IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND
IAEA INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ
4. F 76/1: IR 1/13
aa's Hucleir Weapons Capability a... ^ T -^^,
o^x^x HEAKING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JUNE 29, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
- / ?
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-W4 CC WASHINGTON : 1993
For sale h\ the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-041691-4
\ / IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND
J IAEA INSP ECTIONS IN IRAQ
4. F 76/1: IR 1/13
jq's Hucleir Weapons Capability a... ^-.^-r^
„^xx,x HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JUNE 29, 1993
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
'C J
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-404 CC WASHINGTON '. 1993
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents. Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-041691-4
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LEE H
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
(Vacancy)
Michael H. Van Dusen, Chief of Staff
RICHARD J. GARON, Minority Chief of Staff
Jo WEBER, Staff Associate
DEBORAH BURNS, Staff Associate
HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
(ID
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DAVID A. LEVY, New York
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
TOM LANTOS, California
KATHERINE A. WlLKENS, Staff Director
DEBORAH E. BODLANDER, Republican Professional Staff Member
MARTIN SLETZINGER, Professional Staff Member
Subcommittee on International Security, International Organization and
Human Rights
TOM LANTOS, California, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana DAN BURTON, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
ROBERT KING, Staff Director
MICHAEL ENNIS, Republican Professional Staff Member
KENNETH R. TlMMERMAN, Professional Staff Member
BETH L. POISSON, Professional Staff Member
Maryanne Murray, Professional Staff Member
(in)
CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Page
Hon. Robert L. Gallucci, Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, De-
partment of State 3
Jules Kroll, president, Kroll Associates 21
Gary Milhollin, professor, University of Wisconsin Law School and director,
The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control 25
Jay C. Davis, director, Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry and pro-
gram leader, Geoscience and Environmental Research, Physical Sciences
Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 29
Lawrence Scheinman, professor of government and associate director, Peace
Studies Program, Cornell University 33
Material Submitted for the Record
Response by the Department of State concerning Iraqi alleged illegal banking
practices 9
Response by the Department of State concerning suspected smuggling of
goods by German companies into Iraq 10
Response by the Department of State concerning Iraq's attempt to acquire
French-made spare parts 10
Response by the Department of State concerning the effectiveness of IAEA's
safeguarding of nuclear materials 21
APPENDLX
Prepared statements:
Hon. Robert L. Gallucci 47
Jules Kroll 50
Gary Milhollin . 55
Jay C. Davis 61
Lawrence Scheinman 68
Staff report entitled "Iraq Rebuilds Its Military Industries", prepared by
Kenneth R. Timmerman, staff of the Subcommittee on International Secu-
rity, International Organizations and Human Rights 77
Article from February 1, 1993 issue of The New Yorker, entitled "The Iraqi
Bomb", by Gary Milhollin 129
Article from the New York Times, April 26, 1993 entitled 'Iraq's Bomb—
An Update", by Diana Edensword and Gary Milhollin 138
Op-ed from the New York Times, April 24, 1992 entitled "Iraq's Bomb, Chip
by Chip" 139
Article from The New York Times Magazine, March 8, 1992 entitled "Building
Saddam Hussein's Bomb", by Gary Milhollin 140
Written statement for the record by the International Atomic Energy Agency . 146
Exchange of correspondence between Paul Leventhal, Nuclear Control Insti-
tute and IAEA Director Hans Blix 160
Article entitled "Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing
World Order" by Lawrence Scheinman, which appeared in Security Dia-
logue, volume 23, number 3, September 1992 178
Report of a July 1993 Staff Study Mission to the IAEA, Vienna, Austria 196
(V)
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND
IAEA INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ
TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 1993
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and
on International Security, International Organi-
zations and Human Rights,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
(chairman) presiding.
Chairman Hamilton. The Subcommittees on Europe and the
Middle East, on International Security, International Organiza-
tions and Human Rights and on Economic Policy, Trade and the
Environment meet today in open session to discuss the Iraqi nu-
clear program and the role of the United Nations and the Atomic
Energy Agency.
Today we will hear first from Assistant Secretary of State Robert
L. Gallucci.
Second, we will hear from a panel of private witnesses, including
Jules Kroll, President of Kroll Associates; Gary Milhollin, Director
of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control; Jay Davis, the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and Lawrence
Scheinman, Professor of Government, International Law and Poli-
tics, Cornell University.
We have several topics of interest to the subcommittees, includ-
ing: The post-Gulf War experience of IAEA in inspection, disposal,
and monitoring of Iraq's nuclear weapons program; assessments of
the current status of Iraq's nuclear weapons activities; and the as-
sessment of our witnesses of the lessons learned by the inter-
national community of the Iraqi experience and their recommenda-
tions of how to prevent a similar incident from recurring in the fu-
ture.
We welcome our witnesses before the subcommittees and are
pleased to have them with us today. We have a lot of ground to
cover. I want to advise the witnesses that we anticipate, once the
House goes into session, a series of notes. We don't know how
many at this point. But we may have to make some adjustments
in the schedule as we move along.
Mr. Gallucci, we are very pleased to have you. Your statement,
of course, will be entered into the record in full. And before you
proceed, I will ask my colleagues first if they have any comments
to make.
(1)
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Lantos.
A CRITICAL JUNCTURE FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE GULF
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to commend
you for holding this hearing. This hearing comes at a critical junc-
tion for U.S. policy in the Gulf, and for the new collective security
system that is emerging from the end of the cold war.
Through his despicable attempt to murder former President
Bush, Saddam Hussein has shown once again, if anyone needed re-
minding, that he is not fit to play a role on the world's stage. And
yet, in recent months Saddam has attempted, with some success,
to divide public opinion and drive a wedge between the United
States and its allies. In the Muslim world, we hear many voices ris-
ing, even from Egypt, that the United States is "over-reacting" or
being "too harsh" toward Saddam, while ignoring the fate of the
Bosnian Muslims who are being massacred daily by Serbian thugs.
In Western Europe, U.S. allies such as France have become in-
creasingly reticent at the U.N. to support U.S. military action
against Saddam, lured once again by the scent of financial profits.
Following Operation Desert Storm, which I strongly supported,
Iraq has become subjected to the most rigorous international sanc-
tions ever imposed on any nation since World War II. Its weapons
plants have been subject to repeated inspections by United Nations
teams. Its assets abroad have been frozen. And yet, Iraq continues
to flaunt its military power, massacring its own citizens in the
North, and Iraqi Shiites in the South.
The question arises: What will happen if Saddam Hussein suc-
ceeds in driving a wedge between the United States and its allies
and the U.N. sanctions are lifted?
SUMMARY OF SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT
I called for a staff study, which has been distributed; and I will
summarize just a few of the staff report's findings. 1
Despite ongoing inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the U.N. Special Commission, Iraq has managed to re-
construct 80 percent of the military manufacturing capability it
possessed before Desert Storm. Neither the U.N., nor the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, has been able to do anything
about this.
Despite the U.N. embargo, Iraq has succeeded in reinvigorating
its clandestine procurement network, relying on known front com-
panies in Jordan, France, and Germany to purchase critical items
and spare parts for its weapons industries.
Despite the U.N. trade embargo, Iraq continues to ship oil to Jor-
dan, and to Iran, using this money to feed its procurement network
and to rebuild its weapons plants.
Today, Iraq is manufacturing T-72 tanks, artillery munitions,
and even short-range ballistic missiles, and is operating more than
40 major weapons plants.
x The full text of the report appears in the appendix on p. 77.
Iraq has repaired and returned to service most of the 2,500 main
battle tanks and 250 fixed-wing aircraft that survived Desert
Storm.
Of the more than 850 machine-tools that have now been identi-
fied and catalogued at Iraqi nuclear weapons plants by the IAEA,
only a handful have actually been destroyed or subjected to future
monitoring. Furthermore, the 850 machine-tools and dozen or so
large computers constitute but a small fraction of the more than
$ 14 billion worth of high-tech manufacturing gear imported by Iraq
during the late 1980's. This leaves an immense production capabil-
ity intact, which is already being used to manufacture conventional
weapons and which could be applied in short order to a resumption
of the nuclear weapons program once U.N. sanctions are lifted.
The Chairman of the U.N. Special Commission, Ambassador
Ekeus, is fully aware of Saddam's intentions. As he recently
summed it up before the Washington Institute, Iraq's weapons pro-
grams are likely to "grow up like mushrooms after the rain" once
the United Nations sanctions are lifted.
I think it is critical, Mr. Chairman, that we paint a coherent pic-
ture of Iraq's attempt to rebuild its complex military capabilities,
its support for terrorism in this country and elsewhere, and that
we recognize that Saddam's Iraq continues to represent a major
threat to the peace of this world.
Chairman Hamilton. I thank the gentleman.
Any other opening statements from my colleagues?
If not, Mr. Gallucci, you may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. GALLUCCI, ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Gallucci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, I am pleased to have
the opportunity to discuss our assessment of the nuclear situation
in Iraq and the U.N.'s capabilities to deter or detect any efforts by
Iraq to regenerate its nuclear weapons program.
In these remarks, I would like to briefly describe the work of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq, some lessons learned,
and the continuing need to give our fullest support to the IAEA as
part of our overall nonproliferation efforts.
Under the auspices of the U.N. .Security Counsel Resolution 687
and with the assistance of the U.N. Special Commission,
UNSCOM, the IAEA his conducted 20 nuclear inspections of Iraq
since the end of the Gulf War in April 1991.
These inspections have forced Iraq to disclose, destroy, or render
harmless all of the major nuclear weapons facilities and equipment
that we are aware of, including several enrichment sites, research
facilities, and weapons design facilities. Along with the damage in-
flicted by the war and subsequent military actions, we believe
these inspections have effectively put the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program out of business, at least for the near term.
A LONG-TERM NUCLEAR THREAT
Over the long-term, however, Iraq still presents a nuclear threat.
We believe that Saddam Hussein is committed to rebuilding a nu-
clear weapon capability using indigenous and imported resources.
Iraq retains the most critical resource for any nuclear weapons
program, namely skilled personnel and expertise.
Iraq also retains a basic industrial capability to support a nu-
clear weapons program, including a large amount of dual-use
equipment and facilities.
If sanctions are lifted, Iraq would have access to additional finan-
cial resources to refuel overseas procurement activities.
Finally, Iraq has still refused to provide the U.N. with details of
its clandestine procurement network, a network which could, there-
fore, be reactivated in the future.
To deter or detect regeneration, we need to assure that the IAEA
and the Special Commission receive the political, technical, and fi-
nancial support to implement their plans for long-term monitoring
in Iraq. These plans are contained in Security Council Resolution
715, a Resolution that Iraq has so far refused to accept.
The Security Council will need to enforce the rights of the IAEA
and Special Commission under Security Council Resolution 687
and 715, especially, the right to conduct challenge inspections with-
out obstruction from the Iraqi authorities.
We must also provide technical support and information to the
IAEA and Special Commission, including assistance in the use of
technical monitoring devices such as water sampling, to detect cov-
ert nuclear activities.
To address the risk of overseas procurement, we must continue
to press Iraq to reveal its foreign suppliers and work with other
suppliers to assure effective monitoring of exports to prevent diver-
sion.
Iraq, no doubt, will continue to test the U.N.'s resolve to continue
inspections, especially if it perceives that support for them is wan-
ing. As in the past, Iraq will use tactics such as delays or refusing
access to sites, denying information, harassing inspectors, and re-
fusing to accept Security Council Resolution 715 to reduce the ef-
fectiveness of the inspections.
THE CAMERA DISPUTE
Recently, Iraq's efforts to undermine long-term monitoring has
focused on two issues. Iraq has refused to allow the Special Com-
mission to install cameras at two rocket motor test stands and has
refused to destroy certain chemical weapons precursors and related
chemical weapon equipment.
On June 18, the Security Council adopted a Presidential State-
ment that Iraq's refusal to cooperate with the Special Commission
in these matters constitutes a "material and unacceptable breach,"
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 and a violation of Resolu-
tions 707 and 715. The Statement warned of, and I quote, "serious
consequences."
On June 22, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali met with
Tariq Aziz to discuss the Presidential Statement. Aziz said the
issue could be discussed in a technical meeting with the Special
Commission on July 12.
On June 24, Special Commission Chairman Rolf Ekeus told the
Iraqi Foreign Minister that the meeting cannot take place until
Iraq complies with the Council's demands. We strongly support
Chairman Ekeus in this decision.
LESSONS FOR THE IAEA
I would like to relate the lessons of Iraq to the strengthening of
the overall IAEA safeguards system, a system that plays a critical
role in the international effort to prevent nuclear weapons pro-
liferation.
Fundamentally, the revelations about Iraq demonstrated the
need for the international community to strengthen the Agency's
ability and authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities outside
declared safeguarded facilities.
In response, the IAEA's Board of Governors has taken a number
of important steps to improve safeguards, reflecting the view that
the IAEA should give a higher priority to detecting covert nuclear
activities.
The Board has reaffirmed the Agency's right to perform special
inspections whenever necessary to permit it to fulfill its safeguard
obligations including access to undeclared sites.
The Board has determined that the Agency may rely on informa-
tion supplied by member states when seeking a special inspection.
The Board has strengthened obligations to provide notice and
early submission of design information on new nuclear facilities or
changes to existing facilities.
And the Board has established a voluntary system for reporting
on nuclear exports and imports.
Mr. Chairman, in our view, these changes have substantially
strengthened the IAEA safeguards system, which is essential to en-
suring that fullscope safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty are fully implemented. We have already seen evidence of this
new determination in North Korea, South Africa, and Iran.
We believe that the IAEA's experience in Iraq has resulted in a
substantial improvement in the IAEA safeguard system. And with
the support of member states, it will continue to be an important
part of the international nonproliferation regime.
Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to try to answer any questions
that the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr/ Gallucci appears in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman Hamilton. OK Thank you very much, Mr. Gallucci,
for your statement.
Now, the IAEA believes that it has discovered all of Iraq's nu-
clear program. And it believes that it has substantially reduced or
eliminated Iraq's nuclear program. Do you agree with that assess-
ment?
Mr. Gallucci. I wouldn't, Mr. Chairman, put it exactly that way.
I would say that the IAEA, the Special Commission, and we in
the U.S. Government, believe that the elements of the nuclear pro-
gram — that we are aware of— have been essentially destroyed.
Chairman Hamilton. How confident are you that you are aware
of everything they are doing?
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a fairly high de-
gree of confidence. But it would be unreasonable, I think, to take
the position that we know what we don't know.
INTELLIGENCE FAILURE BEFORE DESERT STORM
Before the end of the Gulf War, our intelligence community and
the intelligence communities of others in the West, had focused on
Iraq's nuclear program. And it is clear, in retrospect, that they got
it wrong and that there were large elements of the Iraqi nuclear
program unknown to the intelligence communities.
Chairman Hamilton. And that it was much farther advanced
than U.S. intelligence believed? And it was much farther advanced
that the IAEA believed?
Mr. Gallucci. I think those two statements are certainly true,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hamilton. Now, what has to happen in Iraq before
you have a high degree of assurance that you know everything
there is to know about their nuclear program?
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, I think we have a high degree of
assurance now. I am just reluctant and unwilling to say that we
are absolutely certain.
The Special Commission and the IAEA can go and have gone ev-
erywhere we have reason to believe there is something related to
Resolution 687 to find. And we have had that kind of assessment,
that is, the Special Commission and the IAEA has.
Chairman Hamilton. IAEA was able to go anywhere they want-
ed to go in Iraq and see anything they wanted to see in Iraq?
Mr. Gallucci. Yes, sir.
Chairman Hamilton. Now, there have been some criticisms, of
course, of the IAEA — which some of our witnesses later today will
make — that it does not share information it collects from its inspec-
tions and fails to use that information to collect further information
from other sources; that some of its managers and inspectors have
been timid in pursuing their mission in Iraq and have played the
game largely according to the rules that the Iraqis have set; that
they are too eager to claim that they have found everything that
there is to find; that they haven't followed up on leads that have
been gained from inspections' that a lot of their people don't have
proper experience with nuclear weapon materials.
What do you say to all of those criticisms? I am sure you have
heard them.
CRITICISMS OF THE IAEA
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the professional-
ism of the Agency, I think the Agency has a very high degree of
professionalism, and they have the right kind of people working as
inspectors doing a very good job.
I want to pick up on a couple of the points you made that have
been raised in criticism of the Agency. The point that there may
not be nuclear weapon expertise in the Agency is sort of an unfair
one, even though to the extent that it is accurate.
We wouldn't necessarily want the Agency to be an expert in nu-
clear weapons design and development. But the Agency can have
attached to it, for an inspection, as it has in the case of Iraq, those
experts that it needs to do an inspection job when nuclear weapons
expertise is required.
With respect to what we have learned from Iraq and what the
Agency has learned, what I tried to focus on in my prepared re-
marks is that the world learned that the IAEA's mandate, up until
the time of Iraq, was to inspect facilities that were declared to it
by the state in which they were conducting the inspections.
So the IAEA focused its efforts at the declared facilities at the
Tuwaitha site in Iraq. When it was discovered after the war that
there were a great many other facilities, the movement within the
Agency and the international community that had already begun
to have the Agency conduct special inspections of undeclared sites
and facilities, that movement produced a change in Agency oper-
ations which we have seen take good effect in the case of North
Korea within the last 6 months.
So I would say that while the Agency has always been a profes-
sional agency, its ability to do more than inspect the sites that
were declared to it was limited until fairly recently.
A lesson was learned, I think, by the international community;
and with the support of the member states, the Agency has
changed its approach and now can and does inspect undeclared fa-
cilities that are identified to it by member states that make that
information available.
MONITORING WILL DETECT FUTURE NUCLEAR ACTIVITY
Chairman Hamilton. Your statement says that "in the near
term." You might define near-term for me. What does that mean,
first of all?
Mr. Gallucci. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. The context of the sen-
tence refers to my statement?
Chairman Hamilton. They effectively put the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program out of business, at least for the near-term?
Mr. Gallucci. As long as long-term monitoring continues.
While it is to continue indefinitely under 687, any failure of the
Security Council to sustain that position, we believe, would result
ultimately in the regeneration of the nuclear weapons program in
Iraq.
Chairman Hamilton. And you. still believe that they present a
nuclear threat and that Saddam wants to rebuild his nuclear weap-
ons capability?
So you have, on the one hand, a leader who wants to rebuild his
nuclear ability and his ability to conceal the program. And, on the
other side, you indicate that if the IAEA is able to proceed under
U.N. Resolutions and to monitor, that we think that the IAEA can
determine if they launch upon a nuclear program.
Is that right?
Mr. Gallucci. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think that is correct.
Chairman Hamilton. And now you say the Security Council will
need to enforce the rights of the IAEA and UNSCOM.
How are we doing so far?
8
Mr. Gallucci. I think we are doing reasonably well, Mr. Chair-
man, but not perfectly. Certainly, with respect to inspections, the
IAEA and Special Commission teams have gone where they think
they need to go, and under the circumstances that they thought
they needed to conduct the inspections under.
At the same time, however, I noted in my remarks that the
Iraqis have, so far, not formally accepted Resolution 715. They
have not accepted it at all. They did accept 687. 115 is, in fact, the
Resolution that describes the program for long-term monitoring in
Iraq. And it is, over the long-term, essential that that resolution be
accepted by the Iraqis.
RELUCTANCE TO PUBLISH IRAQ'S SUPPLIER LIST
Chairman Hamilton. Before I turn to some of my colleagues, let
me just ask about one aspect of this now.
A very important part of keeping their nuclear capability elimi-
nated would be to stop foreign suppliers from sending stuff into
Iraq.
Do we know who these foreign suppliers are?
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, during the years before the war,
there were a great many foreign suppliers to the Iraqi programs,
weapons of mass destruction, not only nuclear but chemical, bio-
logical, and ballistic missile programs.
Chairman Hamilton. Do we know who they were?
Mr. Gallucci. We have substantial knowledge of what compa-
nies and what countries and what those countries provided.
Chairman Hamilton. Why don't we publicize it?
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Chairman, some of that information is avail-
able to us by virtue — or is available to the Special Commission and
the IAEA by virtue of their inspections.
Both the IAEA and the Special Commission have taken the posi-
tion that information that they have about these suppliers, if pub-
lished, would diminish the cooperation of the governments in the
continuing efforts of the Special Commission and the IAEA to do
their job.
Chairman Hamilton. Do we know the name?
Does the U.S. Government know the names?
Mr. Gallucci. We know the names, certainly, of some companies
based upon intelligence.
Chairman Hamilton. Why don't we publicize it?
Mr. Gallucci. I am sure there are a variety of reasons, but the
one that immediately occurs to me is sources and methods, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Hamilton. You mean to publicize the names of the
companies would reveal sources and methods?
Mr. Gallucci. In some cases, Mr. Chairman, I think it would.
In other cases, I don't know that there would be any good to
come from it; and there might be some diplomatic disadvantage.
Chairman Hamilton. One good thing that might come is that
they stop supplying the stuff.
Mr. Gallucci. Well, currently, Mr. Chairman, they are not. And
when we have information that a company in another country is
cooperating in anyone's production of weapons of mass destruction,
we work with that country
Chairman Hamilton. You are confident that suppliers are not
supplying materials that could be helpful in the nuclear program?
Mr. Gallucci. With respect to Iraq, yes, sir I am confident of
that.
Chairman Hamilton. No materials are going into Iraq today
that could be used by their nuclear program?
Mr. Gallucci. As always, I am going to say to the best of my
knowledge. But I think our knowledge is very good.
Chairman Hamilton. Mrs. Meyers.
Mrs. Meyers. Mr. Chairman, I have in front of me a document,
that I presume is a public document that I believe was prepared
by Mr. Lantos' subcommittee. And I would like to read a paragraph
from that document and get you to respond to that if you would
and maybe ask some other questions.
Wall Street investigator Jules Kroll, who has been tracking
Iraq's procurement efforts in Jordan, alleges that the Iraqi Govern-
ment transferred $5.2 billion in government funds to the Arab
Bank in Amman, just as Operation Desert Storm was ending, to es-
tablish a new military infrastructure for Iraq. In addition to this,
he alleges that the Central Bank of Jordan is laundering secret
Iraqi funds in Switzerland through commercial banks such as the
Jordan Housing Bank, the Jordan Gulf Bank, and the Arab Finan-
cial Corporation. He talks about how German companies are break-
ing sanctions and that they are helping Iraq to develop upgraded
Scud missiles.
And then he says that: Unconfirmed reports from Kuwaiti
sources warned that commercial contacts have intensified in recent
months between major French defense exporters and Iraqi agents
in Europe in view of renewing the supply of spare parts for Iraq's
fleet of Mirage F-l fighter bombers.
Now, can you comment on all of that?
That doesn't sound to me like we are seeing any build-down of
defense efforts. And it certainly sounds like we are seeing a build-
up of nuclear capability.
JORDAN BANKING FRONTS
Mr. Gallucci. Mrs. Meyers, first let me try to speak to each one
of these and then to the general point. I am afraid I am unaware
of the banking activity in Jordan just prior to the war. And I just
cannot speak to that. I have no information about that. But I would
take that question for the record if you would like.
[State Department response follows:]
We have no evidence that any transfer of funds was effected by the Iraqi Govern-
ment through the Arab Bank in Amman in the period just after Desert Storm, nor
any evidence of post-war involvement by the Central Bank of Jordan in laundering
secret Iraqi funds through Switzerland.
Because much of Iraq s legitimate trade involves Jordan, it is not uncommon for
Jordanian banking institutions to show evidence of activity with Iraq. It is not im-
possible that Iraq therefore may be able to use Jordanian banks for other activities
as well. When we have discussed financial issues with the Government of Jordan,
they have assured us of their compliance with sanctions prohibiting unauthorized
release of funds to Iraq.
With respect to a German company breaking sanctions by provid-
ing equipment that would upgrade Iraqi Scud capability, I have no
10
information about that. I would personally view that as extremely
unlikely
Mrs. Meyers. Have you seen this report?
Mr. Gallucci. I don't know what you are holding, Mrs. Meyers.
Mrs. Meyers. Mr. Lantos, have you distributed this report?
Mr. Lantos. It is a staff report which is available. And if Mr.
Gallucci doesn't have it, we will be happy to provide it.
Mr. Gallucci. Is that just available todav?
Mr. Lantos. You have now been supplied a copy.
Mr. GALLUCCI. I can assure you, I will read it very carefully.
SMUGGLING FROM GERMANY AND FRANCE
The German company — again, let me say I was unaware of that.
I find it unlikely, but we will certainly look into that.
[State Department response follows:]
The German Government has acknowledged that German companies account for
a sizable number of items discovered in Iraq's WMD programs. But the German
Government has also continued its exemplary cooperation with UNSCOM, the
IAEA, and other governments in identifying and punishing offenders. UNSCOM and
the IAEA have learned a great deal from information made available by German
investigators, and have acted on this information to discover and destroy items in
Iraq.
Some of the shipments of German materials mentioned in the report to Iraq oc-
curred prior to the Gulf War. We are aware of these cases, and have supported
UNSCOM's and the IAEA's efforts to track down the equipment. For the cases of
sanctions-busting after the war, we have heard similar reports. We routinely contact
the source country government when we are made aware of supportable evidence
of sanctions-busting. We do not currently have any more significant detail on any
of the suspected smuggling cases mentioned in the report.
I would say the same about the French contacts. If they would
involve a French company breaking sanctions that now exists, U.N.
sanctions under Resolution 687, I would find that unlikely as well
but not impossible. So I will look into that as well.
[State Department response follows:]
We are aware that Iraq would like spare parts for its French-made Mirage F-l
aircraft, and that Iraq has made attempts at getting parts into Iraq through the
sanctions. We have no confirmed deliveries of such parts, however, We will continue
to watch.
Let me say something more general though, because I fear there
may be a misunderstanding about what was accomplished with
687. It did a number of things; but in the areas that we are ad-
dressing, as I understand it, this morning, we are focusing on the
nuclear capability of Iraq and Resolution 687 in referring to weap-
ons of mass destruction including nuclear capability and provides
for, essentially, the destruction of such capability in Iraq in a cer-
tain, detailed way.
It does not, however, prevent or provide that Iraq cannot have
a conventional weapon capability.
Mrs. Meyers. What do you call the Scud delivery system?
Mr. Gallucci. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 does not
deny them a conventional weapon capability. With respect to the
Scud capability, anything over 150 kilometers in range is pre-
cluded. And certainly a Scud capability is precluded.
To the best of our knowledge, the Scuds that we have been able
to identify and locate have all been destroyed. We cannot exclude
11
the fact that there may still be Scud or Scud variants hidden some-
where in Iraq. And we, supporting the Special Commission, will
continue to look for them.
Yes, you are absolutely correct that capability should be de-
stroyed. And if there were any cooperation with it, we should do
what we could to cut it off, since it would be inconsistent with the
Security Council Resolution.
Mrs. Meyers. Do you think that we can safely assume that as
long as Saddam Hussein and his party are in power that that gov-
ernment will do everything possible to acquire nuclear weapons?
Mr. Gallucci. I think that is a very safe assumption.
Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. What are we doing to try to preclude Iraq from
getting fissionable material?
Mr. GALLUCCI. The most important thing, I think, is that we sup-
port the Special Commission and the IAEA in inspecting, contin-
ually, everywhere that we have any reason to suspect there may
be anything having to do with either enrichment or reprocessing.
And at the same time, we focus as much of our energies as we
can of assuring ourselves that nobody is exporting anything to Iraq
that would provide a fissile material production capability or di-
rectly provide fissile material.
Mr. Gejdenson. One of the things that makes us nervous is that
when the Soviet Union was together, it had probably a better pro-
gram than the West for preventing that kind of material from leav-
ing its control. The West always had some breaches, but we seemed
to be doing all right.
Now it seems to me we have a significant worry involving the
former Soviet Union and its entities. And if you look at our record
with Iraq, there were a number of signals along the way.
What I wonder is, following the chairman's question on the list
of companies that sold to Iraq, are we a little compromised in this
situation?
MDCED SIGNALS ON NONPROLIFERATION
We should have gotten a signal that there was a reason to worry
about Iraq. The Israelis bombed the Osirak reactor, at least they
thought there was a nuclear threat there.
In 1982, when many people were concerned about Saddam's be-
havior and there was good indication that he was arming terror-
ists, we took him off the terrorists list.
In 1989, President Bush signed NSD 26 that basically was a
message to help Saddam Hussein. Now what I am left with is two
things. One, maybe we are doing as good a job as we can under
the present multilateral agreements to prevent Iraq from getting
new weapons capabilities.
But it seems to me that, one, it is clear that you need a multilat-
eral response in all these areas: chemical, biological, and nuclear.
It is also clear that our multilateral responses are wholly inad-
equate and that we have done things that have undermined the
isolation of governments like Saddam Hussein's over the last dec-
ade.
Clearly other countries now are providing missile technology to
Iran, if not to Iraq as well. At one point we found a White House
12
document where, in a debate over what they were selling to Sad-
dam Hussein, somebody used the fact that Iraq was a signatory to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a reason for the treatment
of Iraq.
How do we become more vigilant internationally when our own
resolve is in question, as it was from 1982 to the invasion of Iraq?
We seem to have other political and economic motives. We
thought we could use Saddam Hussein. Other countries seem to
think it is OK to sell missile technology to the Iranians.
You have worked with international organizations and you have
worked at the State Department. We have got to be a little purer
in this game and stop using our politicians as a frontline.
How do we communicate to our allies, who do not have a serious-
ness about controlling nuclear proliferation, the importance of lim-
iting weapons availability?
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Gejdenson, I think the answer to the ques-
tion — I take the question: How can we do better?
NONPROLIFERATION HAS BECOME A POLICY PRIORITY
I think that, in the first instance, we have to identify the prob-
lem of nuclear weapons proliferation, as well as the other problems
of proliferation — chemical, biological, and ballistic missile — as a
primary national concern and an objective to do something about
it. And I think this administration has done that.
Then we have to act consistent with that. And that means a
number of things. I think it means supporting international insti-
tutions that are designed to be elements in overall nonproliferation
strategies. The International Atomic Energy Agency is one such
agency. No agency and no institution is perfect. The IAEA has
come a long way. And the thrust of much of my remarks this morn-
ing is that it has come a long way recently and as a result of what
happened in Iraq.
And I would — as you listen to the rest of the testimony this
morning, I would be concerned that one draw conclusions from
parts of that testimony that may be critical of agency activity that
would lead to a loss of support. Because as a representative of the
administration on this issue, I think supporting the IAEA is one of
the critical things that needs to happen.
Mr. Gejdenson. Reports claim we now have the North Koreans
making some adjustments, but I fear that they are just getting bet-
ter at hiding things. I don't have an answer on how we get multi-
lateral — I mean, can we feel confident that the Iraqis have no fis-
sionable materials today?
Mr. Gallucci. I am trying this morning not to make anybody
feel real good about Iraq or North Korea. It is just that we have
to engage these countries. I don't think that turning our back is the
answer.
Mr. Gejdenson. I agree. How do we get our allies, and ourselves
at times, to not see any short-term political gain — as we obviously
saw from 1982 to the invasion of Kuwait when, in the case of Iraq,
we wanted to play off the Iranians or others in the area — to be
more important than the transfer of technology that has incredible
consequences today? What do we do to get them to focus on it?
13
Mr. Gallucci. Without rehashing the previous 8 years or so of
history, I would say that very often a nonproliferation objective is
embedded in regional analysis as other objectives as well. And
sometimes the nonproliferation objective is best pursued within a
regional context. Sometimes it isn't.
RATIONALIZE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL LAWS
Mr. Gejdenson. You know, in the last 10 years we were stopping
the sale of bank credit cards to England while we were selling
things to Iraq that needed nuclear licenses. It seems to me that if
we are going to lead, we have to rationalize our export control laws
to focus on the things that matter and get our friends to do the
same.
Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Manzullo.
IRAQ'S BW PROGRAMS
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you.
Mr. Gallucci, I would like to return to a question posed by Mr.
Hamilton. To your knowledge, have there been any sales to Iraq in
violation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention?
Mr. Gallucci. Not to my knowledge, that I can think of. No, sir.
Mr. Manzullo. The companies to which you referred were en-
faged in some type of commerce of biological weapons which you
id not want to reveal
Mr. Gallucci. I see. My reference earlier to information that I
am sure the U.S. Government has on cooperation that companies
engaged in with Iraq prior to the war, companies in other coun-
tries, clearly are over a number of the areas of weapons of mass
destruction.
I myself don't know whether there was any cooperation in the
area of biological weapons. I know in general terms what the Spe-
cial Commission found. And I know what the Iraqis declared on the
eve of the first biological weapons inspection.
But I don't believe that got to the point of your question, which
is, what was supplied by external suppliers? And off the top of my
head, sir, I don't have any information about that.
Mr. Manzullo. Do you believe that Iraq, at present, possesses
biological weapons?
Mr. GALLUCCI. I would say that it is highly unlikely, but I can't
exclude the possibility. The Iraqis declared themselves to have had
an offensive biological weapons program, which they told the Spe-
cial Commission they had abandoned. I believe they said they
abandoned it in the fall of 1990. They provided some examples or
specimens of biological agents they had produced to the commis-
sion. But they said that the program was no longer existent.
There were a fairly large number of inspections that were aimed
exclusively or partly at least at uncovering biological weapons ca-
pability in Iraq, as I am sure you know, since the capability to
produce biological weapons is fundamentally a dual-use capability.
Many of the same pieces of equipment that one uses in a pharma-
ceutical or some other area of legitimate industrial activity are also
useful for a biological weapons program.
And that is why I am reluctant to say that such a program
doesn't exist.
14
CW STOCKPILES
Mr. Manzullo. What about chemical weapons?
Mr. Gallucci. The situation there is quite different. There were
literally thousands of fabricated chemical weapons munitions of all
kinds, from missile warheads to rockets to artillery shells, and ad-
ditional thousands of tons of chemical agent, both mustard and
nerve agents, and tens of thousands of tons of precursor chemicals
in Iraq.
And at the present time, and for some time, the Special Commis-
sion has been, with the assistance of the Iraqis, drilling and drain-
ing munitions and neutralizing chemical weapons and chemical
agents. And that is going to continue for some time. The capability
to produce chemical weapons was located at a few sites. Most of
that has been destroyed, all that was exclusively designed and pre-
pared for chemical weapons production.
There are still additional things that need to be destroyed that
the Special Commission is working on with the Iraqis. I could not
offer assurances to you — nor, I think could anybody else — that
there are not stockpiles of at least mustard agent weapons some-
where in Iraq buried or hidden. It is impossible to give any assur-
ance to that.
The inspection regime, however, permits, as I have indicated be-
fore, the Special Commission to go anywhere it deems necessary to
do an inspection. And whenever the Special Commission has re-
ceived information that there is something to look at, whether it
be chemical weapons themselves, agents, precursors, or equipment,
they have gone there.
And there has been in the chemical areas, as in other areas, a
process of peeling the skin on the onion and disclosing what there
is in Iraq. But I cannot preclude that there is not more that the
Special Commission and we do not know about.
Mr. Manzullo. Do you feel that the chemical weapons that Iraq
currently possesses were manufactured by that country or shipped
externally from another country.
Mr. Gallucci. I am certain that at least a large quantity — and
I am sure that all of the chemical weapons were fabricated in Iraq.
They have the capability to do that, and they are well able to.
Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you.
Mr. Gallucci, you have been a very effective and able public serv-
ant for many years, and the character and tone of my questions is
not directed at you but at the palpable failure of our Government
to pull together a coherent policy with respect to Iraq. So let me
attempt to do that and ask you to comment on some questions.
I don't think that these items we read on the front pages — that
Iraq is harassing the inspectors from the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency, that they are threatened, that they are intimidated,
that their hotel rooms are bugged — and the attempt to assassinate
the former President of the United States — which has now been
fully confirmed to my satisfaction — can be understood separately.
The attempt by Iraq to rebuild its conventional and
nonconventional military capabilities is linked to its attempt to in-
timidate the United Nations. I certainly consider it at least a possi-
15
bility that the successful FBI preemption of the attack on U.N.
headquarters in New York was Iraqi-sponsored or financed. They
have a beef with the United Nations, with the United Nations Se-
curity Council, which maintains the sanctions regime. I think they
all hang together. And I think if we look at tiny little parts and
deal with tiny little parts, we are in danger of being like a child
who looks at a complex picture which is a puzzle and doesn't see
what is in that picture, which can be a very clear image of some-
thing.
THE BOMBING OF IRAQI INTELLIGENCE HQ
So let me first just say for the record what a brilliant move it
was by the President to bomb the facility that we did 48 hours ago.
It was described by some of the press as an empty building. It was
anything but an empty building. It was the symbol of torture for
the Iraqi people.
And I would like to just quote half a paragraph from an item ap-
pearing in today's Washington Post by Jim Hoagland referring to
that facility.
"But Baghdadis know that thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians
have been tortured to death in [this intelligence] compound. In
April 1980, in one of the most gruesome and significant assassina-
tions that occurred there, Saddam's secret police drove nails into
the skull of Bakr Sadr, an important Iraqi Shiite religious leader,
after raping his sister before his eyes. Other dissidents were
poisoned with thalium. The compound was the center of Saddam's
foreign espionage and terror operations."
So I think it is important to realize that our Government, within
the last 2 days, took action to strike at the symptom and substance
of the center of Iraqi terror and intelligence operations. This is the
framework in which this hearing is taking place.
Now, I found your testimony, your prepared testimony, and your
answers to Chairman Hamilton's questions, somewhat in conflict.
And I would like to ask you, if I may begin with this, to clarify this
conflict.
In your prepared testimony you say, "Iraq, no doubt, will con-
tinue to test the U.N.'s resolve to continue vigorous inspections, es-
pecially if it perceives that support for them is waning, as in the
past. Iraq will use tactics such as delaying or refusing access to
sites, denying information, harassing inspectors, and refusing to ac-
cept U.N. Security Council Resolution 715 to reduce the effective-
ness of the inspections." I am still quoting. "Recently Iraq's efforts
to undermine long-term monitoring have focused on two issues:
Iraq has refused to allow the Special Commission to install cam-
eras at two rocket motor test stands and has refused to destroy cer-
tain chemical weapons precursors and related equipment.
"On June 18, the Security Council adopted the Presidential
Statement that Iraq's refusal to cooperate with the Special Com-
mission in these matters constitutes," I quote, "a material and un-
acceptable breach" — a material and unacceptable breach — "of U.N.
Security Counsel Resolution 687 and a violation of Resolutions 707
and 715. The Statement warns of serious consequences."
