canadian-Iranian Mahmoud Yadegari convicted of violating several export control laws.
An update and supplemental documents on the case of Canadian-Iranian Mahmoud Yadegari convicted of violating several export control laws.
June 1, 2010: IAEA Iran Report: Enrichment increases slightly; lack of adequate safeguards, by David Albright, Jacqueline Shire and Christina Walrond
May 17, 2010: Iran’s Proposed LEU deal: Skeptical but Awaiting Clarification ,
A look at the LEU swap deal proposed by Iran, Brazil and Turkey.
A look at the LEU swap deal proposed by Iran, Brazil and Turkey.
May 12, 2010: U.S. Extradition Request Denied in France for Alleged Iranian Military Parts Smuggler ,
On May 7, 2010, a French appeals court denied the U.S. extradition request based on a testimony by the French DGA (Direction générale de l’armement) claiming that the items in question could not have military purposes.
On May 7, 2010, a French appeals court denied the U.S. extradition request based on a testimony by the French DGA (Direction générale de l’armement) claiming that the items in question could not have military purposes.
April 13, 2010: Iran’s new centrifuge: What do we know about it?, by David Albright , Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan,
A closer look at the new centrifuge that Iran unveiled on its nuclear day.
A closer look at the new centrifuge that Iran unveiled on its nuclear day.
March 31, 2010: Defected Iranian Nuclear Scientist Reportedly Worked Across from Secret Nuclear Weapons R&D Facility ,
Imagery showing university where scientist worked is across the street from FEDAT.
Imagery showing university where scientist worked is across the street from FEDAT.
March 3, 2010: Supplement to Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock, by David Albright and Christina Walrond,
Supplement to a February 11, 2010 ISIS report on the Iranian centrifuge enrichment program. The new version has been updated with details and analysis based on the latest IAEA safeguards report.
Supplement to a February 11, 2010 ISIS report on the Iranian centrifuge enrichment program. The new version has been updated with details and analysis based on the latest IAEA safeguards report.
February 18, 2010: IAEA Iran Report: Enrichment at Natanz improving; entire LEU tank moved to PFEP; no progress on weaponization, by David Albright, Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan
February 16, 2010: Inventive U.S. Sting Operation Catches Iran-Based Military Equipment Smuggler, by David Albright , Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel Stricker
February 16, 2010: Busting the Members at the Core of Iran’s Smuggling Networksfor Nuclear, Missile, and Conventional Military Goods, by David Albright , Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel Stricker
February 16, 2010: Former Iranian Ambassador Arrested in Britain for Assisting Iran-Directed Smuggling Scheme, by David Albright , Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel Stricker
February 16, 2010: Middleman Majid Kakavand Arrested for Directing Malaysia-Based Iranian Illicit Procurement Scheme, by David Albright , Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel Stricker
February 16, 2010: Arrest Made in Germany of Core Iranian Procurement Agent, by David Albright , Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel Stricker
February 11, 2010: Iran’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Taking Stock, by David Albright and Christina Walrond
February 9, 2010: Iran’s enrichment for the Tehran Research Reactor: Update, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire,
Further details on Iranian attempts to enrich 19.75% LEU for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor.
Further details on Iranian attempts to enrich 19.75% LEU for fuel fabrication for the Tehran research reactor.
February 8, 2010: Iran’s recent statements about production of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor: A quick review, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire,
A review of the Iranian statements regarding the intention to produce 19.75% enriched LEU to fuel the Tehran research reactor and to build ten new enrichment facilities.
A review of the Iranian statements regarding the intention to produce 19.75% enriched LEU to fuel the Tehran research reactor and to build ten new enrichment facilities.
January 5, 2010: Questions and Answers regarding Iranian document:“Outlook for special neutron-related activities over the next 4 years” ,
ISIS takes a detailed look at the Iranian neutron initiator documents first revealed by the Times in December 2009
ISIS takes a detailed look at the Iranian neutron initiator documents first revealed by the Times in December 2009
December 30, 2009: Iran’s Uranium Stockpile Dwindling, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire,
ISIS takes a new look at Iran’s uranium supply In view of an AP report regarding Iranian efforts to procure uranium ore from Kazakhstan.
