Panetta, Army Generals Play Roles in Upcoming Book
Then-Lt.
Gen. John R. Allen and Gen. David H. Petraeus are shown greeting
Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta as he arrived at Camp Eggers,
Kabul, Afghanistan, July 9, 2011. DoD photo by Tech. Sgt. Jacob N.
Bailey, U.S. Air Force. (Released)
Stay tuned as I’m working as quickly as I can to finish The Clapper Memo. I’ll keep you updated.
‘The Clapper Memo’ Nears Publication as First Book Marks One-Year Anniversary
My second nonfiction book, “The Clapper Memo,” is inching closer and closer to publication as my first book, “Three Days In August” turned one-year old this week.
“The Clapper Memo” tells the story of a 40-year-old turf war few Americans even realize is taking place.
What started out in April 2009 as a 27-day effort to obtain answers from the Pentagon about the deployment of new interrogation technology to combat zones turned into almost four years of research, investigation and interviews during which I learned more than I ever imagined I might about the people, products and problems inside the interrogation area. And, trust me, it contains details high-ranking government officials would rather not see made public.
Most importantly, I learned how wrong decisions made by some of those aforementioned government officials have resulted in dozens of American soldiers and citizens being injured or killed in Afghanistan, the victims of so-called “insider” or “green-on-blue” attacks. One of those people bearing some responsibility is Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr.
People from all walks of life shared insights, insider information and occasional doses of insanity related to their personal experiences in the arena.
People from across the United States as well as around the world — in places like Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Mexico — shared. They shared during scheduled and unscheduled interviews. Through official and unofficial channels. By phone, email message, Facebook message, Twitter and “snail mail.”
Some shared without being asked. Most told the truth. Some did not.
Some were forthcoming with information. Others forced me to use the federal Freedom of Information Act and state “sunshine” laws as tools for flushing out answers.
More than anything else, it was old-fashioned detective work that produced results.
I hope you’ll make plans now to read it.
Until then, I hope you’ll read “Three Days In August,” my book chronicling the life story and wrongful conviction of Army Green Beret Sgt. 1st Class Kelly A. Stewart. It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com.
During the past 12 months, I’ve had many opportunities to share the basics of Stewart’s story and have found many Americans nod their heads and empathize with the highly-decorated combat
veteran’s plight but refuse to engage — by reading the whole story,
that is — and speak out on behalf of those in uniform who have been
victimized by the military justice system. I hope that changes.
Regardless, I will continue to tell Stewart’s story and to tell the stories of others who, after reading “Three Days In August,” have approached me with stories of their loved ones — usually husbands and sons — that are eerily similar to Stewart’s.
Note: “The Clapper Memo” is the working title of this book but, for reasons I will explain in the near future, will change upon publication.
What started out in April 2009 as a 27-day effort to obtain answers from the Pentagon about the deployment of new interrogation technology to combat zones turned into almost four years of research, investigation and interviews during which I learned more than I ever imagined I might about the people, products and problems inside the interrogation area. And, trust me, it contains details high-ranking government officials would rather not see made public.
Most importantly, I learned how wrong decisions made by some of those aforementioned government officials have resulted in dozens of American soldiers and citizens being injured or killed in Afghanistan, the victims of so-called “insider” or “green-on-blue” attacks. One of those people bearing some responsibility is Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr.
People from all walks of life shared insights, insider information and occasional doses of insanity related to their personal experiences in the arena.
People from across the United States as well as around the world — in places like Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Mexico — shared. They shared during scheduled and unscheduled interviews. Through official and unofficial channels. By phone, email message, Facebook message, Twitter and “snail mail.”
Some shared without being asked. Most told the truth. Some did not.
Some were forthcoming with information. Others forced me to use the federal Freedom of Information Act and state “sunshine” laws as tools for flushing out answers.
More than anything else, it was old-fashioned detective work that produced results.
I hope you’ll make plans now to read it.
Until then, I hope you’ll read “Three Days In August,” my book chronicling the life story and wrongful conviction of Army Green Beret Sgt. 1st Class Kelly A. Stewart. It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com.
During the past 12 months, I’ve had many opportunities to share the basics of Stewart’s story and have found many Americans nod their heads and empathize with the highly-decorated combat
veteran’s plight but refuse to engage — by reading the whole story,
that is — and speak out on behalf of those in uniform who have been
victimized by the military justice system. I hope that changes.Regardless, I will continue to tell Stewart’s story and to tell the stories of others who, after reading “Three Days In August,” have approached me with stories of their loved ones — usually husbands and sons — that are eerily similar to Stewart’s.
Note: “The Clapper Memo” is the working title of this book but, for reasons I will explain in the near future, will change upon publication.
DNI Clapper Tries to Rewrite History of Libya Fiasco
Raise your right hand if, after reading the Libya-related
statement from Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr.,
you believe it to be true:
UPDATE 10/22/2012 at 7:30 a.m. Central: This video paints a bleak picture of the Obama Administration’s handling of the entire Benghazi affair. DNI Clapper is at the center of the mess.
DNI James R. Clapper Jr.
Friday, September 28, 2012
In the
aftermath of the terrorist attack on U.S. personnel and facilities in
Benghazi, Libya, the Intelligence Community launched a comprehensive
effort to determine the circumstances surrounding the assault and to
identity the perpetrators. We also reviewed all available intelligence
to determine if there might be follow-on attacks against our people or
facilities in Libya or elsewhere in the world.