16
A HISTORY OF LIES AND DECEPTION
Now, if this is your prepared testimony on behalf of the Depart-
ment of State, I find it incomprehensible that in response to ques-
tions by the chairman you say that we believe that declared facili-
ties are known to us, and of course, there may be undeclared facili-
ties. But how can we deal with undeclared facilities? I mean, the
whole history of Saddam's performance, both before and after the
invasion of Kuwait, was one of deception and lies and attempts to
evade the leaky system of Western controls.
We now know — and I am sure you do — that a large number of
firms in Germany, France, and other countries, functioned as pur-
chasing agents for Iraq, that a large number of Jordanian compa-
nies functioned in this capacity, that there were large transfers of
financial resources so that Iraq would be able to avoid the freeze
on its assets.
And we all understand that there has been an enormous rebuild-
ing of Iraq's military capability.
Now it was just days before the invasion of Kuwait that the
State Department gave such an optimistic picture that we can do
business with these people, and we can work with these people.
And I would hate to see this administration fall into the same trap.
We are dealing with Saddam Hussein, who, according to the state-
ments and actions of the President of the United States, 3 days
ago, attempted to assassinate the previous President of the United
States.
Is it really that difficult to pull together all the information with
all of the resources of the administration to demonstrate that Iraq
is hell bent — hell bent on developing or redeveloping or restoring
its nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional facilities?
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Lantos, may I respond?
Mr. Lantos. Please.
Mr. Gallucci. I suppose the written record will show, but I don't
believe I ever said — and if I did, let's change the written record.
I don't believe I said that we are inspecting and destroying facili-
ties only that Iraq has declared. I yield to no one in my belief that
Iraq lies and has repeatedly lied, gets caught at having lied, and
lies again, without any show of remorse. And I have personal expe-
rience with that chain of events.
Mr. Lantos. Could you tell us about that, your personal events.
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM HAS BEEN "KNOCKED FLAT"
Mr. Gallucci. I could, Mr. Lantos, and I will. But I need to —
if I could first make one other comment here. The point I wanted
to make earlier and in the testimony that you quoted, was that we
have — we the United States and other governments who have fo-
cused their energies on the Iraqi situation with respect to weapons
of mass destruction, particularly the nuclear program — have pro-
vided information to the IAEA and the Special Commission on
every place that we could identify; and that, therefore, the agent,
the IAEA and the Special Commission, could identify. They nave
gone to each place and any time they have found anything that de-
served to be destroyed under 687, it has been destroyed. We believe
that program has been knocked flat.
17
Two other additional points that I have made I need to make
again. We believe that program has been knocked flat. We cannot
be absolutely certain that there isn't something hidden we haven't
found. And nobody, I think, is going to want to make that assertion
to you.
And the second point is that, given the intent that we believe
that regime, Saddam Hussein, has to rebuild the nuclear program
and the other programs, given the resources that would fall to that
government if the embargo were lifted and if they could sell oil,
and given the fact that it is an industrial society and the experts,
the scientists, and the engineers are still there, we believe they
could, in the proper environment, rebuild. And, therefore, we be-
lieve the sanctions are vital and the long-term monitoring of the re-
gime is absolutely vital that the IAEA and the Special Commission
would implement.
Chairman Hamilton. Do you have another question?
Mr. Lantos. Yes, I do.
With what degree of assurance can you say that no other coun-
try, ranging from Jordan to individual companies in Western Eu-
rope, is Functioning today as a front organization for Iraq's military
procurement network?
Mr. Gallucci. At the current time, I am unaware of any organi-
zation acting in the way that you just described. I cannot exclude
the possibility. But I myself am unaware of companies breaking the
embargo and acting in that way.
Mr. Lantos. Are you aware that as we speak German customs
is investigating well over 100 German companies with respect to
this issue?
Mr. Gallucci. I am not.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Hastings.
IRAQ IS STILL PREVENTING INSPECTION FLIGHTS OVER BAGHDAD
Mr. Hastings. Thank you, Mr. Gallucci, for being patient. I will
be brief.
Iraq has demanded that IAEA and UNSCOM not fly over Bagh-
dad proper. And this is a demand, of course, which has been re-
jected but apparently not directly challenged.
The demand that Iraq makes conflicts with United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 707.
My question, Mr. Gallucci, is why has IAEA and UNSCOM not
tried to fly over Baghdad proper to challenge Iraq on that restric-
tion?
And, second, what is the United States doing to help the inspec-
tors gain unrestricted access and achieve their rights under the
United Nations cease-fire Resolution?
And should military action be contemplated in this case?
Mr. Gallucci. Mr. Hastings, the specific case you referred to of
the overflight of helicopters of Baghdad proper, which the Iraqis
have refused to permit the Special Commission to do, is one of a
number of cases in which we have had noncooperation from the
Iraqis. And they vary in importance. And when they get important
enough, then, in the past, actions have been taken by the inter-
national community.
18
In each individual case, an assessment in the first instance is
made by the Chairman of the Special Commission, Rolf Ekeus.
Then he takes it to the Security Council, and the Security Council,
of course, needs to consult to see whether that incident is of suffi-
cient moment to act. That is the sequence we have been proceeding
under for the last year and a half or so.
I know that the Special Commission regards the Iraqi refusal to
permit the helicopter flights as an infringement on their inspection
activities, and they very much want to conduct those flights. They
have been taking other steps to compensate. They are not as effi-
cient. They are not as good. But I don't think they have been fun-
damentally hampered on their ability to move about.
I think over the long-term it is like Resolution 715. Acceptance
by Iraq is something that the Special Commission will want to
have and will insist upon having.
As I say, in a general way, though, every time an issue like this
comes up, we in the United States need to consult with our allies
and see what action is appropriate. Right now we have a case be-
fore us where the Iraqis are refusing on two issues: one, the sta-
tionary cameras at the test stand, and two, some movement of
chemical precursors and equipment. This is a matter on which the
United States will consult the Security Council and others; and ap-
propriate action, I am sure, will be taken if this issue isn't other-
wise resolved.
But we must, in every case, ensure that the case before us is one
that will sustain whatever action is contemplated.
Mr. Hastings. Saddam is saying you can't fly over Baghdad. The
U.N. is saying that this is an inappropriate response to unre-
stricted access. If then we don't fly over Baghdad what we are say-
ing, in essence, is that all of your clandestine procurement opportu-
nities are being fostered; or at least, if they are happening in Bagh-
dad, we aren't immediately in a position to do anything about it.
I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I couldn't resist a followup.
Mr. Gallucci. Let me followup. It is not that the Special Com-
mission cannot move around with freedom in Baghdad. It does
that. It has any number of vehicles available to it, and it moves
all about Baghdad.
There is an advantage to being able to move about with heli-
copters and to do monitoring with helicopters. And that is some-
thing that we support the Special Commission in seeking to have.
They have compensated, as I said. And they do have movement
and access.
Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Fingerhut.
CONCERN OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Mr. Fingerhut. Thank you.
I know we are here to talk about Iraq; but in your written testi-
mony and also in a number of other questions, including Mr. Lan-
tos' and others, we expanded the scope of the discussion a little bit.
And since I think we have covered Iraq pretty thoroughly, what
disturbed me about the issue of the nuclear proliferation is that,
even in the case of Iraq, where we have extraordinary access as a
result of the Gulf War and where we have the United Nations
backing up, literally day-by-day, as we do battle with Saddam Hus-
19
sein over inspections and all of the technicalities of the important
work in which you are engaged, even there we still have some
question as to whether or not we have effectively stopped Saddam
Hussein from getting back into the nuclear weapons business.
How much behind the eight ball must we be in all of the neigh-
boring countries — Iran particularly concerns me, but other coun-
tries do as well — where we don't have the kind of constant atten-
tion and access and international backup that you have in Iraq?
And what would it take — I guess two questions.
First, how concerned are you that, as we sit here and critically,
but also in a way, sort of self-congratulatory way, applaud our
work in Iraq — how close are we to losing the game in neighboring
countries?
And what would it require of us if we were serious about making
these same efforts in other countries?
Mr. Gallucci. I think that the point is that we are engaged ac-
tively in addressing the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation
in neighboring countries and in countries in other regions. The
point is that it will require active engagement. You are absolutely
correct.
There are countries with regimes that are dedicated to the acqui-
sition of nuclear weapons, we believe. And we must be as dedicated
to preventing their acquisition. The means to doing that, I think,
in the first instance, is the acquisition of information about their
intentions and how they are proceeding.
And so, I think, in the first question — and I think it is embedded
in the question that you asked — is how good is our information and
are we putting enough resources in the effort to prevent prolifera-
tion? I think the answers are moving initially in that direction, and
our information in some cases is very good and in other cases not
so good, depending on how difficult the problem is.
In terms of the activity that we launch after we have informa-
tion, part of that is diplomatic activity to prevent exports. As hard
as it is to believe, most countries do not build nuclear weapons in-
digenously. They purchase the equipment and facilities they need
to produce the fissile material and to produce the triggering mecha-
nism.
That gives us an opportunity to prevent sensitive exports to
countries that wish to build nuclear weapons. And we are doing
that. So I think that is extremely important.
The final element is the international regimes. And I would put
at the top of the list the international safeguards regime.
THE U.S. SEEKS A NUCLEAR EMBARGO ON IRAN
Mr. Fingerhut. Should we be at five-alarm stage in any of the
neighboring countries or, indeed, in another region? Obviously, we
have talked about North Korea and Iran.
Mr. Gallucci. I don't know how many alarms are appropriate.
But very high on our list is our concern about Iran. It is not so
much of concern because of their present capability to produce nu-
clear weapons but rather their intentions. Given the enormous fi-
nancial resources available to them, and our concerns that are
based upon their interest in acquiring research reactors — heavy
water moderated or graphite moderated natural uranium reac-
20
tors — our position is that we would like no country to engage in nu-
clear cooperation of any kind with Iran in light of the political ori-
entations of its regime.
Chairman Hamilton. Mr. Fingerhut, I apologize for interrupting.
We have a series of votes on the floor. We will have to recess at
once. When we get to the floor, we will see how long it is going to
take us to vote. But I am told there will be one 15-minute vote
which is pending now, and then several shorter votes. I am not too
sure how many at the moment.
Mr. Gallucci, what is your schedule? Do you have to leave very
shortly?
Mr. Gallucci. Yes, I do, as a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hamilton. I think we will have to excuse you with ap-
preciation for your testimony this morning and thank you for it.
I don't think it is going to be possible to keep you here because
it is going to be at least a half-hour or more before we are able to
get back.
So we will recess now.
Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. Oberstar. May I pose a question for the record?
Chairman Hamilton. Certainly.
SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Mr. Oberstar. In subsequent testimony from the Nuclear Con-
trol Institute, a statement is raised that I would like you to re-
spond to, and that is that the IAEA continues to perpetuate the
myth that its safeguards on nuclear materials are effective and
goes on to state that the materials are fundamentally
unsafeguardable and the proof came at the time of the Gulf War
when Iraq secretly removed its nuclear stockpile to the Tuwaitha
facility.
In your statement you say, "We must continue to press Iraq to
reveal its foreign suppliers, and work with other suppliers to en-
sure effective monitoring of exports to prevent diversion." That
seems, to me, rather naive, to believe that Iraq will voluntarily re-
veal information.
So I would like your comment on the Nuclear Control Institute
statement. And I would like a comment on what specific things the
United States is doing, not just to be polite with Iraq but to press
our allies — this is no great secret, you know, who these suppliers
are and how to apply pressure to them.
And since we don t have time for you to respond, I will just leave
it at that.
Mr. Lantos [presiding]. You will submit the response in writing,
Mr. Gallucci? Or would you like to comment on it now?
Mr. Gallucci. I would like to briefly comment, and I will also
provide in it writing.
On the question of pressing the Iraqis to provide the names of
their suppliers, I think we should, and do, press the Iraqis to pro-
vide what they ought to provide. That doesn't mean that we expect
them to. And I don't believe that we are naive when it comes to
the State of Iraq and their leadership.
With respect to the safeguarding of material and what I assume
is meant in the quote by the Nuclear Control Institute, this raises
21
the difficulty of assuring that fissile material — that is to say ura-
nium or plutonium, subject to safeguards — can be assuredly pre-
vented from becoming a part of a nuclear weapons program. They
can be subject to safeguards, which means that material can be ac-
counted for. It doesn't mean that there is an assurance that it will
not be taken out of safeguards and used for weapons.
The basic misunderstanding is what one can expect from safe-
guards. Safeguards cannot prevent. Inspectors are not policemen.
They can provide assurances on where it is located. That is all we
ask of it, and that is all we could expect of it. It requires for states
to do otherwise.
[The response by the Department of State follows:]
The argument suggests that safeguards are fundamentally flawed because Iraq,
during the course of the war, removed the fuel from its research reactors and moved
that fuel to a secret location to secure the fuel against attack. However, Iraq
promptly informed the IAEA that the fuel was removed. They told the IAEA that
the new location would remain secret during the war to protect the fuel from attack.
Iraq's actions do not indicate that this nuclear material is unsafeguardable; they
indicate that IAEA safeguards were designed to provide assurances during times of
peace. The IAEA's record of verifying nuclear materials accounting demonstrates
that nuclear materials are safeguardable, and that the IAEA is up to the job we
give it.
Before the Gulf War the international community did not accept the premise that
the IAEA should search for covert nuclear activities. Iraq's secret enrichment pro-
grams, uncovered after the Gulf War, demonstrated that the IAEA must be
strengthened and given the tools to detect covert nuclear activities. The IAEA's
Board of Governors has acted and we are now giving the IAEA the necessary tools,
including wider access, more kinds of information, and environmental monitoring
capabilities.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Gallucci, on behalf of the committee, I want to
thank you very much for your testimony.
The subcommittees will be in recess for approximately 30 min-
utes.
[Whereupon a brief recess was taken.]
Mr. Lantos [presiding]. The hearing of the joint subcommittees
will resume.
We would like to ask the four witnesses of the second panel — Mr.
Jules Kroll, Gary Milhollin, Jay Davis, and Lawrence Scheinman —
to please take their seats.
I am delighted to have all of you. I want to apologize for the dis-
jointed character of the hearing, but we are still in a heavy voting
mode, so we will undoubtedly have some interruptions.
We will begin, with you Mr. Kroll.
Your prepared statement will be entered in its entirety in the
record. You may proceed in any way that you choose. I would ask
to you speak very close to the microphone.
STATEMENT OF JULES KROLL, PRESIDENT, KROLL
ASSOCIATES
Mr. Kroll. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your interest in this
subject and staying the course while many others have not. I think
my statement is rather self-explanatory; and in the interest of
time, I have a few statements to make and will let the written
record speak for itself.
Mr. Lantos. You will summarize the prepared statement?
22
Mr. Kroll. Yes. I think the key point that I would like to
present today, very simply, is that the network and the arrange-
ment that was set up in the years prior to the invasion of August
of 1990 still exists. Some of the players have changed, but the
strategy is essentially the same. Some of the air has gone out of
the balloon, but the balloon itself exists. And some of the same per-
sons that were active before still exist in the same roles as they
previously had.
That is my first point, very simply.
SMUGGLING ACROSS THE BORDERS
Secondly, that in an age where we depend so much on technology
and satellite photos and cameras, et cetera, to track what's going
on in the world, some very fundamental observations indicate to us
that things are going on. In particular, if one were to stand at the
border, or the borders, of Iraq — at the Jordanian/Iraqi border, at
the Syrian border, at the Iranian border — you would see on any
given day hundreds and hundreds of semitrailers and other forms
of large vehicles going into Iraq and leaving Iraq. And the degree
of inspection at the various points along those borders is extremely
modest.
The fact is that, without human inspections, without technical
use of equipment to monitor what is coming over those borders, no
one really knows what's in those trucks. Steel can easily be buried
underneath lettuce, and military equipment can easily be buried
underneath pharmaceuticals. And it is, very simply, a question of
needing a policeman on the beat in each of those locations.
So I have two essential points to make: One is the kind of pro-
curement network that existed previously still exists. Many of the
same businessmen who were operating in France, Germany, the
UK, Switzerland, Austria and other countries, are still there. Many
of those people are still individuals of immense wealth. The ques-
tion is still an open one as to whose wealth is that, really?
Clearly
Mr. Lantos. Are you suggesting that these individuals may well
be using Iraqi Government funds on behalf of the Iraqi Govern-
ment and are used merely as facades, as surrogates, as front orga-
nizations to pursue the procurement policy of Iraq?
Mr. Kroll. I think that is a distinct possibility.
One of the lessons we learned from the prior procurement net-
work, a part of which was exposed TDG, Matrix Churchill, et
cetera, in some of the other countries, is that seemingly commercial
enterprises were run as Iraqi front organizations.
And I don't believe that has changed very much. You still have
some individuals who were active today as they were then.
I think at this point, it might be more productive in terms of the
use of time and the time of the other witnesses if you had some
questions for me in your areas of interest. I would like to try to
respond.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kroll appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Lantos. Well, we do have a number of questions to ask of
you. But before I come into questions, I want to ask you to com-
ment on the general issue of the financial network.
23
THE ROLE OF JORDAN
In your prepared statement, and I quote, you are saying the fol-
lowing: "The financial network, until recently under the control of
Barzan Al-Tikriti, Saddam's half brother and formerly Iraq's per-
manent representative to the U.N. in Geneva, continues to transact
business out of Switzerland.
"The military procurement network, under the control of Hussein
Kamel, Saddam's son-in-law and former head of the Ministry of
Military Industrialization, has received more publicity as a result
of the Matrix Churchill investigations in the U.S. and abroad. Al-
though several of these individuals and companies have been ex-
posed, we believe that the network has been, or will be, reestab-
lished."
What do you think is the role of Jordan in all of this at the mo-
ment?
Mr. Kroll. Well, the role has changed somewhat. I think in the
spring of 1992, due to the pressures from the United States, the
level of activity going from Jordan to Iraq and back was somewhat
reduced.
However, one must realize that a substantial portion of the com-
mercial infrastructure of Baghdad moved lock, stock, and barrel to
Amman where trading activity, commercial activities, financial ar-
rangements, were more easily and more freely set up. I don't think
that that has changed very much.
I think today if you want to seek to do business with Iraq on any
series of subjects, you are more likely to be able to conduct that
transaction in Amman. So it is still a very important location. I
don't mean to necessarily imply that this is something backed and
sponsored by the Jordanian Government.
I found the King's comments in recent weeks to be very interest-
ing regarding Saddam Hussein. But Jordan is clearly at the center
of commercial transactions vis-a-vis Baghdad.
I think the second most important location is Geneva, and the
third is Vienna.
IRAQI ASSETS ABROAD
Mr. Lantos. Now, what is the extent — even if you can just give
us a ballpark figure — of preexisting Iraqi resources which were
moved out of the country so as to avoid the freeze on Iraqi assets?
Are we talking about billions?
Mr. Kroll. Yes.
Let me try to break those into three categories of assets. There
are the assets that are well known and documented that are cur-
rently frozen. Those are in the billions. Many of those assets sit in
banks today and are demarcated as the assets of the Iraqi Govern-
ment.
I think the second level of assets, also in the billions, are monies,
stock in companies, gold, that was moved out either shortly before
the invasion or shortly after the invasion. That would be the second
category.
And then you have the third
Mr. Lantos. And you say that the second category, which are ba-
sically Iraqi Government assets, are currently at the disposal of the
24
Iraqi Government, contrary to United Nations Security Council
Resolution, and used to obtain military and other supplies?
Mr. Kroll. Yes. My problem with giving precise estimates is
that we don't know. Without a chance to look at the books and
records of the financial institutions in question, which I think is
critical because you can have all the inspectors and all the cameras
and all the spy satellites you want, but quite often in a business
matter you are going to learn more from books and records than
anything else.
Mr. Lantos. But you believe these are in the billions?
Mr. Kroll. Yes, they were. I think it has been diminished some-
what. They are no longer paying quite as frequently in gold. That
has essentially stopped in the last 6 to 9 months. But it is in the
billions.
SLEEPING ASSETS
The third category of assets are assets that I would call sleeping
assets. These are assets that have appeared for years and belong
to individuals in companies that are really a mix of Saddam's per-
sonal assets, the assets of the Ba'athist regime and the Iraqi Gov-
ernment. And this category, as well, is very substantial, I would
say in the billions.
Estimating the precise amounts of these is difficult without ac-
cess to the books and records. I would urge the international com-
munity to spend more time trying to get at those books and
records. I think we would learn a great deal.
Mr. Lantos. I will ask this question of all witnesses, and since
you are our first one, you are getting this question first. There are
certain sanctions currently in effect on Iraq. In order to achieve the
goals of the international community, which aims basically at sta-
bilizing the region and of having a modicum of peace, do you be-
lieve that sanctions currently imposed on Iraq should be, one, lift-
ed; two, weakened; three, maintained; or, four, strengthened?
Mr. Kroll. Again, given where I come from and given my per-
spective on this, I would argue for strengthening those embargoes,
in part, because you need to analyze how effective the embargoes
have been to date. They have been partially effective.
I think the direct sale of oil has been pretty much stymied.
Mr. Lantos. Not entirely?
Mr. Kroll. No. There is significant movement that we know of,
but of a limited amount, moving over the borders by these trucks
with these enormous tanks underneath. We believe, but cannot yet
substantiate, that there are countries friendly to Iraq that are sup-
plying credit by selling their own oil and giving credit to vendors
who wish to sell things to Iraq without literally having to sell Iraqi
oil. We have a proof problem there.
But given the fact that Iraq has rebuilt so much of their infra-
structure, they have clearly not done it purely out of existing in-
ventories and parts and supplies. So they have gotten it from out-
side.
With the passage of time and with the international community
weakening by the day because of their desire for commercial gain,
logic tells me that what you'll have is increased desire for increased
trade.
25
The number of delegations going to Baghdad and going to
Amman seeking to sell things is not diminishing; it is increasing.
And that is where the pressure will continue to come from.
I think we need to strengthen the embargo if we want to achieve
the purpose of the U.N. resolutions.
Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Kroll.
We will need to briefly suspend the hearing because we have a
vote. We will resume in about 10 minutes.
The meeting is in recess.
[Whereupon a short recess was taken.]
Mr. Lantos. The joint hearing of the subcommittees on Europe
and the Middle East, on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment,
and on International Security, International Organizations and
Human Rights will now resume.
Our next witness is Mr. Milhollin.
Your prepared statement will be entered into the record in its en-
tirety. You may proceed in any way that you choose.
STATEMENT OF GARY MILHOLLIN, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY
OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL AND DIRECTOR, THE WISCON-
SIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Mr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to address these three dis-
tinguished subcommittees.
I would like to begin by giving a little background on this situa-
tion. I think it is useful to point out that in roughly 1 month we
will pass the third anniversary of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. If Iraq
had not invaded Kuwait, it is very likely that Saddam himself
would be passing a milestone about now: He would be assembling
his first atomic bomb.
Two U.N. inspectors, David Kay and Jay Davis, have estimated
that at the time of the invasion, Iraq was 18 to 30 months away
from producing its first critical mass of nuclear weapon material.
We have now passed the 30-month mark.
THE IAEA WAS ASLEEP AT THE SWITCH
One of the most frightening things about this possibility is that
the International Atomic Energy Agency did not and never would
have detected it. Before the invasion, the Agency rated Iraq's com-
pliance as exemplary. And in fact it was exemplary at the locations
where they inspected, but they did not inspect where Iraq was
making the bomb. The Agency only inspects locations that are de-
clared by the country being inspected, and so far no country has
made a bomb at a disclosed site.
Now, Iraq is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, as
such, it promises not to make the bomb and it promises to declare
all of its work with plutonium and enriched uranium to the IAEA.
Iraq secretly broke both of these promises at the time when the
Agency was rating its performance as exemplary or its compliance
as exemplary.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Milhollin, what you are saying is so imminently
sensible and reasonable that I wonder how long this charade will
continue on the part of much of the international community of
concluding that, since declared sites appear not to be production fa-
26
cilities for nuclear weapons, we can say with a high degree of as-
surance that nothing is happening.
And as you point out, all of the activity that is interestingly tak-
ing place, obviously, is at undeclared sites. And since undeclared
sites are difficult to find in some instances, the degree of assurance
that the international community has vis-a-vis Iraq, Iran, North
Korea, whatever, is really — by force is — very limited, isn't it?
Mr. MlLHOLLlN. Yes, it is. And it turns out, if you simply look
at the history of the development of bomb programs around the
world, you see that international safeguards have been pretty
much irrelevant to this activity, precisely because it has not oc-
curred at sites that were inspected.
We were lucky in Iraq. If Iraq had not invaded Kuwait, this
strategy would have worked. They could have joined the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty, enjoyed all the benefits and still have developed
the bomb.
Iran is following the same strategy and so is Libya and so is
North Korea. In a sense, though, it is unfair to criticize the Agency
for not doing a job that it was not set up to do. The Agency's pri-
mary function has been to promote the spread of nuclear tech-
nology. It runs training programs; it sends out experts of its own;
and, most of all, it agrees to inspect exports by more advanced nu-
clear countries to less advanced nuclear countries.
THE IAEA'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST
If a supplier, for example, wants to sell a reactor to a country
like India or Pakistan, the Agency provides a guarantee that the
reactor's plutonium will not be used to make nuclear weapons.
Without this guarantee, it would not be possible politically to make
the sale. The result has been that because the Agency stands ready
to cooperate in nuclear exports, nuclear technology has spread
more rapidly around the world. India and Pakistan both got reac-
tors under Agency safeguards. And since getting those reactors,
both countries have made the bomb.
The Agency has a built-in conflict of interest. If it catches some-
body making a bomb with an export, that means that the export
was too dangerous to have been sold in the first place and should
not have been promoted.
So there is an institutional incentive at the Agency always to
find that nothing is wrong.
In the United States, we had this same problem with the old
Atomic Energy Commission, it had the dual functions of promotion
and inspection until Congress wisely split those functions in 1974.
Now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates nuclear
power, and the Department of Energy promotes it. The regulation
of nuclear power in the United States gained great credibility from
this separation. It seems to me that we ought to do the same thing
internationally and separate the Agency's promotion function from
its inspection function. I think the Agency would gain great credi-
bility from this, and it would get over this problem of a conflict of
interest.
27
THE CHINESE REACTOR SALE TO IRAN
I'd like to mention the fact that the Chinese are now planning
to sell a reactor to Iran, as everyone knows. The reactor will be at
least 300 megawatts, enough to make enough plutonium for 10
bombs per year at a minimum.
The Agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, stands
ready to cooperate with this deal and make it politically possible
to achieve the export.
So, in Iran, we will be essentially relying on a piece of paper
signed by the Iranians saying that the plutonium from this reactor
will not be diverted. The United States opposed this deal because
it is a giant nuclear technology transfer to Iran, moving them a
long way down the road to nuclear weapons, regardless of what
promises are made.
The IAEA, however, stands ready to cooperate with it. The sub-
committee has asked specifically about Iraq. So far as we can tell,
from the Special Commission, which is in charge of the chemical
and missile inspections, there has been good progress in destroying
chemical agents, munitions, and precursors. The commission ex-
pects to have destroyed all of them by the end of this year.
With respect to missiles, the U.N. inspectors report that they
have narrowed the uncertainty as to how many Soviet-supplied
Scuds the Iraqis may have left. The uncertainty is in the number
launched from 1980 to 1982. And the Iraqis have not provided the
kind of documentation necessary to substantiate their claims. So
there is an outstanding issue there.
I think the committee has already alluded to the current dead-
lock over destroying equipment used to make chemical weapons
and the deadlock over placing cameras at missile test sites. Those
issues are still outstanding.
I expect that the Special Commission will demand that they be
resolved because it goes to the core of their inspection and monitor-
ing efforts. And so I think there is a real live question now about
what we must do to get Iraq to back down and cooperate.
I would like to make a few other points. First of all, I think the
inspectors deserve a lot of credit. They have carried out a difficult,
dangerous job that is physically and mentally exhausting and dan-
gerous even to their safety. They, I think, deserve the greatest pos-
sible support and cooperation from the Agency's management. But
I don't think they have always received it.
THE IAEA CHIEF INSPECTOR HAS "UNDERMINED" MORALE
The chief inspector, in particular, has said repeatedly to the
press that, in effect, there is nothing more to find in Iraq. I think
the effect of these statements has been to undermine the ability of
the inspectors to to keep their morale up and keep the pressure on
the Iraqis.
The Special Commission doesn't agree with the statements by
the chief inspector. The Special Commission thinks there are still
things to find. And the Special Commission doesn't think the Iraqis
have given up their desire or their goal to make nuclear weapons.
And as we have just heard this morning, neither does the U.S.
Government.
28
The Special Commission, and I think also the U.S. Government,
hopes the following things can still be found in Iraq. These are
things that we are still looking for.
First we are still looking tor parts of the giant machines that
Iraq used to enrich uranium. These particular parts will tell us
how much uranium they managed to enrich and at what level of
enrichment.
There also is a part of the centrifuge program that we think still
exists that hasn't Seen found.
Also, the identities of the Iraqi nuclear personnel have not all
been established, and we don't know what these persons are doing.
We don't have all the records of explosive tests that Iraq carried
out to see how far they got with nuclear weapons design.
We have never found the entire database describing all the nu-
clear weapon programs. That is very important. We know it exists,
but we haven't found it.
Nor have we identified Iraq's foreign sources of technical advice
so we can cut them off.
And we have not identified Iraq's network of foreign suppliers.
These mercenaries stand ready to go back into action as soon as
Iraq gets the money to pay them.
SPLITTING THE IAEA'S FUNCTIONS
Finally, the subcommittee has asked me to comment on how the
International Atomic Energy Agency's inspections can be improved.
I could recommend that the Agency's functions be split up so as to
get rid of the conflict of interest, as I have already said. I think
the Agency should continue to inspect declared locations. It knows
how to do that.
But I think we need a new entity that can look for undeclared
locations. I think the entity should report directly to the Security
Council, which can back it up with force whenever it runs into
noncooperation.
The new entity also should be able to use and receive and protect
intelligence information. The current agency does not have that ca-
pability.
U.S. intelligence officials say that the Agency has been a one-way
street: Information goes in, but no information comes out. That is
because the Agency still regards its safeguarding functions as con-
fidential.
The Agency's inspections play only a minor role in the effort to
stop the bomb. As I said already, in countries like Israel, India,
Pakistan, and South Africa, the Agency's inspections have been vir-
tually irrelevant. We need more powerful tools. I would say that
they include, first, tougher diplomacy; second, trade sanctions;
third, aid cutoffs; and, fourth, denials of technology through export
controls.
It is important to keep the Agency's inspections as strong as pos-
sible, and it is certainly possible to improve them. But I think it
would be a mistake to think that by tinkering with the Agency's
inspection system we are going to seriously affect proliferation.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milhollin appears in the appen-
dix.]
29
Our next witness is Mr. Jay Davis of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.
Your prepared statement will be entered in the record in its en-
tirety. You may proceed in any way that you choose.
STATEMENT OF JAY C. DAVIS, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR AC-
CELERATOR MASS SPECTROMETRY AND PROGRAM LEADER,
GEOSCDENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, PHYSICAL
SCIENCES DD1ECTORATE, LAWRENCE LrVHERMORE NA-
TIONAL LABORATORY
Mr. Davis. Thank you. Today's hearing is particularly timely, as
yesterday was the second anniversary for the unannounced inspec-
tion and subsequent truck chase at Fallujah
Mr. Lantos. Could you briefly describe that episode, because not
everybody may be aware of it, as I think you are, and, to some ex-
tent, I am.
THE NUCLEAR CHASE AT FALLUJAH
Mr. Davis. On the second U.N. inspection, the team was in Iraq
to look for the technology of electromagnetic isotope separation, the
redeployment of the uranium enrichment program employed by
only the United States and then abandoned by us and all other
countries.
The equipment is large, and the pieces weigh 60 tons. So the
Iraqis assembled a truck convoy of 100 tank transports carrying
this equipment that had been moving around the country and stay-
ing ahead of inspections.
Assistant Secretary Gallucci and I, 3 days before the events at
Fallujah, took a group of inspectors to Al Gahrib. The Iraqis denied
us access to that facility. We withdrew back to Baghdad. When the
U.N. gained us access 3 days later, the facility was inspected and
found empty. To our surprise, we got an intelligence update to go
to Fallujah. And after some planning, which I will describe further,
we ran the first-ever unannounced, zero-notice inspection carried
out by any agency.
In the process of that inspection, we were able to panic the
Iraqis. They tried to flee from the compound with the equipment.
We were successful in photographing that equipment, producing
evidence of a covert program and Iraqi activities to not comply with
the U.N. resolution. It involved shots being fired at U.N. inspec-
tors, but it was a very successful and aggressive operation.
Mr. Lantos. Well, if equipment or documentation or materials
that the Iraqis don't want the world to find they move around, even
equipment as vast and as complex as this, 100 trucks carrying
huge pieces of equipment, and they attempt to hide this, doesn't it
make elementary, common sense that materials which are much
easier to hide or documentation that is much easier to hide, they
clearly will also attempt to do?
Therefore, the statement that "we know what they have, what
they are doing," is really a very naive statement because Iraq is a,
physically, large country with enormous capabilities for hiding such
materials or facilities or documentation.
Would you agree with that, Mr. Davis?
30
Mr. Davis. I might disagree in a small sense, Mr. Chairman, in
that the events at Fallujah so totally shocked the Iraqis, the
threats made by both the United States and the Security Council,
after we were withdrawn from the country were quite substantial,
that they divulged much more than we expected and perhaps much
more than they needed to. We have likened the process to peeling
an onion.
And I think we have been able to combine the divulgations they
made and the inconsistencies in those divulgations to draw a pretty
complete picture. I think the bottom line is that you have stated
it properly: We will never know what we don't know by staying on
the ground. We must inhibit, irritate, and postpone. And that may
be the future character of this activity.
It is useful for the committee to understand a bit of my personal
background to put these comments in perspective.
I am an experimental nuclear physicist. I also have other activi-
ties. I have been both an emergency duty officer for the Livermore
Laboratory and a senior scientific advisor for the Department of
Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team and Accident Response
Team. In both of these roles, I have trained with and operated with
security personnel at Livermore and trained with the FBI and U.S.
military. I am both medically and psychologically screened for high-
stress field work. So I look at the Iraqi inspections with an attitude
somewhat different from that of a scientist on a site visit to a for-
eign facility.
The three questions you have posed, I will answer very briefly.
How successful have the efforts of the international community
been in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi resources?
I think the U.N. has been very effective in finding, dismantling,
and destroying Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction.
Aided by intelligence, the process has forced Iraqi disclosure of re-
located equipment, of records concealed, and of personnel involved.
At present in the ballistic missile area, completion of the process
seems to be hindered by the lack of good intelligence leads.
Given that the work is done by unarmed inspectors operating
within a country in full control of its military and security forces,
I think the results have been remarkable.
However, the process has now quite clearly shifted from discov-
ery and destruction of Iraqi facilities to frustration of Iraqi at-
tempts to restart their programs. Keeping inspectors on the ground
in Iraq inhibits Iraqi resumption of prohibited activities, but the
process will become more dangerous as Iraqi frustration rises and
world political support erodes. That change should be noted and its
consequences anticipated.
GIVE UNSCOM THE LEADING ROLE
The second question: How well has the IAEA accomplished its
task? I think its performance could have been improved by giving
the leadership to UNSCOM directly and relegating the IAEA to a
technical support role in its traditional areas of nuclear fuel cycle
and safeguards techniques.
Mr. Lantos. UNSCOM is the United Nations Special Commis-
sion which was set up for this purpose?
31
Mr. Davis. Yes. UNSCOM has the primary responsibility for the
inspections in Iraq. Many of the IAEA staff, and some of the lead-
ership, was burdened by the perceived need to protect the Agency's
role, to defend its past performance in Iraq and to protect them-
selves from criticism and potential career damage within the Agen-
cy.
Institutionalizing the leadership for the nuclear inspections in
the IAEA made it difficult to remove timid leaders and provided an
opening between the commission and the IAEA that made possible
both information loss and Iraqi political intrigue. The IAEA has
been accused of being both politicized and suffering from clientitis.
From my perspective, both of these accusations are justified. The
IAEA shows little appetite for intrusive inspection or aggressive be-
havior, both of which are essential to this inspection regime. The
IAEA fielded very different sorts of team leaders in Iraq. David
Kay, who led the two inspections in which I participated, was ag-
gressive and active in the field, thereby, accomplishing positive
ends. Maurizio Zifferero was more the diplomat, concerned, if not
burdened, by politics of the situation and the IAEA's interests.
Demitri Perricos was a classic IAEA inspector principally con-
cerned with detailed verification of previously declared activities.
"CLIENTITIS" AT THE IAEA
As an example of clientitis, Perricos chided me on several occa-
sions for my estimates of Iraqi design goals and costs. These had
appeared in the media and had offended the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission, leading them to protest that there was political moti-
vation behind the numbers.
As these estimates were made possible only after defeating ex-
haustive Iraqi concealment and deception activities, partly in the
inspection confrontation in Fallujah in which Iraqi agents had fired
upon and detained members of our team, I felt his concerns for
Iraqi sensibilities to be poorly considered.
It is very important for the committee Members to realize that
the aggressive surprise inspection of Fallujah was hardly a typical
IAEA inspection activity. The entire scenario was orchestrated and
carried out by David Kay, four U.S. and British technical experts,
and two non-IAEA support staff using authority guaranteed by Rolf
Ekeus, head of the U.N. Special Commissions.
We quite literally wrote the script for Fallujah while walking
through Baghdad back alleys after midnight, decidedly not the
IAEA style. Had that operation failed, as it threatened to at several
moments, we might never have realized the full scope of Iraqi pro-
gram. This forced a great deal of Iraqi disclosure.
As far as what steps can be taken to strengthen the IAEA to deal
with such challenges in Iraq and elsewhere in the future, as my
comments indicate, I do not believe that IAEA should have the lead
role in these matters.
We are at present strengthening the IAEA's analytical abilities
both through access to their own facilities and by helping them
field improved techniques in their own laboratories. Stan from
Livermore and the other national laboratories are involved in these
efforts now. I think the IAEA has a very important support role in
sample acquisition, maintenance of chain of custody, and technical
32
analysis of materials returned. I am not sanguine about granting
the Agency routine access to intelligence information or allowing it
to acquire genuine sophistication in nuclear weapons design and
technology.
In the chemical, biological, and ballistic missile areas, the
UNSCOM has shown adequate ability to field effective teams and
to accomplish its missions without having a long, previous history
on the ground in Iraq.