ISIS takes a new look at Iran’s uranium supply In view of an AP report regarding Iranian efforts to procure uranium ore from Kazakhstan.
December 15, 2009: The Trials of the German-Iranian Trader Mohsen Vanaki (Updated for Dec. 15th), by David Albright and Christina Walrond,
Further details on the case of Mohsen Vanaki, a trader accused of illicitly procuring materials for Iran’s nuclear program.
Further details on the case of Mohsen Vanaki, a trader accused of illicitly procuring materials for Iran’s nuclear program.
December 14, 2009: Documents Assessing the Organizational Structure of FEDAT ,
A look at the structure of FEDAT which, according to The Times’ source, is in charge of Iran’s “Clandestine Nuclear Sector”.
A look at the structure of FEDAT which, according to The Times’ source, is in charge of Iran’s “Clandestine Nuclear Sector”.
December 14, 2009: New Document Reopens Question on Whether Iran’s Nuclear Weaponization Work Continued Past 2003 ,
New evidence regarding Iranian studies on a neutron initiator revive the discussion of Iranian weaponization efforts and the possibility that these might have continued beyond 2003.
New evidence regarding Iranian studies on a neutron initiator revive the discussion of Iranian weaponization efforts and the possibility that these might have continued beyond 2003.
December 14, 2009: Farsi and English Versions of Document on Neutron Initiator ,
The original Farsi and English documents regarding Iranian research on a neutron initiator provided by the Times of London.
The original Farsi and English documents regarding Iranian research on a neutron initiator provided by the Times of London.
November 30, 2009: Critique of Recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists article on the Fordow Enrichment Plant, by David Albright and Paul Brannan,
A review of the technical information provided in a recent BAS article on the Fordow enrichment plant.
A review of the technical information provided in a recent BAS article on the Fordow enrichment plant.
November 16, 2009: ISIS Analysis of the IAEA Iran Report from November 16, 2009, by David Albirght and Jacqueline Shire,
ISIS analysis of the latest information available in the November 16, 2009 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran.
ISIS analysis of the latest information available in the November 16, 2009 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran.
November 16, 2009: IAEA
Report on Iran: Fordow enrichment plant at “advanced stage of
construction;” decline in numP1 centrifuges enriching but P1 centrifuge
efficiency increases; discovery of previously unknown stock of heavy
water , by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
November 5, 2009: Satellite Imagery Narrows Qom Enrichment Facility Construction Start Date, by Paul Brannan and ,
Satellite imagery analysis suggests that the Qom uranium enrichment facility construction begun sometime after January 2006.
Satellite imagery analysis suggests that the Qom uranium enrichment facility construction begun sometime after January 2006.
October 23, 2009: Update:
The Trials of the German-Iranian Trader Mohsen Vanaki:The German
Federal Intelligence Service Assesses that Iran Likely Has a Nuclear
Weapons Program, by David Albright and Christina Walrond,
An update of the September 16, 2009 ISIS report with further details on the Vananki case.
An update of the September 16, 2009 ISIS report with further details on the Vananki case.
October 23, 2009: A Smuggler’s Use of the U.S. Financial System to Receive Illegal Payments from Iran, by Andrea Stricker and
October 23, 2009: Update: Smuggler Previously Convicted of Aircraft Export Control Violations;Disguised Company As a Larger Operation, by Andrea Stricker and
October 7, 2009: Technical Note: Annual Future Low-Enriched Uranium Fuel Requirements for the Tehran Research Reactor, by David Albright and ,
An estimate of the LEU usage by the Tehran Research Reactor in the context of the LEU supplied by Argentina to Iran within the period spanning from 1967 to 1993.
An estimate of the LEU usage by the Tehran Research Reactor in the context of the LEU supplied by Argentina to Iran within the period spanning from 1967 to 1993.
October 7, 2009: Timeline 1967-1993: Argentine Low-Enriched Uranium at the Tehran Research Reactor, by Christina Walrond and ,
A timeline of the Argentinian supply of LEU for the Tehran Research Reactor between 1967-1993.