As the
Intelligence Community collects and analyzes more information related to
the attack, our understanding of the event continues to evolve. In the
immediate aftermath, there was information that led us to assess that
the attack began spontaneously following protests earlier that day at
our embassy in Cairo. We provided that initial assessment to Executive
Branch officials and members of Congress, who used that information to
discuss the attack publicly and provide updates as they became
available. Throughout our investigation we continued to emphasize that
information gathered was preliminary and evolving.
As we
learned more about the attack, we revised our initial assessment to
reflect new information indicating that it was a deliberate and
organized terrorist attack carried out by extremists. It remains unclear
if any group or person exercised overall command and control of the
attack, and if extremist group leaders directed their members to
participate. However, we do assess that some of those involved were
linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to al-Qa’ida. We
continue to make progress, but there remain many unanswered questions.
As more information becomes available our analysis will continue to
evolve and we will obtain a more complete understanding of the
circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack.
We continue
to support the ongoing FBI investigation and the State Department
review of the Benghazi terrorist attack, providing the full capabilities
and resources of the Intelligence Community to those efforts. We also
will continue to meet our responsibility to keep Congress fully and
currently informed. For its part, the Intelligence Community will
continue to follow the information about the tragic events in Benghazi
wherever it leads. The President demands and expects that we will do
this, as do Congress and the American people. As the Intelligence
Community, we owe nothing less than our best efforts in this regard,
especially to the families of the four courageous Americans who lost
their lives at Benghazi in service of their country.
That’s what I thought, too.UPDATE 10/22/2012 at 7:30 a.m. Central: This video paints a bleak picture of the Obama Administration’s handling of the entire Benghazi affair. DNI Clapper is at the center of the mess.
FYI: DNI Clapper plays a prominent role in my second nonfiction book, “The CLAPPER MEMO.”
Be sure to pick up a copy of it as soon as it’s released this fall.
Until then, you can pick up a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier’s Fight For Military Justice.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com.
Department of Defense: ‘To Hell With Saving American Lives’
An Army Times article
published Friday contains details of a story that ring eerily similar
to the story I’ll be telling in my upcoming second nonfiction book, “The Clapper Memo.” Both seem to share a similar message coming out of the Department of Defense: “To hell with saving American lives!”
The Times
reports that high-ranking Army officials issued a memo prohibiting the
use of a certain software program after finding out that some Army units
went outside official channels to obtain the software because they
think its use could save soldiers’ lives.
“The Clapper Memo” tells the true story of how Department of Defense officials issued no fewer than three memos aimed at prohibiting the use of a certain interrogation technology that had proven itself superior to the one and only technology they had approved for use throughout DoD. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg!
Unfortunately for those DoD officials, many soldiers in the field ignored the memos and, along with interrogation professionals at places like Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq, shared with me never-before-published details about this scandal as well as their feelings about having their best interrogation tool taken from them at a critical time in the nation’s history.
After spending almost four years conducting research and interviews as part of my investigation leading up to the “The Clapper Memo,” I guarantee Pentagon officials will not appreciate this book hitting the market. At the same time, however, Blue Star and Gold Star families will.
The “The Clapper Memo” is set for release this fall.
If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!
The Times
reports that high-ranking Army officials issued a memo prohibiting the
use of a certain software program after finding out that some Army units
went outside official channels to obtain the software because they
think its use could save soldiers’ lives.“The Clapper Memo” tells the true story of how Department of Defense officials issued no fewer than three memos aimed at prohibiting the use of a certain interrogation technology that had proven itself superior to the one and only technology they had approved for use throughout DoD. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg!
Unfortunately for those DoD officials, many soldiers in the field ignored the memos and, along with interrogation professionals at places like Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq, shared with me never-before-published details about this scandal as well as their feelings about having their best interrogation tool taken from them at a critical time in the nation’s history.
After spending almost four years conducting research and interviews as part of my investigation leading up to the “The Clapper Memo,” I guarantee Pentagon officials will not appreciate this book hitting the market. At the same time, however, Blue Star and Gold Star families will.
The “The Clapper Memo” is set for release this fall.
If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!Changes in Field Ops Ignore Long-Term Fix in Afghanistan
Rather than implement a broader solution, Gen. John Allen,
commander of the International Security Assistance Force in
Afghanistan, has resorted to a short-term approach to reduce the number
of so-called “green-on-blue” (a.k.a., “insider”) attacks.
According to news reports like the one shown in the video above, General Allen has suspended most joint field operations in Afghanistan as a measure to combat the growing problem of attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Force against U.S. and coalition troops. Wanting to find out more-specific details about what has been ordered, I fired off an email to my ISAF public affairs contact in Kabul.
In a message sent Monday at 2:57 p.m. Central, I asked Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge to “confirm or deny reports that ISAF troops have been ordered to separate from their Afghan counterparts. If confirmed, please provide details ASAP.” Eight hours later, I received the response below:
“The Clapper Memo” is set to be released this fall.
UPDATE 9/19/2012 at 8:03 a.m. Central: It seems the ISAF Public Affairs folks offered a slightly-different spin on this subject on their website yesterday.
According to news reports like the one shown in the video above, General Allen has suspended most joint field operations in Afghanistan as a measure to combat the growing problem of attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Force against U.S. and coalition troops. Wanting to find out more-specific details about what has been ordered, I fired off an email to my ISAF public affairs contact in Kabul.