UNSCOM has been able to evaluate and replace leaders and to
evolve operational doctrine without institutional inhibitions. I
strongly recommend that future nuclear inspections be run under
direct Special Commission control in a similar fashion.
One should allow UNSCOM, or its successor agency, to collect
the inspection team leaders, evaluate the quality of intelligence, se-
lect the inspection targets, and staff the teams as appropriate, de-
tailing IAEA staff in support roles as needed. This change would
relieve the IAEA of its conflicting roles — well described by other
speakers — of first friendly teacher and inspector of the nuclear
technology, and then suddenly the operator of adversarial and ac-
cusatory special inspections. Such a change would allow more read-
ily the fielding of teams of mixed specialists likely to be more suit-
able for future inspections in troublesome places.
Let me close with a comment on the future. I think it important
to emphasize in Iraq that the IAEA and the Special Commission
have been asked to do a task without precedent, operating under
conditions and restraints that have been applied to no previous in-
spections.
A NEW INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION AGENCY IS NEEDED
To criticize the IAEA for its performance on institutional grounds
fails to recognize that it is trying to do a task for which it was nei-
ther created nor enfranchised. Criticism on grounds of inadequate
personal performance and the failure to deal with it is allowable.
We need new institutions operating with different access to infor-
mation, different team selection, and training approaches, and very
different access to supporting military and political power if we are
to be prepared for future events.
Those of us who participated in the Iraqi inspections have come
away feeling that their multinational character and U.N. direction
were essential to success. We are very proud of what was accom-
plished on an ad hoc basis by teams that made up doctrine and
procedures as they went along. This approach will not suffice in the
future where intrusive inspections may have to be carried out in
states that have not recently been shocked by massive aerial bom-
bardment and ground combat as Iraq was. An ad hoc approach will
similarly not suffice if we are to undertake such missions as seizing
control of the nuclear weapons of a collapsing proliferant state, an
event of increasing probability.
If we are to succeed in these tasks in the face of deception, frus-
tration, organized attempts to defer us, we need doctrinal develop-
ment, specialized equipment, and frequent practice with our peers
from other countries. None of those useful preconditions is being
accomplished at present. Almost all discussion of improved non-
33
proliferation programs has focused on technology, not on doctrine
and operations.
This deficiency in present planning is an error that will have
fatal consequences, both personal and political, for participants at
all levels. It would be very dangerous for both governments and to
individuals to presume the successes in Iraq demonstrate a general
case. Iraq may, in fact, be the easiest case we ever face.
Thank you for your consideration of my insights.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Lantos. Our final witness today is Professor Lawrence
Scheinman from Cornell University, who has also served as a con-
sultant to IAEA Director, Hans Blix, and participated in IAEA-
sponsored panels on improving the international safeguards sys-
tem.
We are pleased to have you, sir. Your prepared statement will be
entered in the record in its entirety.
You may proceed any way you choose.
STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, PROFESSOR OF GOV-
ERNMENT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Scheinman. Thank you. I will follow along the text of my
prepared remarks, but I will skip over quite a bit.
I must say that following the two previous speakers, I find my-
self, as most would suspect, in a rather different position of assess-
ment. I would like to be able to respond point by point to many of
the observations that were made, but I hope that my testimonial
statement will accomplish part of that task.
As in the case of the other members of this panel, I was asked
three questions: how well the United Nations has accomplished the
task of eliminating weapons of mass destruction from Iraq; how
well the IAEA has done; and what can be done to improve IAEA
safeguards. I will try to focus most of my remarks on that last
question. However, I would like to say something about each of the
previous two in at least an abbreviated form from my formal testi-
mony.
I think — and this goes to a point that everybody I believe agrees
with — that a fundamental point of departure in answering a ques-
tion about whether we have succeeded in eliminating weapons of
mass destruction from Iraq, is that it is virtually impossible to be
certain about success.
The only prudent approach is to be certain of uncertainty. Leav-
ing aside the obvious problems of scientists, engineers, theoretical
knowledge, technical expertise, records, reports, design activities
which would be very easy to hide and difficult to ferret out, there
also can be no definitive assurance that nothing remains in Iraq in
terms of tangible resources and capabilities to produce weapons of
mass destruction; and there never can be.
I think we have to have that as our fundamental point of depar-
ture. This reality is one of the reasons for long-term monitoring in
Iraq as described in United Nations Security Council Resolution
715. You may recall that it would provide for full and ready access
to sites, materials, and persons and give the Agency the ability to
34
restrict and/or stop movement of suspected material, equipment,
and the like.
Such a verification system, even if based and implemented on a
presumption that Iraq will again try to build nuclear weapons, can
severely limit but not absolutely foreclose a successful clandestine
effort. And we have today a complicating factor, and that is the
breakup of the former Soviet Union and the risk of the possibility
that Iraq or others might be able to purchase, directly, weapons —
usable material, or compete nuclear devices, thereby bypassing the
need for mounting a program for producing fissile material which
would be highly vulnerable to detection by a robust verification sys-
tem.
This underscores a fundamental point that the ultimate effective-
ness of a verification system is not self-contained but contingent on
other considerations such as a vigorously applied comprehensive
export control system and resolute political support by the United
Nations Security Council and the key states in the international
system.
As Mr. Gallucci testified earlier, a great deal has been done.
Given the adverse conditions described by Mr. Davis, under which
the IAEA and UNSCOM have had to operate, those achievements
are even more impressive. UNSCOM and IAEA, despite these dif-
ficulties, appear to have substantially exposed the Iraqi develop-
ment.
There is a sense that while not everything has been found, the
vast majority of what existed has been identified.
Mr. Lantos. Could I stop you there for just a moment?
You listened, along with me and everybody else, to Mr. Davis'
rather dramatic description of
Mr. Scheinman. Yes, I did.
Mr. Lantos [continuing]. Really a cops and robbers chase scene
of the Iraqis running away with 100 trucks of heavy equipment,
hiding it when unexpectedly the inspectors appeared. They pan-
icked. They shoot at them. They don't let them into the facility.
These people go back to Baghdad. A couple of days later they come
back. The place is clean. And the materials have been moved far-
ther north.
This clearly doesn't give me a great deal of confidence in our abil-
ity to state that the danger is gone.
Mr. Scheinman. I fully agree. And I didn't say that the danger
is gone.
Mr. Lantos. I am not saying you do. But here you have the
international community acting through the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the United Nations Special Commission, with a
whole team of highly qualified people, and as it were, through cre-
ativity and good luck, they chase down the big secret. And had that
episode not occurred, we wouldn't know anything about it.
Isn't that true?
Mr. Scheinman. That I agree with.
However, I would, in turn, ask a question: Can we conceptualize
a viable alternative method of getting at this kind of a problem
than the one that was put forth in trying to deal with Iraq?
35
THE IAEA SOLUTION IS THE ONLY IMAGINABLE ONE
I have thought about this. And I find it very difficult to conceive
of an effective multilaterally supported approach to the problem
that is fundamentally different from what we had in the case of
dealing with Iraq.
The United States could choose to be an international policeman
for all and to walk around the world and enter and push its way
into doors and into sites as it saw fit because its intelligence serv-
ice told it that that is where it ought to go. But I don't think that
would produce that world under the rule of law that we all under-
stand is fundamental if we are going to have a stable international
order.
So we do have to find international strategies or internationally
supported strategies to deal with these problems. And it seems to
me that whatever deficiencies may still exist — and they do still
exist in the case of Iraq under these extraordinary circumstances —
the task before us is to improve our capabilities, to strengthen and
build our base, and to create the possibility to more effectively car-
ryout the mission of limiting, if not ultimately preventing states
tnat have undertaken to not acquire nuclear weapons, from doing
so. And I think this would apply to all other weapons of mass de-
struction, as well.
If I may just go on, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the bal-
ance sheet seems to say that we have done pretty well in Iraq, but
we still have a large number of uncertainties.
The second question is really like the first, but it deals only with
the International Atomic Energy Agency. And I have a different
answer to that question than the ones given by previous speakers
on this panel.
THE IAEA HAS PERFORMED WELL
It seems to me that the IAEA has fulfilled its responsibilities,
professionally and effectively, earning it the confidence of the Secu-
rity Council, the Secretary General, and many governments for
whom resolute implementation of the provisions for the elimination
of weapons of mass destruction and the ability to produce them by
Iraq are of paramount concern.
I think the best judges of this are not any one of us sitting here
as an outside observer, nor is it the IAEA. But I believe that those
who are close to the situation, outside the IAEA, may be able to
offer us a better insight. This is an insight that is based upon a
2-year experience and not a one-time situation. And it is based
upon an overall institutional assessment rather than on the assess-
ment of the performance or behavior of specific individuals who
were specified in testimony just a few moments ago.
An UNSCOM spokesman, in a recent article in Arms Control
Today, made the comment that, the initial understanding in imple-
menting the verification regime was that Iraq would, in good faith,
make declarations about its former activities that are now banned.
Instead, it quickly became evident that Iraq was consistently
concealing the extent of its programs. As a result, the verification
regime had to be tightened; and the UNSCOM teams — and in the
nuclear sphere, the IAEA — were forced to change the basic prem-
36
ises of their approach to the inspection relationship. Iraq, it seems,
had to be presumed guilty until proven innocent.
It would appear that if the IAEA approached its tasks with some
naivete and caution, as has been noted, it was not at all alone in
this regard. That judgement relates to the period at the early
stages of the now 19 completed inspections.
The assessment that I would like to note, again turns to the
statement of the UNSCOM spokesman. That comment, in the same
article that I referred to a moment ago, was that, through their
diligent work, the IAEA inspection teams with the assistance and
cooperation of UNSCOM, uncovered three major programs for the
enrichment of uranium to weapons grade materials, laboratory
scale preparation of plutonium, and a full-scale program of
weaponization.
This is a public document in a popular journal, so you might
want to go further in your assessment. The Deputy Executive Di-
rector of UNSCOM, Ambassador Michael Newlin, speaking before
The Washington Council on Nonproliferation, and now in a pub-
lished document, commented that the Agency had to adapt to an
intrusive type of inspection primarily at undeclared sites as man-
dated in Resolution 687. He went on to say that in his view, "the
IAEA has adjusted to the new inspection requirements with re-
markable success, a fact illustrated to UNSCOM by IAEA's very
thorough, excellent reports. Beyond inspections, the IAEA has also
done well in the destruction phase of Resolution 687."
THE IAEA HAS LEARNED IN IRAQ
And we can go further still. At Mr. Davis's institution, the Law-
rence Livermore Laboratory last November, Ambassador Ekeus
himself made the statement that "Iraq's nuclear program has been
halted. The IAEA did a truly magnificent job in this respect."
And again that is in the written record. This conformed with
similar statements that Ambassador Ekeus reportedly made in
periodic reports to the Security Council itself. So I think the record,
on the whole, and taking the institution as a whole, seems to indi-
cate that the IAEA, while it may have started out slowly and with
a bit, perhaps, of uncertainty and hesitation that was just de-
scribed a moment ago, certainly has gone on the traditional learn-
ing track and has become a much better institution for dealing
with the kinds of problems and responsibilities that have been as-
signed to it under Resolution 687, and that may come afterward.
This brings me to the third question about improving IAEA safe-
guards. And here is where I would like to focus my remaining re-
marks.
What can be done to strengthen the ability of IAEA to deal with
Iraq-type challenges in the future?
I fully concur with what has been said by previous speakers, that
Iraq is not the last and probably not the most difficult problem we
are going to have to face.
Mr. Lantos. The reason you are saying it is not the most dif-
ficult problem is because, as a result of Iraq's defeat in the war,
it had to accept intrusive inspection, which clearly North Korea or
Iran currently do not have to put up with?
Is that your point?
37
Mr. Scheinman. Those two countries do not have to put up with
as intrusive inspection as Iraq has to put up with under Resolution
687; but there has been a change in the IAEA attitude, and behav-
ior, and implementation of safeguards in the course of the last 2
years as part of that learning process, and that is what I would
like to focus on. That change makes it more difficult for a Korea
or an Iran to get away with something. But this is not just because
of the defeat of Iraq; it is because the IAEA has learned what Iraq
could hide and where Iraq was or was not successful with respect
to acquiring materials, equipment, et cetera, from outside. In tact,
my memory is that North Korea is probably better at hiding things
than anybody, including Iraq, over past history.
I think in approaching the question of what we do for the future,
it is absolutely essential to understand that the Draconian and pu-
nitive measures applied in Iraq under the Security Council Resolu-
tions cannot be taken as a standard for normal international ver-
ification by any institution whatsoever.
It is absolutely implausible that sovereign states would freely
and voluntarily submit themselves to so onerous and intrusive a re-
gime.
If anything underscored this truth, it is the reversal of the Unit-
ed States' position regarding "any time, any place" inspection
under the chemical weapons convention. For many years we pro-
moted that idea; but when it came down to the rock and the hard
place, we backed down.
But in recent arms control agreements and in changes brought
about by IAEA safeguards, there is considerable support for taking
significant steps to ensure credibility and to reinforce confidence.
States are willing to accept more today than they were willing to
accept 20 years ago.
However, any regime of the future is still going to have to strike
a balance between the demands of international confidence and na-
tional sovereignty. A point that I feel cannot be repeated too often
is that the safeguard system applied by the IAEA in support of the
NPT was commensurate with the expectations and desires of the
international community at the time that system was put in place.
THE NPT WAS DESIGNED TO BE NONINTRUSIVE
The NPT was devised to apply comprehensive safeguards prin-
cipally to the fuel cycles of advanced industrial states, which were
at the time that the NPT was being negotiated, the only states
with significant nuclear activity. These states, Germany, Japan,
Sweden, and Italy, and so on were determined to minimize any risk
that the distinction between themselves and the nuclear weapon
states inherent in the NPT would extend into the peaceful realm
of nuclear activity and competition.
To ensure the adherence of these states to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union endorsed a verifica-
tion regime that kept intrusions to the minimum, consistent with
credible verification that resulted in a system that focused on the
flow of declared nuclear material that we have heard a lot about.
It is important to understand as well that governments — and I will
come back to this — speaking through their representative on the
Board of Governors of the IAEA, establish the tone of the times.
38
And the tone of the time was verify, but don't push all that hard.
Just make sure that you feel reasonably confident that you know
what the situation is and that you independently verify that safe-
guarded material can be accounted for, but don't go overboard.
Now, given the structure of global competition at the time be-
tween the Russians and the Americans, it was also presumed that
those two would control any real threat of proliferation among their
allies or clients and as their competition reached to every region of
the world that assumption applied to the world at large.
The periodic 5-year reviews of the NPT have resulted in endorse-
ments over the years of the efficiency and credibility of the safe-
guard system, despite differences raised by activist nongovern-
mental institutions over the adequacy of the material control in
large scale facilities.
The end of the cold war
Mr. Lantos. You are referring to activist nongovernmental insti-
tutions?
Mr. Scheinman. Not in a pejorative way.
Mr. Lantos. Not in a pejorative way. I appreciate that.
Don't we need these activist nongovernmental gadflies to keep
governments honest?
Mr. Scheinman. Absolutely. That is why I say it was not a pejo-
rative statement.
Mr. Lantos. Maybe we could refer to them as treasured activist
nongovernmental institutions.
Mr. Scheinman. Yes. I think they have as a rule done very good
public service in the questions that they have raised.
A NEW PROLIFERATION ENVIRONMENT
The end of the cold war changed one of the assumptions about
superpower predominance and control. The discovery of a massive
and largely unknown nuclear weapons development program in an
NPT state, Iraq, changed another. It changed the notion that it is
only the advanced industrial states that are capable of mounting
a sophisticated nuclear weapons program.
In this new environment, the expectations are that, with the dif-
fusion of technology, more states that are no longer under the
watchful eye of the superpowers can engage in nuclear weapons de-
velopment and, because of security and political concerns, no longer
are being subordinated to the superpower competition. Some of
these states may seek to satisfy their security interests with nu-
clear arms, and Korea, Iran, and Iraq are certainly on that list.
All of these factors have had an impact on international institu-
tions, not the least of which the IAEA; notably, the credibility of
safeguards is now seen to be a function of their capacity to detect
undeclared or clandestine nuclear activities.
Both Mr. Davis and Mr. Milhollin described the IAEA verifica-
tion system as it was several years ago. They did not describe it
as it is today. The concept of verifying declared nuclear material
and activities no longer exists. It is now a total verification of de-
clared or undeclared activities.
39
CAN THE IAEA RELIABLY SEEK OUT UNDECLARED ACTIVITY?
Mr. Lantos. May I just ask, Mr. Davis and Mr. Milhollin to com-
ment on this point at this stage, if you care to.
Mr. Milhollin. My comments had to do with the Agency's his-
tory and capability up until the time of the Gulf War. I think the
Agency still has the basic problem that I pointed out: it has a fatal
conflict of interest which produces a culture in which they really
don't want to find things that have gone wrong.
And I think that still exists and will exist as long as the Agency
has a promotion function. And so, even though the Agency, having
suffered a tremendous defeat in Iraq, is now talking bravely about
changing its ways, I don't believe it really can.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Davis, would you care to comment?
Mr. Davis. I think my only comment is that I acknowledge the
conflict of interest problem, which has been with us for a long time
and is of concern. I am unsure that we understand the mechanisms
by which we will pursue undeclared activities with or without the
IAEA. This is a difficult task, and I have seen no clear road map
that suggests how we will pursue such things with any confidence
of success.
Mr. Scheinman. As long as Mr. Davis says "with or without the
IAEA," I think I concur on the difficulty of the problem.
THE IAEA HAS REFORMED ITSELF
However, the IAEA has done a number of things to try to bring
itself into the modern world, if you will. Mr. Milhollin referred to
this as tinkering, but I think it is more than tinkering. There has
been the examination of existing safeguards authority that pre-
vailed through the statute and safeguards documents. And upon
that analysis was built a new approach. The main focus has been
the so-called special inspections.
And as the Chair is aware, the Board of Governors, a year ago,
a year and a half ago, concluded that the Director General's assess-
ment that the authority to conduct special inspections in full scope
safeguard states extended to undeclared activities and that the use
of outside information, including national intelligence information,
was appropriate information upon which to base a request, was en-
dorsed.
Now, the authority to invoke an inspection of this nature is one
thing. The willingness to do it is another. And I think that we are
very fortunate at this time to have a case in point. That case is
North Korea. It provided the testing ground, in my view, for agency
determination.
As the Chair is aware, there was a discrepancy with respect to
the initial inventory. The Agency came to the conclusion that the
North Koreans had not revealed all that they should have revealed;
and as a consequence of this, the Director General and subse-
quently the Board of Governors called for special inspections. Upon
refusal, the Board of Governors reported the failure to comply with
safeguard obligations by North Korea to the Security Council.
I submit that the IAEA acted with deliberation and decisiveness,
giving a clear indication that the new political environment was,
40
indeed, well understood and that it was prepared to exercise its au-
thority.
I think it is also interesting to note that the board came to a de-
cision to report noncompliance while the United Nations Security
Council had more difficulty in deciding whether or not and what
nature of sanctions to apply. And the reason was that there is a
veto power in the Security Council, and China was unwilling to go
along with the more severe sanctions, and so we have a modified
sanctions arrangement now in place in North Korea. That does not
occur at the level of the IAEA where no veto is possible.
MORE TRANSPARENCY
As vou know, early submission of information, including report-
ing of design information and the like, was included in a Board of
Governors measure reinforcing the safeguards system.
The point I want to make is that the IAEA has moved to estab-
lish increasing transparency in the nuclear arena to acquire a bet-
ter early warning basis, a basis upon which it can call into question
the integrity or the completeness of the record provided by states
with respect to their total nuclear activities.
Again, I refer to the North Korean case as a case in point. I also
think that there have been changes on the cultural side. There is
increased awareness. There is now a system of country officers in
place to consolidate all available information, all sources regarding
the nuclear activity of states under safeguards and to assist witn
briefing and debriefing of inspectors as they go into and return
from the field.
Still other measures are being considered now to improve the in-
ternal dynamics of the agency. But this brings me to my last point,
Mr. Chairman, and that is that we cannot stop with just improving
the quality of safeguards, reorganizing activities within the context
of the IAEA secretariat, or the like. We need to make some addi-
tional things. I would like to mention four things that need to be
done.
ADDITIONAL CHANGES ARE STILL NEEDED
First I think it is unequivocally clear that the ability of the
IAEA, or any other institution, to optimize safeguards capabilities
and to create the greatest probability for detecting clandestine ac-
tivities depends to a substantial degree on the availability to it of
sensitive information which only a limited number of states are
able to provide. The flow of relevant information to the IAEA
should be regularized and institutionalized.
Contrary to the remark made by Mr. Davis, to my knowledge,
there have been few, if any, questions seriously raised about the
ability of the IAEA to receive and utilize national intelligence infor-
mation provided to it pursuant to its responsibilities under Resolu-
tion 687. And there is every reason to think that they have been
pretty good about protecting the source and the nature of the infor-
mation that has been provided.
I think that the United States should take a lead in moving for-
ward on such regularization as well as ensuring any other oper-
ational or logistic support the IAEA may need to fulfill our expecta-
tions.
41
Second, it is a truism that international organizations lack mean-
ingful enforcement power. The exception is the United Nations Se-
curity Council which, if it invokes Chapter VII of the U.N. charter,
as it did in the Gulf War, can take enforcement action and pass
mandatory resolutions binding upon member states.
The January 1992 summit statement of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment of the Council declared that the proliferation of nuclear
weapons constitute a threat to international peace and security,
which is the key to opening the door to Chapter VII and enforce-
ment.
That same statement acknowledges the integral role of IAEA
safeguards in implementing the NPT and asserted that members
of the Council will take appropriate measures in the cases notified
to them by the IAEA, which is what they did when the North Ko-
rean case came before them.
Given that the statement was made in the midst of a continuing
crisis in Iraq and a strong sense of uniformity of purpose on the
Council, I think it would be pertinent to the strengthening the
international consensus against safeguards or nonproliferation vio-
lations to codify this statement in a formal United Nations Security
Council Resolution.
This would provide an important element of enforcement and en-
forceability to IAEA safeguards, especially in view of the fact that,
by statute, the IAEA has direct access to the Security Council in
cases of safeguards noncompliance.
I believe it is the only international organization in the U.N.
family that has this direct access.
A third measure requiring political leadership and action is to
ensure that the IAEA is adequately funded to meet growing re-
sponsibilities, responsibilities flowing from North Korea, Argentina,
Brazil, South Africa, and eventually, we hope, the non-Russian
states of the former Soviet Union.
USE THE IAEA TO VERIFY NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIAL
Finally, the United States should take the lead with the Russian
Government to make use of the IAEA to verify dismantled nuclear
warhead material. I am going in a opposite direction of my col-
leagues. Such a measure would be a strong demonstration of con-
fidence in the system and the openness it implies could have a po-
tentially powerful precedent setting value.
The consignment of verification responsibility for dismantled
warhead material would be less costly and more useful than apply-
ing safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities in the weapons
states. I think it is a step the United States should take now.
But the single most important element in strengthening the abil-
ity of the IAEA to meet the challenge of verification is the political
will and the political support of its member states and of the Secu-
rity Council.
International organizations, as we know, are creations of sov-
ereign states. They lack sovereignty or independent political au-
thority, and they are dependent on the political will of their sov-
ereign members. Secretariats can influence and cajole, but it is the
governing bodies of the international organizations that are reposi-
tories of political authority.
42
Sovereignty is a vigorous and contradictory force against empow-
ering international institutions with far-reaching authority. But
threats to international peace and security cannot be successfully
addressed unilaterally. They do require a collective action. While
international verification may have to be supplemented by region-
ally verified arms control and security arrangements, it is some-
thing that cannot be done if there is to be any confidence in the
world at large regarding the status of nuclear programs and the
absence of clandestine nuclear activity.
That is why it is all the more important that governments like
ours that are committed to international verification, take what-
ever measures are possible to strengthen the hand of our chosen
international instruments, in this case, the IAEA. We and others
have developed expectations for our international institutions.
Now, we must ensure that the necessary authority, operational
and financial support and political backing for vigorous implemen-
tation is made available to them.
My closing comment is that the best of all possible verification
arrangements is only the first step on a very tall staircase to
achieving a global order free of the threat of nuclear proliferation
or the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. We are
talking about a regime strategy which embraces many, many as-
pects, only a few of which have Deen touched upon today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scheinman appears in the ap-
pendix.]
Mr. Lantos. Well, I want to thank all you for excellent state-
ments and for shedding a great deal of light on what may well be
the single most important issue facing the globe, the danger of nu-
clear proliferation.
EXPORT CONTROLS SHOULD BE TIGHTENED
You mentioned that this is only the first step. Would you not
agree that the first step, perhaps, is to dramatically tighten export
controls and to bring about a degree of cooperation we certainly
have not seen for years?
Isn't it infinitely easier to prevent technology and materials and
high-tech equipment getting into the hands of countries like Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, rather than, once there, trying to pursue
this cat and mouse game of chasing trucks as they runaway with
materials?
I mean, it seems to me if there is a Western failure — and I pro-
foundly believe that there was both Western failure — when I say
Western, I include Japan in that — both Western failure and irre-
sponsibility in, say, during the decade of the 1980's.
It really was focused on not controlling Western companies from
supplying rogue regimes with lethal capabilities.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Scheinman. I do, Mr. Chairman. I pride myself on having
been one of a few outside experts invited by the German Bundestag
several years ago to testify about their nonproliferation organiza-
tion, law, policies, and the like. Export control was one of the very
fundamental points that was addressed in that Bundestag hearing.
And it was the first of a number of hearings that led to fundamen-
43
tal changes in internal German law, which has certainly come 180
degrees from where it was a few years ago.
But when I spoke of a regime, I meant precisely the idea of ver-
ification, export control, and delegitimizing nuclear weapons, estab-
lishing the concept that they are not only not usable, but that there
is no legitimacy to having them as a deterrent in the final analysis.
I am referring also to the question of enforcement and to the
question of working to resolve regional controversy, which is at the
core in most cases, but not all, of the interest of states in acquiring
nuclear weapons.
There is always the renegade problem. A Kim Il-Song or a Sad-
dam Hussein, who may see nuclear weapons not as defensive or as
a means of deterring others from attacking them, but as a means
of promoting an expansionist policy. That is the problem that the
world has confronted since the state system emerged at the Treaty
of Westphalia in the 17th century. And it is a problem that we will
have to deal with until we have transcended the basic order of the
world community that we have known for the past century. There
is no final answer to that one either.
It is a question of striving and organizing and bringing to bear
as much of a concerted multilateral effort that provides a legiti-
mate basis for dealing harshly with the recalcitrant state, and that
deals with the good states in a constructive and positive way and
helps to reensure security that we have to work toward.
Mr. Lantos. I mentioned earlier I will ask each of you the same
question with respect to the sanctions regime. And the question
that I would like, first, Mr. Milhollin to respond to, do you favor
lifting sanctions on Iraq, weakening sanctions, maintaining them
as they are, or strengthening them?
Mr. MILHOLLIN. I Favor strengthening them.
Before I go into that, I would like to make a request of the Chair.
Mr. Lantos. Sure.
Mr. Milhollin. I have, as I am sure you know, written a couple
of articles recently on this subject, one in The New Yorker maga-
zine and another in the New York Times in April. The one in the
New York Times lists those things that we have found in Iraq and
the things that are still missing.
I would request that they be included in the record.
Mr. Lantos. Without objection, they will be included in the
record.
[The articles appear in the appendix.]
Mr. Milhollin. I think that the sanctions on Iraq should be
strengthened. Certainly they should be maintained.
I believe that the inspectors have now, in effect, shifted into a
monitoring mode in Iraq rather than a search mode. I think that
such a shift may be premature.
I think there have been suggestions — the U.S. Government has
suggested an inspection arrangement that would be far more ag-
gressive, and that I think, will be more likely to yield results than
the one that has been used. The Special Commission and the IAEA
have not adopted however.
As a substitute for it, the helicopter flights over Baghdad were
proposed. Of course, they are not happening now. So there was a
time when it was agreed that we needed a more aggressive effort;
44
we needed to engage the Iraqis more frequently; we needed to con-
centrate on certain areas where the government believes — our Gov-
ernment believes — that Iraq has the infrastructure and the people
and the communications equipment, for example, to carry on the
nuclear research effort.
And we thought — the U.S. Government — thought that it would
be possible to concentrate on those areas and flush things out and
get things to move so that we could see them from above. Those
plans were not adopted.
And so I think we are moving into a phase in which we will sim-
ply monitor what we have found. I think it may be premature to
do that. So this goes a little beyond your question, but I think one
safeguard could be more aggressive inspections. Arid I recommend
that that course be adopted.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. It is always dangerous, Mr. Chairman, to ask a sci-
entist a political question, but I will give you an answer as the only
person here who nas been on the ground in Iraq and has seen the
pain inflicted on the citizens of Iraq.
I think I would favor altering them to make them more effective.
And perhaps a suggestion is to let the Iraqis sell their oil, but de-
clare that all exports will come down the Jordan highway — or all
imports come down the Jordan highway. And inspect the 20,000
trucks a day that Mr. Kroll says crosses that border very, very rig-
orously to see what is brought in.
I think in so doing, it would strengthen the support of the Arab
countries in the region who are both concerned about the impact
on 18 million people and have a vested interest in seeing that this
regime is contained and controlled.
It strikes me as much less risky and cheaper to put a powerful
and effective inspection process on that border than to continue to
impose an unsuccessful set of economic controls.
THE FIRST U.S. BOMB WAS BUILT WITH THIRD WORLD TECHNOLOGY
There is one additional remark I must make. I am not very san-
guine about export controls as a way of deterring nuclear weapons,
and I have taken to stating that in a rather blunt way. It is useful
for people to remember that the first nuclear weapons were con-
ceived, built, and used by a Third World country. The United
States, at the end of the World War II, was a Third World country
by our definitions: no computers, no numerically controlled ma-
chine tools, no jet aircraft; very primitive systems by the standards
we now use.
A particular problem of the Iraqi business has been to shock peo-
ple currently involved in the weapons program who look at Iraqi
accomplishments and say they are not significant because they
tend to think of it as we now do or as the Russians are doing it
rather than as we did 50 years ago. Much of the discussion about
dual-use technologies is, I think, flavored by that.
There were interesting arguments on the inspection teams be-
tween the scientists and the engineers and the politicians over
when dual-use technology should be destroyed. Most of the weap-
ons people thought that many of these things were essential for a
country to play in the first world economy. And if you deny that,
45
then you have said to the Iraqis, we will hold you in the Third
World. That is a very powerful political statement. I think part of
the enigma is how ao we achieve the degree of transparency that
lets us override many of these dual-use problems.
Mr. Scheinman. I concur with the idea that the sanctions should
at least be maintained, possibly strengthened; but I really haven't
given much thought to what kind of strengthening I would pursue.
However, when we speak of strengthening or maintaining the
sanctions, we have to remember that it is not us alone. There are
other countries that would have to concur. This would require a
collective decision, again, at the level of the Security Council.
I think we have to proceed carefully to know that we have got
a concurrence of view, that a strengthening of sanctions, in one
way or another, is going to achieve a desired outcome before we
will be able to proceed to bring about stronger sanctions.
I would also like to comment that the remark that was just made
by Mr. Davis goes to the heart of the point, that preventing pro-
liferation or bringing about a favorable result can only be done
through an interdependence of measures or an interdependence of
action.
Not one of these safeguards or export controls or anything else
is going to prevent a state from acquiring nuclear weapons. The
only thing that will ever prevent that from happening is the politi-
cal decision of the leadership of that country that it is not in their
interest to acquire such weapons. We have to bring about the con-
ditions in which that frame of mind can prevail. That is the biggest
challenge of all.
Mr. Lantos. Well, if you cannot change the mind of the political
leadership on that point, then perhaps change the political leader-
ship.
I want to thank all of you for an insightful series of comments.
The hearing of the joint subcommittees is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the subcommittees adjourned to recon-
vene at the call of the Chair.]
APPENDIX
TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
ROBERT L. GALLUCCI
TO THE
HOUSE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
June 29, 1993
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to
discuss our assessment of the nuclear situation in Iraq and the
UN's capabilities to deter or detect any efforts by Iraq to
regenerate its nuclear weapons program. In these remarks, I
would like to briefly describe the work the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq, some lessons learn3d. and
the continuing need to give our fullest support to the IAEA as
part of our overall non-proliferation efforts.
Impact of Inspections
Under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 687,
and with the assistance of UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), the
IAEA has conducted 20 nuclear inspections of Iraq since the end
of the Gulf War in April 1991. These inspections have forced
Iraq to disclose, destroy, or render harmless all of the major
nuclear weapons facilities and equipment that we are aware of,
including several enrichment sites, research facilities, and
weapons design facilities. Along with the damage inflicted by
the war and subsequent military actions, we believe these
inspections have effectively put the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program out of business — at least for the near term.
Regeneration a Problem
Over the long-term, however, Iraq still presents a iiuclear
threat. We believe that Saddam Hussein is committed to
rebuilding a nuclear weapon capability, using indigenous and
imported resources.
Iraq retains its most critical resource for any
nuclear weapons program, namely skilled personnel and
expertise.
Iraq also retains a basic industrial capability to
support a nuclear weapons program, including a large
amount of dual-use equipment and facilities.
If sanctions are lifted, Iraq would have access to
additional financial resources to refuel overseas
procurement activities.
Finally, Iraq has still refused to provide the UN with
details of its clandestine procurement network, a
network which could therefore be reactivated in the
future .
(47)
48
Focus On Long-term Monitoring
To deter or detect regeneration, we need to ensure that the
IAEA and UNSCOM receive the political, technical, and financial
support to implement their plans for long-term monitoring in
Irag. These plans are contained in Security Council Resolution
715 -- a resolution that Irag has so far refused to accept.
The Security Council will need to enforce the rights
of the IAEA and UNSCOM under Security Council
resolutions 687 and 715, especially the right to
conduct challenge inspections without obstruction from
the Iragi authorities.
We must also provide technical support and information
to the IAEA and UNSCOM, including assistance in the
use of technical monitoring devices, such as water
sampling, to detect covert "''"nuclear activities.
To address the risk of overseas procurement, we must
continue to press Irag to reveal its foreign
suppliers, and work with other suppliers to ensure
effective monitoring of exports to prevent diversion.
Sustainabi litv
Irag no doubt will continue to test the UN's resolve to
continue vigorous inspections — especially if it perceives
that support for them is waning. As in the past, Irag will use
tactics such as delaying or refusing access to sites, denying
information, harassing inspectors, and refusing to accept UN
Security Council Resolution 715 to reduce the effectiveness of
the inspections.
Recently, Irag's efforts to undermine long-term monitoring
has focused on two issues:
Irag has refused to allow the Special Commission to
install cameras at two rocket motor test stands and
has refused to destroy certain chemical weapons
precursors and related eguipment.
On June 18, the Security Council adopted a
Presidential Statement that Irag's refusal to
cooperate with the Special Commission in these matters
constitutes a "material and unacceptable breach" of
UNSCR 687, and a violation of UNSCRs 707 and 715. The
Statement warned of "serious consequences."
On June 22, UN Secretary General President Boutros
Bout ros-Gha 1 i met with Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz to discuss the Presidential Statement.
Aziz said that the issues could be discussed in a
technical meeting on with UNSCOM on July 12.
49
On June 24, UNSCOM Chairman Rolf Ekeus told the Iraqi
Foreign Minister that technical meetings between the Commission
and Iraq cannot take place until Iraq complies with the
Council's demands. We strongly support Chairman Ekeus in this
decision .
Strengthening of IAEA Safeguards
Finally, I would like to relate the lessons of Iraq to the
strengthening of the overall IAEA safeguards system — a system
that plays a critical role in the international effort to
prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. Fundamentally, the
revelations about Iraq demonstrated the need for the
international community to strengthen the Agency's ability and
authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities outside
declared safeguarded facilities. In response, the IAEA's Board
of Governors has taken a number of important steps to improve
safeguards, reflecting the view that the IAEA should give a
higher priority to detecting covert nuclear activities. The
Board has :
Reaffirmed the Agency's right to perform special
inspections whenever necessary to permit it to fulfill
its safeguards obligations, including access to
undeclared sites.
Determined that the Agency may rely on information
supplied by Member States when seeking a special
inspection .
Strengthened obligations to provide notice and early
submission of design information on new nuclear
facilities or changes to existing facilities.
Established a voluntary system for reporting on
nuclear exports and imports.
In our view, these changes have substantially strengthened
the IAEA safeguards system, which is essential to ensuring that
fullscope safeguards under the Non-Prolif eration Treaty are
fully implemented. We have already seen evidence of this new
determination in the Agency's performance in North Korea, South
Africa, and Iran. We believe that the IAEA's experience in
Iraq has resulted in a substantial improvement in the IAEA
safeguards system and, with the support of member states, it
will continue to be a important part of the international
non-proliferation regime.
50
Jules Kroll
Chairman
Kroll Associates
June 29th, 1993 - Testifying before the Subcommittee on
International Security, International Organizations and
Human Rights
Kroll 's involvement with the issue of Iraq's military
procurement program began as an outgrowth of our assignment
for the Government of Kuwait. In October of 1990, Kroll
Associates was hired by the Government of Kuwait to locate
covert assets of the current Iraqi regime and identify the
individuals and/or companies controlling those assets. As the
investigation progressed, it became apparent that prior to the
war, Iraq had set up two worldwide networks: a military
procurement network that used front companies to acquire
restricted technology and a financial network used to hold and
invest the hidden funds of the Iraqi regime.
The financial network, until recently under the control of
Barzan Al-Tikriti (Saddam's half-brother and formerly Iraq's
permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva) ,
continues to transact business out of Switzerland.
The military procurement network, under the control of Hussein
Kamel (Saddam's son-in-law and former head of the Ministry of
Military Industrialization) , has received more publicity as a
result of the Matrix Churchill investigations in the U.S. and
abroad. Although several of the individuals and companies
51
involved in this network have been exposed, we believe that
this network either has been, or will be, re-established.
While there is no doubt that the sanctions have had a
devastating effect on the people of Iraq, the evidence
suggests that the current regime, with the apparent help of
several countries, has not suffered and in fact, has
solidified its control over the country.
It should be noted that Jordan, frequently cited for its aid
to Iraq, appears to be making a serious effort to cooperate
with the international community's efforts to control Iraq. I
have insufficient knowledge at this point to evaluate the
current level of these efforts.