A timeline of the Argentinian supply of LEU for the Tehran Research Reactor between 1967-1993.
October 2, 2009: Excerpts from Internal IAEA Document on Alleged Iranian Nuclear Weaponization ,
The report looks into the IAEA’s internal process of evaluating information regarding the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.
The report looks into the IAEA’s internal process of evaluating information regarding the possibility of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.
September 29, 2009: Qom Uranium Enrichment Site May Have Been Re-purposed Tunnel Facility, by Paul Brannan and ,
Satellite imagery analysis seems to suggest that the recently disclosed Qom enrichment facility might have actually been re-purposed tunnel complex.
Satellite imagery analysis seems to suggest that the recently disclosed Qom enrichment facility might have actually been re-purposed tunnel complex.
September 27, 2009: New Satellite Imagery of Suspected Gas Centrifuge Site Near Qom, Iran
September 25, 2009: ISIS Imagery Brief of Two Possible Sites of the Qom Enrichment Facility ,
A set of before and after commercial satellite images of two sites fitting the descriptions given of the recently disclosed Qom uranium enrichment plant in Iran.
A set of before and after commercial satellite images of two sites fitting the descriptions given of the recently disclosed Qom uranium enrichment plant in Iran.
September 22, 2009: What is Venezuela Up To? Chavez’s Latest Efforts to Purchase Nuclear Technology Cause for Concern, by Andrea Scheel and ,
Venezuela has announced plans for nuclear cooperation with Russia that might involve the construction of a research and a power reactor. Combined with the strengthening ties between Caracas and Tehran that would reportedly extend to the nuclear realm and to the supply of refined petroleum to Iran in direct contravention of the threat of U.S. supported U.N. sanctions, Venezuela risks becoming a major source of concern both in terms of dealing with Iran as well as non-proliferation in general.
Venezuela has announced plans for nuclear cooperation with Russia that might involve the construction of a research and a power reactor. Combined with the strengthening ties between Caracas and Tehran that would reportedly extend to the nuclear realm and to the supply of refined petroleum to Iran in direct contravention of the threat of U.S. supported U.N. sanctions, Venezuela risks becoming a major source of concern both in terms of dealing with Iran as well as non-proliferation in general.
September 16, 2009: The
Trials of the German-Iranian Trader Mohsen Vanaki:The German Federal
Intelligence Service assesses that Iran likely has a nuclear weapons
program, by David Albright and Christina Walrond ,
In November 2007, German authorities arrested German-Iranian Mohsen Vanaki under suspicions that he illegally brokered the transfer of dual-use equipment to Iran with applications in a nuclear weapons program. This case provides rare, illuminating insight into a disagreement among intelligence agencies about the complex judgments concerning Iran’s nuclear program.
In November 2007, German authorities arrested German-Iranian Mohsen Vanaki under suspicions that he illegally brokered the transfer of dual-use equipment to Iran with applications in a nuclear weapons program. This case provides rare, illuminating insight into a disagreement among intelligence agencies about the complex judgments concerning Iran’s nuclear program.
September 1, 2009: Natanz Enrichment Plant: How to Measure Progress, by David Albright, Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan ,
The report clarifies misinterpretations based on the August 2009 IAEA report which indicated that the number on enriching centrifuges in Natanz had decreased, but which did not necessarily imply that the overall program had slowed down.
The report clarifies misinterpretations based on the August 2009 IAEA report which indicated that the number on enriching centrifuges in Natanz had decreased, but which did not necessarily imply that the overall program had slowed down.
August 28, 2009: ISIS Analysis of August 2009 IAEA Iran Report, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Jacqueline Shire,
Centrifuges increase; Rate of LEU production steady; progress on inspection requests at Arak and Natanz; no progress on possible military dimensions.
ISIS has released its analysis of the August 2009 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran’s nuclear program.
Centrifuges increase; Rate of LEU production steady; progress on inspection requests at Arak and Natanz; no progress on possible military dimensions.