In a message sent Monday at 2:57 p.m. Central, I asked Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge to “confirm or deny reports that ISAF troops have been ordered to separate from their Afghan counterparts. If confirmed, please provide details ASAP.” Eight hours later, I received the response below:
Sir,
ISAF continually conducts threat
assessments and adapts to the current operating environment. Recent
events outside of and inside Afghanistan related to the ‘Innocence of
Muslims’ video plus the conduct of recent insider attacks have given
cause for ISAF troops to exercise increased vigilance and carefully
review all activities and interactions with the local population.
General Allen has directed all
operational commanders to review force protection and tactical
activities in the light of the current circumstances. This guidance was
given at the recommendation of, and in conjunction with, key Afghan
leaders.
This will likely lead to
adjustments in exactly how, when and where ISAF troops operate,
especially during the current period of heightened tension. These
changes will often be short notice and reactive to the latest
information. ISAF remains focused on the continued conduct of effective
combined operations with our Afghan partners to achieve the mission.
Those operations will always be conducted in a manner that mitigates
risks to our troops but ensures mission success.
The commander of the ISAF Joint
Command directed a change in the level at which advising and partnering
takes place. Most partnering and advising will now be at the Kandak
(Battalion) level and above. This does not mean there will be no
partnering below that level; the need for that will be evaluated on a
case by case basis and approved by RC commanders. In
some cases, ANSF are fully capable of increased independent activity and
their advisors will simply be stepping back to advise from the next
level.
While the approach outlined above will likely reduce the number of
deaths and injuries during the short term, only a long-term solution
will fix the problem. In my soon-to-be released second nonfiction book,
“The Clapper Memo,”
I’ll share stunning details about that long-term solution and about the
people — inside and outside the Department of Defense — doing their
best to prevent that solution from being employed.“The Clapper Memo” is set to be released this fall.UPDATE 9/19/2012 at 8:03 a.m. Central: It seems the ISAF Public Affairs folks offered a slightly-different spin on this subject on their website yesterday.
ISAF clarifies information on partnering with ANSF
2012-09-CA-14
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 18,
2012) — Recent media coverage regarding a change in ISAF’s model of
Security Force Assistance (SFA) to the Afghan National Security Forces
is not accurate. ISAF remains absolutely committed to partnering with,
training, advising and assisting our ANSF counterparts. The ISAF SFA
model is focused at the battalion level and above, with exceptions
approved by senior commanders. Partnering occurs at all levels, from
Platoon to Corps. This has not changed.
In response to elevated threat
levels resulting from the “Innocence of Muslims” video, ISAF has taken
some prudent, but temporary, measures to reduce our profile and
vulnerability to civil disturbances or insider attacks. This means that
in some local instances, operational tempo has been reduced, or force
protection has been increased. These actions balance the tension of the
recent video with force protection, while maintaining the momentum of
the campaign.
We’ve done this before in other
high tension periods, and it has worked well. Under this guidance, and
as conditions change, we will continue to adapt the force posture and
force protection. The SFA model is integral to the success of the ANSF,
and ISAF will return to normal operations as soon as conditions warrant.
Bob McCarty is the author of “Three Days In August: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier’s Fight For Military Justice,” a nonfiction book that’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com.
Writer Links Guantanamo Bay Events to ‘Green-on-Blue’ Attacks in Afghanistan
As Americans prepare to mark the 11th anniversary of the
day on which Islamic terrorists waged a series of horrific and deadly
attacks against the United States, you may think you’ve heard every
possibly-important detail related to the events of that day. But you haven’t.
In my soon-to-be-published second nonfiction book, “The CLAPPER MEMO,” I’ll share unbelievable-but-true details obtained from high-ranking individuals who worked inside the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility in Cuba and were personally responsible for interrogating detainees.
Using those details and others, I’ll connect the dots between a troubling series of events that occurred at GITMO during the first two years after 9/11 and the “green-on-blue” attacks that have taken place in Afghanistan and resulted in the deaths and injuries of dozens of U.S. and coalition personnel at the hands of their so-called “allies” in the Afghan National Security Force.
“The CLAPPER MEMO” is set for release this fall. I’ll let you know as soon as it’s available to order.
If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!
Camp
Delta at Joint Task Force (JTF) Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,
Cuba, July 7, 2010. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Michael R.
Holzworth)
Using those details and others, I’ll connect the dots between a troubling series of events that occurred at GITMO during the first two years after 9/11 and the “green-on-blue” attacks that have taken place in Afghanistan and resulted in the deaths and injuries of dozens of U.S. and coalition personnel at the hands of their so-called “allies” in the Afghan National Security Force.
“The CLAPPER MEMO” is set for release this fall. I’ll let you know as soon as it’s available to order. If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!New Report: More Detainees Returning to Terrorism Upon Release From Guantanamo Bay
The number of detainees returning to terrorism after being released from Guantanamo Bay is rising, according to a new report released Wednesday by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr.
As of July 19, 168 of 602 (28 percent) detainees released to
date from the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility have either reengaged in
terrorism or are suspected of having reengaged in terrorism, the report shows. In comparison, the DNI’s 2011 report
showed a total of 150 of 598 (25 percent) detainees had returned to
terrorism or were suspected of having returned to terrorism following
their release from the U.S. Navy facility in Cuba.
By my calculations, the new numbers represent an increase of three percent over the 2011 figures. Any way you slice ‘em, however, these numbers represent bad news for our combat and anti-terrorism efforts.