From an historical perspective however, any discussion of the
regime's survival begins with Jordan, as its role both during
and after the Gulf War cannot be overestimated.
After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, we received numerous reports
of Iraqi government funds being transferred into Jordanian
bank accounts to shield them from the international freezes on
all Iraqi assets imposed shortly thereafter.
After the end of the Gulf War, Jordan provided a safe haven
for the Iraqi government to conduct business and Amman
subsequently became Iraq's business center for all trading
52
operations. These trading operations were funded by
previously transferred funds held in Jordanian banks as well
as periodic shipments of gold from Baghdad.
In addition to its role as depository for Iraqi assets, Jordan
allowed the formation of trading companies controlled by
Saddam Hussein's family members including his son, Udai, and
his half-brothers. These companies are believed to handle the
import of all types of materials. However, Khaled Marzoumi,
Iraq's commercial attache in Amman, reportedly has primary
responsibility of trade in military goods.
Numerous sources have also reported on the frequent appearance
of several Iraqi officials in Jordan including members of
Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization as
well as Safa Habobi, a major player in Iraq's procurement
network who has been indicted in the United States for his
role in the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro scandal.
Jordan, however, does not bear sole responsibility for the
regime's ability to survive under international sanctions.
Several other countries, including Turkey, Iran and Syria have
all contributed on some level to Iraq's sanctions-busting
activities.
More importantly, international pressure on countries to abide
by the sanctions has not eliminated the network of individuals
53
and companies willing to assist the current Iraqi government.
In addition to those listed as "specially designated
nationals" of Iraq by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, I
believe that a substantial network of Iraqi bankers and
businessmen continue to assist the regime while operating in
coalition countries.
If the manner in which Iraq built up its military prior to the
Gulf War is any indication, the mere existence of covert
networks may not be as significant as the ease with which
these networks conducted business. In particular, the ability
of Iraq to purchase, through the use of front companies,
stakes in companies in countries such as the United States,
Great Britain and Switzerland provided it with ready access to
military materials while decreasing the effectiveness of
export laws.
Events of the last few years suggest that we must address both
the short-term and long-term issues affecting Iraq's ability
to re-establish itself as a threat to peace . in the region:
Without pressure from the international community, countries
will continue to assist Iraq in breaking sanctions; without
increased attention to Iraq's covert networks, Iraq's agents
will continue to conduct business as usual; and without
monitoring of foreign investments in companies dealing in
sensitive technology, Iraq will continue to have access to the
materials necessary to rebuild its military capabilities.
In closing, I would like to thank the committee for the
opportunity to share my thoughts on this matter. It has been
a honor to assist in this matter and I am available at the
committee's convenience if additional questions arise.
54
JT7LBS B. KROLL
CHAIRMAN
Jules B. Kroll is the founder of Kroll Associates and is
its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. He has been
credited with creating a new professional service of
international corporate investigations and consulting which
matches sophisticated fact-finding and investigative
techniques to the needs of the multinational business,
financial and legal communities. Kroll Associates has
offices throughout the United States as well as London,
Paris, Hong Kong and Tokyo. -
Mr. Kroll is recognized as a leading authority on the
prevention and detection of white collar crime, defensive
tactics in contests for corporate control, industrial
counter-espionage, and the management of complex investi-
gations. He has been featured on Sixty Minutes, ABC's
Nightline, BBC, ITN and in such noted publications as Time ,
Newsweek , The New York Times . Fortune , Business Week .
Corporate Finance , The Times of London, and many other
leading international publications.
55
Wisconsin Project
on Nuclear Arms Control
Cdi: Viilholiin
Professor L'nt\-erstt\ ->r IV/jt/J/ii/n School ot Lu»
Director
PREPARED STATEMENT OF GARY MILEOLLIN
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL
AND DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment,
and
Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations and Human Rights
June 29, 1993
10:00 a.m.
56
Good morning. I am pleased to have this opportunity to
address these three distinguished Subcommittees of the Foreign
Affairs Committee.
The Subcommittees have asked me to address the question of
the inspections in Iraq and the effectiveness of the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
In roughly one month, we will pass the third anniversary of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. If Iraq had not invaded Kuwait, it is
very likely that Saddam Hussein would be passing a different
milestone about now: he would be assembling his first atomic
bomb. Two former U.N. inspectors, David Kay and Jay Davis, have
estimated that at the time of the invasion, Iraq was 18 to 30
months away from producing its first critical mass of nuclear
weapon material. We have now passed the 30-month mark.
One of the most frightening things about this possibility is
that the International Atomic Energy Agency did not, and never
would have, detected it. The Agency's inspections were not set
up to do so. Before the invasion, the Agency consistently rated
Iraq's compliance with its inspections as "exemplary." In fact,
Iraq's cooperation was exemplary at the locations the Agency was
inspecting. The problem was that the Agency was not inspecting
the locations where Iraq was making the bomb. The Agency only
inspects locations declared by the country being inspected, and
so far, no country has made a bomb at a declared site. All A-
bomb programs have been carried on at secret, undeclared sites.
Iraq is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
which means that Iraq promised not to make nuclear weapons and
also promised to declare all of its work with plutonium and
enriched uranium to the Agency. (Plutonium fueled the Nagasaki
bomb; enriched uranium the Hiroshima bomb) . But Iraq secretly
broke both of these promises at the very time that the Agency was
rating its Treaty compliance as exemplary.
To make matters worse, Iraq broke its promise by diverting
equipment that the Agency's current chief inspector in Iraq had
helped sell — over U.S. objections — to the Iraqis in the late
1970s. Thus, the very equipment that the chief inspector helped
supply was used to break the promise he is now supposed to be
57
enforcing. Worse still, the Agency was later told about the
violation by an Iraqi official who was himself a former Agency
inspector. The former inspector had used his experience at the
Agency to help outwit the current inspectors.
It is now clear what Iraq's strategy was. Iraq joined the
Nonproliferation Treaty, enjoyed the diplomatic and trade
benefits that come from membership, but still tried to make the
bomb by outwitting the inspectors. If Saddam had not been
foolish enough to invade Kuwait, the strategy would have worked.
Iran is now following this same strategy, and so are Libya and
North Korea. These countries cannot be expected to invade their
neighbors on the eve of nuclear capability.
It is unfair, however, to criticize the Agency for not doing
a job that it was not set up to do. The Agency's primary duty is
to promote the spread of nuclear energy, especially to developing
countries. It does a good job of that by running training
programs, by sending out exports of its own, and — most of all — by
agreeing to inspect exports made by the more advanced nuclear
countries to the less advanced ones.
When a nuclear supplier wants to sell a reactor to a country
like Pakistan or India, the Agency provides a "guarantee" that
the reactor's plutonium won't be used to make atomic bombs.
Without such a guarantee to make the export palatable, such
transfers would be politically impossible. The result has been
to encourage the proliferation of nuclear technology around the
world. India and Pakistan both got reactors under Agency
guarantees, and both have since made atomic bombs.
The Agency's conflict of interest is obvious. If the Agency
catches somebody making bombs, it means that the nuclear exports
were too dangerous to have been sold in the first place and
should not have been promoted. Thus, the institutional incentive
is always to find that nothing is wrong.
In the United States, the old Atomic Energy Commission had
the job of both promoting and regulating nuclear energy until
1974, when Congress wisely split the functions. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission now regulates; the Department of Energy
promotes. The U.S. regulatory process gained great credibility
from this separation.
The situation in Iran illustrates the Agency's dilemma.
The Chinese are now planning to sell Iran at least one 300MW
power reactor. The reactor will make enough plutonium for at
least ten atomic bombs per year. The world will be relying only
on a piece of paper, signed by Iran, promising that the plutonium
will never be diverted.
58
The United States opposes the deal because it will be a
giant nuclear technology transfer, moving Iran a long way down
the road toward a bomb. James Woolsey, Director of Central
Intelligence, told Congress in February that Iran intends to make
nuclear weapons. The IAEA, however, stands ready to facilitate
this export by promising to inspect it — providing the necessary
political cover. I hope the Subcommittees will ask the IAEA
witnesses here this morning why the IAEA is willing to cooperate
with this deal.
The Subcommittees have asked specifically about Iraq — about
the progress in destroying Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
since the Gulf War. According to the U.N. Special Commission in
New York, which is in charge of the chemical and missile
inspections, there has been good progress in destroying chemical
agents, munitions and precursors. More than one thousand tons of
chemical weapon precursors have been destroyed so far, but a
large amount remains. The Commission expects to have destroyed
all of the identified nerve gas, mustard gas and precursors by
the end of this year.
With respect to missiles, the U.N. inspectors report that
they have narrowed the uncertainty as to how many Soviet-supplied
Scud missiles remain in Iraq. The uncertainty is in the number
launched from 1980 to 1982. The Iraqis have not provided the
documents necessary to verify their claims.
Both the missile and chemical inspectors are now being
defied, however. The U.N. Security Council has just condemned
Iraq for refusing to move chemical equipment to a site for
destruction, and for refusing to allow surveillance cameras to be
installed at rocket test sites. The Special Commission believes
that these refusals threaten the core of its inspection effort,
so the question is what action to take if Iraq does not back
down. The matter is now under consideration.
With respect to the nuclear program, there is less progress
and more uncertainty. I have described the nuclear inspections
in an article that I wrote for the New Yorker in February. Also,
in April the New York Times published a list of the main nuclear-
related items that still appear to be missing in Iraq. The list
is an estimate, compiled by the Wisconsin Project from Agency
reports and other sources. It gives a general picture of what
the Agency is still looking for. I would like to submit both
articles for inclusion in the record.
The Subcommittees have asked me to comment on the adequacy
of the Agency's inspection effort in Iraq. The Agency is in
charge of the nuclear inspections. I think that the inspectors
themselves deserve our deepest gratitude and admiration. They
have carried out a difficult, dangerous job that is both
physically and mentally exhausting. The inspectors are entitled
59
to the greatest possible support from the Agency's management,
but they have not always received it.
One of the main problems has been the chief inspector's
statements to the press. As early as February 1992, he said that
"practically the largest part of Iraq's nuclear program has now
been identified — probably what is missing is just details." And
in September, he told Reuters that Iraq's nuclear program "is at
zero now," and "they [the Iraqis] have stated many times to us
that they have decided at the higher political level to stop
tnese activities." Ke eve*! made the improbable statc^er.t that
"this we have verified."
The U.N. Special Commission flatly rejects these statements.
The Commission believes that Iraq has not given up on any of its
mass-destruction weapon programs, including the nuclear one.
Because of his press statements, the chief inspector has
undermined the other inspectors' credibility. How can they
plausibly search for things that their leader says don't exist?
The Special Commission still wants to find the following:
* parts of the giant machines the Iraqis used
to purify uranium to nuclear weapon grade, to
find out how much of this uranium the Iraqis
made
* a suspected experimental array of
centrifuges, also used to purify uranium to
weapon grade
* a suspected underground reactor that could
secretly make plutonium for bombs
* the identities of Iraqi nuclear personnel, to
find out what these persons are doing
* records of explosive tests, to find out
whether the Iraqi bomb design succeeded
* other records of the nuclear weapon program,
to find out whether all of its components
have been discovered
* Iraq's foreign sources of technical advice,
to cut them off
* Iraq's network of foreign equipment
suppliers, to make sure that it does not
revive as soon as the embargo is lifted.
60
Finally, the Subcommittees ask how the Agency can be
strengthened. I believe that the United Nations should follow
the lead of the Congress and separate the Agency's promotion
function from its inspection function. This would increase its
credibility by removing its conflict of interest. The
inspections in Iraq, for example, would be carried out better by
the Special Commission, which has no promotion function and acts
directly under the United Nations Security Council.
In other countries, the Agency could continue to inspect
declared locations, but inspections of undeclared locations
should be done by a new entity whose sole job would be
verification; no promotion function would interfere. This new
entity could concentrate its resources on inspecting countries
where the threat of proliferation is greatest, rather than
dissipate its inspection resources as the Agency presently does.
The Agency currently spends most of its scarce inspection funds
looking at Germany, Japan and Canada, hardly the most acute
proliferation risks today. This leaves fewer resources for
countries like Iran.
This new entity should report to the U.N. Security Council,
rather than to the Agency's Board of Governors. The Board
typically includes countries like Algeria, China, India, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Syria. This amounts to letting a
committee of arsonists decide where to send the fire truck.
This new entity should also be able to receive, use and
protect intelligence information. The Agency has never had that
ability, which is why it has never been able to do anything more
than inspect declared locations. Even in the case of Iraq, where
the Agency has been provided intelligence information, the
Agency's secrecy rules have kept the providers from finding out
what their intelligence produced. U.S. intelligence officials
say that the Agency has been a one-way street: information goes
in, but nothing comes out.
I would like to end with an important reminder, which is
that the Agency's inspections play only a minor role in the
effort to stop the spread of the bomb. In countries like Israel,
India, Pakistan and South Africa — countries that have
successfully proliferated — the Agency's inspections have been
virtually irrelevant. These countries made the bomb at places
where the Agency never had any right to look. To stop the bomb
from spreading further, more powerful tools are needed. They
include tougher diplomacy, trade sanctions, aid cut-offs, and
denials of technology through export controls. It is important
to make the Agency's inspections as strong as possible, and it is
certainly possible to improve them, but it would be a mistake to
think that by tinkering with them we are going to seriously
affect proliferation.
61
The United Nations Inspections of Iraq:
Accomplishments and Operational Lessons
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Joint Hearing
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and Environment
Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations, and Human Rights
June 29, 1993
Dr. Jay C. Davis
Director, Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry
and
Program Leader, Geoscience and Environmental Research
Physical Sciences Directorate
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
62
Chairman Hamilton, Chairman Gejdenson, Chairman Lantos and
Members of the Subcommittees, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss my
insights from the Iraqi inspection process. Properly learning the lessons of these
inspections, clearly an on-going process, is vital to the success of future efforts to
control and inhibit proliferation of nuclear weapons to states or non-national
organizations that might readily choose to use them. Today's hearing is
particularly timely, as yesterday was the second anniversary of the unannounced
inspection and subsequent truck chase at Fallujah. That inspection and
confrontation produced the first irrefutable evidence of Iraq's covert nuclear
weapons program, its violation of its obligations under the Nonproliferation
Treaty, and its efforts to evade the requirements of Resolution 687. As a
principal in the events at Fallujah, I must confess that I never imagined that two
years later we would still be dealing with so many uncertainties regarding both
Iraq and the inspection process.
I should begin with an important caveat. I speak to you as an individual,
not as a representative of either the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or
the Department of Energy. My impressions of the inspections and the inferences
with respect to policy that I draw from them are mine alone; neither Livermore
nor DOE should be burdened with them.
It is perhaps useful for the Subcommittee to understand a bit of my
personal background to help put my comments in perspective. I am an
experimental nuclear physicist, having spent over twenty years at Livermore as
both a research leader and engineering project manager. I have built several
accelerator facilities and am familiar with nuclear weapons design, fabrication
and testing and with the various technologies used to produce plutonium or to
enrich uranium for weapons purposes. My principal research interests are in the
application of accelerator and isotopic techniques to problems as disparate as the
dosimetry of carcinogens and mutagens, the mechanisms of global climate
change, and the development of verification techniques for nuclear arms control.
I served as a technical expert detailed to the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) on two of the early confrontational and productive inspections,
Nuclear 2 and Nuclear 4 in the summer of 1991, to assess Iraqi efforts in these
areas.
In addition, I have been both an Emergency Duty Officer for the
Livermore Laboratory and a Senior Scientific Advisor for DOE's Nuclear
Emergency Search Team (NEST) and Accident Response Group (ARG). In both
these roles, I have trained and operated with security personnel at Livermore and
have trained with the FBI and US military for NEST/ ARG activities. I am both
medically and psychologically screened for high-stress field work. In
consequence, I look upon the Iraqi Inspections with an attitude somewhat
different from that of a scientist on a site visit to a foreign facility-
63
You have posed three questions. I will answer them as directly as is
possible for a scientist, feeling that your subsequent questions will elicit further
detail as necessary.
1. How successful have the efforts of the international community since
the Gulf War been in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi resources and
capabilities to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction?
The United Nations has been very effective in finding, dismantling, and
destroying Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction. Aided by
intelligence, the process has forced Iraqi divulgement and disclosure of
relocated equipment, of records concealed, and of personnel involved. At
present, particularly in the ballistic missile area, completion of the process
seems to be hindered by lack of good intelligence leads. Given that the
work is done by unarmed inspectors operating within a country in full
control of its military and security forces, I think the results have been
remarkable. However, the process has shifted from discovery and
destruction of Iraqi facilities to frustration of Iraqi attempts to restart their
programs. Keeping inspectors on the ground inhibits Iraqi resumption of
prohibited activities, but the process will become more dangerous as Iraqi
frustration rises and world political support erodes. That change should
be noted and its consequences anticipated.
2. How well has the International Atomic Agency accomplished the
tasks in Iraq that were given to it by the United Nations Security Council?
Performance could have been improved in the nuclear inspections by
giving the leadership role to UNSCOM and relegating the IAEA to a
technical support role in nuclear fuel cycle and safeguards techniques.
Many of the IAEA staff, and some of its leadership, were burdened by the
perceived need to protect the Agency's role, to defend its past
performance in Iraq, and to protect themselves from criticism (and
possible career damage) within the Agency. Institutionalizing leadership
for the nuclear inspections in the Agency made it difficult to remove timid
leaders and resulted in an opening between UNSCOM and the IAEA that
made possible both information loss and Iraqi political intrigue. The
IAEA has been accused of being both politicized and of suffering from
clientitis. From my perspective, both these accusations are justified. The
IAEA shows little appetite for intrusive inspection or aggressive behavior,
both of which are essential to this inspection regime.
The IAEA fielded very different sorts of leaders in Iraq. David Kay, who
led the two inspections in which I participated, was aggressive and active
in the field, thereby accomplishing positive ends. Maurizio Zefferero was
more the diplomat - concerned, if not burdened - by the politics of the
64
situation and the IAEA's interests. Demitri Perricos was a classic IAEA
inspector, principally concerned with detailed verification of previously
declared activities. As an example of clientitis, Perricos chided me on
several occasions for my estimates of Iraqi design goals and costs. These
had appeared in the media and had offended the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission, leading them to protest that there was political motivation
behind the numbers. As these estimates were made possible only after
defeating exhaustive Iraqi concealment and deception efforts, partly in the
inspection confrontation at Fallujah in which Iraqi agents had fired upon
and detained members of our team, I felt his concerns for Iraqi sensibilities
to be poorly considered. It is very important for Committee Members to
realize that the aggressive surprise inspection at Fallujah that forced the
Iraqis to disclose their covert program was hardly a typical IAEA
inspection activity. The entire scenario was orchestrated and carried out
by David Kay, four US and British technical experts, and two non-IAEA
UN support staff, using authority granted by Rolf Ekeus, head of the UN
Special Commission. We quite literally wrote the script for Fallujah while
walking through Baghdad back alleys after midnight, decidedly not the
IAEA style. Had that operation failed, as it threatened to at several
moments, we might never have realized the full scope of the Iraqi
program.
Placing leadership for the nuclear inspections in the hand of UNSCOM, as
was done for the chemical, biological, and ballistic missile inspections,
would have allowed evaluation of team leaders based on their
performance in the field and their replacement if needed without
institutional questions arising. This step would have also provided the
IAEA with a useful mechanism for evading the political costs associated
with the conduct of intrusive inspections. I strongly recommend such an
arrangement in the future. The Security Council's direct authority is much
stronger than that of the IAEA and should be appropriately utilized.
3. What steps can be taken to strengthen the IAEA to deal with such
challenges in Iraq and elsewhere in the future?
As my comments above indicate, I do not believe that the IAEA should
have the lead role in such matters in the future. We are at present
strengthening the IAEA's analytical abilities, both through access to our
own facilities and by helping them field improved techniques in their own
laboratories. Staff from Livermore and the other national laboratories are
involved in these efforts now. I think that the IAEA has an important
support role in sample acquisition, maintenance of chain-of-custody, and
technical analysis of materials returned. I am not sanguine about granting
the Agency routine information to intelligence information or allowing it
to acquire genuine sophistication in nuclear weapons design and
technology.
65
In the chemical, biological and ballistic missile areas, the United Nations
Special Commission has shown adequate ability to field effective teams
and to accomplish its mission without having a long previous history on
the ground in Iraq. UNSCOM has been able to evaluate and replace
leaders and to evolve operational doctrine without institutional
inhibitions. I strongly recommend that future nuclear inspections be run
under direct Special Commission control in a similar fashion. Allow
UNSCOM (or its successor agency) to select the inspection team leaders,
evaluate the quality of intelligence, select inspection targets, and staff the
teams as appropriate, detailing IAEA staff in support roles as needed.
This change would relieve the IAEA of its conflicting roles of first friendly
teacher and inspector of nuclear technology, and then suddenly operator
of adversarial and accusatory special inspections. Such a change would
allow more readily the fielding of teams of mixed specialists, likely to be
more suitable for future inspections in troublesome places.
There is perhaps one consequence of the Iraqi program that has not been
fully realized and that is appropriate to point out to the Subcommittee Members
concerned with economic effects. Much of the Iraqi investment in the covert
uranium enrichment program was dual purpose. The Iraqis intended not only to
create weapons but to produce an infrastructure of trained people and state-of-
the-art production facilities that would make them a first-world nation in
economic terms. They discussed this goal in terms of human capital and return
on investment in a fashion that would be perfectly understood by the Clinton
Administration. It is useful to remember that Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, the head of their
covert program, is both Vice-Chairman of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
and Deputy Minister of Industry. Although they failed to produce nuclear
weapons, the Iraqis succeeded in creation of first-world production facilities for
mechanical and electrical hardware, a fact verified and broadcast by our
inspections. While much of the dual use infrastructure has been destroyed, the
Iraqis quite cheerfully state that they can rebuild it. The size and sophistication
of this act of industrialization, unprecedented among the Arab countries of the
Middle-East, is a threat to their Arab neighbors and a destabilizing force, even if
the Iraqis magically adopt a pacific and democratic governmental style. The
Iraqis openly express a desire for educational, economic and political leadership
of the Arab states. Many of us on the teams feel that they have the capability to
emerge as the Japanese of the Middle-East; that such emergence may not be
welcomed by their neighbors should be anticipated.
Finally, let me close with a comment on the future. I think it important to
emphasize that in Iraq the IAEA and the Special Commission have been asked to
do a task that is without precedent, operating under conditions and restraints
that have been applied to no previous inspections. To criticize the IAEA for its
performance on institutional grounds fails to recognize that it is trying to do a
66
task for which it was neither created nor enfranchised; criticism on grounds of
inadequate personal performance and the failure to deal with it is allowable. We
need new institutions, operating with different access to information, different
team selection and training approaches, and very different access to supporting
military and political power if we are to be prepared for future events.
Those of us who participated in the Iraqi inspections have come away feeling
that their multi-national character and UN direction were essential to success.
We are proud of what was accomplished on an ad-hoc basis by teams that made
up doctrine and procedures as they went along. This approach will not suffice in
the future where intrusive inspections may have to be carried out in states that
have not recently been shocked by massive aerial bombardment and ground
combat as Iraq was. An ad-hoc approach will similarly not suffice if we are to
undertake such missions as seizing control of the nuclear weapons of a
collapsing proliferant state, an event of increasing probability. If we are to
succeed in these tasks in the face of deception, frustration, and possible violence,
we need doctrinal development, specialized equipment, and frequent practice
with our peers from other countries. None of those useful preconditions is being
accomplished at present. Almost all discussion of improved nonproliferation
programs has focused on technology, not on doctrine and operations. This
deficiency in present planning is an error that will have fatal consequences, both
personal and political, for participants at all levels. It would be very dangerous,
both to governments and to individuals, to presume that the successes in Iraq
demonstrate a general case. Iraq may in fact be the easiest case we ever face.
Thank you for your consideration of my insights.
67
Biography
Jay C. Davis
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
University of California
P.O. Box 808, L-397
Livermore, CA 94551
Jay C. Davis is a nuclear physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory. At Livermore since 1971, he has worked as a research scientist and
as an engineering manager, having led the design and construction of several
unique accelerator facilities used for basic and applied research. He has also
worked as a manager in magnetic fusion and laser isotope separation.
In 1988, Dr. Davis was appointed Director of the Center for Accelerator
Mass Spectrometry, a multi-disciplinary, multi-organizational group applying
accelerator analytical techniques to problems in biomedicine, geochemistry,
materials science, and arms control. In 1993, he also became Program Leader
for Geoscience and Environmental Research at LLNL, overseeing the
Laboratory's efforts in global climate change, environmental sciences, earth
sciences and the emergency response to airborne release of toxic or radioactive
materials.
Dr. Davis received his BA in Physics from the University of Texas in 1963,
his MA in Physics from the University of Texas in 1964, and his Ph.D. in Physics
from the University of Wisconsin in 1969. From 1969 to 1971, he was an AEC
Postdoctoral Fellow in nuclear physics at the University of Wisconsin
Dr. Davis has numerous publications on research in nuclear physics,
nuclear instrumentation, plasma physics, accelerator design and technology,
nuclear analytical techniques and analytical methods, and treaty verification
technologies. He holds patents on spectrometer technologies and methods for
low-level dosimetry of carcinogens and mutagens, and the study of metabolic
processes. He has been a scientific advisor to the UN Secretariat, several US
agencies, and to scientific agencies of the governments of Australian and New
Zealand. He participated in two UN inspections of Iraq in 1991 He is an avid
backpacker, biker and cross-country skier
6/22/93
68
Prepared Testimony of Professor Lawrence Scheinman, Cornell University: Joint Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the Subcommittee on Economic
Policy, Trade and Environment, and the Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations and Human Rights, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
June 29, 1993
Thank you very much for the opportunity to participate in these important hearings on
UN and IAEA efforts to identify and destroy Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and establish
a long-term monitoring regime. I propose to focus most of my remarks on the questions of
how well the IAEA has accomplished the tasks assigned to it by the United Nations Security
Council under Resolution 687, and what steps can be taken to strengthen the IAEA's ability
to deal with the challenge of proliferation in Iraq and elsewhere in the future. However, I
would like to begin with a few remarks on the general question of how successful have been
the efforts of the international community in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi
resources and capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass
destruction.
A fundamental point of departure in answering this question is the understanding that
it is virtually impossible to be certain about success. The only prudent approach is to be
certain of uncertainty. Leaving aside the obvious problems of the continued presence of
thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the consequent residual theoretical and
technological knowledge and expertise, accrued technical and experimental experience, and
copies of records, reports, and design activities related to nuclear weapons development,
which are easy to hide and difficult to ferret out, there can be no definitive assurance that
nothing remains in Iraq in terms of tangible resources and capabilities to produce weapons of
mass destruction, and there never really can be.
This reality is one of the underlying reasons for long-term monitoring in Iraq as
prescribed by UNSC/RES.715. Long-term monitoring is intended to ensure continuous
verification of Iraqi compliance with extensive nonproliferation undertakings defined in the
Security Council cease-fire resolution that go beyond those agreed by Iraq as a party to the
NPT, and to minimize the risk that Iraq could successfully reconstruct a nuclear weapon
development program. RES. 715. among other things, authorizes the IAEA to carry out
anytime/anyplace on-site inspections; to secure full and free access to all sites, material and
persons that the Agency judges necessary to fulfill its monitoring and verification activities;
and to restrict and/or stop movement of suspected material, equipment and other items. As
the Committee is aware, Iraq has thus far refused to formally accept this Resolution, insisting
that it is an unwarranted intrusion on its national sovereignty, although elements such as a
water-sampling program already are under way.
So far-reaching a verification system, especially if based and implemented on a
presumption that Iraq will try again to build nuclear explosives, can severely limit, but not
absolutely foreclose, a successful clandestine effort. An additional complicating factor that
69
did not exist at the onset of the Gulf War, is the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the
increased risk that would-be proliferators such as Iraq might be able to purchase directly
weapons-usable material, or even acquire complete nuclear devices, thereby bypassing the
need for mounting a program for producing fissile material which would be highly vulnerable
to detection by a robust verification system. This underscores a fundamental point: the
ultimate effectiveness of the verification regime is not self-contained, but contingent on other
considerations such as a vigorously applied comprehensive export control system embracing
all relevant suppliers, and, of course, resolute political support by the United Nations
Security Council and the key states in the international system. I will return to this theme in
addressing the question of steps to strengthen the IAEA.
This having been said, it is clear that a great deal has been accomplished in stripping
Iraq of its capability to develop weapons of mass destruction. Given the rather adverse
conditions under which the IAEA and UNSCOM have had to operate, the achievements are
all the more impressive. Inspection in Iraq is not a cooperative venture. Although accepting
the terms and conditions of the cease fire resolution that established the rights and
responsibilities of the IAEA, UNSCOM and Iraq, Iraqi authorities have attempted to redefine
their obligations and the rights of inspecting authorities and have interposed difficulties all
along the way. This includes failing to disclose information until it was clear that inspectors
had irrefutable evidence of the existence of a facility, material or equipment; attempted
continuous concealment of equipment and documents; denial of use of airfields to UN
personnel; complicity in hostile behavior toward inspectors, and so on. This is a continuing
problem. As noted by the UNSCOM spokesman, rather than making good faith declarations
of former activities that were now banned, Iraq consistently concealed the full extent of its
programs. UNSCOM and the IAEA were forced to change the basic premises of their
approach to the inspection relationship from good faith to using information from
independent sources and backed by threats of continuing the embargo and resuming
hostilities. (T.Trevan, Arms Control Today , April, 1993, p. 11).
Despite these impediments, UNSCOM and the IAEA have substantially exposed the
Iraqi programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. There is a sense that while not
everything has been found the vast majority of what existed has been identified; that the
broad infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons has been identified and rendered
harmless, destroyed or taken into custody; that all declared nuclear material and quantities of
undeclared material have been accounted for and where relevant either already removed or
readied for removal; that dual-use equipment has been identified although the question of its
ultimate disposition in a number of instances remains unresolved. Uncertainties persist about
the continued presence of unacknowledged and undiscovered items or facilities such as an
alleged hidden reactor, with the IAEA following up all plausible leads regarding the possible
location of such a facility, a process that will continue as long as plausible information is
made available or other indicators arise suggesting the existence of an undeclared facility.
The possibility that more undeclared nuclear material may exist in Iraq has not been
excluded. There is also a widely shared presumption that Iraq has not given up in its quest
for weapons of mass destruction, and that given the opportunity it would reinstitute its
70
program. As well, it is recognized that given its human resource and technical experience
base a rejuvenated program could move forward more rapidly than in the case of newly
aspirant states. Remaining gaps in information regarding the possible existence of hidden
components as well as incomplete information on the Iraqi supply network both in the
nuclear and missile areas are well understood by UNSCOM and IAEA, and this guides their
definition of future actions.
In short, the efforts of the international community in identifying and disabling Iraqi
resources and capabilities to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction appear to
have been remarkably successful even if incomplete and limited by the reality that the only
certainty is uncertainty. But if policy is developed and implemented on that premise the risks
associated with uncertainty will be commensurately reduced.
The second question asks how well the IAEA accomplished the tasks in Iraq that were
given to it by the United Nations Security Council. The short answer to this question is that
the IAEA has fulfilled its assigned responsibilities professionally and effectively, earning it
the respect and confidence of the UN Security Council, the Secretary General, and many
governments for whom resolute implementation of the provisions for the elimination of
weapons of mass destruction, and the capability to produce them by Iraq, are a paramount
concern.
There are also those who have criticized the Agency's performance of its assigned
tasks. Some have done so because of what they considered to be deficiencies in how the
IAEA carried out its mission. A second kind of criticism reflects the intrinsic distrust of
international organizations to deal with security-related matters that some people share. Still
other criticism is based, in my view, less on the question of how the IAEA performed in Irac
than on a concern that an organization that has a mandate both to promote and to safeguard
the peaceful use of nuclear energy and that has been focussed on verifying declared nuclear
materials and activities and operating more as a confidence-building mechanism than as a
verification mechanism (searching for clandestine activity and invoking mandatory no-notice
on-site inspections of declared or undeclared sites) might not be able to adequately
accommodate to the requirements of a more demanding verification regime that will have to
deal not just with declared nuclear activities, but increasingly with the threat of future Iraqs
and of undeclared and clandestine nuclear operations. In part this reflects a misunderstanding
of the process of international safeguards, in part, an intuitive preference not to rely on a
technically-anchored international organization to carry out what is seen to be a political and
security function. This raises sizable issues about the future of the non-proliferation regime
and its supporting institutions that cannot be adequately addressed in the time available today
Turning back to the first criticism concerning quality of performance, there are
several points to make. First, a number of the tasks assigned by the Security Council to the
IAEA broke new ground. While the Agency had a long experience in material control and
71
accounting and in identifying and evaluating the capabilities of nuclear plant, it had not
before been called upon to deal with national military activities or to take physical control of
nuclear materials and assets. Yet RES/687 charged the IAEA with responsibility to identify
and evaluate weaponi2ation facilities and nuclear weapons infrastructure, and to take control
of and supervise the removal, destruction or rendering harmless of items specified in the
resolution. The earlier cited remark of the UNSCOM spokesman is particularly relevant
here: he noted that "The initial understanding in implementing the verification regime was
that Iraq would, in good faith, make declarations about its former activities that are now
banned." Instead, it quickly "became evident that Iraq was consistently concealing the full
extent of its programs. As a result, the verification regime had to be tightened, and the
UNSCOM teams, and in the nuclear sphere, the International Atomic Energy Agency, were
forced to change the basic premises of their approach to the inspection relationship; Iraq, it
seems, had to be presumed guilty until proven innocent." (Trevan, loc.cif ) It would appear
that if the IAEA approached its tasks with some naivete and caution, it was not at all alone in
this regard.
In the course of 18 nuclear inspections in Iraq the IAEA-led teams have, as indicated,
mapped out a substantially comprehensive picture of Iraq's nuclear development program,
while acknowledging that they do not,and cannot ,have an absolutely complete picture. All
known major facilities that could contribute to a weapons development program have been
destroyed and all dedicated or single purpose equipment and components either destroyed or
placed under seal. Some quantities of dual-use equipment have been left intact. This appears
to follow the UNSCOM policy, as described by its spokesman of "not destroying many dual-
use items that could be irreversibly converted for permitted purposes." (Trevan. op.cit ,
p. 14). The full extent of the weapons development program however, is not clear; knowledge
of the sources of supply for equipment and components is incomplete; and it is uncertain that
all special nuclear material in Iraq has been located and taken into custody. Recognizing that
some activities, especially those involving small-scale research and progress in theoretical
work and design, cannot be known except under the circumstance of extraordinary luck, the
IAEA emphasizes the monitoring of nuclear material pursuant to the very broad range of
inspection rights referenced earlier, as approved by the Security Council in the long-term
monitoring plan (RES/715).
How should one assess IAEA performance in all of these tasks? That judgment is best
made by those outside the IAEA closest to the events. In the course of evaluating two years
experience under RES/687, the UNSCOM spokesman remarked that "Through their diligent
work, the IAEA inspection teams, with the assistance and cooperation of UNSCOM,
uncovered three major programs for the enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade material,
laboratory-scale preparation of plutonium, and a full-scale program for nuclear
weaponization." (Trevan, op.cit p. 13) The Deputy Executive Chairman of UNSCOM.
Ambassador Newlin, speaking before a small professional group assembled by the
Washington Council on Nonprol iteration this past October, after noting the past limitations of
IAEA inspections commented that "...the Agency has had to adapt to the intrusive type of
inspection, primarily at undeclared sites, as mandated by resolution 687. In my view, the
72
IAEA has adjusted to the new inspection requirements with remarkable success, a fact
illustrated to UNSCOM by IAEA's very thorough, excellent reports. Beyond inspections, the
IAEA has also done well in the destruction phase of resolution 687. The Agency....
performed magnificently at the Al Atheer site in supervising the destruction of a very large
number of.. .buildings that were involved in the weaponization program." Finally,
Ambassador Ekeus, the UNSCOM Executive Chairman, while questioning the current
adequacy of the nonproliferation regime to halt the spread of nuclear weapons in a talk at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory last November, remarked that "Iraq's nuclear
programme has been halted-the IAEA did a truly magnificent job in this respect." This
conforms with similar statements he has reportedly made in periodic reports to the Security
Council.
If, as some others contend, the IAEA record has been less than sterling, I submit that
one should look not at isolated instances, but at the record as a whole; and that one should
focus on the institution in its entirety rather than on any single individual. Perfection is
beyond human reach. The consensus among those objectively viewing events seems to be that
the IAEA has performed very competently in meeting its responsibilities under RES/687.
This brings us to the final question raised, namely what steps can be taken to
strengthen the ability of the IAEA to deal with Iraq-type challenges in the future. As the
Committee is well aware, this question has been the focus of attention for several years
dating in some respects to pre-Iraqi times. But the events in Iraq and the implications of the
end of the Cold War for non-proliferation have served to concentrate the mind and energy of
governments, IAEA leadership and non-governmental organizations. In approaching this
question one must, of course, understand that the draconian and punitive measures applied
under the UNSC resolutions in Iraq cannot be taken as a standard for normal international
verification. It is implausible that states would freely and voluntarily submit themselves to so
onerous and intrusive a regime. If anything underscores this truth it is the reversal of the
United States position regarding anytime/anyplace inspections under the chemical weapons
convention. On the other hand, as demonstrated in recent arms control and disarmament
agreements, and in changes brought about in IAEA safeguards, there is considerable support
for taking significant steps to ensure credibility and to reinforce confidence. But any regime
of the future will still have to strike a balance between the demands of international
confidence and national sovereignty.
A point that cannot be repeated too often is that the safeguards system applied by the
IAEA in support of the Nonproliferation Treaty was commensurate with the expectations and
desires of the international community. The NPT system was devised to apply comprehensive
safeguards principally to the nuclear fuel cycles of the advanced industrial states which at the
time were the only states with anv significant nuclear activity at all. These states. Germany.
Japan. Italy, Sweden and so on were determined to minimize any risk that the distinction
between themselves and the nuclear weapon states inherent in the NPT would extend into the
73
realm of peaceful nuclear activity and competition. This deep-seated concern, parenthetically,
was the reason why President Johnson offered to submit all US peaceful nuclear activities to
the IAEA safeguards regime to be applied to the non-nuclear weapon states under the Treaty.