ISIS has released its analysis of the August 2009 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran’s nuclear program.
August 25, 2009: Update on the Arak Heavy Water Reactor in Iran ,
On August 11, 2009, ISIS released a report on Iran’s IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, which is currently under construction. The report raised several questions regarding the reactor’s planned fuel and the status of its construction. Since the release of that report, ISIS has received additional information on these issues, shedding more light on the origin of the Arak reactor fuel rod bundle depicted in President Ahmadinejad’s visit to the Fuel Manufacturing Plant at Esfahan.
On August 11, 2009, ISIS released a report on Iran’s IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, which is currently under construction. The report raised several questions regarding the reactor’s planned fuel and the status of its construction. Since the release of that report, ISIS has received additional information on these issues, shedding more light on the origin of the Arak reactor fuel rod bundle depicted in President Ahmadinejad’s visit to the Fuel Manufacturing Plant at Esfahan.
August 11, 2009: Mysteries Deepen Over Status of Arak Reactor Project, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Robert Kelley,
Iran’s IR-40, or Arak, heavy water reactor, which has been under construction since June 2004, has not received as much attention as its gas centrifuge program and its operation and potential to produce significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium are years away, although this timeline is narrowing.
In addition to increasing questions about the status of the reactor’s construction and associated hot cells that could be capable of separating plutonium, there are also numerous questions about the 40 megawatt-thermal heavy water reactor’s fuel assembly that was recently presented by President Ahmadinejad at the Esfahan Fuel Manufacturing Plant.
Iran’s IR-40, or Arak, heavy water reactor, which has been under construction since June 2004, has not received as much attention as its gas centrifuge program and its operation and potential to produce significant amounts of weapons-grade plutonium are years away, although this timeline is narrowing.
In addition to increasing questions about the status of the reactor’s construction and associated hot cells that could be capable of separating plutonium, there are also numerous questions about the 40 megawatt-thermal heavy water reactor’s fuel assembly that was recently presented by President Ahmadinejad at the Esfahan Fuel Manufacturing Plant.
July 14, 2009: A Smuggler’s Procurement of Nuclear Dual-Use Pressure Transducers for Iran, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Scheel,
This case study looks at the April 2009 case of an Iranian-Canadian citizen arrested by Canadian authorities on evidence that he procured nuclear dual-use components from a U.S. company, brought them to Canada, and attempted to re-export them to Iran via Dubai. He allegedly purchased two pressure transducers, which can be used in gas centrifuge plants to measure gas pressure of the uranium hexafluoride in the cascades.
This case study looks at the April 2009 case of an Iranian-Canadian citizen arrested by Canadian authorities on evidence that he procured nuclear dual-use components from a U.S. company, brought them to Canada, and attempted to re-export them to Iran via Dubai. He allegedly purchased two pressure transducers, which can be used in gas centrifuge plants to measure gas pressure of the uranium hexafluoride in the cascades.
July 8, 2009: Misconceptions about Iran’s Nuclear Program, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire,
In the interest of promoting a broader understanding of technical issues about Iran’s uranium enrichment programs, ISIS has identified below several misconceptions about Iran’s nuclear program that have arisen in comments we have received or seen expressed in the broader news media.
In the interest of promoting a broader understanding of technical issues about Iran’s uranium enrichment programs, ISIS has identified below several misconceptions about Iran’s nuclear program that have arisen in comments we have received or seen expressed in the broader news media.
June 5, 2009: ISIS Analysis of IAEA Report on Iran ,
ISIS analysis of the IAEA safeguards report on Iran’s nuclear program released on June 5, 2009.
The report includes several new findings regarding the progress of the Iranian program and details the continuing challenges faced by the IAEA.
ISIS analysis of the IAEA safeguards report on Iran’s nuclear program released on June 5, 2009.
The report includes several new findings regarding the progress of the Iranian program and details the continuing challenges faced by the IAEA.