In my upcoming book, “The CLAPPER MEMO,” I’ll share details contained in letters and other documents I obtained during the past four years from individuals who’ve served as high-ranking interrogation officials at GTMO. Most importantly, I’ll share how they describe the damage done to national security by a Pentagon decision to strip GTMO interrogators of their most-effective tool for learning about detainees’ past exploits and future plans.
“The CLAPPER MEMO” is set for release this fall.
If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!
A
U.S. Sailor, foreground, assigned to the Navy Expeditionary Guard
Battalion conducts an early morning patrol while detainees stand by in
the background at the recreation yard inside Camp Delta at Joint Task
Force (JTF) Guantanamo, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, July 7, 2010.
JTF Guantanamo provides safe, humane, legal and transparent care and
custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commission
and those ordered released by a court. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech.
Sgt. Michael R. Holzworth/Released)
By my calculations, the new numbers represent an increase of three percent over the 2011 figures. Any way you slice ‘em, however, these numbers represent bad news for our combat and anti-terrorism efforts.
In my upcoming book, “The CLAPPER MEMO,” I’ll share details contained in letters and other documents I obtained during the past four years from individuals who’ve served as high-ranking interrogation officials at GTMO. Most importantly, I’ll share how they describe the damage done to national security by a Pentagon decision to strip GTMO interrogators of their most-effective tool for learning about detainees’ past exploits and future plans.
“The CLAPPER MEMO” is set for release this fall.
If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!
UPDATE 9/24/2012 at 7:49 a.m. Central: The New York Times
is one of many news outlets reporting that the Obama Administration has
approved the transfer of 55 more GITMO detainees. Based on the
percentages above, we can expect 15 of these detainees to return to
lives of terrorism. Comforting thought.
Are Military Officials Telling Truth About Who Is Vetting Afghans?
I’ve asked a lot of questions about the measures being employed to stem the growing number of attacks by members of the Afghan National Security Force against the U.S. and coalition personnel (a.k.a., “green-on-blue” attacks) who mentor and train them. Today, I’m inclined to believe some — if not all — of the answers I’ve received from official U.S. and coalition spokespersons in Afghanistan are simply not true.
My inclination stems from what I read in the first paragraph of TIME/World reporter John Wendle’s article published Tuesday morning:
After
being asked about the process via which ANSF members are being vetted
prior to working alongside U.S. and coalition forces, Army Lt. Colonel
Jimmie E. Cummings told me via email that “ISAF or U.S. are not
responsible for vetting Afghans for either the Afghan National Army or
Police. The Afghans use a 8-step process in vetting their candidates.”
Responding to similar questions July 4, the International Security Assistance Force public affairs officer reassured me nothing had changed and that Afghans were still in charge.
“We (ISAF) have today, just as we discussed back in April, advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in assisting them to develop improvements to the overall vetting and recruitment process for the ANSF,” Colonel Cummings wrote. “The 8-step vetting process, which we have discussed in the past, is the result of our advising on this issue. Just like everything else that we (ISAF) advise on in Afghanistan, it is an ongoing and continuous process. We continually advise our Afghan partners on ways to improve processes. Again, the Afghans have the lead and are responsible for vetting their recruits into their security forces.”
On Aug. 23, Colonel Cummings’ replacement in Afghanistan confirmed again that Afghans were in charge of vetting Afghans.
“In response to your question on the vetting procedures adopted by the Afghans, the Afghan National Security Force is working hard to make their vetting processes more robust,” wrote Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge via email.
As examples of the measures being taken, Major Hodge listed the following:
In closing, Major Hodge reiterated what I had been told by her predecessor, Colonel Cummings, and referred me to the Afghan MoD for further information on vetting procedures:
At the same time, I’m inclined to believe this long war in Southwest Asia is starting to bear similarities to our last war in Southeast Asia. More than many are willing to admit.
More details about my investigation into “green-on-blue” attacks and about my quest for related documents via the Freedom of Information Act will appear in my upcoming second nonfiction book, “The CLAPPER MEMO,” set for release this fall.
If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!
My inclination stems from what I read in the first paragraph of TIME/World reporter John Wendle’s article published Tuesday morning:
Alam Gul, a potential Afghan
Local Police (ALP) recruit sat cross-legged on a mat outside the unit’s
crumbling, mud-brick headquarters in the village of Tabin, in Kandahar’s
restive Arghandab district, alternately looking at his hands and at the
sky as he answered a series of questions. Two ALP members sat watching
nearby, while others washed motorbikes or lounged in the sun. The U.S.
Army specialist and staff sergeant in charge of the interview were
getting increasingly frustrated with the young man.
The words in the final sentence of that paragraph reveal what the
reporter interpreted was happening before his eyes. At the same time,
those words run counter to everything I’ve been told since April 4.
After
being asked about the process via which ANSF members are being vetted
prior to working alongside U.S. and coalition forces, Army Lt. Colonel
Jimmie E. Cummings told me via email that “ISAF or U.S. are not
responsible for vetting Afghans for either the Afghan National Army or
Police. The Afghans use a 8-step process in vetting their candidates.”Responding to similar questions July 4, the International Security Assistance Force public affairs officer reassured me nothing had changed and that Afghans were still in charge.
“We (ISAF) have today, just as we discussed back in April, advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in assisting them to develop improvements to the overall vetting and recruitment process for the ANSF,” Colonel Cummings wrote. “The 8-step vetting process, which we have discussed in the past, is the result of our advising on this issue. Just like everything else that we (ISAF) advise on in Afghanistan, it is an ongoing and continuous process. We continually advise our Afghan partners on ways to improve processes. Again, the Afghans have the lead and are responsible for vetting their recruits into their security forces.”