To ensure the adherence of these states to a non-proliferation treaty the United States
and the Soviet Union endorsed a verification regime that kept intrusion to the minimum
consistent with credible verification. This resulted in a system that focussed on the flow of
nuclear material and resulted in certain constraints on how the IAEA exercised the rather
liberal rights originally granted it in its statute. Governments, speaking through their
representatives on the Board of Governors, established the tone of the times. Participating
non-nuclear weapon states were obligated to declare all of their nuclear material to the IAEA
which would then verify that the material could be accounted for.
Given the structure of global competition between the two superpowers it was always
presumed that they would control any threat of proliferation among their allies or clients, and
as their competition reached into every region of the world, that assumption applied to the
world at large. The periodic five year reviews of the NPT have resulted in consensus
endorsements of the sufficiency and credibility of the safeguards system despite some
differences [raised by activist non-governmental institutions] over the adequacy of the
material control and accounting system upon which the regime was based to detect diversions
of quantities of nuclear material suitable to produce a single nuclear explosive device in
certain large-scale facilities.
The end of the Cold War changed one of the assumptions upon which the
nonproliferation regime had been built; the discovery of a massive and largely unknown
nuclear weapons development program in an NPT state, Iraq, changed another. In this new
environment the expectations are that with the diffusion of technology more states that are no
longer under the watchful eye of the superpowers can engage in nuclear weapons
development and that, because of security and political concerns no longer being
subordinated to the superpower competition, some of these states well may seek to satisfy
their political/security interests with nuclear arms.
All of these factors have an impact on international institutions, not least the IAEA.
Most notably, the credibility of safeguards is now seen to be a function of their capacity to
detect undeclared or clandestine nuclear activity. And the measure of the IAEA is to be its
willingness and capability to agree and implement a more intrusive verification regime -- a
regime for which the basic authority is already essentially in place. An underlying concern
for some, as mentioned earlier, is whether an organization that simultaneously promotes and
regulates nuclear energy can focus sufficiently and firmly enough on regulation to provide
the necessary credibility; whether, given the strong emphasis on confidence-building in the
past, it can apply rigorous verification.
The effort to meet the new circumstances and new expectations has centered on re-
examining existing safeguards authority and clarifying or building upon it as appropriate.
74
The main focus has been special inspections, authority for which derives from the statute and
the governing safeguards document, INFIRC/153. In February, 1992 the Board of Governors
confirmed the Director General's conclusion that authority to conduct special inspections in
full-scope safeguards states extended not only to other locations within an already declared
facility, but also to facilities and locations other than those notified to the Agency by the
state. It was also confirmed that a request for a special inspection could be based on plausible
information from sources other than safeguards inspections, including information from
national intelligence sources.
The authority to invoke special inspections is one thing; the willingness to do so,
given its potential political ramifications is another. North Korea provided a testing ground
for Agency determination. Faced with a discrepancy regarding how much plutonium may
have been produced by the North Koreans when measured against findings derived from the
procedures to establish an initial inventory pursuant to the North Korean safeguards
agreement, and provided with corroborative non-safeguards information concerning the
existence of undeclared waste storage facilities, the Director General called for a special
inspection. When North Korea refused, this was reported to the Board of Governors which
reaffirmed the need for a special inspection without further delay. North Korea's refusal to
accede to this demand resulted in a finding and report of noncompliance to the United
Nations Security Council. The IAEA acted with deliberation and decisiveness giving a clear
indication that the new political environment was well understood, and that it was fully
prepared to exercise its authority. Besides giving evidence of Agency will, this says
something about the value of initiating challenges in a technical institution that is not
encumbered with veto powers.
Other measures reinforcing the safeguards system have been taken including a Board
of Governors decision requiring states, under a safeguards provision calling for design
information to be submitted "as early as possible", to inform the agency at the time
authorization to construct or modify a facility is given rather, than as has been the practice,
no less than 180 days prior to introducing nuclear material into the facility. Together with a
further Board decision calling upon states to adopt a policy of universal reporting of exports
and imports of nuclear materials, sensitive non-nuclear materials and specialized equipment
especially relevant to nuclear activity, the IAEA has moved to establish increasing
transparency in the nuclear arena. The expectation is that as these early warning measures
become institutionalized, the insight of the Agency into the world's nuclear programs will
deepen and the proficiency of safeguards will increase.
Within the secretariat itself additional changes have been made. The inherent
conservatism that prevailed in safeguards over the past two decades is giving way to greater
political awareness about the linkage between safeguards and proliferation. The emphasis in
reaching beyond declared nuclear activity is altering the mind-set of the inspectorate and
organizational leadership is emphasizing the total nature of nonproliferation on a continuing
basis. A system of country officers to consolidate all available information from all sources
75
regarding the nuclear activities of states under safeguards and to assist in briefing and
debriefing of inspectors has been established.
These developments signify important progress in adapting to a changing international
environment and to changing political expectations. The process is dynamic, not a one time
adjustment. The actions and decisions taken thus far work to strengthen the ability of the
IAEA to respond to the challenge of verification in new political circumstances. Other
measures are under consideration including adaptation of environmental monitoring and
sampling techniques to increase confidence about the non-existence of undeclared facilities or
activities, introducing institutionalized short-notice inspections and the like.
These and other measures are valuable potential additions to the arsenal of capabilities
at the disposal of the IAEA. What is necessary now is to consolidate the gains that have been
made, to institutionalize new procedures, to build on what has been done and to identify and
address remaining problem areas.
There are some building blocks that need early attention and action. Some of them are
discussed in material I would like to ask the committee to incorporate in the record. I will
limit myself here to four points. First , it is unequivocally clear that the ability of the IAEA
to optimize its safeguards capabilities and to create the greatest probability for detecting
clandestine activities depends to a substantial degree on the availability to it of sensitive
information which only a limited number of states are able to provide. The flow of relevant
information to the IAEA should be regularized and institutionalized. To my knowledge there
has been little if any question raised about the ability of the IAEA to receive and utilize
national intelligence information provided to it pursuant to its responsibilities under RES/687.
There is every reason to take steps to ensure that information enhancing the IAEA's ability to
carry out inspections or to request visits (a measure that is of recent vintage) in safeguarded
stateslfTne united States should take a lead in moving forward such regulanzation as well as
ensuring any other operational or logistic support the IAEA might need to fulfill our
expectations for its safeguards activities.
Second , it is a truism that international organizations lack meaningful enforcement
power. The exception is the United Nations Security Council which, if it invokes Chapter
VII as it did in the case of the Gulf War, can take mandatory' action and pass mandatory
resolutions binding upon member states. The January. 1992 summit statement of Heads of
State and Government of the Council declared that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
constitute a threat to international peace and security which is the key to opening the door to
Chapter VII and enforcement. That same statement acknowledged the integral role of IAEA
safeguards in implementing the NPT and asserted that "members of the council will take
appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA." (UNSC,
S/23500, January 31, 1992) Given that the statement was made in the midst of a continuing
crisis in Iraq, and a then strong sense of unity of purpose on the Council, it would be
pertinent to strengthening the international consensus against safeguards or nonproliferation
violations to codifv this statement in a formal Security Council resolution. This would
76
provide an important element of enforcement and enforceability to IAEA safeguards
especially in view of the fact that by statute, the IAEA has direct access to the Security
Council in cases of safeguards noncompliance.
A third measure requiring political leadership and action is to ensure that the IAEA is
adequately funded to meet the growing safeguards responsibilities with which it is
confronted. Studies are under way, and have been for some time, to ascertain whether and
how increased efficiency can be built into the safeguards system without sacrificing quality of
knowledge and an adequate basis for confidence in the integrity of the system. Whatever
streamlining might be achieved it stands as a stark reality that with Argentina, Brazil, and
South Africa now under comprehensive safeguards and with former Soviet Union republics
hopefully joining the NPT and negotiating comprehensive safeguards agreements with the
IAEA added resources will be necessary if the agency is to operate a credible safeguards
system. This is all the more the case with enhanced safeguards that address problems of
possible undeclared or clandestine nuclear activity.
Fourth , the United States should take the lead, with the Russian government, to make
use of the IAEA to verify dismantled nuclear warhead material. Such a measure would be a
strong demonstration of confidence in the system and the openness it implies could have a
potentially powerful precedent setting value. The distinction between weapon and non-
weapon states in so far as safeguards is concerned has long been an item on the agenda of
the non-aligned, with support from other quarters. The idea of applying comprehensive
safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in weapon states is attractive in principle but
costly in implementation. The consignment of verification responsibility for dismantled
warhead material would at one and the same time be less costly and more useful. It is a step
that the United States government should take now.
But the single most important element in strengthening the ability of the IAEA to
meet the challenge of verification is the political will and political support of its member
states and of the United Nations Security Council. International organizations are creations of
sovereign states; they lack sovereignty or independent political authority and are
fundamentally dependent on the political will of their sovereign members. Secretariats can
influence, cajole and help to define collective interests, but it is the governing bodies of
international organizations that are the repositories of political authority.
Sovereignty is a vigorous and contradictory force against empowering international
institutions with far-reaching authority. But threats to international peace and security as
nuclear proliferation is, cannot be successfully addressed unilaterally; they require a
collective action. While international verification may have to be supplemented by regionally
verified arms control and security arrangements, it is something that cannot be done without
if there is to be any confidence in the world at large regarding the status of national nuclear
programs and the probable absence of clandestine nuclear activity. That is why it is all the
more important that governments, like ours, that are committed to effective international
verification, take whatever measures are possible to strengthen the hand of our chosen
international instruments, in this case the International Atomic Energy Agency. We and
others have developed expectations for our international institutions; now we must ensure that
the necessary authority, operational and financial support and political backing for vigorous
implementation is available to them.
77
LEE M HAMILTON. Mouju
BENJAMIN A GHJAAN New V<M«
U4 GEJDCNSON COMMcncuT
3MLANT0S
*ynr zunuutn tunni connrus w*uam * goooung. ^«-rv»««
** JIM LEACH Uw
MEWT G TOFWKEIU. New Jimmy ^^ T08V "0™. Wiconi
E£Ev=F Congress of the Idrntefl States E^E
JOT L tMOtl- NIW »0" *' CMB1T0WCT K 5I«TH NlW J1M«
k l^iSt^i^^" Sa "" (romiTiitttx on Iforotm Slffriirs "is**™"™"
SUB t SCMUUOl «~ r»> "^VIlHMli*** «l» J| MIWJJH **ll«»'* tLTON GA1XKLY. r
4TTMEW G <«*<IT1N£I. U>H»<u IL£*NA «Q^l£KT1HO» M>»».
EEV2"X2"S"r House of 'Rqntstmatitits o^So^S^-L^r-
»C*TT t ANDWWS Nrw Jiwrr r 0*V° L£W Nrw Y«
>eorr menenocz. New jmn donalo a manzuuo. i
ttSXSEm— Washington, ©£ 20515 ^2£rs^T r
MM CAMTWtU. Wmmmmjtom
Ctt L HASTINGS. Kctmu
IC RNGfr-HLTt OMM
TW DCVT5CH. ROMM
Bt-T WJSSEU WYNN liyTYUM
m edwaads C aumwm*
ANK McCLOSKFY Iwoju
OMAS C SA WYE A Owe
Vacancy)
UKHACL H VAN DUSEN
Cwav o* Sta*«
nCHAMD J. GABON
*S-iautAi Cm* Of STA-»
Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations and Human Rights
Iraq Rebuilds Its Military Industries
A Staff Report
prepared by Kenneth R. Timmerman for the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and
Human Rights
June 29, 1993
78
Letter of Transmittal
June 21, 1993
The Honorable Tom Lantos
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations, and Human Rights, of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman: At your direction, I have prepared this staff report on
the current status of Iraq's weapons manufacturing capability.
While UN Council Resolution 687, which Iraq accepted, obligated the
Baghdad government to renounce all production, stockpiling, and use of
unconventional weaponry, Iraq has rebuilt many of the weapons plants damaged
during the Allied air campaign, and has resumed the production of a very wide
range of conventional weaponry. Iraq has also succeeded in in returning to
service most of the tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft damaged during Desert
Storm. If unchecked, the Gulf could face the threat of renewed Iraqi agression
during this administration.
In addition to published reports, mainly from the Iraqi press, information
for this report was gathered from personal interviews with UN Special
Commission staff in New York, with inspectors from the International Atomic
Energy Agency in Vienna, and from a trip to Jordan in April 1992, prior to my
joining the subcommittee staff. Other interviews were conducted in Paris with
French government officials, with German Customs officials in Cologne, and
with German export authorities in Bonn and Eschborn. At no time during the
preparation of this report did the author have access to classified material.
Some of the information on Iraqi procurement networks was developed by
Jules Kroll, president of Kroll Associates, a private financial investigative firm on
Wall Street under contract to the Kuwaiti government to identify hidden Iraqi
assets abroad. For material on Crescent Petroleum, I am indebted to British
journalist Alan George. My colleague Dennis Kane, of the House Banking
committee staff, has generously made available some of the vast documentation
he gathered while investigating the Atlanta branch of Italy's state-owned Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL).
In addition, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
Kenneth Katzman and Zachary Davis of the Congressional Research Service.
The conclusions drawn in this report are my own, and do not necesarily
reflect the views of the Committee on Foreign Affairs or any member thereof.
Sincerely yours,
Kenneth R. Timmerman
79
Iraqi Weapons Plants\
Key
Arms manufacturing
facility t^T ^
CBVV facility M
Missile plant v*4
Nuclear site ^g
Citv, Town atmiah
Baghdad
^t I m a/a • ^ai 'l/xajarmynh
Qaddisisya I'M l : urai o"K.ihiv.i ^g Atomic Research
' Jiadr S»l.! Dieiia Center (Thuwailhal
A I Oaoaaggi :
Taj al Maank .g-j
\1 Alheer -gj^
Mussayih..*2il-
lluteen
Cpp\rif<iit 3 I WO- 1 W.I
Kenneth R Timmurnum
\l Xfusayyib
L
VI Yawm.il \71n1 S._
80
TJie weapons industry
The scope of Iraq's weapons industry was largely unknown before the
invasion of Kuwait 1 . More than forty major weapons-manufacturing complexes
were built during the 1980s, most of which are beyond the scope of the UN
inspections. Many have already started operating again. Little or no attention has
been paid to these activities by Congress or the press.
Saddam's son-in-law and cousin, Hussein Kamil al-Majid, who was the
driving force behind the military industrialization of Iraq before Desert Storm,
was officially rehabilitated in February 1992 after a brief fall from grace. He is
once again in charge of the weapons industries. His principal technical assistants,
Lt. Gen. Amir Hammoudi Al-Saadi (now Minister of Industry and Minerals), and
Lt. Gen. Amir Rashid al-Ubaidi, continue to occupy positions of prominence.
Both are men of vision, and are extremely gifted in managerial skills. They are
assisted by a large number of experienced weapons designers and production
technicians.
Iraq announced in January 1992 that it had already repaired and tooled up
more than 200 factory buildings associated with various military production
lines 2 . On May 4, 1992, Lt. Gen. Amir Al-Saadi announced that "more than 50
establishments" of the former Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization
had been put back into commission, using equipment taken out of the weapons
plants and hidden before Desert Storm. 3
IThe author of this Staff report chronicled the growth of Iraq's military industries in
The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (Houghton-Mifflin, 1991. Boston & New York).
Information in this report is drawn from the author's previous experience in Iraq, interviews
with the directors of Iraqi weapons programs, and a broad range of government and
industry sources in France, Germany, Britain, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and the
United States, in addition to those sources mentioned in the letter of transmittal.
2Middle East Defense News (MEDNEWS), March 9, 1992. Michael Eisenstadt, a
military fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy- wrote in a March 1993
paper entitled "The Iraqi Armed Forces since the Gulf War: "Significant reconstruction
activity has been observed at more than two dozen militarv-industrial sites and more than
200 buildings have been partially repaired. Iraq has now reportedly resumed assemblv of T-
72 tanks, and limited production of artillery, short-range missiles and rockets, ammunition,
and spares at some factories, although production is likely to remain limited as long as
sanctions remain in place."
3"Minister Pledges 'Surprises' in Industrial Output," Iraqi News Agency, May 4 1992.
81
Among those facilities that have been "thoroughly reconstructed," accorded
to inspection reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are the
notorious Saad 16 ballistic missile research and development center near Mosul,
and the Al Rabiya plant in Zaafarniyah, which was bombed by Allied warplanes
on Jan. 17, 1993. 4
Iraq has already reactivated many of its black market procurement
networks to acquire spare parts for conventional weapons-manufacturing
facilities. Once United Nations sanctions are lifted, Iraq will be free to procure
most of what it needs on the open market, to complete any gaps in technology.
Speaking before the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on March 24,
1993, the Chairman of the UN Special Commission for the Disarmament of Iraq
(UNSCOM), Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, said he believed Iraq fully intended to
restore its military industrial base. "The capabilities are there, the supply system
including banks and payments is there. The day the oil embargo is lifted, Iraq
will get all the cash and that will be a great concern... With the cash, the
suppliers, and the skills they will be able to re-establish all the weapons
programes," Ekeus said. "It may grow up like mushrooms after the rain." 5
It should be emphasized that Iraq's success in rebuilding its military-
industrial base has occured despite the most rigorous international economic
sanctions imposed on any nation since World War II, and despite intrusive
inspections of certain weapons facilities by UNSCOM and the IAEA .
Hidden Equipment
Iraq's industrial purchases from the West in the 1985 through 1989 ran to
$14.2 billion - excluding armament. The vast majority of this equipment went
into Iraqi weapons plants and has not been found by the UN Special
Commission. It was purchased either directly by the Ministry of Industry and
Military Industrialization (MIMI), which was run by Saddam Hussein's son-in-
law, Hussein Kamil Hasan, or by entities directly reporting to that ministry.
Production equipment found in Iraqi^nuclear weapons plants has been
catalogued in part by the IAEA. Some has been placed under seal to prevent
further use; other production tools have been slated for future monitoring, to
4 IAEA 18th inspection report, page 5; released April 28, 1993.
5Reuter, March 24, 1993.
82
ensure Iraq does not use them for its weapons of mass destruction. Only a
handful of state-of-the-art tools and application-specific fixtures have actually
been destroyed, however. The IAEA argues that Iraq should be allowed to retain
production equipment that has a potential civilian use, since Iraq's nuclear
weapons program has been fully dismantled. Chief IAEA inspector, Maurizio
Zifferero, has been arguing for months that Iraq's nuclear program "stands at
zero now." 6 Few independent experts agree with this sanguine assessment.
Indeed, even IAEA director general, Hans Blix, has expressed his scepticism. In a
discussion before a non-proliferation study group in Paris on May 26, 1993, Blix
acknowledged that Iraq has refused to allow the IAEA to establish permanent
monitoring of its nuclear facilities.
Throughout the 1980s, West Germany was Iraq's largest supplier of high-
technology, with sales totalling $4,243 billion during the 1985-1989 period, or
four times the level of U.S. sales.
Iraqi purchases in Germany included:
• $2.4 billion worth of heavy machinery and transportation equipment
• $1.3 billion worth of manufactured goods
• $425 million worth of chemicals, and
• $114 million worth of controlling instruments. 7
The vast majority of this equipment is still missing.
Main- frame computers
Iraq's extensive purchase of mainframe, mini-supercomputers and process
control systems provides an eloquent case of the type of supplier information the
UN Special Commission would require in order to better identify and dismantle
Iraqi unconventional weapons programs.
It is widely acknowledged today in scientific circles that advanced
computers give the edge to Third World countries such as Iraq, who seek to
develop a nuclear device without going through the costly and political perilous
process of a nuclear test. Using high-speed computers and graphics work
stations, it is now possible to simulate a nuclear blast, thus allowing design
improvements to be developed in a matter of months that used to require long
6"Iraq Nuclear Effort Is 'at Zero,' UN Says, International Herald Tribune, Sept. 3, 1992.
7Figures derived from OECD monthly trade statistics. Cf "Who's Been Arming Iraq,"
Middle East Defense News (MEDNEVVS), Paris, France, April 15, 1991.
83
The Men Who Built Iraq's
Military Industries
Hussein Kamal Hasan
al Majid,
former Minister of
Industry and Military
Industrialization, cur-
rently in charge of the
Military Industries and
4iead of clandestine
procurement
Lt. Gen (Dr) Amer Hamoodi Al-Saadi,
the industrial mastermind.
Lt. Gen. Amer Rashid Al Obeidi
the engineer
All photos copyright © Kenneth R. Timmermun. /WsV
84
and arduous live testing. The UN nuclear inspectors discovered documents in
Iraq which proved beyond a doubt that Iraq was using mainframe computers in
precisely this way, and had gone through five major design upgrades of a
nuclear explosive device, without undertaking a live nuclear test.
Most is known about U.S. high-tech exports to Iraq, although the United
States was bottom on the list of Iraq's Western suppliers (a situation set to change
had Iraq not invaded Kuwait). This is because intense pressure from the press
and Congress forced the U.S. government to release detailed lists of export
licenses requests for Iraq. An analysis of Department of Commerce records
shows that in the United States alone, Iraq received a total of 354 export licenses
for computers and advanced scientific analysis equipment from May 1985
through August 1990, worth a total of $113,760,714.
Of these licenses, at least 157, worth $57,792,275, were for advanced
computing systems. The most widely selling item were VAX machines from
Digital Equipment Corp. Other frequently sold items included high-speed
oscilloscopes, radio-spectrum analyzers, integrated circuits, gas chromatography
equipment, spectrophotometers, and a wide range of electronics manufacturing
and test equipment. All were used in Iraqi weapons plants, many in the
manufacture of ballistic missiles and in nuclear weapons research and
development. Typical purchasers were the Iraqi Ministry of Industry, the
Ministry of Defense, and weapons establishments including Saad, Huteen, Badr,
and Nassr.
Of the 157 computers, Iraq has acknowledged to possessing a single IBM
370 mainframe - just one - located at the Thuwaitha nuclear research center.
When the 8th UN nuclear inspection team demanded in writing a full accounting
of all mainframe computers Iraq had purchased for use in its nuclear weapons
program, this was the full text of the answer they received:
"The Computer Office at Tarmiya was initially designed to accommodate
the option of a large computer (mainframe). Due to the special circumstances in
operating individual separators [ie, calutrons for uranium enrichment], it was
discovered through experience that the best condition would be to connect the
separators to small dedicated computers. After achieving the steady operating
conditions for the separators, the small computers would have been connected
through a network located in the above-mentioned office. This approach was
adopted at Tarmiya. It also applies to the design of the Computer Office at Ash-
Sharqat. although computers were never introduced at this site.
85
"At the Al Thuwaitha site, the large computer was an IBM-370; in addition
there were a number of personal computers (PCs) including IBM PS/2. The
approach adopted at Al Tuwaitha was to use the computer capability available in
the country when needed in addition to the above-mentioned computers." [8th
IAEA inspection report, p 13].
Iraq's consistent refusal to provide detailed supplier information is one of
the most daunting problems facing the UN inspection teams. Without detailed
lists of equipment, suppliers, and the Iraqi purchasers, they have been hard put
to penetrate the sophisticated shell game Iraq has been playing since April 1991,
when the first inspections began, to hide its unconventional weapons capabilities.
In some cases, they do not even have the necessary data to ask the Iraqis the right
questions.
On Feb 12, 1992, UN inspectors demanded to visit computer centers in
Baghdad, where they discovered six mainframe computers made by Digital
Equipment Corp, IBM, and Hewlett Packard Three machines had been
purchased by the Scientific Research Council (SRC), a procurement front run by
Lt. General Amer Rashid al-Ubaidi. Iraq had never admitted to possessing any of
them.
Two of Iraq's major computer suppliers deserve to be singled out, since the
scope of their deliveries puts them in a case all by themselves.
Hewlett Packard received 57 licenses to export computer systems to Iraq
from the United States, worth $3,147,608, from 1984 until 1990. HP systems can
be found throughout the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, at Thuwaitha, at the
Saad 16 research and development center, and at a variety of heavy engineering
complexes that were manufacturing parts of uranium enrichment centrifuges
and calutrons. Hewlett Packard maintained an office in Baghdad throughout
most of the 1980s, and was a major exhibitor in the yearly Baghdad international
trade fair.
The second company, International Computer Systems Ltd, was established
in 1986 in the UK by a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, Esam Samarra. ICS
received 49 export licenses from the Department of Commerce in the United
States to sell computers to Iraq, worth $16,377,132, in addition to extensive sales
it made directly from Britain. Samarra currently owns 70% of ICS.
ICS serves as a distributor /front for Digital Equipment Corp (DEC) VAX
and MiniVAX computers, which have proven their worth to weapons designers
the world over. It is no accident that ICS's clients were primarily Iraqi weapons
86
establishments, including: Nassr, Saad 16, me Scientific Research Council, the
Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, and the State Establishment
for Heavy Engineering Industries (SEHEE), which was deeply involved in the
manufacture of centrifuges and calutrons for uranium enrichment.
Esam Samarra subsequently set up a service company to maintain DEC
computers in Iraq, called Computer and Communication Services Company
(CCS), located in Amman, Jordan. Samarra told the author of this report during
an interview in his Amman office in April 1992 that he had also been selling Iraq
data systems made by McDonnell Douglas Computer Systems.
ICS was a major purveyor of VAX workstations to Iraq, importing
equipment from the United States and from Great Britain, depending on where
licenses could be obtained. It should be noted that during this same period (1985-
1990), DEC only applied directly for four U.S. export licenses for Iraq.
Machine-tools
Machine-tools are the basic building blocks for any heavy industry, and are
particularly critical for the weapons industry. Because of this, machine-tool sales
were carefully regulated throughout the 1970s and 1980s by the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), an informal group of
NATO partners which attempted to prevent the sale of strategic technologies to
the Soviet Union and its allies. In many countries, machine-tool exports required
an export license regardless of the destination, because of the COCOM controls.
This led Iraq to devise a particularly ingenious method for sidestepping controls,
which has since become one of the hallmarks of Iraq's secret network.
In 1987, as plans to build an atomic weapon accelerated dramatically, the
Iraqis decided to purchase a Western machine-tool manufacturer, Matrix-
Churchill, as a means of securing unlimited supplies of advanced machine-tools
and as Iraq's principal partner for establishing its own machine-tool industry.
Matrix Churchill was purchased through a web of front companies controlled
directly by Baghdad. The main procurement front was the London-based
Technology and Development Group (TDG), run by Safa Habobi, a former
director of the giant Taji weapons complex.
Once it became an Iraqi company, Matrix Churchill used its subsidiary in
Solon, Ohio as a front to procure additional controlled technologies in the United
States.
87
Key documents detailing the construction by Matrix Churchill and an
American composite materials manufacturer, Glass International Incorporated,
were uncovered during the investigation of the Atlanta branch of the Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro, conducted by the House Banking Committee. The ceramic
and glass fiber plant was used by Iraq for the manufacture of uranium
enrichment centrifuge rotors and possibley for missile nose cones. None of this
production equipment has been found by the UN Special Commission during its
inspections in Iraq, although shipping documents and plant progress reports
show that deliveries were virtually complete by July 1990. The plant appears to
have functioned as a stand-alone unit at the Taji weapons complex in the
northern suburbs of Baghdad, according to corporate site drawings.
Similarly, little work has been done to date on the very large volume of
industrial purchases by Iraq from Japan, Yugoslavia, China, and East European
countries such as Czechoslovakia. Sources in Prague, for instance, indicate that
Czech state enterprises had a hand in Iraqi chemical weapon plants, while the
IAEA has identified a Czech company as the source of the HMX explosives
found at that were to be used in constructing nuclear bomb cores.
A declassified U.S. Army intelligence document, obtained by privately
funded Nuclear Control Institute in Washington, reveals that China was
suspected of having built a top secret underground plutonium reactor in Iraq in
the late 1980s, which the IAEA has sought to locate, without success. So strong
were IAEA suspicions that Iraq had built an underground reactor that in
September 1992 plans were drawn up to begin long-range monitoring of Iraqi
waterways, in order to detect the minute traces of radioactivity the operation of
such a reactor would emit.
Finally, much Japanese high-tech gear has been discovered by the IAEA in
Iraqi nuclear weapons establishments, although procurement information has
remained unavailable and unsolicited by the Japanese press.
Tlie UN Inspections
UN inspection teams have found only a portion of the dual-use
manufacturing equipment known to have been purchased by Iraq in the mid and
late 1980s.
From April to June 1992, during its 11th and 12th inspection tours in Iraq,
the IAEA catalogued 603 machine-tools that had been found in facilities related
88
to Iraq's nuclear weapons program. However, approximately 2,000 machine-tools
show up in Western export licensing records as having been sold to Iraq in the
late 1980s, primarily from the UK, Germany and Italy. Because export controls on
machine-tools were being relaxed at the same time, and because certain
governments were seeking to expand their machine-tool exports to Iraq by
decontrolling items that normally would have been controlled, it is impossible to
estimate how many more machine-tools were actually delivered to Iraq without
individually validated licenses. 8
For instance, of the 603 nuclear-relevant machine tools found in Iraq, IAEA
records showed that 502 were not licensed by exporting authorities. In the case of
Great Britain, 49 of the 83 machine-tools found by the IAEA were subject to
export licensing restrictions. However, British export licensing records, made
available to Parliament as part of its inquiry into British arms sales to Iraq, show
that the Department of Trade and Industry licensed 313 machine-tools to Iraq
from 1987-1989 - and by all accounts, only a fraction of what was actually
shipped 9 . By the most conservative estimate, therefore, at least 264 British tools
are currently missing. 1()
In the two months preceding Operation Desert Storm, Iraq worked day and
night stripping its manufacturing facilities of valuable production equipment,
computers, records, and materials. According to a senior Jordanian official,
interviewed in Amman in April 1992, this effort was supervised by Lt. General
Amer Rashid al-Ubaidi, Undersecretary at the Ministry of Industry and Military
Industrialization (MIMI). The Jordanian official was a frequent visitor to Iraqi
weapons plants, ballistic missile tests, and research centers in the late 1980s, in
his official capacity as a scientific and technical advisor to King Hussein. He
claimed that General Amer boasted to him after the war of his success.
U.S. spy satellites photographed this activity only days before the air war
began, leading one Operations intelligence officer interviewed subsequently to
"The U.S. Department of Commerce licensed only a handful of machine-tools; much
production equipment was shipped without licenses. One example: 30-foot long boring
machines intended for making long-range artillery tubes.
""Exports to Iraq: Minutes of Evidence," House of Commons, Trade and Industry
Committee, Tuesday, 26 Nov. 1991.
^An additional 94 Matrix Churchill tools were found in March 1993 during the 18th IAEA
inspection at the Al Huteen State Establishment, bringing the total number of Matrix Churchil
machine-tools found in Iraq to 148. See below.
89
observe that the Pentagon had "solid evidence" Iraq had been stripping its
weapons plants in preparation for war 11 .
Underground storage sites used to hide industrial equipment were not
high-priority targets during the air war. Besides, they were so numerous as to
render a bombing campaign against them extremely costly. After the Israeli
bombing of the Osirak nuclear research reactor in June 1981 every government
building in Iraq was constructed on top of large underground shelters. Airbases
and entire factory complexes were buried, with exact copies constructed
elsewhere to fool enemy warplanes and reconnaissance satellites (so-called
"potemptkin" facilities) . This accounts in part for the difficulties in bomb-
damage assessments during the air campaign.
In mid-April 1992, following the destruction of the nuclear weapons design
center at Al Atheer, Western intelligence photographed Iraqi trucks hauling
equipment back into known manufacturing facilities. This signalled Iraq's
conclusion that it had reached the end of the intrusive UN inspections and was
free to rebuild its weapons plants at will.
Declarations in recent months by senior Iraqi leaders have only highlighted
this intent. On Jan. 13, 1993, Lt. Gen. Amer Rashid boasted that Iraq had rebuilt
its air defense network "better than before" Desert Storm 12 . On Feb. 7, Lt. General
Amir Hamoudi Al-Saadi announced that Iraq had succeeded in rebuilding the
war-damaged Al Qaim industrial complex, which had been used to extract
uranium from phosphates ore and for the manufacture of CW precursors. Al-
Saadi also hinted that Iraq had resumed production of main battle tanks. "I think
every country is entitled to produce what it can for its legitimate defence and
Iraq is no exception," he said. 13 Meanwhile, Russian ballistic missile expert Nikiti
Smidovitch returned from an inspection tour to announce that Iraq had begun
work on a new family of surface to surface missiles, with a range just under 150
km. 14
11 Confidential interview with the author, Nov. 14. 1991.
12 Iraqi News Agency, Jan. 13, 1993
13 Reuter, Feb. 7, 1993.
14 Reuter.Jan. 29, 1992.
90
The flbabil MLRS program
The Ababil is a multiple rocket launch system which Iraq developed jointly with
Yugoslavia's Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement. Two versions were built: a 50-
km range launch vehicle, with 12 rocket tubes, and a 100-km range version, with 4 tubes.
Both were designed to launch chemical as well as a variety of conventional warheads
(cluster, hollow charge, HE, mine-laying), making it a powerful offensive weapon. Proto-
type launchers were put on display at the Baghdad International Arms Fair in May 1989
where they were photographed by the author. Contractual information obtained from sources
in Yugoslavia shows that the first two unassembled launchers were shipped to Iraq in 1988
from Yugoslavia . The solid-fuel rockets and warheads were made in Iraq at the Saddam
Engineering Complex (Saad 5). while most of the electronics were manufactured at the
Salah-al-Din (Saad 13) plant. The Yugoslav designation for the system was M87.
91
The Limits of the UN Inspections
None of the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq calls for the
dismantling or future monitoring of Iraq's conventional weapons plants. This is a
loophole that has never been examined very closely in open fora.
UN teams have inspected some of these plants, but only within the very
limited framework of the contractual relationship between the facilities and Iraq's
nuclear weapons complex or with the ballistic missile or CBW programs. As one
senior analyst with the UN Special Commission put it, "We can't be bothered
with counting how many 155 mm shells the Iraqis can make, as long as they do
not violate the terms of [UN Security Council Resolution] 687... We have too
much to do as it is."
In other words, Iraq is fully allowed by the terms of the ceasefire to
continue manufacturing conventional weapons and ammunition and whatever
rate it desires, even in the same plants that have been identified for their
relevance to the nuclear weapons program. In theory, Iraq can even save
equipment slated for disposal by the UN Special Commission by declaring that it
will "only" be used for the manufacture of conventional weaponry. Allowable
activity includes the manufacture of artillery rockets and ballistic missiles with
ranges of 150 kilometers or less. What is not allowed is research or production of
weapons of mass destruction, defined as nuclear weapons, chemical or
biolological warfare agents, or ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometers.
Iraq has tried to take advantage of this loophole to prevent the destruction
of equipment used for the production of the Badr 2000 (Condor II), a 1000
kilometer-range ballistic missile believed to be far more accurate than Iraq's
upgraded SCUDs. (Its solid-fuel motors also make it easier to conceal and
quicker to deploy). Starting in 1985, the United States government led a major
Western campaign to prevent the sale of critical manufacturing equipment to the
Condor II program, parts of which were being conducted jointly with Argentina
and Egypt. Before the UN inspections began in Iraq, it was widely claimed that
halting the Condor II program was the largest single success of the Missile
Technology Control Regime.
UNSCOM ballistic missile teams soon discovered not one but four separate
facilities in different parts of Iraq that were heavily engaged in the production of
92
the solid-fuel Badr 2000 only days before the Allied bombing of Iraq began. One
of the facilities, south of Fallujah, was also manufacturing liquid-fueled al
Hossein and al Abbas missiles, Iraq's improved-range SCUDs.
All four missile plants appear to have been built by German and Italian
firms, although the bulk of the solid fuel technology is said to have originated in
the United States and to have reached Iraq via France and Italy. 15
Nevertheless, in letters dated Nov 19, 1991 and Feb 28, 1992, Iraqi officials
informed the UN Special Commission that they intended to "modify and alter the
equipment for the Badr-2000 project with a view to its reuse... [for] the
manufacture of civilian explosives [and] in the manufacture of 100 kilometer
range Ababil missiles" - both of which were allowable activities.
In particular, the Iraqis wanted to save from destruction a series of solid
fuel mixers, made by the Draiswerke company in Germany, installed at the Taj
al-Ma'arik missile plant south of Baghdad. They argued that since the mixers
could also be used for "allowable" activity, they should not be destroyed.
While UNSCOM rejected Iraq's reasoning in this particular case and began
destroying Condor II manufacturing equipment in April 1992, it left the vast
majority of Iraq's "dual-use" equipment untouched.
Thirty-one machine-tools were destroyed by the UN Special Commission
during the March and April 1992 inspections Ten of these were designated as
missile-related, the other 21 as nuclear-related. Twenty-five other pieces of
production equipment were destroyed, most as part of Iraq's ballistic missile
program (solid fuel mixers, induction furnaces, hot and cold isostatic presses,
etc). Specialized jigs and mandrels were destroyed, as were calutron and
centrifuge assemblies used in uranium enrichment. Isolated pieces of equipment
have been rendered inoperational since then.
This extremely modest destruction of Iraq's unconventional weapons
capability has left major military manufacturing programs virtually untouched.
15 "UN Inspectors destroy Condor II equipment," MEDNEWS, March 30, 1992.
93
The Zaafarniyah complex
The case of the Zaafarniyah industrial complex, located some 20 kilometers
south of Baghdad, illustrates the limits of the inspection process as currently
structured.
Two distinct facilities were located on the same site, both of which were
inspected by the IAEA because they had been producing parts for the nuclear
weapons program. The Digila electronics plant was inspected twice because it
had produced electronic parts for the calutron uranium enrichment program.
The Al Rabiya heavy machining plant (aka al Rabee) was inspected on four
separate occasions - twice by UNSCOM for missile activities, and twice by the
IAEA.
Like most Iraqi weapons plants, Al Rabiya was designed and operated as a
dual-use facility, under the auspices of the Ministry of Industry and Military
Industrialization. Seventy-eight machine tools at this site were catalogued by the
IAEA as related to the nuclear weapons program. These included large German
machines used to make the calutron casings. Despite this known activity, the
plant was never disabled by the IAEA, nor were these key manufacturing tools
placed under any kind of monitoring that would have prevented their use in
nuclear projects in the future. Inexplicably, the IAEA eventually dropped it from
its list of potential inspection sites.
In January 1993, U.S. military planners concluded that Al Rabiya continued
to operate, and that the Iraqis considered it a safe haven for illicit activity
including the production of calutrons and uranium enrichment centrifuges
assemblies.
Confidential informants have told the Subcommittee staff that one Western
government (not the U.S.) had urged the IAEA to destroy Al Rabiya prior to the
U.S. air strike against the site on Jan. 17, 1993. Despite the plant's clear relevance
to both the calutron and centrifuge programs, however, the IAEA refused.