May 21, 2009: Iran’s Procurement of U.S. Military Aircraft Parts: Two case studies in illicit trade ,
Iran illicitly targets U.S. military technology for procurement both because of its high quality and Iran’s need for specialized replacement components for existing aircraft programs dating to the Shah’s reign in the 1970s. Two recent cases of Iranian procurement of controlled U.S. aircraft parts illustrate the difficulty of detecting and preventing such activities.
Iran illicitly targets U.S. military technology for procurement both because of its high quality and Iran’s need for specialized replacement components for existing aircraft programs dating to the Shah’s reign in the 1970s. Two recent cases of Iranian procurement of controlled U.S. aircraft parts illustrate the difficulty of detecting and preventing such activities.
March 18, 2009: Nuclear Weapon Breakout Scenarios: Correcting the Record ,
ISIS analyzes a March 2 paper published by Alexander Glaser and R. Scott Kemp of Princeton University regarding Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon.
ISIS analyzes a March 2 paper published by Alexander Glaser and R. Scott Kemp of Princeton University regarding Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon.
March 12, 2009: Iran Official Statements Issue Brief ,
In a post last week on the ISISNuclearIran website, we addressed the perceived inconsistency in statements made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair sought to clarify the issue.
In a post last week on the ISISNuclearIran website, we addressed the perceived inconsistency in statements made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair sought to clarify the issue.
February 19, 2009: ISIS Analysis of the February 19 IAEA Report ,
ISIS analyzes the three main subjects of the latest IAEA report on Iran: the increase in the number of installed centrifuges, the current amount of LEU and the progress of the Arak heavy reactor plant.
ISIS analyzes the three main subjects of the latest IAEA report on Iran: the increase in the number of installed centrifuges, the current amount of LEU and the progress of the Arak heavy reactor plant.
February 11, 2009: Is Iran running out of yellowcake? ,
Iran could be close to exhausting its supply of yellowcake while lacking the adequate resources to sustain indigenous commercial-scale uranium processing and enrichment. Our conclusion, echoed in a recent report by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel,1 is based on an examination of Iran’s uranium reserves, its stocks of yellowcake, or uranium oxide, acquired from overseas sources and, the requirements to sustain a commercial nuclear power program. The absence of activity at one of Iran’s two uranium mines casts further doubt on its claims that it can establish independence in the fuel cycle required for a civil nuclear energy program.
Iran could be close to exhausting its supply of yellowcake while lacking the adequate resources to sustain indigenous commercial-scale uranium processing and enrichment. Our conclusion, echoed in a recent report by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel,1 is based on an examination of Iran’s uranium reserves, its stocks of yellowcake, or uranium oxide, acquired from overseas sources and, the requirements to sustain a commercial nuclear power program. The absence of activity at one of Iran’s two uranium mines casts further doubt on its claims that it can establish independence in the fuel cycle required for a civil nuclear energy program.
January 28, 2009: A Company’s Discretion Detects Large Iranian Valve Orders ,
In this case, a company used its knowledge about its products’ end uses as well as its expertise in identifying suspicious equipment requests to detect Iranian attempts to procure a large number of valves for its gas centrifuge program. The illicit procurement agents requested items not on international control lists of dual-use items, hoping to evade detection while still obtaining equipment adequate for use in a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant.
In this case, a company used its knowledge about its products’ end uses as well as its expertise in identifying suspicious equipment requests to detect Iranian attempts to procure a large number of valves for its gas centrifuge program. The illicit procurement agents requested items not on international control lists of dual-use items, hoping to evade detection while still obtaining equipment adequate for use in a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant.
January 21, 2009: Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire ,
Few foreign policy and national security issues have dominated debate in the United States and abroad as Iran’s nuclear program has. Is its declared civil uranium enrichment program a cover for an effort to secretly build nuclear weapons? What should be done to stop Iran from developing a capability to build nuclear weapons? The Obama administration faces a formidable and urgent challenge to sculpt a policy that can convince Iran to abandon or defer a nuclear weapons capability. This report seeks to answer several key questions about how much Iran has achieved. It also offers a roadmap for resolving the nuclear issue both peacefully and in a manner that would redirect Iran away from proliferation-sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, in particular uranium enrichment, while strengthening international monitoring of its nuclear capabilities. Part I of this report contains an overview of Iran’s uranium enrichment program with an emphasis on questions related to Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, including when it might achieve such a capability and the state of evidence suggesting research and development of a weapons program. Part II looks to the recent nuclear histories of Pakistan and South Africa as possible futures for Iran’s nuclear program and draws out key lessons from those experiences. Part III offers a detailed set of recommendations and specific steps that the incoming administration should consider as it seeks to confront the specific challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear program in a wider context of competing regional political and security concerns.