On Aug. 23, Colonel Cummings’ replacement in Afghanistan confirmed again that Afghans were in charge of vetting Afghans.
“In response to your question on the vetting procedures adopted by the Afghans, the Afghan National Security Force is working hard to make their vetting processes more robust,” wrote Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge via email.
As examples of the measures being taken, Major Hodge listed the following:
Afghan National Policeman
• The ANSF introduced re-vetting procedures for Afghan National Army soldiers returning from leave;
• The ANSF outlawed the sale of uniforms; and
• The ANSF established an anonymous reporting system.
Further, as highlighted in this article published the same day, the major explained that Afghan President Hamid Karzai
had issued a presidential decree which mandates that Afghan National
Army recruits be interviewed by a four-person council consisting of
officials from the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as from
the Afghan National Directorate of Security and medical department
officials.In closing, Major Hodge reiterated what I had been told by her predecessor, Colonel Cummings, and referred me to the Afghan MoD for further information on vetting procedures:
“While we advise our Afghan counterparts, the
vetting of recruits and personnel is an Afghan-led and -owned process
and they would be the appropriate authorities to discuss it in more
detail.”
Maybe I’m wrong. Maybe Wendle misinterpreted what was taking place before his eyes. But I doubt it.At the same time, I’m inclined to believe this long war in Southwest Asia is starting to bear similarities to our last war in Southeast Asia. More than many are willing to admit.
More details about my investigation into “green-on-blue” attacks and about my quest for related documents via the Freedom of Information Act will appear in my upcoming second nonfiction book, “The CLAPPER MEMO,” set for release this fall.
If you need something to read until then, order a copy of my first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August.” It’s available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com. Thanks in advance!
UPDATE 9/05/12 at 10:53 a.m. Central:
Contrary to everything I had been told to date by ISAF spokespersons
about who is responsible for vetting Afghans, I had it confirmed this
morning — by Major Hodge via email — that U.S. Special Operations Forces
are in charge of vetting Afghan Local Police (ALP) recruits. She
confirmed that fact for me, but only after I presented her with details
from John Wendle’s above-cited report. The major also apologized for
having omitted this important detail from earlier correspondence with
me. A major omission, I’d say.
Afghans to Use Same Flawed Procedures to Re-Vet Own Troops
The Washington Post reported
Saturday evening that the senior commander for Special Operations
forces in Afghanistan has suspended training for all new Afghan recruits
until the more than 27,000 Afghan troops working with his command can
be re-vetted for ties to the insurgency. Unfortunately, using a
flawed procedure a second time will do little to improve the situation
for Americans in the Stone Age country.
During
the past five months, I’ve had a lot of electronic discussions with
U.S. military public affairs officers around the world and have written
many articles about the so-called “green-on-blue” (a.k.a., “insider”) attacks and about my quest for related documents via the Freedom of Information Act.I will provide expanded coverage of this subject matter in my second nonfiction book, “The CLAPPER MEMO,” set for release this fall.
UPDATE 9/03/12 at 6:31 a.m. Central: Statement below from ISAF in Afghanistan:
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 2, 2012) — Statement attributed to Col. Thomas Collins, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan spokesman:
“Special Operations Forces has a strong and trusted relationship with
its Afghan partners that has endured more than a decade. Despite the
recent rise in insider attacks, they are relatively rare among SOF
partnered forces. Special Operations remains fully committed to a close
and productive relationship with our Afghan partners. Current partnered
operations have and will continue, even as we temporarily suspend
training of about 1,000 new ALP recruits while re-vetting current
members. While we have full trust and confidence in our Afghan partners,
we believe this is a necessary step to validate our vetting process and
ensure the quality indicative of Afghan Local Police.”
Bob McCarty’s first nonfiction book, “Three Days In August: A U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier’s Fight For Military Justice,” is available in paperback and ebook via most online booksellers, including Amazon.com.Afghans Remain in Charge of Vetting Despite Increase in ‘Green-on-Blue’ Attacks
Days after three top U.S. generals gathered in Kabul to discuss how to combat the growing problem of so-called “green-on-blue” (a.k.a., “insider”) attacks
by members of the Afghan National Security Force against Americans and
other coalition troops, Afghans remain responsible for vetting Afghans.
I received confirmation of this news via email this morning from Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge, an International Security Assistance Force public affairs officer in Afghanistan.
After reading an article Tuesday in which a Bloomberg.com reporter cited Pentagon Spokesman George Little as the source for a statement about Afghan security ministries adopting more “rigorous vetting procedures” for Afghans seeking to join the security forces, I asked Major Hodge to explain exactly what kind of “rigorous vetting procedures” had been adopted and what made them different from previously-followed procedures.
Much to my amazement, I received a reply from her within 24 hours.
“In response to your question on the vetting procedures adopted by the Afghans,” she wrote, “the Afghan National Security Force is working hard to make their vetting processes more robust.”
As examples of the measures being taken, Major Hodge listed the following:
In closing, Major Hodge reiterated what I had been told by her predecessor, Lt. Col. Jimmie Cummings, in April and July and referred me to the Afghan MoD for further information on vetting procedures:
In response to the discovery that the unit had installed Palantir-provided servers at Fort Stewart, Ga., for training and to provide an analytical backbone during its 2012-13 deployment, the Army has ordered the servers shut down and has ordered them removed by the end of the month, according to a source familiar with the issue. While the domestic backbone was envisioned as a way for the unit to do further analysis of IED networks and provide a reach back capability for analysts down range, the unit is still using the Palantir software in Regional Command-South that it inherited from the outgoing 82nd Airborne Division.