Three days after the strike, Saddam Hussein vowed to rebuild the plant.
And on March 16, the head of Iraq's Military Industrialization Organization,
Hussein Kamal Hasan, announced that reconstruction was not only complete but
that the "enterprise is now operating even better than before." 16 In his
16 Baghdad INA, March 16, 1993.
94
announcement, Kamil renamed the plant the "al-Nida State Enterprise for
Manufacturing Molds, Construction Works and Machines." Al-Nida is the
codename for a project to build mobile missile launchers. Indeed, al-Rabiya plant
equipment was perfectly suitable for casting large steel and aluminium
assemblies for missile launchers. The reconstruction of Al Rabiya/ Al Nidaa was
documented during the 17th and 18th IAEA inspections.
Another example, drawn from the 18th IAEA inspection report, is the
notorious Saad 16 ballistic missile R&D plant near Mosul, built by Guildemeister
and a consortium of German and Austrian companies in the mid-1980s. By any
interpretation of the UN ceasefire resolutions, this plant should have been
thoroughly monitored and kept out of commission. Just the opposite has
occured. According to the 18th IAEA inspection report,
"Al Kindi (SAAD 16)... is a facility for military research and development, in
particular, the pyrotechnics and propellants used in rockets. The site has been
thoroughly reconstructed after severe destruction during the Gulf War. The
facilities at the site have features that could be useful in development of small
quantities of explosives such as those used in a nuclear weapons development
program. It has also some good quality machine shops for fabricating non-
explosive materials, an electroplating capability and a primitive capability for the
machining of high explosives. The reconstruction effort has proceeded since the
visit in November 1992. More buildings have been completed and additional
equipment has last been installed.No nuclear related activities prohibited under
UNSCR 687 were observed." 17
As a general rule, the IAEA has been loath to destroy dual-use equipment to
avoid giving the impression it is seeking to prevent Iraq's scientific and
technological development. Rather than shut down an entire factory, the IAEA's
approach has been to target isolated pieces of equipment spread across a number
of sites. This has left virtually untouched the largest military manufacturing base
in the Arab world.
Sometimes this has led to extreme cases. Also during the 18th IAEA
inspection in early March 1993, Chief inspector Dimitri Perricos chanced upon no
fewer than 242 machine-tools, many of them potentially subject to UNSC 687
monitoring, in a single nuclear weapons facility, Al Huteen. Earlier IAEA teams
17 IAEA 18, April 28, 1993, page 5.
95
had simply missed them. 94 of these machine-machine tools were 3 and 4-axis
turning machines manufactured by Matrix Churchill.
The IAEA is unlikely to become more severe with Iraq, and indeed, can be
expected to argue that Iraq should be allowed to retain its dual-use equipment
and production facilities - indeed, even nuclear facilities. During an extended
conversation in Vienna earlier this year, the head of the IAEA inspection team,
Professor Maurizio Zifferero, said he could see "no reason why Iraq should not be
allowed to pursue legitimate civilian nuclear research again. I can imagine the
day where they might want to rebuild the Thuwaitha research reactor, or build
nuclear power plants." Such activity, Zifferero believed, would be "legitimate and
innocuous" since the IAEA has reduced the Iraqi bomb program "to zero." 18
Since Zifferero's comments were publicized in the Wall Street Journal, he
has backed away from this position in his public statements.
Industrial strategy
Iraq has been steadily building up the industrial infrastructure necessary for
a broad-based weapons industry since Saddam Hussein took charge of military
procurements and security questions in 1974.
At that time, Saddam set up a three-man Strategic Planning Committee that
took charge of arms purchases, military-industrial planning, and the secret
financial networks.
In the early days, Saddam's partners on the three-man committee were his
cousin, Adnan Khairallah (who went on to become Defense Minister in the 1980s
before his death in a mysterious helicopter crash in May 1989), and Adnan
Hamdani, Saddam's personal secretary. Trained as a lawyer, Hamdani was in
charge of contractual negotiations and financing, and went on to become
Planning Minister. 19
^Comments reproduced in the Wall Street journal Europe, "What the IAEA Hasn't Found
in Iraq," Jan. 28; a similar account of Zifferero's attitude toward dismantling Iraq's manufacturing
capabilities can be found in Gary Milhollin, "The Iraqi Bomb," The New Yorker, Feb. 1, 1993.
Milhollin notes that Zifferero, who has been given the task of dismantling Iraq's nuclear weapons
program, had sold Iraq plutonium reprocessing hot cells and other equipment in the mid-1970s
as the lead Italian government official in charge of nuclear exports.
19 For more background, see chapters 1-4 of The Death Lobby: Hoxo the West Armed Iraq,
opcit.
96
Part of Hamdani's job was to slip strategic weapons projects into large
contracts ostensibly devoted to developing Iraq's civilian manufacturing or
agricultural potential, which in turn were buried in Iraq's Soviet-style Five-Year
Plan. Under the heading "agricultural development," for instance, Hamdani
inscribed a little-noticed entry that called for "the creation of six laboratories for
chemical, physiological, and biological analysis." To operate the laboratories,
which were devoted to biological weapons research, the Plan called for the
training by foreign companies of 5,000 technicians. One of these labs was the now
famous Salman Pak "baby milk" plant, identified by UNSCOM as Iraq's largest
biological weapons facility.
Every "civilian" plant Iraq built in the late 1970s and 1980s was also geared
for military production. Chemicals plants at Fallujah, for instance, also churned
out precursors for poison gas. Heavy engineering plants in the southern suburbs
of Baghdad produced uranium centrifuge parts as well as machine-tools and
railroad ties. Steel plants were built so they could just as easily manufacture
reinforcing bars for the construction industry as armor-plate for tanks. To fully
grasp the scope of Iraq's weapons-manufacturing capability, one must examine
in detail Iraq's industrial base with an eye to dual-use. This was the case before
the UNSCOM inspections, and it remains the case today.
The imbrication of military with civilian production made procurement of
most materials an easy task throughout the 1980s. Under the guise of building a
$1 billion "super-phosphates" plant at Al Qaim, for instance, Iraq also procured
processing lines to separate uranium from phosphate ore. As part of the gigantic
steel complex at Taji, they purchased a foundry for tank barrels; or again, under
the cover of electrical generating equipment they purchased large steel casings
which were used for the uranium enrichment calutrons.
Key Installations
While many Iraqi weapons plants were heavily destroyed during Allied
bombing raids, extraordinary efforts have been spent over the past two years to
get military production back up and running. According to Israel's top private
analyst on Iraq, Amatzia Baram, "Saddam must continue his military efforts,
since his whole raison d'etre over the past twenty years has been to transform
97
Iraq into the Prussia of the Middle East. Arms manufacturing is built into his
system. Without it, Saddam will lose prestige, and perhaps lose power." 20
Of the forty-seven main weapons plants listed in the Appendix, thirty-three
have been cited by the IAEA for having contributed to Iraq's crash effort to
develop an atomic weapon, ten were engaged in chemical or biological weapons
production, twelve were involved in ballistic missile research, design,
development, and manufacture, while twenty-four were making conventional
armaments.
Much remains of this vast industrial infrastructure. As mentioned above,
most production equipment was dismantled before the Allied bombings and was
stored in underground bunkers or civilian industrial sites for the duration of the
war. Over one hundred pieces of production equipment from the Samarra poison
gas works, for instance, were stored in the Mosul sugar factory, and discovered
only by accident by UN inspectors. It is not known how much of this equipment
has been subjected to monitoring.
The following is a brief summary by factory of the conventional weapons
production capability still believed to exist in Iraq:
• Al Ameen: 1-72 tank assembly, under Polish and Czech licenses;
machine-tool assembly line.
• Al Amil: liquid nitrogen production
• Al Muthena (Fallujah chemicals plant): HMX,.RDX explosives.
• Al Qaqaa: aerial bombs, TNT; solid rocket propellants
• Al Rabee: precision machining
• April 7: proximity fuzes for 155 mm and cluster munitions
• Badr: aerial bombs, artillery pieces; tungsten-carbide machine-tool bits
• Base West World: major armor retrofitting center
• Digila: computer software; assembly of process-line controllers for
weapons plants; plastics casting
• Fao: cluster bombs; fuel-air explosives
• Huteen: explosives, TNT, propellants; potential for armored vehicle
assembly
• Mansour: defense electronics
• PCI: ethylene oxide for fuel-air explosives
20 Interview with the author in Haifa in Feb. 1992.
98
• Saad 5 (Saddam Engineering Complex): 122 mm howitzers; Ababil
rockets; tank optics; mortar sites
• Saad 13 (Salah al Dine): defense electronics, radars, frequency-hopping
radios radios
• Saad 21: Nonferrous metal plant for ammunition cases
• Saad 24: gas masks
• Sawary: small patrol boats
• SEHEE: heavy engineering complex capable of a wide variety of military
production (artillery, vehicle parts, cannon barrels)
• Taji: wheeled APCs (East European license); armor plate; artillery
pieces. 21
This very broad-based capability gives Iraq the possibility not only of
refurbishing the 250 or more fighter aircraft and 2,500 main battle tanks that
survived the war, but of expanding its military inventory in the very near future.
Noting this development, the Chairman of the UN Special Commission, Rolf
Ekeus, noted earlier this year that Iraq "considers its obligations ended once
destruction of its weapons of mass destruction is completed, and has said it will
not accept UN monitoring of any future arms buildup." 22
UNSCOM believes that Iraq is systematically preserving its options in all
four areas of unconventional weapons production - nuclear, ballistic missile,
chemical, and biological. Furthermore, UNSCOM inspectors say they have
seen no signs that Iraq has dispersed the teams of scientists that had worked
on these weapons projects. Iraq has jealously guarded and protected its foreign
suppliers network, and refuses to accept monitoring of its future capabilities,
both of which constitute clear violations of the UN ceasefire agreements.
Instead of cooperating with the UN, the Iraqis have tried to conceal as much
production equipment as possible, redeploying it to "conventional" military
production."
21 "Rebuilding the Defense industry," MEDNEWS, March 9, 1992; "Does Iraq have the
Bomb?," MEDNEWS, Jan. 25, 1993.
22 Wireless File, USIS, Feb. 6, 1993.
99
Ongoing Procurement Efforts
Iraq continues to operate an extensive clandestine procurement network in
Europe, the Middle East, and possibly in the United States. Some of the most
notorious agents who helped Iraq obtain sophisticated Western technologies for
its long-range ballistic missile programs and its nuclear weapons effort are still at
large. Among these:
• Safa Habobi, the President of Technology Development Group (TDG),
London. TDG led the Iraqi procurement effort in Europe, serving as the front for
the purchase of the machine-tool company, Matrix Churchill Ltd. British
Customs inexplicably waited several months after the international embargo on
Iraq and Iraqi assets was in place before raiding the TDG offices, allowing the
Iraqis to cart of critical documents that might have exposed their network.
Habobi was allowed to leave Britain and return to the Middle East. On
September 27, 1992 he was involved in a non-fatal car crash and was identified in
hospital in Amman, Jordan. He is believed to have moved his procurement
operations to Tunisia. 23
• Khaled Marzoumi, the former Commercial attache at the Iraqi Embassy in
Paris in the late 1980s, now operates out of the offices of the State Oil Marketing
Organizaiton (SOMO) in Amman, Jordan, where the author briefly encountered
him in April 1992. In 1988-89, he was instrumental in the operation of Babil
International, an Iraqi front company registered in France that was controlled by
Safa Habobi of TDG and was used for procurement and financial transactions on
behalf of the Iraqi government.
• Pierre Drogoul, the father of indicted BNL-Atlanta banker Christopher
Drogoul. Until recently, the elder Drogoul worked as a consultant for Babil
International. The French government has never closed Babil or seized its
accounts, which are held at the Neuilly-sur-Seine branch of the Union des
Banques Franchises et Arabes (UBAF). Drogoul continues to operate a trading
company, Technique Materiel Commerce International (TMCI), in the Paris
suburb of Garches.
• Sam Namaan, aka Saalim Naman, served as Vice President of Matrix
Churchill Corp, the U.S. branch of the British tool company that fitted out a
23 Jim Hoagland, International Herald Tribune, Oct. 15, 1992
100
dozen Iraqi weapons plants in the late 1980s. Although the Solon, Ohio offices of
MCC were raided by U.S. Customs agents in 1991 and Namaan was sought for
questioning, he was reportedly allowed to re-enter the United States at Detroit on
Oct. 10, 1992 on an immigration visa. 24
• Anis Mansour Wadi, one of the original members in Europe of the Iraqi
procurement network, established several companies in Britain and later in the
United States that were used to purchase equipment for the nuclear weapons
program. One of these, Bay Industries, of Century City, California, was searched
and closed down by U.S. Customs agents on March 22, 1991. However, Wadi is
believed to have continued operating in the United States.
German companies breaking sanctions
The investigative arm of German Customs, the ZKI (Zollkriminalinstitut), is
currently investigating more than 150 German and Iraqi-owned companies based
on German territory for possible breaches of the UN sanctions against Iraq.
Among the companies on the "active" list, which was made available to the
subcommittee by private sources in Europe, are some of Germany's largest
industrial concerns, such as Thyssen, MAN, and Strabag Bau AG.
Some companies are familiar to investigators for their role in helping Iraq to
develop its upgraded SCUD missiles, such as ABC Beaujean of Stuttensee. Others
are under investigation for selling technologies with a potential nuclear end-use,
including calutron magnets, and special piping for use in a centrifuge enrichment
plant. This suggests that Iraq indeed intends to continue its nuclear weapons
program, despite its commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 687.
Iraq-owned fronts constitute another category of companies on the ZKI case
list. Among these are the Iraqi Shipping Lines in Bremen, and the German office
of the Technology Development Group, known as TDG-SEG, Krefeld, which is
believed to be purchasing machine-tools and other goods in Germany using fake
Jordanian end-use certificates. Equipment purchased in this manner is shipped
legally to Jordan, where it is subsequently diverted to Iraq by truck.
The German subsidiary of Minolta, based in Arensberg, is under
investigation for a potential export of a flash x-ray camera. A similar item was
discovered by the IAEA at Iraq's Al Atheer nuclear weapons lab, where it was
24 John Fialka, Wall Street Journal , Dec. 11, 1992.
101
signing false end-use and embargo-compliance certificates. Key to obtaining
Jordanian support was the cutoff of U.S. aid to Jordan in 1991.
Jordan has been allowed, however, to continue purchasing Iraqi oil by the
UN Sanctions Committee. These purchases, estimated at 60,000 to 70,000 b/d,
were specifically tied to the repayment of Iraq's debt to Jordan. This debt stood at
around $400 million when the initial waver was granted in August 1990. By all
estimates, even at the reduced price of $16 per barrel, Iraq's oil deliveries should
have wiped out the debt by late December 1991 However, the oil deliveries to
Jordan continued on the same scale as before throughout 1992.
According to Western diplomats interviewed in Amman, this is because the
Central Bank of Jordan had been purchasing Iraqi debt from commercial banks,
and reclassifying it as "official" debt. Debt officers at the Central Bank of Jordan
confirmed that the Iraqi government debt to Jordan still stood at around $400
million in April 1992, despite the oil deliveries, but refused to comment on how
this had come about.
Wall Street investigator Jules Kroll, who has been tracking Iraq's
procurement effort in Jordan, alleges that the Iraqi government transferred
$5 2 billion in government funds to the Arab Bank in Amman just as
Operation Desert Storm was ending to establish a new trading infrastructure
for Iraq. In addition to this, he alleges that the Central Bank of Jordan is
laundering secret Iraqi government funds in Switzerland through
commercial banks such as Jordan's Housing Bank, the Jordan Gulf Bank, and
the Arab Financial Corporation.
Oil and Arms
Already in March 1992, two French major oil companies, CFP Total, and Elf
Aquitaine, acknowledged that they were engaged in active negotiations with the
Iraqi government over future oil production-sharing agreements in Iraq. 27 Since
then, oil ministry and private businessmen from Russia, Italy, and Belarus have
also attempted to renew contact.
^"Jordan reverses embargo policy,'' MEDNEWS. April 13, 1992.
17 Le Monde, March 6, 1992.
102
used to develop nuclear explosive "lenses." Minolta has strenuously denied
accusations in the past of having supplied Iraq with dual-use equipment. The
IAEA in Vienna continues to look with great interest Iraq's suppliers of flash x-
ray equipment. Another unit was obtained from IMACON in Switzerland,
apparently through the intermediary of a Geneva-based trading company,
Bonaventure (Europe) Inc.
In Hamburg, Stinnes Interoil AG is suspected by German Customs of
having organized purchases of Iraqi oil, in contravention of the embargo. It is not
known whether they played the role of intermediary for foreign sales of Iraqi oil,
or whether they imported oil into Germany itself. As in all other cases cited, no
criminal proceedings have been initiated.
Some new names appear on this latest list of German companies suspected
of embargo-busting, including Krupp Atlas, of Bremen, and machine-tool
manufacturers such as Condux Maschenbau, of Hanau, and Moller
Maschinenfabrik GmbH, of Bekum. Reman Enterprises-Raouf Mahdi, of
Nurenburg, is suspected of having sold weapons. Companies under
investigation for unspecified embargo breaches include: Allgemeine Nah-ost
Handelsgesselshaft (Hamburg), Alloy Pipe and Metal (Rattingen), Benteller AG
(Vienslacke), China Project and Investment (Hamburg), Comaco GmbH
(Gellhausen), Commerce und Finance Service, Pan Trade GmbH (Bensheim), and
Rotermund GmbH (Munich). None has been indicted. 25
Smuggling through Jordan
Until recently, Jordan had served as Iraq's primary conduit to the West.
Goods were imported for use in Jordan through the port of Aqaba, and shipped
up through the desert to Baghdad on trucks operated by the Iraq-Jordan Land
Transportation Company, which is owned jointly by the governments of Iraq and
Jordan.
Under intense pressure from the United States, and from public exposure of
Jordan's role as a conduit for embargoed goods reaching Iraq, in early 1992 King
Hussein ordered a crackdown on illicit activities, in an attempt to clear his
country's name as an Iraqi ally. However, it took several months before key Iraqi
agents were weeded out of the Jordanian bureaucracy, where they had been
^"German Companies Break Iraq Embargo," MEDNEWS, July 6, 1992
103
In March 1993, the State Department formally accused Iran of having
violated the oil embargo on Iraq, after U.S. observation satellites detected what
was described as a "large convoy of oil trucks" leaving Iraq for Iran. Iran denied
the charge, which was reiterated in the daily State Department briefing on March
30 by spokesman Richard Boucher.
Unconfirmed reports from Kuwaiti sources warned that commercial
contacts have intensified in recent months between major French defense
exporters and Iraqi agents in Europe, in view of renewing the supply of spare
parts for Iraq's fleet of Mirage Fl fighter-bombers. The Franco-German
Eurocopter consortium was also said to have been probing new sales. Given the
public support of the UN embargo by the French government, however, most
foreign diplomats in Paris believe it highly unlikely that the French government
would approve such sales. One report, from a French source that claimed
personal knowledge, alleged that a major French defense electronics company
had established an office in Amman, Jordan for the sole purpose of servicing
equipment sold to Iraq in the 1980s. This has not been confirmed.
What is certain is that the Iraqi Air Force Mirages have been performed
training missions in recent months in an increasingly brazen manner, notably
along the borders oaf the southern exclusion zone.
Furthermore, according to Andrei Volpin, a a Russian research fellow at the
Washington Institute for Near East Studies, some 200 Russian military
technicians remain in Iraq and are servicing Soviet-built equipment. Russian
officials from Oboronexport, the government's arms export agency, confirmed
the presence of the Russian technicians in Iraq but insisted that they had been
engaged on "private" contracts. 28
Crescent Petroleum
The Office of Foreign Assets Control continues to investigate a $700 million
independent oil company, Crescent Petroleum Company International, on the
suspicion it may be acting on behalf of the Iraqi government.
Crescent operates out of the Emirate of Sharjah and is controlled by Hamid
Dhia Jaafar, the brother of Jaafar Dhia Jaafar, the acknowledged head of Iraq's
clandestine nuclear weapons program. Jaafar Jaafar currently serves as senior
28 Interview with Oboronexport officials at the Paris Air Show. June 17, 1993.
104
Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, formerly known as the
Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), and is the principal
interlocutor for International Atomic Energy Agency inspection teams
investigating Iraq's nuclear weapons capabilities.
If Crescent has been acting on behalf of Iraq then its assets worldwide could
be seized under the terms of UN Security Council resolutions. Crescent has a
registered office at 5847 San Relipe, Suite 2150, Houston, Texas.
The allegations, which Crescent's owner of record, Hamid Jaafar,
strenuously denied, revolve around the company's ties to MIMI. In 1989,
Crescent was appointed sole agent on MIMI's behalf to negotiate the
acquisition of technology for a large-scale aluminum smelter to be built near
Nassiriyah in southern Iraq. In the "Chairman's letter" introducing the
company's 1989-1990 Annual Report, Hamid Jaffar states that the project was
halted by the UN embargo. In the 9th inspection report of Iraq's clandestine
nuclear facilities, IAEA inspectors note that special aluminum parts used in
Iraq's uranium enrichment centrifuges were melted down in May or June
1991 at the old Nassiriyah smelter, identified by the Iraqis as the "Ur
Establishment" and described by the United Nations as "the only aluminum
smelter in Iraq." Since then, the IAEA and the UN Special Commission have
catalogued the Nassiriyah site as being "linked" to Iraq's clandestine nuclear
weapons program.
Crescent appears to have been doing business directly with the head of
Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, MIMI Senior Undersecretary Lt. Gen.
(Dr.) Amir Hamoodi Al-Saadi. In an apparently unrelated deal, Al-Saadi
empowered Hamid Jaafar to purchase financial interests in foreign oil refineries
by using Iraqi oil as collateral. This led to an attempted purchase by Crescent of
the entire Petrofina network of refineries and 3,000 filling stations in the United
States, and would have vastly expanded the financial assets available to MIMI for
weapons development.
While Crescent may not have been in the business of arms manufacturing
or procurement per se, it was certainly linked to the principal Iraqi government
organization that was. Crescent has repeatedly denied any wrong-doing.
However, in a libel suit company lawyers brought against independent journalist
Alan George for having written about Crescent's ties to MIMI, a London court
ruled that no libel had been commited and awarded damages to Mr George.
105
Unconventional Weapons timetable
Former CIA Director Robert Gates put a timetable on the Iraqi rearmament
effort, addressing Iraq's capabilities in the areas of nuclear technologies, chemical
and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles in testimony before the U.S. Senate
Government Operations Committee on Jan 15, 1992.
The most immediate threat following the easing of UN sanctions would be
from Iraqi biological weapons, because of the small amount of specialized
production equipment required. Iraq "could be producing BW materials in a
matter of weeks of a decision to do so," Gates said.
Some chemical warfare agents could also be produced almost immediately,
since much of the hard-to-get production equipment was removed and hidden
before Operation Desert Storm began. However, heavy bomb damage to Iraqi
CW plants and continued monitoring by the UN Special Commission will
partially retard Iraq's effort to regain the CW capability it had previously
enjoyed. Gates believed that a full CW capability would take "a year or more" for
Iraq to accomplish - a very short lead time, indeed.
The CIA continues to estimate that Iraq has hidden away around 200
improved SCUD missiles (al-Hossein and al-Abbas variants, with ranges of 650
and 900 km respectively) - an estimate Ekeus reiterated recently. 29 Added to this
is a suspected capability to indigeneously produce liquid fuel for these missiles,
making Iraq independent of outside sources or technology. 30
Iraq's nuclear program took the hardest hit, Gates claimed. Even here,
however, the CIA estimates the time Iraq would need to reconstitute its nuclear
weapons program at "a few, rather than many, years."
Gates concluded: "In our opinion, Iraq will remain a primary proliferation
threat as long as Saddam remains in power." A similar view was expressed in a
29UPI, March 24, 1993.
30The facility, code-named Al Amil, or Project 7307, is located approximately 6 km
west of the Tarmiyah Electro-Magnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) plant, and was inspected
in 1992 by the IAEA. The Iraqi authorities told the IAEA that while Al Amil was no longer
doing work for the Iraqi nuclear program, production of liquid nitrogen - which can be used
for liquid-fueled ballistic missiles - was continuing under German license. "Rebuilding the
Defense Industry," MEDNEWS, March 9, 1992.
106
recent Rand Corporation study on Iraq by former National Security Council staff
member, Graham Fuller.
To insist that Saddam Hussein's commitment to rebuilding the most
powerful military machine in the region is an obstacle to peace, is not a
"personalization" of the conflict between Iraq and the United States; it is merely a
statement of fact.
After World War I, Germany was banned altogether from rebuilding its
military industries, and from moving troops into the Ruhr Valley. The
comparison with Iraq's current situation is illustrative. While demilitarized zones
have been created to protect Kurds in the north and Shiites in southern Iraq, no
restrictions have been placed on Iraq's military industries beyond the ban on
unconventional weapons development, manufacture, and possession. Iraq has
pumped all available resources into rebuilding its military plants, without a
thought to international sanctions or to treaty restrictions. As a result, Iraq is
likely to reemerge as the predominant military power in the region in very short
order.
107
Machine-Tools Found in Iraqi Nuclear
Facilities by UN Inspectors
The 11th and 12th Mission Lists
Source: IAEA
Manufacturer
Country
Location Ouantitv Tvpe Machine
Use
Ultradex
?
Badr 1
Plasma Cutting MDI (not
CNC)
Kunming
China
Saddam <
Sphencal Crinder 46mm
Diameter
Gun Sights
To* Hulin/Bosch
CSSR Germany
Daura
Turning VTL
Heat excha
Skoda/Phillips
CSSR Netherlands
Daura
Milling Bonng
Heat excha
Skoda/Phillips
CSSR Netherlands
Daura
Milling Boring 150 mm spindle
Heat excha
Stenhoj Hydraulik
Denmark
Tuwaitha \
Press vertical 1600kg
Heckert WMW
East Germany
Badr 1
Gantry Mill
Colly
France
Salah Al Din <
Shear Press
Fromat/Industio
France
Taji (Nassr)
Drilling/Bonng
HES
France
Salah Al Din 1
2 Milling not CNC
HES
France
Salah Al Din <
• Milling (notCNQ
-400 x250x150 mm
Hure
France
Salah Al Din 1
Milling
Petit Jean
France
Taji (Nassr)
Shear
Petit Jean
France
Taji (Nassr) ;
Shear Press
Sciaky
France
Al Rabiya
EB Welder
Cent
Renault HP/ Rennishaw-Probe
France US UK
Al Rabiya
CMM 1600mmxl300mm
Renault HP/ Rennishaw-Probe
France US UK
Al Rabiya
CMM 1300mmx800mm
Renault HP/ Rennishaw-Probe
France US UK
Al Rabiya
CMM 600mmx800mm
Germany ?
[skandariya
Flowforming Horizontal (not
CNC)
Adolph Waldrich Coburg
Germany
Badr 1
Piano Mill not CNC
Adolph Waldrich Coburg
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Piano Crinder
BHG Hermle/ Heidenhain
Germany
Al Rabiya I
' Milling
Biller/ Heidenhain
Germany
Saddam
Turning ~10m
Cun/ Barre
Blohm
Germany
Saddam
Grinding not CNC
Deckel
Germany
Al Radwan
Milling
Deckel
Germany
Badr <
Milling
Deckel
Germany
Salah Al Din
! Milling
Deckel
Germany
Taji (Nassrl
Milling
Denug
Germany
Salah Al Din
Horizontal Press
Donau
Germany
Badr
1 Milling Knee Type (not CNC)
CP
Domes
Germany
Al Radwan
Turning VTL - 4m
EMIS
Domes
Germany
Al Ameer
Turning VTL -10m table
EM1S
Domes
Germany
Al Rabiya
Turning VTL -2.5m table
EMIS
Domes
Germany
Aqua Bin Nan
Turning VTL
EMIS
Domes
Germany
Taji (Nassrl
Turning Vertical -2.0m table
EMIS
Domes
Germany
Taji (Nassrl
Turning Vertical -2.0m table
EMIS
Domes Siemens
Germany
Badr
Turning -2m table VTL
EMIS
Droop & Rein
Germany
Badr
Milling
ESAM
Germany
Aqua Bin Nan
3 Flame Cutter
108
Company
Countrv
Location OuantitY Tvpe Machine
Use
Frolich
German]/
Taji (Nassr)
Press
Gerber/ Boehringer
German]/
Saddam i
Turning
Gildermeister
Germany
Al Atheer 1
Turning
Gildermeister
Germany
Saddam !
> Turning
H+H Metalfonn
Germany
Taji (Nassr) '
Flowforming Vertical
Rotors
H+H Metalfonn
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Flowforming Vertical
Rotors
H+H Metalfonn
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Flowforming Verticle
Rotors
H-t-H Metalfonn
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Flowforming Vertical
Rotors
H+H Metalfonn
Germany
Taji (Nassr) 1
How forming verncal
Rotors
H+H Metalfonn
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Flowforming vertical
Rotors
H+H Metalfonn
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Rowforming vertical
Rotors
H&H
Germany
Shuala
Rowforming
Rotors
H&H
Germany
Shuala
Flowforming
Rotors
H&H
Germany
Daura
Flowforming
Rotors
H&H
Germany
Daura
Flowforming Horizontal non
CNC
Hahn & Kolb
Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
Hahn & Kolb
Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
Measuring
Hahn&Kolb
Germany
AlRadwan
Milling
Hennig/Siemens
Germany
Saddam
Milling
Hennle/ Heidenhain
Germany
Al Rabiya ;
) Milling
Keilinghaus
Germany
Daura
Spin Forming non CNC
Kieserling & Albrecht Siemens
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
! Spinforming/flowrorming
Warheads
Kuhlmann
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling
Electrodes
Kulhmann
Germany
Al Radwan
Milling
Ueber
Germany
Tuwaitha
Turning non CNC
Uranium
Magdeburg
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Turning
Shell Casir
Magdeburg
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Turning
Shell casir
Magdeburg
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
' Turning
Shell Casir
Magdeburg
Germany
Daura
Turning Special
Rotors
Magdeburg
Germany
Daura
Turning Special
Rotors
Magdeburg
Germany
Daura
Turning Special
Rotors
Maho
Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
Weapons
Maho/ Heidenhain
Germany
Al Rabiya
i Milling
Maho/ Heidenhain
Germany
Al Rabiya •
1 Milling
Maho/ Heidenhain
Germany
Al Rabiya
l Milling
Maho/ Heidenhain
Germany
Al Rabiya
Milling
Maho/ Heidenhain
Germany
Al Rabiya
Milling
Maho Heidenhain
Germany
Tuwaitha
Milling
Messer Gersheim Balzers
Germany
Al Radwan
EB Welder
Peddinghaus
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Press
Petzing & Hartman
Germany
Badr
Cutoff Mach Bar
Prepare B-:
Petzing & Hartman
Germany
Badr
Cutoff Mach Bar
Prepare B
Petzing & Hartman
Germany
Badr
Cutoff Mach Bar
Prepare B
Pfauter Gildermeister
Germany
Badr
Cear Cutter
M a i n t
Ravensburg
Germany
Saddam
Turning -15m long
Gun/ Barr-
Ravensburg
Germany
Saddam
Turning -10m long
Gun Barrt
Ravensburg/ Siemens
Germany
Saddam
! Turning -20m long
Gun /Barr-
109
Compaox
Countrv
Location Ouantity Tvpe Machine
Uii
Ravensburg/ Siemens
Germany
Saddam
2
Turning Vertiacl lm table
R a vensburg/ Siemens
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
4
Turning -15m long
Cun/Barre
SHW
Germany
AlRadwan
3
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Radwan
2
Milling
Scheiss
Germany
Al Ameer
1
Milling Boring 4.5-7.0 diam
EMIS
Scheiss Froreip
Germany
Al Ameer
1
Milling
Scheiss Froreip
Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
3
Milling Bonng
EMIS
Scheiss Siemens
Germany
Al Radwan
1
Milling Boring -150mm
spindle moving column
Sharmann
Germany
Al Ameer
1
Milling
Shannann
Germany
Al Ameer
1
Milling 150mm Spl.
Sheiss
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
1
Turning Vertical two heads
-6m table
EMIS
SHW
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
1
Milling
Weapons
SHW
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
1
Milling
SHW
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
4
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Ameer
6
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling
SHW
Germany
Badr
Milling
SHW
Germany
Badr
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Rabiya
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Rabiya
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Rabiya
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Rabiya
Milling
SHW
Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
Weapons
SHW
Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling
SHW
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling
SHW
Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
SHW
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Milling
SHW Siemens
Germany
Badr
Milling
SHW/Heidenhain
Germany
Al Radwan
Milling
SMS
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Horu Press
Tiefbohrtenik
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Turning/ Bonng Mill
Trennj agger
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Press
Trumpf
Germany
Al Rabiva
Laser Cutter
VDF Wohlenberg/Siemens
Germany
Saddam
Turning -20m long
Cun/ Barr
VDF Wohlenberg/Siemens
Germany
Saddam
Turning -5m long
Gun/ Barr
Walter
Germany
Badr
Tool Grinder
Tooling
Walter Seigen
Germany
Al Radwan
Milling
Repair m
Walter Seigen
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling
Repair m
Walter Seigen
Germany
Al Ameer
Milling 20 m bed -6m bridge
Repair M
Wanderer
Germany
Saddam
Milling
Weiger
Germany
Daura
Shear Press
Werner
Germany
Saddam
Milling
Werner
Germany
Saddam
Milling Horizontal heads
Wotan Siemens
Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Milling Bomg
Weapsr-
110
Company
Country
Location Ouantitv Tvpe Machin* Use
YVota it/Siemens
Germany
Saddam
5
Milling /Bomg
SHW/Aqua
Germany
Iraq
Aqua Bin Nafi
3
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Taji (Nassr)
2
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Taji (Nassr)
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Taji (Nassr)
3
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Atheer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Atheer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Atheer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Atheer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Atheer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Ameer
1
Milling Weapons
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Ameer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Ameer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Ameer
2
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Ameer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Ameer
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Badr
2
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
10
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
3
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
2
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
3
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
3
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
5
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany
/Netherlands
Al Rabiya
1
Milling
Leitz/ HP/DEC
Germany/
US
Al Atheer
1
Coordinate Measuring (CMM) Centrifuge i
Maho/Phillipes
Germany/Netherlands
Aqua Bin Nafi
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany/Netherlands
Taji (Nassr)
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany/Netherlands
Taji (Nassr)
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany /Netherlands
Aqua Bin Nan
1
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany/
Netherlands
Saddam
5
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germany /Netherlands
Saddam
3
Milling
Maho/Phillips
Germanv/Netherlands
Taji (Nassr)
1
Milling
Boldrini
Italy
Daura
1
Press
Carvaghi
Italy
Badr
1
Canrry Mill
Ceruti
Italy
Badr
1
Milling horizontal
DEA
Italy
Tarmiya
1
CMM EMIS
DEA
Italy
Al Radwan
1
CMM
DEA
Italy
Al Radwan
1
CMM
DEA
Italy
Al Radwan
1
CMM
DEA
Italy
Al Radwan
1
CMM-7mx3 5m EMIS
DEA
Italy
Al Ameer
1
CMM EMIS
DEA
Italy
Al Ameer
1
CMM
DEA
Italy
Al Rabiva
1
CMM -2x1'
DEA
Italy
Al Rabiya
1
CMM 2x1
DEA
Italu
Salah Al Din
1
CMM
Ill
<, ompanv
Country
location Oi
ilii
lity Type Machine
llu
DEA
Italy
Saddam
CMM
Famup
Italy
Salah Al Din
Milling
Innoccnti
Italy
Badr
Gantry Mill
Weapons
DEA/ DEC
Italy US
Al Rabiya
CMM 1000mm
Fanuc
japan
Salah Al Din
Turret Drill CNC
Waida
japan
Al Atheer
Jig Grinding (not CNC)
Infratriena
Romania
Daura
Radia Dnll
Titan
Romania
Badr
Gantry Mill not CNC
Sacem
Spam
Al Radwan
Milling
Zaher
Spam
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
Zayer
Spam
Al Ameer
Milling 5m bed
Weapons
Zayer
Spam
Al Ameer
Milling
Zayer
Spam
Al Ameer
Milling
Zayer
Spam
Al Ameer
Milling
Zayer
Spam
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
Zayer
Spam
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
Zayer
Spam
Al Radwan
Milling
Weapons
Zayer/
Heidenhain
Spam Germany
Saddam
Milling
Zayer Siemens
Spam Germany
Aqua Bin Nafi
Milling
Weapons
Zayer/Heidenhain
Spam Germany
Saddam
Miling
Zayer
Spam Netherlands
Al Ameer
Milling
Zayer/
Heidenhain
Spam/Germany
Al Radwan
Milling
Zayer/
Heidenhain
Spam/Germany
Saddam
Milling
Zayer/
Heidenhain
Spam/Germany
Saddam
Milling
Zayer/
Heidenhain
Spam/Germany
Saddam
Milling
Zayer/
Siemens
Spam/Germany
Taji (Nassr)
Milling
Zayer/
Siemens
Spam/Germany
Al Radwan
3
Milling
Aciera
Switzerland
Al Radwan
5
Milling
Aciera
Switzerland
Al Radwan
2
Milling
Aciera
Switzerland
Badr
2
Milling
Aciera
Switzerland
Badr
Milling
Aciera
Switzerland
Badr
3
Milling
Aciera
Phillips
Switzerland
Al Ameer
1
Milling
Agie
Switzerland
Taji (Nas^rl
1
EDM ram
Agie
Switzerland
Al Atheer
1
Electncal Discharge
Agie
Switzerland
Al Atheer
1
Electrical Discharge Rjm
tvpe
Agie
Switzerland
Al Radwan
1
EDM Wire
Agie
Switzerland
Al Ameer
1
EDM
Agie
Switzerland
Al Ameer
1
EDM
Agie
Switzerland
Al Rabivj
2
EDM Ram
Agie
Switzerland
Al Rabiva
1
EDM Wire
Agie
Switzerland
Al Rabiva
1
DEM Wire
Agie
Switzerland
Al Rabiva
1
Edm Ram
Charm
illes
Switzerland
Tap (Nassr)
1
EDM Kam
Charmilles
Switzerland
Taji (Nawl
1
EDM Ram
Charmilles
Switzerland
Badr
3
EDM Ram
Charm
illes
Switzerland
Saddam
1
EDM Ram type
Dixi
Switzerland
Salah Al Din
1
Jig Bore/ Mill non C\C
Dixi
Switzerland
Ta|i (Nassrl
1
Jig Bore
112
Company
Country
Location Qu
intitv Tvpe Machine
Use
Hauser
Switzerland
Al Radwan
Jig Grinding
Hauser
Switzerland
Al Ameer
Jig Grinder
Tooling
Hauser
Switzerland
Al Rabiya
Jig Bore
Hauser
Switzerland
Al Rabiya
Jig Grinder
Tooling
Hauser
Switzerland
Al Rabiya
Jig Bore
Hauser
Switzerland
Badr
Jig Grinder
Tooling
Hauser
Switzerland
Salah Al Din
Jig Grinder
Tooling
Hauser
Switzerland
Saddam
I Jig Grinder non CNC
Kellenberger
Switzerland
Al Atheer
Grinding (not CNC)
Kellenberger
Switzerland
Al Ameer
Grindind OD
Mikron
Switzerland
Saddam
Milling
Oerlikon
Switzerland
Taji (Nassr)
Milling
Oerlikon
Switzerland
Taji (Nassr)
Milling
Oerlikon
Switzerland
Saddam
Milling
Reishauser
Switzerland
Saddam
Grinder
Rigid
Switzerland
Iskandanya
Vertical Milling; 2 Spindle
Schaublin
Switzerland
Badr <
i Turning
End Ops
Schaublin
Switzerland
Badr \
I Turning
End Caps
Schaublin
Switzerland
Badr
Turning
End Caps
Schaublin
Switzerland
Badr :
! Milling
Schaublin
Switzerland
Saddam
3 Turning non CNC
Schaublin
Switzerland
Saddam
2 Turning non CNC
Schaublin Siemens
Switzerland
Al Rabiya
Milling
SIP
Switzerland
Al Radwan
Jig Bore
Precision
SIP
Switzerland
Al Ameer
Jig Bore
Precision
SIP
Switzerland
Al Ameer ',
! Jig Bore
Precision
SIP
Switzerland
Saddam
Jig Bore
S ruder
Switzerland
Al Atheer 1
OD/ID Crdng (not CNCO
S ruder
Switzerland
Saddam '
Turning non CNC
Tomos Bechler Sinumerix
Switzerland
Badr 1
Turning (Bar)
CP
Wahli
Switzerland
Salah Al Din
Milling
EWAG
Switzerland France
Badr ;
Tool Crinding
Tooling
Mikron/Heidenhain
Switzerland Germany
Saddam ;
.5 Milling -250mm, 200mm.