Few foreign policy and national security issues have dominated debate in the United States and abroad as Iran’s nuclear program has. Is its declared civil uranium enrichment program a cover for an effort to secretly build nuclear weapons? What should be done to stop Iran from developing a capability to build nuclear weapons? The Obama administration faces a formidable and urgent challenge to sculpt a policy that can convince Iran to abandon or defer a nuclear weapons capability. This report seeks to answer several key questions about how much Iran has achieved. It also offers a roadmap for resolving the nuclear issue both peacefully and in a manner that would redirect Iran away from proliferation-sensitive parts of the fuel cycle, in particular uranium enrichment, while strengthening international monitoring of its nuclear capabilities. Part I of this report contains an overview of Iran’s uranium enrichment program with an emphasis on questions related to Iran’s nuclear weapons capability, including when it might achieve such a capability and the state of evidence suggesting research and development of a weapons program. Part II looks to the recent nuclear histories of Pakistan and South Africa as possible futures for Iran’s nuclear program and draws out key lessons from those experiences. Part III offers a detailed set of recommendations and specific steps that the incoming administration should consider as it seeks to confront the specific challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear program in a wider context of competing regional political and security concerns.
December 2, 2008: Has Iran Achieved a Nuclear Weapons Breakout Capability? Not yet but soon., by David Albright , Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan ,
As Iran’s operation of its gas centrifuges has expanded and improved, there is growing focus on the quantity of low enriched uranium (LEU) produced at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). This is understandably an important topic deserving of close scrutiny. However, lost in often imprecise reporting are important qualifiers such as units of measurement. As we explain below, understanding these units is relevant to Iran’s timetable to a weapons capability, or “break-out.”
As Iran’s operation of its gas centrifuges has expanded and improved, there is growing focus on the quantity of low enriched uranium (LEU) produced at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). This is understandably an important topic deserving of close scrutiny. However, lost in often imprecise reporting are important qualifiers such as units of measurement. As we explain below, understanding these units is relevant to Iran’s timetable to a weapons capability, or “break-out.”
November 19, 2008: IAEA Report Analysis: Enrichment output steady; centrifuge numbers to increase dramatically;no access to Arak, by David Albright , Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan ,
The report makes three points: Iran continues to make progress on developing and operating its centrifuges and plans to significantly increase the number of operational centrifuges; it has refused to allow the IAEA access to the Arak heavy water reactor that is under construction; and continues to resist efforts to address substantively its alleged nuclear weapons-related work, which the IAEA says remains of serious concern.
The report makes three points: Iran continues to make progress on developing and operating its centrifuges and plans to significantly increase the number of operational centrifuges; it has refused to allow the IAEA access to the Arak heavy water reactor that is under construction; and continues to resist efforts to address substantively its alleged nuclear weapons-related work, which the IAEA says remains of serious concern.
November 13, 2008: Arak Heavy Water Reactor Construction Progressing, by David Albright and Paul Brannan,
Much of the focus on Iran’s nuclear facilities remains fixed on the Natanz enrichment plants and Iran’s progress toward mastering the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment
process. While seldom noticed, Iran continues with construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak, called the IR-40, which has a declared power of 40 megawatts-thermal.
Much of the focus on Iran’s nuclear facilities remains fixed on the Natanz enrichment plants and Iran’s progress toward mastering the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment
process. While seldom noticed, Iran continues with construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak, called the IR-40, which has a declared power of 40 megawatts-thermal.