The Palantir software is designed to coordinate vast amounts of information stored in various government databases to help deployed units track and pinpoint insurgent leaders, IED strikes, and IED-planting networks, and reports indicate that it has met with great success in Afghanistan with the 82nd Airborne and a Stryker brigade. The U.S. Special Forces Command, some Marine units, and several foreign militaries also use the software for data analysis in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
A packet of documents obtained by Army Times includes a May 23 memo from the 3rd ID to the Rapid Equipping Force requesting a year-long agreement for stateside access to a Palantir server for training and mission support. In the memo, a 3rd ID officer called Palantir “the primary analytical tool/server being utilized” in Regional Command South and Southwest. Other memos make clear that the 3rd ID didn’t have the funding to purchase the software and was seeking a solution to the problem of getting its soldiers trained on the equipment before falling in on it in Afghanistan.
Neither the Rapid Equipping Force nor Palantir have responded to requests for comment.
The Army isn’t having any of it, however. A Sept. 12 memo from Kim Denver, the Army’s deputy assistant secretary for procurement to the service’s Contracting Command, calls for a cease-and-desist order against Palantir banning it from “approaching units and providing goods and services for free.” The company has been told that “future actions resulting in unauthorized commitment may result in Palantir forgoing payment for services provided prior to the contract.”
A source close to the issue, however, said that every Army unit that had requested the Palantir software had contacted the company on its own initiative by finding emails and phone numbers on the firm’s website.
While the Palantir issue didn’t come up during Thursday an emotional hearing of the House Defense Appropriations Committee at which the Joint IED Defeat Organization’s Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero gave testimony, the issue of intelligence — and the lack of it when it comes to unraveling IED smuggling networks in Afghanistan — cast a pall over the normally strictly bureaucratic proceedings.
The story of Army Staff Sgt. Matthew Sitton and 1st Sgt. Russell Bell of the 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, became a central focus of much of the hearing after Rep. Bill Young of Florida had a letter from Sitton read aloud.
In a letter to the congressman written earlier this year from Afghanistan, Sitton said his chain of command was “making us walk through, for lack of a better term, basically a mine field on a daily basis.” He continued to say that as a brigade, “we are averaging at a minimum an amputee a day from our soldiers because we are walking around aimlessly through grape rows and compounds that are littered with explosives.”
Sitton and Bell were killed Aug. 2 when an IED detonated while their platoon was on a dismounted patrol in Kandahar province, Afghanistan.
Barbero said that while the Army continues to focus on protecting both mounted and dismounted patrols in Afghanistan, the vast majority of the 16,000 IED “events” in Afghanistan in 2011 came from virtually undetectable combinations of commercially available ammonium nitrate and wood. JIEDDO has been trying since 2006 — at a cost of almost $20 billion — to unravel the IED riddle, and despite some real and substantial successes, it has been unable to fully prevent the weapon from killing and maiming coalition troops and civilians.
Barbero said that although 2011 was a record year for IED strikes, 2012 “is on track to meet or exceed the historic number of IED events we saw last year.” The 3rd ID’s attempts to work outside the system to map insurgent networks may have drawn the ire of Army contracting professionals, but the fight on the ground in Afghanistan continues, extra servers or not.
In eastern Afghanistan, a suspected Taliban suicide bomber detonated a
truck laden with explosives at a NATO base in Pul-i-Alam in Logar
province.
I received confirmation of this news via email this morning from Air Force Maj. Lori Hodge, an International Security Assistance Force public affairs officer in Afghanistan.After reading an article Tuesday in which a Bloomberg.com reporter cited Pentagon Spokesman George Little as the source for a statement about Afghan security ministries adopting more “rigorous vetting procedures” for Afghans seeking to join the security forces, I asked Major Hodge to explain exactly what kind of “rigorous vetting procedures” had been adopted and what made them different from previously-followed procedures.
Much to my amazement, I received a reply from her within 24 hours.
“In response to your question on the vetting procedures adopted by the Afghans,” she wrote, “the Afghan National Security Force is working hard to make their vetting processes more robust.”
As examples of the measures being taken, Major Hodge listed the following:
Afghan National Policeman
The ANSF introduced re-vetting procedures for Afghan National Army soldiers returning from leave;
The ANSF outlawed the sale of uniforms; and
The ANSF established an anonymous reporting system.
Further, the major explained, Afghan President Hamid Karzai
issued a presidential decree which mandates that ANA recruits be
interviewed by a four-person council consisting of officials from the
Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as from the NDS and medical
department officials.In closing, Major Hodge reiterated what I had been told by her predecessor, Lt. Col. Jimmie Cummings, in April and July and referred me to the Afghan MoD for further information on vetting procedures:
“While we advise our Afghan counterparts, the
vetting of recruits and personnel is an Afghan-led and -owned process
and they would be the appropriate authorities to discuss it in more
detail.”
During the past five months, I’ve had a lot of electronic discussions
with U.S. military PAOs around the world and have written many articles
about the so-called “green-on-blue” (a.k.a., “insider”) attacks and about my quest for related documents via the Freedom of Information Act. Still, I’m stunned that Afghans remain in charge of the vetting process. Sigh.
Look for expanded coverage of this topic coming soon in “The CLAPPER MEMO,” set for release this fall.