150mm
Mikron/Heidenhain
Switzerland Cermanv
Saddam
Milling
Tarex/Bosh
Switzerland Cermanv
Saddam 1
Milling
Schaublin
Switzerland fapan
Al Atheer 1
Turning
End caps
Matrix Churchill
UK
Taji (Nassri
Grinding OD
Cinn/Milacron
UK
Badr 1
Milling
FMT
UK
Taji (Nassr)
Milling
Harrison
UK
Badr 1
Turning
Matrix Chruchill
UK
Al Radwan
Turning
End Caps
Matrix Churchill
UK
Taji (Nassri
Turning
Ammo
Matrix Churchill
UK
Taji (Nassri
Turning
Ammo
Matrix Churchill
UK
Taji (Nassri l
Turning
Ammo
Matrix Churchill
UK
Taji (Nassr) ;
2 Turning
Ammo
Matrix Churchill
UK
Shuala
Turning
End Caps
Matrix Churchill
UK
Al Ameer ;
Turning
End Caps
Matrix Churchill
UK
Badr 1
Turning
End Caps
113
C p m p a n v
Matrix Churchill
Matrix Churchill
Matrix/Churchill
Morgan Rushworth
Wickman
Wickman
Wickman
Colchester/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Matrix Churchill/ Fanuc
Bridgeport/Heidenhain
Bliss
Pacific
Pangbom
Hardinge
Skoda
Ivo Lola Ribar
Ivo Lola Ribar
Total machine-tools:
Country
Location Ouantitv Tvpe Machine
L'se
UK
Badr
1
Turning
Cent
UK
Aqua Bin Nafi
1
Turning
End Caps
UK
Tap (Nassrl
1
Turning
End Caps
UK
Tuwaitha
1
Shear Press
UK
Taji (Nassrl
17
Turning
Ammo
UK
Taji (Nassrl
2
Turning
Ammo
UK
Taji (Nassrl
2
Turning Bar type
Ammo
UK Japan
Badr
2
Turning
UK Japan
Taji (Nassr)
1
Turning
End Caps
UK japan
Taji (Nassr)
1
Turning
End Caps
UK japan
Taji (Nassrl
1
Turning
End Caps
UK Japan
Taji (Nassr)
1
Turning
End Caps
UK Japan
Taji (Nassrl
1
Turning
Ammo
UK japan
Al Rabiya
1
Turning
Piston Val\
UK Japan
Al Dijjla
1
Turning
Cent
UK lapan
Taji (Nassrl
1
Turning
End Caps
UK/Germany
Taji (Nassr)
4
Milling Knee
US
Salah Al Din
2
Press (1 medium) (1 smaih
US
Taji (Nassr)
6
Press
US
Taji (Nassr)
Small Rolling Mill
US/UK (?)
Al Atheer
Turning (notCNO
Centrifuge
USSR
Taji (Nassn
Drilling
USSR
Al Radwan
Milling
USSR
Badr
Gantry Mill
USSR
Badr
Milling horizontal
USSR
Badr
Radial Drills not CN'C
USSR
Daura
Turning Vertical
Yuqoslax'ia
Saddam
OD Grinding not CN'C
Morpass Gaging
Yugoslavia
Saddam
4
Milling
Yugoslavia
Saddam
1
Milling
605
114
Iraqi Weapons Plants and
Their Foreign Suppliers
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Abu Sukhayr
Nuclear
Abu Sukhayr
Uranium prospection in the desert near Samawa
NATRON (Brazil)
Akashat
CBW*
Akashat
Nerve agents and precursors from organic phosphorus
compounds; UN says site of a second calutron uranium
enrichment plant.
Klockner Industries, Karl Kolb (Germany); Sybetra (Belgium)
Al Ameen
Conventional; Nuclear
Al Yusufiah
Headquarters of Auqba bin Nafi establishment and machining
center for calutron ("Baghdadatron") parts. Initially built for
assembly of T-72 tanks on license from Poland and
Czechoslovakia. HQ located within the Badr complex. Also
made parts for hydroelectric power stations and assembled
CNC machine tools (tool assembly resumed in 11/91). Most
damage to the plant repaired.
Polish and Czechoslovak state enterprises; Western machine-
tool manufacturers
Al Amer
Nuclear; Missile
Fallujah/ Amiriya
One of three turning/ machining centers of the Auqba Bin
Nafi Establishment, dedicated at 70% to manufacturing
Chemical and biological weapons.
115
Foreign Contributors
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
assemblies for uranium enrichment calutrons and to al-
Hossein and al-Abbas ballistic missiles. Products included
magnet cores, return irons, ion sources, and collector parts. Al
Amer had 2 large capacity turning and milling machines,
plasma cutting machines for shearing metal sheets, jig-boring
machines, and surface heat-treatment equipment used for
improved SCUD missile casings.
Rexroth, Maho, Waldrich-Siegen, Dorries, Schiess-Frohripp,
ABA, ESAB, DEMAG, Liebherr, Hahn & Kolb, Sharmann,
SHW (Germany); DEA (Italy); Kaldyf, Zayer (Spain); Aciera,
Agie, SIP-Hauser, Kellenberger, Kuhlmann (Switzerland);
Raving Mayer (USA); Morris, Matrix Churchill (UK).
Al Amil (aka Project 7307)
Nuclear; Missile
6 km west of Tarmiyah
Liquid nitrogen for EMIS diffusion pumps. Other uses (rocket
fuel?) also suspected. Foreign-built. No significant bomb
damage; production continuing as of Nov 1991.
Unknown
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
AlAtheer(PC3)
Nuclear
Al Musayyib
Nuclear warhead casting and assembly; co-located with PC2.
Contained a Plasma coating facility (Powder building); a
polymer lab, a carbide building (to make tungsten carbide for
the Badr plant). Plant inaugurated by Hussein Kamil on 7
May 1991; blown up under UN supervision on April 14, 1992.
Approximately 85 km south of Baghdad.
ABRA, Hahn & Kolb, Maho, Gildermeister, Vakuum Technik
GmbH.Plasmatechnik, Schaublin, Leitz (Germany); Philips
(Netherlands); Hardinge Brothers (UK); Kennametal. Matrix
Churchill Corp, XYZ Options, Digital Equipment Corp, Hewlett
Packard (US); Hamamatsu, NEC, Waida (Japan); Asea Brown
Boveri, Agie, Kellenberger, Studer (Switzerland)
116
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
AlFurat
Nuclear
An Walid
Industrial production of maraging steel centrifuges scheduled
to start in mid-1991; German-built workshop to house 100-
centrifuge enrichment cascade.
Interatom/Siemens (Germany)
AlHadre
Nuclear
West of Mosul
Hydrodynamic studies and explosives testing for nuclear
weapons program. Included open firing range for FAE and
cluster bombs, and well equipped control bunker
Unknown
Al Hakan
CBW
Unknown
Biological weapons lab discovered by UN Special Commission,
for production of unicellular proteins. Inspectors discovered
virus strains imported from the US.
US and German firms.
Al Jezira
Nuclear
Mosul
Uranium processing plant for industrial quantities of
enrichment feedstock; U02, UC14 (for EMIS process); UF6 for
centrifuge. (Previously identified as located at Makhour. in the
Jebel Qarachoq). Heavily bombed during Allied air raids.
Inspected by the UN during 3rd and 4th IAEA teams.
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Al Mutasm
Conventional weapons
Unknown
Towers for field observation posts; 4x120 mm rocket launcher,
mounted on tracked AFV
Yugoslav state-owned defense establishments
117
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Al Mutbena
Conventional; CBW
Al Fallujah
Naval mines, explosives; HMX, RDX; CW precusors.
Identified by Iraq in 4/91 report to the United Nations Special
Commission as a chemical weapons plant and depot
WET, Preussag, WTB Walter Thosti Boswau and numerous
other West German companies
Al Qadissiya
Conventional; Nuclear
An Walid
Sniper rifles, optical sights; robotics R&D (for handling of
nuclear materials); gun barrels.
Unknown
Al Qaim
CBW; Nuclear
Al Qaim
Organic phosphorus compounds for chemical weapons;
extraction of uranium from U-bearing phosphates ore
(production capability: 103 tons/year, according to UN
inspection reports). Dual-use facility.
Sybetra, Six Construct International, Spie Batignolles
(Belgium); Davie Power Gas (UK); Copee Rust (France); F.R.
Schmidt (Denmark); Alesa Alusuisse Engineering Ltd
(Switzerland)
Al Qaqaa
Missile; Nuclear; Conventional
Al Hillah
Aerial bombs (500 kg); TNT filling; explosives; ammonium
perchlorate for solid rocket propellant. An explosion heavily
damaged this plant on August 17, 1989. The Al Qaqaa State
Establishment also maintains facilities at Al Fallujah and
Karbala, variously identified as Project 395 or the Space
Research Center, and has been linked to the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program.
Multiple U.S. companies, licensed by DoC; SNPE (France)?;
SNIA Bpd (Italy)?
118
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Al Rabee (Al Rabiya)
Dual-use; Nuclear
Zaafarniyah
Precision machining; large-scale pieces in steel, stainless
steel, and aluminium, including parts for calutron
enrichment process. Run by MIMI; co-located with Digila plant
Agie, Hauser, Shaublin (Switzerland); BHG Hermle,
Siemens, Maho, Dorries, Heidenhain (Germany); DEA
(Italy); Digital Equipment Corp, Hewlett Packard, Rennishaw
Probe (USA); Philips (Netherlands); Matrix Churchill (UK);
Fanuc (Japan); Renault, Skiaky (France)
Al Rad wan
Missile; Nuclear
Baghdad (Khandri)
Part of the Auqba Bin Nafi Establishment, dedicated at 70% to
manufacturing assemblies for "Baghdadatrons" (Iraqi
calutrons). Included five 6-meter diameter vertical turning
machines to produce pole pieces for Tarmiyah separators. Also
known as the Batra SCUD assembly plant. Inspected by 4th
IAEA team and by UNSCOM 8.
Waldrich Siegen, Doerries, Scharrman, Deckel, Hahn & Kolb,
DEMAG, Liebherr (Germany); Goimendi (Italy); Sacem, SIP-
Hauser , Aciera, AGIE (Switzerland); machine-tools from
state suppliers in USSR, Bulgaria, and China
AlRafah
Missile
At Taqtaqanah
Also known as the Al Shahiyat Liquid Engine Research,
Development, Test & Engineering Facility, or as the Rufhah
testing grounds. Located 135 km east of Kufa. Adjacent to this
missile production site is a second facility, identified as
Project 328, still under construction following Desert Storm,
believed to be a missile test site for Silkworm and Russian
"Volga" missiles.
Matrix Churchill (UK); Soviet, Chinese, and Bulgarian state
companies; DEMAG (German; Baltimore Aircoil (USA)
119
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Suppliers:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Al Shaheed
Missile
Unknown
License of x-ray equipment from Great Britain in 1989,
intended for "metallographical research"
UK companies
An Anbar Space Research Center
Missile; nuclear
Karbala
Ballistic missiles, and dedicated missile testing range;
suspected location of nuclear warhead plant. Run under the
aegis of the Al Qaqaa State Establishment
Numerous German companies; Consarc (U.S.); 600 Group (UK)
April 7 (Narawan fuze factory)
Conventional
Baghdad
Cardoen/ISC fuze factory for 155mm munitions.
Industrias Cardoen (Chile), Matrix Churchill (USA), ISC
(USA); Getplantrade, Switzerland
Atomic Research Center
Nuclear
Thuwaitha
Site of Osirak nuclear reactor, supplied by France and
destroyed by Israel; Soviet 5 MW research reactor; nuclear fuel
fabrication plant; four hot cells; pilot centrifuge plant for
uranium enrichment; manufacturing site for calutrons;
production of trial quantities of UC14 for EMIS enrichment.
Iraq's only nuclear site registered with the IAEA and partially
subjected to international safeguards
Snia Techint (Italy), Techniatome, St. Gobain Nucleaire,
Framatome, CEA (France); Morgan Rushworth (UK); Maho,
Heidenhain, Leybold Heraeus, Lieber (Germany); Veeco,
Hewlett Packard (USA)
120
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Badr
Conventional; Nuclear
Al Yusufiyah
Aerial bombs; artillery; tungsten-carbide machine-tool bits.
A.k.a. Badr General Establishment. Contains the Al Amin
workshop (qv)
Skiaky (France); Centrifugal Casting Machines, American
Bank & Trust, XYZ Options, Pratt & Whitney, Moore Special
Tool, International Computer Systems/DEC, TI Coating Inc,
Cincinnati Milacron (US); Aciera, Charmilles, EWAG ,
Schaublin, Tomos Bechler, Hauser (Switzerland); Waida,
Fanuc (Japan); Adolph Waldrich Coburg, Donau, Deckel,
Dorries, Siemens, Droop & Rein, Petzing & Hartman, Pfauter
Gildermeister, SHW (Germany); Carvaghi, Cerutti, Innocenti
(Italy); Colchester lathes, Harrison, Matrix Churchill (UK)
Baiji
CBW
Baiji
Chemical warfare agents. Run under the aegis of the Arab
Detergent Chemicals Company
Technipetrole/TPL (Italy)
Base West World
Conventional
Samawa
Maintenance and retrofitting of Iraqi armored vehicles of
Western origin. Originally built using plans for a "vehicle
assembly plant" provided by a West German consortium
Weidleplan, Integral, and Kohlbecker (Germany); Giat, Sofma
(France)
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Digila
Conventional; Nuclear
Zaafarniyah
Computer software, hardware; process-line controllers. Plastics
casting, using Matrix Churchill V2K machining centers
licensed by the UK in 1989. United Nations inspectors found
that it also made magnets and calutron parts for uranium
enrichment. Co-located in suburb of Baghdad with Al Rabee.
HAL Computers. Matrix Churchill (UK)
121
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Dhu Al Fiqar
Missile
Fallujah
Condor II and upgraded SCUD missile cases. Significant
equipment slated for destruction by UN, 14 Feb 1992. A.k.a.
Project 124; Project 1728; Project 395.
Werner & Plheiderer, Siemens, Hengstler, Lincoln GmbH,
DEMAG (Germany); Carlo Banfi Rescaldina, Italargon,
Generale Controlli, Galbadini, DEA, Tomi Tachi, ECS,
Resistanze Industrial^ SNIA-BPD (Italy); Stankopromexport
(USSR); Philips (Netherlands); Instom (UK); unidentified
(Hungary)
Name
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Factory 10
Nuclear
Taji
Manufacture and assembly of gas ultracentrifuges for
uranium enrichment. Specialized workshop located within the
Taji complex; foreign purchases organized by Nassr State
Establishement for Mechanical Industries
H+H Metalform, MAN Technologie, Inwako, Export Union
Dusseldorf GmbH (Germany); TDG, Euromac (UK)
Fao [aka Saad 38]
Conventional; Missile
South of Baghdad
Future aircraft factory for advanced jet trainers, run by the Al
Fao State Establishment; proximity fuzes; Cardoen cluster
bomb plant; Fuel Air Explosives . Identified in 7/91 House of
Commons report as part of Project 395
Carlos Cardoen (Chile), Potain (France), Trebelan SA, Forjas
Extruidas (FOREX) (Spain); Matrix Churchill (UK); ISC (USA)
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Huteen
Conventional; Nuclear
Al Iskandariyah
Explosives, TNT, propellants, fuzes, tungsten-carbide
machine-tool bits. A very large facility with diversified output;
possibly vehicle manufacture. IAEA discovered high
explosives testing for nuclear device at the Al Atheer firing
122
Foreign Contributors:
bunker, within the Huteen walls. Foreign purchases by the
Huteen General Establishement
Carlos Cardoen (Chile), TS Engineering (Germany); GTE
Valenite, XYZ Options, Pratt & Whitney, General Industrial
Diamond Co, Modern Machinery Associates, Moore Special
Tool, Matrix Churchill Corp, Shalco, American Export Import
(U.S.); Matrix Churchill Ltd (UK); Hertel (Germany); Sandvik
(Sweden)
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Mansour
Conventional
Baghdad
Transistors, linear integrated circuits (sister factory to Salah
al Dine), run under the aegis of the Saad General Establishent.
Foreign purchases also listed as intended for the Scientific
Research Council and various University research projects
Thomson-CSF (France); multiple U.S. and UK companies
Name:
PCI
Type:
Dual-use; Conventional
Location:
Basra
Production:
Ethylene Oxide for fuel air explosives.
Foreign Contributors:
Multiple U.S., Germany, and UK suppliers
Name:
PC2
Type:
Dual-use; CBW; super-gun
Location:
Al Musayyib
Production:
Ethylene Oxide for FAE bombs; CW precui
Foreign Contributors:
s. Foreign
purchases handled by Technical Corps for Special Projects
Space Research Corp (Belgium, Switzerland); Walter
Summers, Sheffield Forgemasters (UK); Bechtel , Lummus
Crest (U.S.)
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Saad 16
Missile; Nuclear
Mosul
Large ballistic missile research and design center, run by the
Saad General Establishement
Consultco, Ilbau (Austria); SRC (Belgium); WTB International
AG (Egypt); Sagem (France); Aviatest Blohm Maschinbau,
Carl Zeiss, Degussa, Gildemeister AG, Heberger Bau,
123
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Integral/Sauer Informatic/ICNE, Korber AG, MBB, MBB
Transtechnica, Mauser-Werke, Scientific Computers GmbH,
Siemens AG, Korber AG, TS Engineering, Water Engineering
Trading (Germany); Snia Techint (Italy); IFAT Corp. Ltd.
(Switzerland); Scientific Computers (UK), Electronic
Associates Inc., Gould Inc., Hewlett Packard, Tektronix Inc.,
Scientific Atlanta, Wiltron (U.S.)
Saad21
Missile
Mosul
Nonferrous metal plant for cartridge cases, Condor missile
parts
Steyr-Daimler-Puch (Austria)
Saad24
Conventional; CBW
Mosul
Gas masks, CBW protective clothing. Major rubber and
plastics plant. Aka the Mosul Military Production Facilities
Unknown
Saddam Engineering Complex (Saad 5)
Conventional; Nuclear; super-gun
Al Fallujah
122 mm howitzers; Ababil multiple launch rocket system:
possible site for supergun barrel manufacture. Aka Kol 7 or
Saad 5. Built by Yugoslav firms over a 9-year period (1980-1989.
IAEA discovered manufacturing equipment for Type 1
(Beams) centrifuges. The Saddam State Establishment for
Optics, believed to be a sister organization, manufactures
sniper rifles and optical sights for mortars and artillery
Unisys, Dale Toler, RD&D International, Applied Systems,
West Homestead Engineering, Kennametal, Matrix Churchill
Corp (USA); Bratstvo, Zrak , Ivo Lola Ribar (Yugoslavia);
Biller, Heidenhain, Blohm, Gerber, Boehringer,
Gildermeister, Hennig, Siemens, Maho, Ravensburg, VDF
Wohlenberg , Wotan, Werner, Wanderer (Germany i; Zayer
(Spain); Reishauser,Mikron, Schaublin, SIP, Studer, Tarex,
Hauser, Charmilles (Switzerland); DEA (Italy); Kumming
(China)
124
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Salah al Dine (ex Saad 13)
Conventional (electronics); Nuclear
Ad Dawr
Hybrid circuits, printed circuit boards and components;
licensed production of battlefield computers, Rasit ground
surveillance radars, Tiger G 2-D radar, Jaguar frequency
hopping radars. Bubble memory production planned.
Procurement by the Saad General Establishment, Scientific
Research Council, and various University research projects
Thomson-CSF, CIMSA, Elno S.A, Colly, HES, Hure (France);
Deckel, Demag (Germany); Bliss (USA) ; Racal (UK); DEA,
Fanup (Italy); Dixi, Wahli, Hauser (Switzerland); Fanuc
(Japan)
Salman Pak
CBW
Salman Pak
Chemical and bacteriological weapons research; United
Nations inspectors in July 1991 discovered large-scale
production facilities. Virus, fungi, and protozoa purchases
made by the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
Noske Kaeser, Thyssen Rheinstahl Technik, Identa Co.
(Germany); Atlanta Centers for Disease Control, American
Type Culture Collection (U.S.); multiple UK companies
Samarra
CBW
Samarra
Large-scale chemical weapons manufacturing site and
research center, run under the auspices of the State
Establishement for Pesticides Production (SEPP); biological
weapons; unit for manufacturing centrifuges for nuclear
weapons. Aka the Muthena State Establishment (sister plant in
Fallujah)
Karl Kolb GmbH, Preussag, WET, Ludwig Hammer GmbH.
Neuberger Wood and Plastics Industry, Ltd, Heberger Bau
GmbH, Pilot Plant , Quast, Klaus Union (Germany); Protec
SA, Carbone Lorraine, Le Vide Industrie!, Pirep, Prevost,
SVCM (France)
125
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Sawary
Conventional
Basra area
Small naval patrol boats
Multiple U.S. companies
Sharqat
Nuclear
Ash-Sharqat
Site of calutron magnetic isotope uranium enrichment plant,
still under construction when Allied bombing raids partially
destroyed it in 1/91; under the control of the Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission. Included dedicated 100 MW power plant.
Near the Jebel Makhour site, on western bank of the Tigris
almost due west of Kirkuk.
Unknown
State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment
(SEHEE)
Nuclear; Conventional; super-gun
Al Dura
Mechanical assemblies for super-gun; magnets and
assemblies for calutrons and gas centrifuges, including
vacuum chamber parts. Production line to make components for
the maraging steel Model 21 centrifuge (joint venture with
Badr). Nuclear-specific equipment slated for IAEA destruction
includes flow turning machine, expanding mandrel, electron
beam welding chamber, 2 oxidation furnaces, one MIG welder.
one brazing furnace, one heat treatment furnace, and 3 CNC
machine-tools.
ATI (Belgium), Destec International (UK), Destec Engineering
B.V., Philips (Netherlands); H+H Metalform, Leybold Heraeus
AG, Degussa, Magdeburg, Bosch (Germany); TechnoExport,
Tos Hulin, Skoda (Czechoslovakia)
Suleimaniyah
Nuclear
Suleimaniyah
Alleged site of centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment
Unknown
126
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Taj al-Ma'rik
Missile
Latifiyah
Solid fuel mixing plant for Condor II/Badr 2000, and Sakr 200
missile; casting of solid-fuel rocket motors and production of
APC (ammonium perchlorate), under an Egyptian process.
Aka the "Soviet motor plant. Located within the perimeter of the
giant Al Qaqaa complex, but administratively part of the Bilat
Ash Shuhadaa Establishment.
TMS, Draiswerke, Demag (Germany); Varian Linatron
(USA); Consen group (Germany, Switzerland); Snia Techint
(Italy); Abu Zaabal Specialty Chemical Co (Egypt)
Taji (Nassr State Establishment)
Conventional; nuclear
Al Taji
Artillery; T-72 tanks; production site for Gerald Bull's super-
gun (Babylon Project). A.k.a. Nassr State Establishement for
Mechanical Industries, run by Safa Haboby. Initial project
called for 1,000 artillery pieces/year. Very large, dual use
facility, including steel rolling mills
ABB (Mannheim), Buderus Wetzlar, SHW, Wotan, Siemens,
Magdeburg, H&H Metalform, Schloemann SIEMAG, Dango &
Dienenthal, Ferrostaal AG, Graeser Technology Transfer
GmbH, Hochtief (Essen I, Klockner Industrie Anglage GmbH,
Leifeld & Company (Leico), Leybold AG, LOI Industrie
Anlagen, M.A.N., Machinenfabrtik Ravensurg, Maho,
Dorries, Mannensmann Demag Hitttentechnik, Blohm
Maschinen, Thyssen Rheinstahl, Ravensburg, Rheinmetall,
Ruhrgas, Saarstahl, Schmidt, Kranz & Co., Siemens AG, SMS
Hasenclever, TBT Tiefbohrtechnik, Feld-Muehle, TuV, Zublin
(Germany); Teco, Nassr State Enterprise for Mechanical
Industries (Iraq); Danieli, Officina E. Biglia, (Italy), HMT
International Ltd. (India), Georg Fischer. Von Roll, Oerlikon
& Shaudt, Schmeidemeccanica (Switzerland); Bull Oak Tool
& Gauge, Gerber Systems Technology, Pacific, Pangborn
(USA), International Computer Systems, Matrix Churchill,
FMT, Wickman Bennett, Bridgeport (UK); Petitjean, Fromat
(France)
127
Name:
Type:
Location:
Production:
Foreign Contributors:
Tarmiyah
Nuclear
At Tarmiyah
Site of calutron uranium enrichment plant. Heavily damaged
during Allied bombing.
Unclassified technologies provided by Hypotronics and other
U.S. companies
128
"- ' Ov " '/v' ...II,-
.->.__/
/.
7
']
/
)
*
1 8
4
A. O \ / \ / C / J...JI
Rt run Lie of iraq
MINISTUV OK INDUSTRY and
MILITARY MANUFACTURE
BAGHDAD
Mr. Ha mid U. Jalar
Chairman and Chief Executive
Crescent Petroleum Company International Limited
P. 0. Box 2222
Siiarjall, United Arab Emirates
14th May 1989
International Downstream Integration
Petroleum Industry
Dear Mr, Jaf.ar:
This letter is to confirm the establishment of the Joiiit Venture
between the Ministry of Industry and Military Manufacture of the
Republic of Iraq and Creocent Petroleum Company International
Limited ( "Crescent" ) , for the purpose of acquisition of joint
ownership interests in international petroleum refining, market-
ing and pet roehemical assets outside of the Republic of Ir^y.
Crescent is hereby authorized to contact the owners and/or
rrionoger3 oi appropriate companies in .order to discuss and nego-
tiate the potential purchase or participation of the Joint Ven-
ture in such companies arid/or in the appropriate petroleum as-
sets .
Crescent is also authorized to discuss with the aforementioned
owners/ma lagcmcnt the terms for provision of Iraqi crude oil to
such asset; on a long term basis in support of such transactions.
The formal contract negotiations and execution will be undertaken
by the relevant Agency of the Government of Iraq.
If the parties which are contacted by Crescent should require
direct confirmation from the Ministry of the authority hereby
vested in Crescent. they may contact the undersigned at the Min-
istry in Uaghdad en telex number 213670 "SAFAN IK", or telefax
(9G41) 538 4634.
Youra sincerely.
> 3
Lt. Gen. Dr. Amir H. Al-Saadi
Senior Deputy Minister
!'
Y
t 1
129
THE NEW ARMJ RACE
THE IRAQI BOMB
Because the International Atomic Energy Agency is ineffectual,
Saddam Hussein zsiU continue to outwit U.N. inspectors.
BY GARY MILHOLLIN
AST week, as the United States and
its coalition partners sent cruise
missiles crashing into a nuclear
site near Baghdad, the message to
Saddam Hussein was clear: Don't inter-
fere with international inspectors — let
them look anywhere, any time, and at
anvthing, in accordance with the United
Nations resolutions. The allies know
that Saddam is still hiding part of his
atom-bomb program, and they're eager
for the inspectors to find it. What the al-
lies did not say is that, even though
Saddam has now allowed the U.N.
nuclear inspectors back in. thev probably
won't find what he is hiding. They are
being thwarted by their own manage-
ment as well as by Saddam Hussein.
The inspection trips are a constant
test ot nerves. The inspectors usually stav
at the Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, in Bagh-
dad. "It is unlike any other Sheraton in
the world." one of them told me. "The
most gruesome thing is the dove. It's on
a poster in the lobby, stretched out on a
cross — crucified — with blood dripping
down. And on the top ot" the cross is
written 'U.N.' " This inspector is dis-
couraged, and so are manv others. For
almost a vcir. they have found practically
nothing new. The Iraqis are outfoxing
them at even- turn, harassing them, and
making it more and more likely that
Saddam Hussein will wriggle out from
under the current embargo with large
part? ot his A-bomb effort intact. In
fact, some inspectors believe that if
SacJ.im escapes the embargo soon, he
could get the bomb within five to seven
year?.
The best chance to deter him has al-
ready been lost. When the inspections
began, in May of 1991, the Iraqis were
Still reeling from the Gull War and were
no: able to deceive the inspectors. In
June, the inspectors flushed out a convov
o: trucks earning A-bomb-making
equipment, and in September they
:■ md trunkfuls ot classified nuclear
documents in Baghdad office build-
ings — apparendv left there by mistake.
These finds produced invaluable leads,
which, if thev had been followed aggres-
sively, might have unveiled the essentials
of the Iraqi nuclear program. The op-
portunity was lost, many inspectors be-
lieve, because of the timidity of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, an
arm of the U.N. based in Vienna. The
I.A.E.A. was created in 1956 with two
conflicting goals: to encourage the pro-
liferation of atomic energy and. at the
same time, to insure that the civilian
nuclear projects it spawned did not make
atomic bombs. .After the Gulf War, the
Security Council created a Special Com-
mission to uncover the Iraqi missile,
nuclear, and chemical-and-biological-
weaoon programs, but left control ot the
nuclear inspections in the hands of the
I.A.E.A. The Special Commission and
the I.AE.A. immediately began to feud.
It is the Special Commission that
gets intelligence about Iraq from the
United States and other governments; it
then designates sites for the I.A.E.A. to
inspect, and it controls the inspection
budget. The Special Commission also
persuades friendly governments to sup-
ply technical experts, who are used to
augment I.A.E.A. inspection teams. But
the I.A.EA. runs the inspecdons in the
field, and it tends to rely on Iraqi disclo-
sures, as it does in its civilian inspections.
It also hoards anv information it finds.
The Special Commission docs have in-
spectors of its own — on loan from
friendly governments — but when they
go to Iraq they arc under the IA.E.A. s
thumb.
The agency's timid managers, several
inspectors sav, gave the Iraqis the crucial
time thev needed to spin^a web of de-
ccption — a web now too cense for tr.e
inspectors to penetrate. Representative
Hcnrv B. Gonzalez, the most prominent
congressional investigator ot L.S. ex-
ports to Iraq, told me that he :s cr.t:c.L
of "the ineffective manner in which the
. has addressed Iraq's secret net-
THE NEW YORKER.
FEBRUARY I. 1993
130
work of Western suppliers," and he
added, "The whole effort to stop the
proliferation of nuclear weapons de-
pends on making the I.A.E.A. much
more effective than it has been to date."
Most of the inspectors I've spoken
with — all of whom insist on anonvm-
ity — despair of finding anvthing more in
Iraq as long as the I.A.E.A. remains in
charge.
Kere is how one inspector describes a
team's arrival in Iraq: "You fly in from
Bahrain on a C-160 Transall, operated
by the German Air Force — the Luft-
waffe. You sit on canvas seats made for
paratroopers, and it gets cold. You take
everything in with you — food, water,
money, equipment, even tires. You need
the tires to replace the slashed tires on
U.N. vehicles. You land at Habaniva,
an airport about sixty miles from Bagh-
dad. The first thing you see is a di-
lapidated bus, in the green-and-white
colors of Iraqi Airways. It's low-slung,
belching, and stinking. It
takes you to the operations
center, where you get vour
visa stamp. Then you load
your bags on another bus,
which takes you to Baghdad.
On this bus you meet your
'minders.' These are the Iraqis
who will be your hosts.
They're always with vou,
wherever you go. You assume
the bus is bugged.
"At the hotel, everything is
dimlv lit — the lobbv, the res-
taurant, the hallwavs, the
rooms. Deliberately. The ho-
tel is also bugged. In the
lobbv, there is an enormous portrait ot
Saddam, looking down on evcrvthing.
There is also the poster of the dove. This
is when you first notice the sccuritv guys.
They're not the same as the minders.
They stand around the lobby and watch
evcrybodv. Most of them wear dark
lackers. Thev are also in the hallwavs up-
stairs. At about seven in the evening, you
have the first team meeting, in a confer-
ence room off the lobby. The whole
team usually has one or two dozen in-
spectors. Sonic arc from the I.A.E.A.
and some are from the U.N., but most
are technical experts lent bv friendly
governments. The chief inspector breaks
the team up into subgroups, and each
group has a different mission, After the
team meet: i et the Iraqis — or
their representatives. These are vour
counterparts — the technical guvs who
are the experts. They ask vou where
vou're going. They want to know, be-
cause they're going with you. They pro-
vide vour security and arrange vour
visits. You tell them about the routine
inspections — the ones where you go
back to sites you've already been to — but
vou don't tell them about the surpnse in-
spections, where you go to new sites.
You save these until the next morning,
at the last minute."
THE I.A.E.A. chief inspector for
Iraq is Maurizio Zifferero. a sixtv-
two-year-old nuclear chemist from Italv
who is a specialist in plutonium process-
ing. He was asked to join the I.AE.A.
in 1980 as a deputy director-general — a
high post for which he needed his
government's backing. Several U.N. in-
spectors condemn his conduct of the en-
tire inspection operation and cite a string
of incidents involving him
which, they claim, have en-
abled the Iraqis to stav ahead
of the game. Last week. I
gave him an opportunity to
comment on these incidents
in a telephone conversation
with him at I.A.E.A. head-
quarters in Vienna.
Two U.N. inspectors who
were present at secret pre-
inspection discussions last
February in Baghdad sav that
thev believe the Iraais were
alerted to several surprise in-
spections because Zifferero
discussed them in areas the
Iraqis had bugged. The result, a United
States official says, was that on one "sur-
prise" inspection, the Iraqis were waiting
for the inspectors with coffee and
doughnuts. Rejecting this charge of
careless talk. Zifferero told me, "I as-
sume that even-thing is bugged in the
hotel, and I never mention sites in meet-
ings." The inspectors insist that it hap-
pened, and that United States intelli-
gence and several inspectors warned
Zifferero beforehand that the areas were
bugged.
The same U.N. inspectors sav that
Zifferero has been lax about the security
of documents. Inspection-team mem-
bers arc supposed to keep their back-
packs with them at all times, but thev
sav thev saw Zifferero relaxing in the
hotel without his backpack, which at
the time contained line drawings of
Iraqi nuclear sites based on recent .Amer-
ican intelligence photographs. Again.
Zifferero disputes the charge. He told
me he always wears his backpack and al-
ways keeps his documents in it. (The se-
riousness ot the Iraqi effort to find out
what the inspectors know manifests it-
self' outside the country. In New York,
Marjarta Rautio, Finland's representative
to the Special Commission, got a shock
in her hotel room when she emerged
from the bathroom to find a man who
had been let in by the bellboy going
through her wastebasket. The U.N. in-
spectors assume he was an Iraqi agent. I
The anxieties about Zifferero's per-
formance go beyond concern over his
carelessness. He is also charged with
"spoiling" fresh intelligence. A few
months ago, documents seized in Iraq
revealed that the Iraqis had been doing
secret research on plutonium metal.
Some thirteen pounds of this substance
destroyed Nagasaki in 1945. .Although
plutonium can fuel nuclear reactors,
there is no real use for plutonium metal
other than in atomic bombs, so the fact
that the Iraqis were working on it
proved their dedication to bomb-
making. It was assumed that ZLfferero.
as the I.A.E.A.'s chief inspector, would
use the tip as a lead and do additional
research. That might have produced
enough detail to force the Iraqis to reveal
more leads, or might have brought about
a surprise inspection. Instead, to the dis-
may of his colleagues. Zifferero mere!'.
took the information to the Iraqis and
asked for an explanation. Thev coolly re-
plied that thev were planning to srudv
neutrons. This was not credible techni-
cally, but Zifferero simplv quoted the
Iraqi replv. without comment, in his
December 10th inspection report, which
did not even note that Iraq was experi-
menting with bomb material. Last week,
Zifferero told me that the IAEA,
didn't consider the matter closed, and
might pursue it further.
Zifferero's behavior has not escaped
1 the eye of the United States Con-
gress. Senate Intelligence Com."
staff members have specifically requested
information about Ziftcrero from the
C.I.A. The committee should h.v.
told, among other things, that ir. the
mid-ninetccn-scventics Zirlercr .