November 12, 2008: Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East:Now is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation , by David Albright and Andrea Scheel and ,
This report examines future Middle East reactor projects and the large quantities of plutonium in spent fuel expected to accumulate from reactor operations. Since Iran’s nuclear progress could cause other nations to consider their options, several steps must be taken now to prevent proliferation from occurring in the region.
This report examines future Middle East reactor projects and the large quantities of plutonium in spent fuel expected to accumulate from reactor operations. Since Iran’s nuclear progress could cause other nations to consider their options, several steps must be taken now to prevent proliferation from occurring in the region.
September 23, 2008: Analysis; September IAEA Report, by David Albright , Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan ,
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on September 15, 2008 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran’s compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. The report, which shows Iran’s continued non-compliance with these resolutions, includes two important findings…
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on September 15, 2008 its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran and the status of Iran’s compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. The report, which shows Iran’s continued non-compliance with these resolutions, includes two important findings…
August 7, 2008: Can Military Strikes Destroy Iran’s Centrifuge Program? Probably Not, by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Jacqueline Shire,
This report examines what is known about when and where Iran produces centrifuges and related components and concludes that attempts to target the program militarily are unlikely to succeed and would actually be counterproductive.
This report examines what is known about when and where Iran produces centrifuges and related components and concludes that attempts to target the program militarily are unlikely to succeed and would actually be counterproductive.
May 26, 2008: IAEA Report Analysis: Centrifuge Operations Improving but Cooperation on Weaponization still lacking, by David Albright, Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan,
This analysis of the May IAEA report notes Iran’s continued progress in installing and operating centrifuges at Natanz, in particular its increase in UF6 feed rates over previous reporting periods.
This analysis of the May IAEA report notes Iran’s continued progress in installing and operating centrifuges at Natanz, in particular its increase in UF6 feed rates over previous reporting periods.
April 29, 2008: Presidential Candidates on Iran’s Nuclear Program - April Update, by Jelena Avramovic and Andrea Scheel,
This is a compilation of the candidates’ statements to major media on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.
This is a compilation of the candidates’ statements to major media on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.
April 29, 2008: The Candidates’ Positions - Iran and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, by Andrea Scheel and Jacqueline Shire,
This document contains the candidates’ direct responses to questions from ISIS regarding Iran and its nuclear fuel cycle.
This document contains the candidates’ direct responses to questions from ISIS regarding Iran and its nuclear fuel cycle.
April 11, 2008: Briefing notes from February 2008 IAEA meeting regarding Iran’s nuclear program ,
These are unofficial notes from a meeting at IAEA headquarters with representatives from UN missions at which senior IAEA officials briefed diplomats on a range of information regarding Iran’s alleged weaponization work.
These are unofficial notes from a meeting at IAEA headquarters with representatives from UN missions at which senior IAEA officials briefed diplomats on a range of information regarding Iran’s alleged weaponization work.
February 22, 2008: Presidential Candidates on Iran’s Nuclear Program, by Jelena Avramovic and Andrea Scheel
February 22, 2008: IAEA Report Analysis: A Balanced Safeguards Report, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
February 7, 2008: Iran Installing More Advanced Centrifuges at Natanz Pilot Enrichment Plant: Factsheet on the P-2/IR-2 Centrifuge, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
November 15, 2007: November IAEA Report: Centrifuge File Not Closed; Natanz Enrichment Expands, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
November 1, 2007: A Witches Brew? Evaluating Iran’s Uranium-Enrichment Progress, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, November 2007 issue of Arms Control Today
October 17, 2007: Iran’s Nuclear Program: What the 2008 Presidential Candidates are Saying, by Jelena Avramovic and Andrea Scheel
August 30, 2007: IAEA
Safeguards Report on Iran: Limited Progress in enrichment;
controversial strategy on outstandinoutstanding issues; continued
defiance of UN Security Council , by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
August 28, 2007: A Flawed IAEA-Iran Agreement on Resolving Outstanding Issues, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
July 9, 2007: New Tunnel Construction at Mountain Adjacent to the Natanz Enrichment Complex, by David Albright and Paul Brannan,
Commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on June 11, 2007 indicates that Iran is building a tunnel facility inside a mountain about two kilometers south of the Natanz uranium enrichment complex. The construction activity is taking place in the closest mountainous area to the Natanz site, strongly suggesting that the site is affiliated with Natanz.