Army upset at way 3rd ID obtained software
By Paul McLeary - Staff writer
Posted : Friday Sep 21, 2012 18:12:38 EDT
The
Army is investigating how the 3rd Infantry Division obtained
intelligence software on a cost-free basis from Palo Alto, Calif.-based
Palantir prior to its year-long deployment to Afghanistan.Posted : Friday Sep 21, 2012 18:12:38 EDT
In response to the discovery that the unit had installed Palantir-provided servers at Fort Stewart, Ga., for training and to provide an analytical backbone during its 2012-13 deployment, the Army has ordered the servers shut down and has ordered them removed by the end of the month, according to a source familiar with the issue. While the domestic backbone was envisioned as a way for the unit to do further analysis of IED networks and provide a reach back capability for analysts down range, the unit is still using the Palantir software in Regional Command-South that it inherited from the outgoing 82nd Airborne Division.
The Palantir software is designed to coordinate vast amounts of information stored in various government databases to help deployed units track and pinpoint insurgent leaders, IED strikes, and IED-planting networks, and reports indicate that it has met with great success in Afghanistan with the 82nd Airborne and a Stryker brigade. The U.S. Special Forces Command, some Marine units, and several foreign militaries also use the software for data analysis in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
A packet of documents obtained by Army Times includes a May 23 memo from the 3rd ID to the Rapid Equipping Force requesting a year-long agreement for stateside access to a Palantir server for training and mission support. In the memo, a 3rd ID officer called Palantir “the primary analytical tool/server being utilized” in Regional Command South and Southwest. Other memos make clear that the 3rd ID didn’t have the funding to purchase the software and was seeking a solution to the problem of getting its soldiers trained on the equipment before falling in on it in Afghanistan.
Neither the Rapid Equipping Force nor Palantir have responded to requests for comment.
The Army isn’t having any of it, however. A Sept. 12 memo from Kim Denver, the Army’s deputy assistant secretary for procurement to the service’s Contracting Command, calls for a cease-and-desist order against Palantir banning it from “approaching units and providing goods and services for free.” The company has been told that “future actions resulting in unauthorized commitment may result in Palantir forgoing payment for services provided prior to the contract.”
A source close to the issue, however, said that every Army unit that had requested the Palantir software had contacted the company on its own initiative by finding emails and phone numbers on the firm’s website.
While the Palantir issue didn’t come up during Thursday an emotional hearing of the House Defense Appropriations Committee at which the Joint IED Defeat Organization’s Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero gave testimony, the issue of intelligence — and the lack of it when it comes to unraveling IED smuggling networks in Afghanistan — cast a pall over the normally strictly bureaucratic proceedings.
The story of Army Staff Sgt. Matthew Sitton and 1st Sgt. Russell Bell of the 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, became a central focus of much of the hearing after Rep. Bill Young of Florida had a letter from Sitton read aloud.
In a letter to the congressman written earlier this year from Afghanistan, Sitton said his chain of command was “making us walk through, for lack of a better term, basically a mine field on a daily basis.” He continued to say that as a brigade, “we are averaging at a minimum an amputee a day from our soldiers because we are walking around aimlessly through grape rows and compounds that are littered with explosives.”
Sitton and Bell were killed Aug. 2 when an IED detonated while their platoon was on a dismounted patrol in Kandahar province, Afghanistan.
Barbero said that while the Army continues to focus on protecting both mounted and dismounted patrols in Afghanistan, the vast majority of the 16,000 IED “events” in Afghanistan in 2011 came from virtually undetectable combinations of commercially available ammonium nitrate and wood. JIEDDO has been trying since 2006 — at a cost of almost $20 billion — to unravel the IED riddle, and despite some real and substantial successes, it has been unable to fully prevent the weapon from killing and maiming coalition troops and civilians.
Barbero said that although 2011 was a record year for IED strikes, 2012 “is on track to meet or exceed the historic number of IED events we saw last year.” The 3rd ID’s attempts to work outside the system to map insurgent networks may have drawn the ire of Army contracting professionals, but the fight on the ground in Afghanistan continues, extra servers or not.
Coordinated Taliban attacks rock Kabul, eastern Afghanistan ahead of US pullout
-
08/07/12 11:31 AM ET
A series of coordinated attacks on civilian and military targets in
central and eastern Afghanistan on Tuesday left 10 people dead and
dozens wounded, including at least three coalition troops.
The deadliest attack occurred west of Kabul, where Taliban fighters set off a roadside bomb that hit a bus full of Afghan civilians. At least nine people were killed and five wounded in the attack, according to recent news reports.
The deadliest attack occurred west of Kabul, where Taliban fighters set off a roadside bomb that hit a bus full of Afghan civilians. At least nine people were killed and five wounded in the attack, according to recent news reports.
While the bomber was unable to
breach the base's outer perimeter, the explosion wounded 13 people,
including two Americans, according to recent reports.
U.S.
and coalition forces are gearing up to take out Taliban strongholds
along Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan this spring, Gen. John
Allen, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said earlier this year.
In
the third attack, NATO forces engaged Taliban fighters in Kapisa
province in northeast Afghanistan, where a French soldier was killed
during the firefight.
Afghan President Hamid
Karzai condemned the attacks, saying the strikes will only turn public
opinion further against Taliban forces because they took place during
the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Tuesday's
violence comes as U.S. forces are preparing to pull the first tranche of
American troops out of the country within the coming weeks.