Commercial satellite imagery from DigitalGlobe taken on June 11, 2007 indicates that Iran is building a tunnel facility inside a mountain about two kilometers south of the Natanz uranium enrichment complex. The construction activity is taking place in the closest mountainous area to the Natanz site, strongly suggesting that the site is affiliated with Natanz.
March 15, 2007: Iran’s Centrifuges: How well are they working?, by Jacqueline Shire and David Albright
November 14, 2006: ISIS Issue Brief: Latest IAEA Report on Iran: Continued Progress on Cascade Operations, No New Cooperation with IAEA, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
November 9, 2006: ISIS Report: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Flawed House Intelligence Committee Report Should Be Amended orWithdrawn, by da Albright and Jacqueline Shire
September 29, 2006: ISIS Issue Analysis: Iran’s NPT Violations: Numerous and Possibly On-Going?, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
September 11, 2006: ISIS Issue Analysis: Iran’s Response to the EU: Confused but Sporadically Hopeful, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
August 31, 2006: ISIS Issue Brief: Iran’s Centrifuge Program: Defiant but Delayed, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
August 23, 2006: ISIS Imagery Brief: IAEA Inspectors and Iran Clash Over Frequency of Inspections of Underground Facilities, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
July 10, 2006: ISIS
Issue Brief on Iran: Better Carrots, not Centrifuges: Why Iran must
halt its centrifuges andwhat the U.S. can do to make it happen, by David Albright and Jacqueline Shire
April 21, 2006: ISIS Imagery Brief: “Update on Construction Activities at Arak 40 MW Heavy Water Reactor”, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
April 14, 2006: ISIS Imagery Brief: “New Activities at the Esfahan and Natanz Nuclear Sites in Iran”, by David Albright and Paul Brannan
March 27, 2006: ISIS Issue Brief: “The Clock is Ticking, But How Fast?”, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
January 13, 2006: New satellite image of the Natanz uranium enrichment complex in Iran.
January 13, 2006: Satellite Image of the Natanz uranium enrichment complex in Iran
January 12, 2006: ISIS
President David Albright responds to the November 13, 2005 New York
Times article, “Relying onComputer, US Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear
Aims."
January 12, 2006: ISIS Issue Brief: Iran’s Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plan, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
May 30, 2005: : ISIS Imagery Brief: Kalaye Electric
May 3, 2005: Newly Annotated Image: Natanz Facility in Iran Showing the Location of the Underground Cascade Halls
May 2, 2005: ISIS Imagery Brief: Multiple Images Showing the Tunnel Entrance to the Underground Facilities at Natanz
February 17, 2005: ISIS Imagery Brief: New Satellite Images Show Tunnel Construction at Esfahan Facility in Iran
February 17, 2005: Countdown to Showdown, by David
Albright and Corey Hinderstein, appearing in the November/December 2004
edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
September 13, 2004: ISIS Issue Brief: Parchin: Possible Nuclear Weapons-Related Site in Iran, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
June 17, 2004: Furor over Fuel, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein,
appearing in the May/June 2003 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
appearing in the May/June 2003 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
June 17, 2004: Iran, Player or Rogue?, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein,
appearing in the September/October 2003 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
appearing in the September/October 2003 edition of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
June 17, 2004: The Centrifuge Connection, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein,
from the March/April issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
from the March/April issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
June 17, 2004: ISIS Imagery Brief: Destruction at Iranian Site Raises New Questions About Iran’s Nuclear Activities ,
NEW: Image from May 10, 2004
NEW: Image from May 10, 2004
March 14, 2003: ISIS Issue Brief: The Iranian Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Plant at Natanz: Drawing from Commercial Satellite Images, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
February 20, 2003: ISIS Issue Brief: Iran at a Nuclear Crossroads, by David Albright and
December 12, 2002: ISIS Issue Brief: Iran Building Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: International Transparency Needed, by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
No comments:
Post a Comment