The
administration's road map for U.S. draw-downs in Afghanistan has 32,000
American soldiers coming home this summer. The remaining 68,000 are
expected to be stateside by the end of 2014.
Afghan
forces are expected to have compete control of all combat operations in
country by 2013, according to a postwar deal struck between President
Obama and Karzai in May.
A senior U.S. Army soldier was killed along with a couple of majors by a
suicide bomber in Afghanistan, and three special operation forces
soldiers were gunned down by an Afghan commander who had won their trust
and invited them to dinner.
The suicide bomber struck Wednesday as a group of U.S. military and civilian officials from the 4th brigade, 4th Infantry Division were in Sarkowi in Kunar Province, which is located in eastern Afghanistan. The suicide attacker detonated an explosive vest near the group.
Killed in the attack were Command Sgt. Maj. Kevin J. Griffin, 45, of Laramie, Wyo., the brigade's senior enlisted soldier. As a command sergeant major, Griffin was one of the brigade's senior leaders and provided leadership and guidance to the 4,000 man brigade.
Also killed in the blast were Army Maj. Thomas E. Kennedy, 35, of West Point, N.Y., and Air Force Major Walter D. Gray, 38, of Conyers, Ga. Gray was an air liaison officer and flight commander attached to the brigade.
The brigade is tasked with providing security in three provinces that border Pakistan. Based in Fort Carson, Colo., the brigade arrived in Afghanistan this past April.
The explosion also killed American USAID Foreign Service Officer Ragaei
Abdelfattah. Another American foreign service officer and an Afghan
civilian were also injured in the attack.
In a statement released Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Abdelfattah's work in eastern Afghanistan over the last year as "critical to our efforts to support Afghanistan's political, economic and security transitions and was an example of the highest standards of service." She said he was so committed to his mission that he had volunteered to serve a second year-long tour in Afghanistan.
The second incident was what is described as a "Green on Blue" attack where coalition forces are attacked by Afghan Security Forces. Friday's attack brings to 25 the number of such attacks that have taken place this year and have resulted in 31 deaths. The number of Green on Blue attacks this year has already surpassed the 21 that occurred last year.
A coalition spokesman says the three killed service members were killed at their outpost in Sarwan Qala in the Sangin District of Helmand Province. The American military members mentored and trained local security forces out of their outpost.
The exact details of the shooting incident remain unclear, but the spokesman says that shortly after 1am an Afghan male dressed in an Afghan National Security Force uniform the shooter opened fire on the American military members.
Contrary to reports by the Taliban that the gunman was able to escape and join their ranks, a coalition spokesman says the shooter was quickly detained and is in ISAF custody.
Afghan sources had said earlier that the shooting had occurred during a late meal at the end of the daily Ramadan fast. The coalition spokesman could not confirm those details.
In an earlier version of this story, ABC News incorrectly reported that the commander of the 4th Brigade was seriously wounded in the suicide bombing.The commander was not injured.
Senior U.S. Soldier Killed By Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan
The suicide bomber struck Wednesday as a group of U.S. military and civilian officials from the 4th brigade, 4th Infantry Division were in Sarkowi in Kunar Province, which is located in eastern Afghanistan. The suicide attacker detonated an explosive vest near the group.
Killed in the attack were Command Sgt. Maj. Kevin J. Griffin, 45, of Laramie, Wyo., the brigade's senior enlisted soldier. As a command sergeant major, Griffin was one of the brigade's senior leaders and provided leadership and guidance to the 4,000 man brigade.
Also killed in the blast were Army Maj. Thomas E. Kennedy, 35, of West Point, N.Y., and Air Force Major Walter D. Gray, 38, of Conyers, Ga. Gray was an air liaison officer and flight commander attached to the brigade.
The brigade is tasked with providing security in three provinces that border Pakistan. Based in Fort Carson, Colo., the brigade arrived in Afghanistan this past April.
U.S. Defense Dept./AP Photo
Command Sgt. Maj. Kevin J. Griffin is shown... View Full Size
Senior U.S. Soldier Killed in Afghanistan Watch Video
From Military Service to Civilian Life Watch Video
What Year Was It? Watch Video
In a statement released Thursday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Abdelfattah's work in eastern Afghanistan over the last year as "critical to our efforts to support Afghanistan's political, economic and security transitions and was an example of the highest standards of service." She said he was so committed to his mission that he had volunteered to serve a second year-long tour in Afghanistan.
The second incident was what is described as a "Green on Blue" attack where coalition forces are attacked by Afghan Security Forces. Friday's attack brings to 25 the number of such attacks that have taken place this year and have resulted in 31 deaths. The number of Green on Blue attacks this year has already surpassed the 21 that occurred last year.
A coalition spokesman says the three killed service members were killed at their outpost in Sarwan Qala in the Sangin District of Helmand Province. The American military members mentored and trained local security forces out of their outpost.
The exact details of the shooting incident remain unclear, but the spokesman says that shortly after 1am an Afghan male dressed in an Afghan National Security Force uniform the shooter opened fire on the American military members.
Contrary to reports by the Taliban that the gunman was able to escape and join their ranks, a coalition spokesman says the shooter was quickly detained and is in ISAF custody.
Afghan sources had said earlier that the shooting had occurred during a late meal at the end of the daily Ramadan fast. The coalition spokesman could not confirm those details.
In an earlier version of this story, ABC News incorrectly reported that the commander of the 4th Brigade was seriously wounded in the suicide bombing.The commander was not injured.