131
THE NEW AHMJ KACE
was then working for the Italian Atomic
Energy Commission, went to Baghdad
to, as he put it to me last week, help "ne-
gotiate a bilateral agreement" tor Italy to
sell plutonium-production equipment to
Iraq. The equipment was essential to
Iraq's plan for the bomb, and would
complement a reactor that France was
preparing to build there: the Italian
equipment would extract plutonium af-
ter the French reactor irradiated ura-
nium. Other Italian equipment, also part
of the deal, would fabricate uranium into
reactor fuel rods suitable for irradiation.
Iraq had bought a complete plutonium-
production line.
"We raised hell about the Italian
deal," a senior American official who op-
posed it at the time told me. ZifFerero
says that in 1976 he visited an Iraqi ra-
diochemistry lab to help Iraq determine
whether it could do "fuel-cycle re-
search" — plutonium research — in its ex-
isting facilities. He says that he never
went back to Iraq — and never visited the
facilities that were using the Italian
equipment — until he was sent bv the
I.A.E.A. after the Gulf War.
The Israelis, who were not fooled by
Iraqi promises of peaceful use, destroyed
the French reactor with precision bomb-
ing in 1981. But the Italian equipment
survived. In fact, it lived on to become
the hottest topic of conversation during
the I.A.E.A.'s fourth inspection, which
began in late July of 1991. Before a
shocked group of inspectors, a senior
Iraqi official calmly revealed that Iraq
had used the Italian equipment to ex-
tract plutonium in violation of Iraqi
promises to the I.A.E.A.
This was a watershed for the
I.A.E.A. It was the first time in history
that a country was known to have bro-
ken its pledge to report all work with
plutonium to agency inspectors. Thus
the very equipment that ZifFerero helped
supplv was used to break the promise
that he is now responsible for enforcing.
To make matters worse, the Iraqi official
was himself a former I_A.E.A. inspector.
He told his outraged ex-colleagues that
his I.A.E.A. experience had made it
easier to dupe them. "He really rubbed
their noses in it," said David Kay, a
former inspector and I.A.E.A. em-
ployee, who has led several inspections
in Iraq, and was present at the meeting.
The Italian equipment was not
all that survived the 1981 attack. The
132
THE NEW YOftKER. FEDKUAHY 1, 1993
"Before we get started, are we showing pony tail or not?"
U.N. inspectors believe that Israel's
bombs also missed the French reactor's
control panels, instrumentation system,
and computers. These are vital compo-
nents, and the Iraqis would have a hard
time replacing them if they decided to
build a second reactor. Some U.N. in-
spectors think they have tried to build a
new, underground reactor; otherwise,
the plutonium research makes no sense.
The inspectors have searched for this re-
actor with no success.
The French components were yet an-
other lead that was not followed up. The
components are on an I.A.E.A. list of
sensitive nuclear items that the inspec-
tors know the Iraqis have, and which the
Iraqis are required to account for, but
when Zifferero asked where the compo-
nents were, the Iraqis refused to produce
them (while admitting that thev ex-
isted). Zifferero accepted this refusal
without challenge. Last week, when I
pressed Zifferero about the components,
he said, This is a lead that will be fol-
lowed up soon. It may have been an
oversight not to follow it up earlier."
Senate Intelligence Committee staff
members are still puzzled about
Zifferero. The committee asked the
C.I. A. months ago about his back-
ground, but still has no answer. Some
senior officials at the Pentagon say they
have been complaining about Zifferero
for months, but they say the State De-
partment has done nothing to have him
removed. Our government is divided on
this issue. Officials in at least one other
major Western government also have
doubts about him. According to a well-
placed official, its intelligence analysts
find his behavior inexplicable.
AN inspector described to me a
l. typical day in the field: "The
loudspeakers in the mosques come on at
5 A.M. with the first call to prayer, so you
don't need an alarm. You assemble in
the lobby by seven. If you are driving,
you go in a bus or a van, usually a blue-
and-white Toyota. All the vehicles are
Tovotas, usually with broken windows.
Behind vou is a U.N. vehicle driven by a
U.N. medic or radio operator. It's loaded
with water, communication equipment,
medical kits, and food. The Iraqis pro-
vide all the other vehicles, including the
one vou ride in, and the drivers. In front,
there's an Iraqi police car — an Olds
Cutlass Ciera, with a blue light on
top. If you get caught
in traffic, the Iraqi po-
lice stick their arms
out the windows and
wave their guns. Then
evervbodv gets out of
the way."
The teams alwavs
take along a portable
IMARSAT — Inter-
national Marine Sat-
ellite dish. The size of
a big suitcase, it beams
its signal up to an
IMARSAT over the In-
dian Ocean, enabling
team members to talk
to the U.N. in New
York If a team is go-
ing to a new site, its
leader shouldn't tell
the Iraqis where until
the team actually gets
in the car. Then the
Iraqis radio ahead.
This usually gives the
site a half hour to an
hour's notice. And, of
course, the Iraqis can
drive slowly. The site
is usually protected bv a high fence and
anti-aircraft guns. Team members go
first to the headquarters building to
meet the director-general in his office.
In many of the factories, there is a model
of the site after it was bombed, showing
every piece of damage in detail. Next to
it is a model of the new site — rebuilt to
the highest standards. (As they ap-
proached one site, team members saw
huge piles of debris that the Iraqis had
bulldozed to clear the way for a new
building. The Iraqis told the team that
they had taken all the machines out of
the site to escape the bombing. Thev hid
them between people's houses, and after
the war they moved them into the new
building.)
The team leader will ask the director-
general for a historv of the plant,
whether it made anv nuclear equipment,
and other questions. The Iraqis always
deny everything. The interview cakes twenty
or thirty minutes. Then the team tours
the plant, looking for proscribed activi-
ties and for equipment on Annex 3 — the
list of items that Iraq is not allowed to
possess under U.N. resolutions. It also
looks at the plant's potential for going
back into weapons production. Team
THE NEW ARMJ HACE
133
members can take notes, or samples, or
photographs.
The inspector says, "Normally, you
don't find anything. After two or three
hours, vou eat lunch. Usually it's Ameri-
can M.R.E.s — meals ready to eat — and
bottled water. Then you go to the next
site. By the end of the day, you're tired,
because it's hot and you've walked so
much. Everybody is also demoralized,
because you haven't found anything.
You do this every day for about ten
davs" — the usual duration of a team's
tour. "Back at the hotel, you have the
team meeting, which is a debriefing.
The subgroups report on what they did,
but you can't be very specific, because
the room is bugged. Then you shower,
eat dinner, and go to bed."
BEFORE the war, IA..EA. inspectors
had visited Iraqi nuclear sites twice
a year for a decade. Their job was to
verify that Iraq was keeping its promise
not to make an atomic bomb. As late as
1990, they rated Iraqi cooperation as
"exemplary." But all that time Saddam
was running a vast A-bomb program
under their very noses. The inspectors
spent their time at a huge complex called
Al Tuwaitha, where they visited only the
buildings that Saddam designated; they
never looked at what was going on next
door. If they had, they would have found
laboratories busily engaged in research
on both plutonium and uranium for
atomic bombs. In the words of an
American official, "the I.A.EA. missed
the Iraqi bomb before the war, and now
it's missing it again."
One U.N. inspector accuses the
agency of "playing information games."
The process of gathering information
about Iraqi activities is fairly complex.
The Iraqis are watched by satellites, by
U-2 spy planes, and by U.N. helicopters
flying out of Baghdad. They are also be-
ing informed on by a number of defec-
tors. Most of this intelligence pours in to
the C.I.A.. which sifts it and prepares a
package of promising sites to visit. The
package then goes to both the State De-
partment and the Pentagon, which to-
gether decide what sites to propose to
the Special Commission. The British,
French, German, and Russian intelli-
gence agencies do the same. The Com-
mission weighs all this advice and de-
cides where to strike next.
The process has worked well for mis-
sile and chemical-and-biological inspec-
tions, but it hasn't worked for nuclear
inspections. When the missile inspec-
tors, who work independently of the
I.A.EA. , find something — a rocket-
engine diagram, say — they immediately
inform the governments that provided
the leads. The governments then funnel
the data back to their missile experts,
who evaluate it and provide more leads.
The Special Commission's missile in-
spectors thus get the benefit of concerted
expert analysis, which they could never
provide themselves. Each inspection
builds on the previous one.
The I.AEA. doesn't work that way.
It deems the results of its inspections
confidential, and puts only a fiacrion of
what it knows in its written reports; it
gives data to the Special Commission
only upon specific request. The Special
Commission's inspectors complain that
they don't know what to ask for, because
they don't know what the agency has.
Nor does the agency generally report its
findings back to the governments that
have supplied its intelligence leads. The
result is a gap in the information loop,
isolating the nuclear inspectors from
competent intelligence work. The
agency has no expertise in nuclear weap-
ons, because since its inception it has in-
spected only civilian nuclear plants.
Most of its employees are from countries
without nuclear weapons, and thev lack
security clearances. "Your typical
I.A.E.A. inspector wouldn't know a
nuclear-weapon part if it fell on him,"
says one American bomb expert who
was an inspector in Iraq. The agency has
no photo interpreters — essential for un-
derstanding data from satellites. Its few
available analysts cannot possibly match
the power of the American, Russian,
British, and French nuclear-weapon
laboratories. (Incidentally, the I.A.EA.'s
practice of including as many nationali-
ties as possible on the inspection teams
allows inspectors from countries without
nuclear weapons to learn in Iraq what
machines are needed to build them,
where" to get the machines, and how to
avoid detection.)
ONLY two of a total of sixteen
nuclear inspections in Iraq have
produced major intelligence leads, and in
both the inspectors had to violate
I.A.E.A. policies to get them. Late in
June of 1991, at the beginning of the
134
THE NEW YORKER. FEBRUARY 1. 1993
second inspection, the inspectors were
giving the Iraqis between six and twelve
hours' notice before each site visit. This
was the rule laid down bv I.A.E.A.
headquarters in Vienna. The Iraqis
understood the rule far too well; they
were moving equipment from one site to
another during the notice period. In
June, as American satellites watched, the
Iraqis went to hiding places in the
desert, dug up giant machines for pro-
cessing uranium, loaded them on trucks,
and drove them to a site called Abu
Gharib, to which the inspectors had been
denied entry. Then the satellites saw the
trucks move the equipment from Abu
Gharib to a second site, at Al Fallujah.
David Kay, the American who led
the team, says that he got this informa-
tion in Iraq at about 3 A.M. He then
called together six inspectors "for a long
walk in Baghdad," during which they
could talk without being bugged. They
agreed to do a zero-notice in-
spection at Al Fallujah that
morning, despite the policy of
giving six to twelve hours' no-
tice. Kay told the Iraqis that
he was going "in the direction
of a site the team had already
toured — a site that happened
to be on the road to Al
Fallujah. Kay managed to get
his vehicle in front of the col-
umn and went right bv the
first site. The Iraqis "went
crazy," Kay says. "They
turned on red lights, pulled us
over, and argued with us, but
we got to Fallujah anyway."
There they were denied entry,
but they managed to photo-
graph trucks leaving through another
gate, while the Iraqis fired bullets over
their heads.
The moment was dramatic: the in-
spectors had the first clear proof that
Saddam was trying to make a bomb.
The equipment included huge seventeen-
foot magnets, weighing more than fifty
tons, which could be used onlv for en-
riching uranium — raising it from its
natural state to nuclear-weapon grade.
Kay saw it as a vindication of the team.
"We all pulled together and it worked,"
he said. "Even though we had to break
IA.E.A. rules to do it."
The I.A.E.A. then sprang into ac-
tion. It and the Special Commission
rushed to Iraq a high-level delegation
that included Mohamed El Baradei, an
Egyptian on the I.AEA legal staff. The
delegation found the Iraqis arguing
lamely that the equipment had nothing
to do with uranium enrichment. El
Baradei, fresh on the scene, embodied
the tradition of the I.A.EA. Before an
incredulous group of inspectors, he de-
clared, as Kay recalls it, "The Iraqis do
not have a uranium-enrichment program.
I know so, because they are my friends
and they have told me that they don't."
El Baradei was wrong, of course. But
he was following the line laid down bv
his I A.E.A. superiors. If they had had
their way, Kay's inspection might never
have occurred. After the first inspection,
in May, Iraq had accounted for all the
imported nuclear material it had previ-
ously informed the I.A.E.A. about,
which balanced the agency's accounts.
"The I.A.EA. was lucky," a former
inspector who was on the first team says.
Kay and this inspector say that
Zifferero and his boss, Hans
Blix, the director-general of
the I.A.E.A., wanted to put
out a report at the end of May
concluding that everything
was fine. But a minority of in-
spectors, mostly Americans,
wouldn't go along. They
couldn't understand why the
Iraqis had left some of the
bombed buildings untouched
while razing others, even tear-
ing out foundations as far as
several metres down. The
Americans thought that the
Iraqis might be concealing
nuclear-weapon work, and
they wanted the report to say
so. "It all looked very suspicious," the in-
spector said. "But the I.A.E.A. wasn't
interested. It wanted to pasteurize our
language and put the report out any-
wav." The I.A.E.A. was saved from hu-
miliation by a defector, who turned up
just before the report was to be released
and told Western intelligence about the
equipment. A few weeks later, Kay suc-
ceeded in finding and photographing it.
Kay also led the only other team that
produced major intelligence leads. After
arriving in Baghdad late in the afternoon
on September 22, 1991, the team set out
early the next morning. Kay pointed
toward the Al Rashid Hotel, and told
the Iraqis simply to "drive that way." By
6 A.M., the team was searching a nine-
story building in Baghdad from the top
down. It turned out to be where the Iraqis
were designing facilities for their first
atomic bomb. When thev reached the base-
ment, a few hours later, the team found
trunkfuls of classified documents from
the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission.
This discovery sparked an intense
confrontation. The Iraqis kept the team
in the parking lot until 7 P.M., confis-
cated the documents until 2 A.M. the
next day, and then gave onlv some of
them back. What the Iraqis didn't know
was that the inspectors had spirited out
two reports marked "Top Secret." These
crucial papers contained the bomb de-
sign. The design was crude but workable,
and would have produced a weapon with
nearly twice the power of the Hiroshima
bomb.
EARLY on the morning of Septem-
ber 24th, Kay's team began a
search of two other buildings, using the
same tactics. These buildings turned out
to be the headquarters of the entire Iraqi
A-bomb program, code-named Petro-
chemical 3. The team turned up person-
nel lists and procurement records, and
four hours later there was another con-
frontation. The Iraqis demanded that
the team surrender its records, its photo-
graphs, and its videotapes. When the in-
spectors refused, the Iraqis held them at
the site. This was the celebrated "parking-
lot incident'' — a four-dav standoff in the
scorching Baghdad heat. The team lived
near its immobilized bus until the Iraais
finally backed down.
Eventually, the team hauled out pav
records, computer files, and more than
sixty thousand pages of documents, in-
cluding the two top-secret reports on
bomb design. The reports were a gold
mine of intelligence nuggets: thev re-
vealed numerous aspects of Saddam's
bomb-manufacturing effort and still
constitute the primary evidence of how
close he was to the bomb when the war
broke out.
The aggressive tactics required for
this breakthrough did not please the
I.A.E.A. Zifferero, who was not in Iraq
at the time of that inspection, later told
an inspector who was there that the epi-
sode was "one of the worst things that
ever happened." .And. according to Kav.
Hans Blix reacted by saying that Kav
was not going to be assigned to any
more inspections in Iraq. Kav then re-
THE NEV AI\MJ l\ACE
135
signed from the agency. He and another
American inspector who" was in the
parking-lot standoff maintain that "ev-
erybody associated with the parking-lot
incident became persona non grata" at
the I.A.E.A. As tor the sixty thousand
pages of documents, onlv about fifteen
per cent of them have been translated
from the Arabic, although summaries of
most documents have been completed.
The titles alone show that the docu-
ments are rich in procurement data and
other leads. The I.A.E.A. has farmed
most of them out to coalition govern-
ments for translation, but none has com-
mitted the resources to do the job
effectively. Thus, the inspectors are like
treasure hunters who can read only
scraps of a map.
Acting on an intelligence tip from a
United States ally, Zifferero finally had a
chance to lead his own team into the
Petrochemical 3 headquarters last De-
cember. The team was an unusual com-
bination. It had Special Commission in-
spectors from New York, who were
looking for missile and chemical-and-
biological-weapons documents, and
I.A.E.A. inspectors who suspected the
Iraqis of having moved nuclear docu-
ments back into the building. On this
particular trip, I'm told, Zifferero ap-
peared to observe security precautions
more closely. Nevertheless, the differ-
ence in methods and attitudes between
the I.A.E.A. and the Special Commis-
sion was striking.
When Zifferero gave the order to
begin, the Special Commission's
"document-exploitation
team" tanned out quick-
ly to surround and oc-
cupy the building. Zif-
ferero, however, had no
experience with rapid
engagement. "As team
leader, he had to be
readv to order teams to
go here, go there — im-
mediately — and to or-
der Iraqi escorts to go
with them," a missile
inspector later said.
"But he was totally un-
able to do that — he
couldn't keep up."
The result was a
breakdown in com-
mand and control. The
Special Commission
and I.A.E.A. inspectors started to de-
bate procedures in front of the Iraqis,
and the Iraqis themselves began to move
documents. One threw a bundle out a
window, and another picked it up and
ran with it to a city bus. A Special Com-
mission inspector dashed in front of
the bus to stop it, but had to leap out of
the way to avoid being run over. (The
Iraqis later returned what they said were
the documents.) In this instance, the
I-A.EA. procedures were probably harm-
less, because Petrochemical 3 had been
turned into a fundamentalist seminary
with low security, making it an unlikely
hiding place for sensitive information.
The intelligence tip from the allied gov-
ernment was probably a dud.
To put the blame on Zifferero or
Hans Blix for the I.A.EA.'s attitude and
its unwillingness to run intrusive inspec-
tions is to miss the point. Many inspec-
tors don't see Zifferero as a villain. They
say that he is simply the wrong man for
the job. One inspector sums it up this
way: "Zifferero has poor organizational
skills in the field, and he is out of his ele-
ment when it comes to getting things
done if the opposition doesn't want you
to." Other inspectors agree that he
doesn't have the temperament for con-
frontation. The fundamental problem is
the I.A.EA. itself. "The agenev's charter
didn't have in mind the amplitude of in-
spections called for by the U.N. resolu-
tions" on Iraq, says Gerard C. Smith,
who was Ambassadot at Large for Non-
proliferation Matters in the Carter Ad-
ministration and represented the United
States on the IA..E.A.'s board of gover-
nors. The agency was established in the
glory days ot nuclear power, when
people thought that electricity from the
atom would be "too cheap to meter." It
was given the job of spreading nuclear
technology to developing countries,
mostly by promoting exports from ad-
vanced countries. At the same time, it
was supposed to inspect the exports to
make sure they weren't used to make
atomic bombs. The conflict of interest is
obvious: if the agency catches somebodv
making bombs, it means that the nuclear
exports were too dangerous to have been
sold in the first place, and should not
have been promoted.
Iraq is the perfect example. The
I.A.E.A. gave Saddam a clean bill of
nuclear health for a decade before the
invasion of Kuwait. Whv would the
agency now want to find even more
evidence of how badlv it was duped?
"It's against the I.A.E.A.'s culture to
find anything," savs an American expert
who was on one of the eorlv inspection
teams. Only this "culture" can explain
Zifferero's statements to the press. Just a
year ago, in February, he told Reuters
that "practically the largest pan of Iraq's
nuclear program has now been identi-
fied — probably what is missing is just
details." He made this statement after
his team's tenth inspection trip — the one
during which he is said to have discussed
surprise-inspection sites in the bugged
hotel.
On September 2nd, Zifferero told
Reuters that Iraq's nuclear program "is at
"I'm behind on my carrots.
136
THE NEV YOftKER. FEBRUARY 1. 1993
zero now," and that the Iraqis "have
stated many times to us that thev have
decided at the higher political level
to stop these activities." He also made
the spectacularly improbable statement
"This we have verified." Even the
I.A.E.A. had to disavow that", it put out
a statement the next day blaming the
press for giving "a misleading impression
ot his understanding of the situation,"
and saying that it is "too earlv to conclude"
that Iraq's entire nuclear program had
been uncovered. Zifferero, undeterred,
reiterated the same day that "there is no
possibility of a substantial organized
[nuclear] program going on in Iraq
now." And, for good measure, he said a
few days later. "I don't believe in the ex-
istence of an underground reactor."
When I asked Zifferero about these
statements last week, he insisted, "The
Iraqi program is now dormant. Iraq has
other priorities, and now has no labs in
which to continue the program."
ZIFFERERO stated in his latest re-
port that the inspection team "was
not harassed." If that was the case, it was
unique. On most trips, the inspectors tell
me, the harassment is unrelenting. The
Iraqis stan calling about 1 A.M.," one of
them said. "They threaten you or thev
just dial to wake you up. You also get
notes under the door." The Special
Commission inspectors sav the notes are
often death threats. Some of the Ger-
man members got notes saying that
what the United States did to Iraq dur-
ing Desert Storm was the same as what
the United States did to Germanv dur-
ing the Second World War, so the Ger-
mans shouldn't cooperate with the
"American" inspections.
Another inspector says, "Thev also
come into your room, whether vou're
there or not. You have to put evervthing
valuable in your backpack, and vou have
to assume that if you don't sleep with it
tied to you, voull lose it. This creates a
lot of tension and makes it hard to
sleep." Team members are also harassed
in restaurants, another inspector adds.
"Somebody will stop at your table, pick
up your plate, and dump your food in
your lap. This is alwavs a young, well-
dressed, physically fit Iraqi male."
On two occasions, while groups of
inspectors were standing in the hotel
atrium, someone threw a light bulb
down on them from three stories up. It
terrified everybody, because when it hit
the floor it sounded like a rifle shot. A
Special Commission inspector says,
"They even came up to one of our
people in the street and threw diesel fuel
on him." Another inspector tells me that
"after two weeks of this, you're ex-
hausted. Nobodv is sad on the trip back
to the airport. When the plane takes off,
everybody applauds."
THE Special Commission flatly re-
jects Zifferero's rosy picture of
Iraq's nuclear status. In its reports to the
Security Council, the Commission ac-
cuses the Iraqis of "non-cooperation,
concealment and sometimes false infor-
mation" in all areas that are being in-
spected, and goes as far as to say that
they have "actively falsified the evi-
dence." The Special Commission's in-
spectors still want to find (1) parts of the
giant machines that the Iraqis used to
raise uranium to nuclear-weapon grade,
to learn how much progress they made;
(2) the identities of Iraqi nuclear person-
nel, to learn what those people are do-
ing; (3) records of test explosions, to
learn the status of the Iraqi bomb de-
sign; (4) other records of the nuclear-
weapon program, to team whether all its
components have been discovered; (5)
Iraq's foreign sources of technical advice,
to cut them off, and (6) Iraq's network of
foreign equipment suppliers, to make
sure that the network- does not revive as
soon as the embargo is lifted.
These inspectors also fear that
Saddam may be hiding experimental
centrifuges used to raise uranium to
weapon grade, and an underground re-
actor that could secretly make plutonium
for bombs. Thev are not likely to find
anv of these things under the aegis of the
I.A.E.A. Zifferero's press statements
alone have undermined his credibility.
Can he plausibly search for something
that he savs doesn't exist? The solution
to the problem, these inspectors argue, is
to transfer authority for the nuclear in-
spections to the Special Commission,
which would require a U.N. resolution.
The I.A.E.A. knows how to do onlv one
thing: visit declared sites. In civilian in-
spections, a country tells the agency
what it is doing and invites it in. and
then the agency inspects only agreed-
upon items at agreed-upon sites. It
closes its eyes to anything else. And,
worse, it usuallv doesn't reveal what it
finds. But no bomb-builder ever admits
what he is doing, let alone where he is
doing it. And Saddam Hussein is cer-
tainly no exception. (However, some
United States government analysts think
that Saddam is likely to make a spec-
tacular offer soon to President Clinton.
It will probably contain a dramatic rev-
elation about one or more of the weapon
programs and will probably include in-
formation — and disinformation — about
Western companies that provided cru-
cial help. Saddam's goal will be to drive a
wedge into the Gulf War coalition bv
convincing some of its members that he
has finally come clean, and that the em-
bargo should be lifted.)
There are still two big jobs to do in
Iraq: find the rest of Saddam's bomb
program and prevent him from gaining
control of resources already found and
reconverting them to bomb-making. To
accomplish the first task, the inspectors
need to change tactics. "We have diplo-
mats when we should have detectives." a
knowledgeable American official says.
"This is a shell game, and you have to
stop the other guy from moving the
shells." The inspectors are reluctant to
go into government ministries, universi-
ties, and private homes, but that is their
best chance of finding the nuclear-bomb
program. United States intelligence is
convinced that the program is on com-
puter data bases. Only a data base could
keep track ot the design, manufacturing,
testing, and procurement data essential
to continuity. The computers are be-
lieved to be at universities or in the
homes of key members of the nuclear
program. "We think that if the inspec-
tors went into these places they would
find some important stuff." savs an in-
formed United States official.
The United States government has
also proposed that the Special Commis-
sion adopt an "area strategy," in which
the Commission would pick an area and
search every building and everv cave be-
fore movine on to the next area. "There
137
"You know you have my support on pork and beans, but where do you
stand on chicken and dumplings?"
are only a few places where Iraq has the
people, communications, and infrastruc-
ture to continue to run the program," an
American official says, "so you can des-
ignate the areas." The goal is to freeze
Saddam's shells in place so that any
moves by the Iraqis could be detected.
This strategy would require more in-
spectors. The United States proposes
that a score or more move into Iraq per-
manendy. The plan is that thev would
work in prefabricated, bug-free quarters
flown in from America, enabling them
to talk to New York without Iraqi ears
bent over their telephones. When new
intelligence develops, they could strike
quickly, hitting two or three areas at a
time, thus overwhelming Saddam's
disinformation specialists.
The United States proposal was sub-
mitted to Rolf Ekeus. of Sweden, the
head of the Special Commission. Ekeus
has been a tenacious leader of the Spe-
cial Commission inspectors, but, with
the exception of the proposal for secure,
prefab quarters, he has rejected the Amer-
ican plan, out of concern that the U.N.
might lose control of the inspections in
the held. The inspectors would be
mostly British and American, and he
tears that once they began to generate
hot intelligence leads, which would be
analyzed in London and Washington,
the U.N. could be pushed out of the in-
formation loop. He also points out that
Saddam would have more ammunition
for his charge that the inspections are re-
ally an Anglo-Saxon operation.
It may be that Ekeus can no longer
afford these qualms. The information
tug-of-war between the C.I. A and the
I.A.E.A. has reached a deadlock. As
David Kay desenbes it, "The I A.EA. is
saying, Tell us where to go,' and the
C.I. A. is saying, 'Do something to get
something moving, so we can see it.' "
The C.I.A. has the better argument:
some action is needed to flush Saddam's
nuclear covey from its hiding place.
The other big job in Iraq is to guard
what has been found. By mid-November,
the I.A.E.A. had compiled a list of six
hundred and ninety pieces of sensitive
equipment, of which eighty-tour have
direct nuclear-weapon applications. Vir-
tually all the equipment was imported,
and most of it is "dual use" — capable of
making either civilian products or weap-
ons of mass destruction. The U.N. must
decide whether to destroy it, monitor it,
or release it to the Iraqis.
The United States wants the inspec-
tors to destroy any item that was either
used to make nuclear weapons or in-
tended for such use. The I.A.E.A.
doesn't want to go along with that pro-
posal. It argues that Iraq would still have
manv machines — some still in their
crates — equivalent to the ones
destroyed, and therefore de-
struction would not reallv derail
the Iraqi bomb program but
would only be punitive. The
I.A.E.A. would rather let the
Iraqis use the machines under
its monitoring.
But Iraq smuggled many of
those machines out of Western
countries illegally, and it falselv
promised to confine others to
peaceful use. For example, in
the late nineteen-eighties, the
Iraqi government secretly took
over a British machine-tool
maker called Matrix Churchill,
which apparendy lied to British
customs about the uses to
which its exports would be put
in Iraq. According to a U.N.
report. Matrix Churchill sup-
plied thirty-three machines
with nudear-weapon potential
Matrix Churchill also sold Iraq
nineteen additional machines,
which were found in damaged condi-
tion. Letting Iraq keep these machines
rewards Iraqi fraud.
If the inspectors were allowed to de-
stroy any sensitive equipment not
bought honesdy, they would catch most
of the machines now in dispute. Iraq is
already supposed to disclose its supplier
network, to comply with U.N. resolu-
tions. But that network is one of its most
important secrets. If Iraq won't say
where it got the machines, the inspectors
should assume that it got them dishon-
estly. To leave the machines in Iraqi
hands, one inspector savs, would be follv,
for "Iraq already has the people and the
know-how, and it will still have the dual-
use equipment, so if the world gets rued
of monitoring, Iraq is back in business."
Without new leadership and protec-
tion, the inspection effort will die by de-
moralization. The stakes are enormous.
An .American A-bomb expert who served
on one of the inspection teams sal's that
if Saddam had not invaded Kuwait, "he
could have had a first crude device by
now, deliverable with great accuracy in a
Ryder truck." There is no evidence that
any of Saddam's nuclear scientists have
been laid off, and unless the inspectors
find the test of his nuclear program and
neutralize it, the world will face the same
uncertainty about the Iraqi bomb in
1993 that it faced before the war. ♦
138
(Etjc $eUr fjork eimcs
MOND^y. /*pr;l :«. iwj
Iraq's Bomb — an Update
By Diana Edenswortl
and Gary MUhoi Un
WAtMtmermm
^ oow pwWMf this •««*. uw
U N wiM raport 1AM HI
Iraq U«i
IAEA rrwnrfl rrrularTv
d Mi Kuwaa
ar. tat m>«M navy had hu nm bomb
mm H* HOI hat ham«su«i it*
mi and ha a prwrrtcd thr iofmhm
■an 0> hit global tuopiarr* Hr haa
a aianao to «n European and Amrr-
■» on Muit oti uvi i*"t>
o Bomb cllon
■ar war mated
i ai lead iwijy li drawi an
1 rrcorai and rrooni Bv •mpretasn
■a rhc umn al manulanurrn «rno
1 an havy tuoomd iranr produrii
fit* to Irao, «t iivan a-harc known
i claimed i»«u«hik"i »ai tor cmt-
Mr rht U S Govammam *ami nwai
ht material Octtrovad thy I A E-A
1 ■- trig uit it under <*r atenrv i
i tuu tufP montior
tailed io detect
b proaram at in* dm place
■ fcuVtt-orO ■> O rcM-orcn onuli I
•r *>«->Mini PnneCt na NuClM
■ (.munW i.ijf i M'lhoJIm it i fir
Found but Not
• aa* ions of natural aranawm (Branl.
WajaY ami Pomnul)
• I.? loan a* awrajaaa acaawaaai 4 lialyi
• 111 torn a* HMX a h.idi iqawi
kar anoninn) aioaaar baaMas.
a aa aiacftaan mat anaoa Banal traa
aainluaa Bant, br Damn. HAH Me-
jaJaarn. Kta**rttra| m AandR. LritoW
bsaaMuH Birafcriatav by raatajia II IT
• Ta^ eaacinc I reowea^rv convi nen
ta pvaai namK bom* lurl prymariaaa.
by Acomn (SxittUmi
a Mara than TM vaNa* that can pro
ceaa atomar bomb furl o-» liUm VAT
(SanuarbMd) and Nunra (Ul)
a Two to afdawp-mra i naa . ma-
by DE a (tiaiyi
a fa mi.frr<iin uaui io eat ran pfc>
toanuna aom* by Mctaiarnrahian Aft
(Saao a w)
a Machaw-a lor mittwia. metal by
MaM achata*. SHW and area an iGerma
ny» I nw arawn f Italy > ■"* Zayay
(Spaaal
a Two aucrnbty praiaca and too bai-
M —l mioiiwi to miir rmtnfuaaa
a One re-savmtaana and diacfiarae
marhntr to auopon rtecir u maanrcir
urtmiiM eemehmeni bv Mtlhtorr iHm
•Ml
a imr *i motuinc mjrnw m mjar
ceaanltaw mot on nv Artwqi tCc^maitvt
a (jnr aM-tun nvdr juIk (V>* "• uupr
rapaawwa atomic noma nana
a One m».nir«T>r compuiar uvt) to
pnarraa nwcatar aiocnar Dontb rtxan bv
NEC IJaoani
• tan* oiNjaiam lurnacr* tar maitnt
cpmnluircpana bv Oaiuiu tGcrnanvi
a Ora? fWirwBrim welder 10 ■»
wme*rwr.iu|ti bv Scuav tFrancrt
a Tanialwnt mrtal ahrvt* tor maaini
cnartbiaa to ran atomar bomb com
SU3 Mhtine
paat to atomar bomn nuihoVra bv Hrw-
■Mt Packard (U S I
a Mara tnaa I .* milltaat aronh nt mm-
!■■! 1 1 iKTftaM lor liupnant to atamtc
i buitdera bv
a Cr-rbaui iFranrc)
a Oaaapwwri and aaaala a aa B aH rapa-
Mr tt (Mi*tnt nanala and poaorn lor
K"-Mmiiw U S )
• MM awit. ot conapwipri lar a
aaatarar anpaejaa imaai utc lic t w io lor
afaaprjan*. O* CZ Loaat Uaia i L S I
a IJD ooa »onn ot rarcinanc and tvttt-
□uama couapn<f aj la naeaaaanr nrwrom
aad «*mm* rav*. lattaiartl lor arttppana
by Canbrrra Indamrara and Cantarrra
Eatftintma (US r^>rmaayt
Ifavam
a Kant ilui roHmrd tntmh L * ura-
aaaaa m chctfum—jwuf mnrttawia
a Onr a^-naraaatai mar haw to maar
rvatnluar naatorv bv Arhwra h-'h«m»i
a Unr p u aOf r ami aaaahtr lor r<im~
paciaaa. nurlcar lorta by KV7 Optnan-t
rUS.)
a 1 1 i mtltaaa ananh >•> rvttnd n rat
prr**r% bv I nlrtd f>rrmanvi
• HI mtllaaa amrth ral MimpiHrrv I.
cmrd to hr wiiranrd to an auamw n>mh
hun-jrf hv Unnva (U S >
• 12M POO rwih H f ompwrr* and rapr
tranar and photaarapmc rgwapmrni lor
awekrar an-apam uaarataram timtwiJ u,
i itnallwf »L h .
a MR 0o> anarth
I'dri sv-nm- III SI
a t Wiitn pi .n- iitf i **. t. millaw pt.int
ta pr»arr^» urjiivm bv Njiioii ilir.i/tli
a Mi-i Hud IUB mtatf snm • uaM* lu
fiinii IMiiKMnint hv Mr.jlk.in»i««
AH (SanPdrat
a CfMriluwr- ra^cadr lu c*>'k h ofj
a Lndrrt round nr art nr and hr.-iw w^
trr lu rinaJt* r pniuatHim
a Nn i>ra* (it Ir jq « lurnan \.»n. . ■ <>l
Ciprnivr ut uranium fnrtthinrnt lor
"«n muipmrm unptarr* and PIpKvuvr
im«ni atomic niimh rnmnnnrnit
a Record* runummff lOrniiiio .>r..i
eorrrm idimm nl tragi nm i- .- nrf
aannri mcHidina tnnw irainr^i n\ mn
Mnallorm Intrr^tum I . >. i..m i nr|i
and 'Si IGcriMfn'l Bal/cr* ism/n
land! Chrmaora tfi.ljndi I M . tlir.<
putrri rlrcirontr icinna marnm
tomnuir-r arapntrl rquipmrnt and f
Quencv »vnihr»ncr» tirpn^nd Inr \r
nit ana Matrii ( hitrm
a < ompuirr HalblWM
and cwicni nl itw cnnir
139
EljciN T ctuJ]orkSimc*j
OP-ED fhiimy Ai'Hii. 14. mi
Iraq's Bomb, Chip by Chip
ThtUS Commtrtt Dtvanmtm HOMOO? *A9 t cUO** *i UrOl rflC A imnetm liven lK*A*Mt mroroi: th* toiler omcuM of *ocA lro«\joclwn (I ai rlojmrO
riponi /or Soodom JfiuitM'a oioomc ■ Maw on>froou eeli«ooo IUS M by loo oiponjnf romtnmy It ■•«■ comprint or Gory Mt(MJm.a low pro/titor
IB* Vitiuouy all o/ !»• B»mi «w» WippW 10 Irof ; alt ert lurM <m imM| „ M Oiwniir W WHconuo omt Olmur M uw wmia Prorm o»
onm* Oemoi or ionf-ronfo »i«W UnBOO Hollow IMOOCMW w If— pro I4 m. *m um COMna. ow Ckoao EoVwaenL • roioorrk iirinl oi 1*1
■Ur Ir )in| 10 |>nO noil 0) l»»P«. 1*0 «« " fU* •» ClIUIIIII >■ '
Atomic Bomb Builders
Salei io froari Atom* Emtrfj C*mm
laboratory; I ad r u. Dun $i I as, trfcare i
wft«rt detonators were mode*.
tht rnou oiomtc research
'wrJ «M mod*. A I Qooaal .iif
Canberra Ckbirwik: compuien lor meaewnng |imm« rays and) lm m»
irtna — 130.000
Cerberva Lid.: computer* — lll.lll
■lew-ten Pwkii.: computer a: etKirenw tenant, calibration anal graorrtc*
equipment — Hi 000
International Computer Syeiame. eortspaftera unlui (or graphic dealt* of
atomic pomes snemissiies — ll.KW.OOO
PtfiinEimrr compuiers and Inairumenta uaaful (or quaint control ol bomb
Tuc la — $110 000
Tl Coating Inc. : equipment lor coaling metal pana. uatful (or bomb produc-
tion — 1373.701
Atomic Bomb and Missile Builders
Solei io Mi»inr> if fudajiry °"* Military tndaelrtellfaile*. whKh tan the
oiom.f pome rmtnlrond cnemrecU -««oon focionei: Maatr it are r a terpen «
w*ere eouipmeni for enriching atomic pome fuel woa mad«: Sals* ai Ola site.
-«•-'»- electronic equipment /or mni"»i ond atomic borne* -oi mad*
Mimiu v o/ Dtftmit. which oversow missile end atomic bomo <l<v»ioomim
Aatl Electronics: capaciiort — Ul.000
BDM Corporation: compwicra: compuier-aesiaied design equipment —
isjooo
CmMt'i EMlrwatt! computers (or computers settled design — 111. Ml
Carl Itltt microcomputers (or mopping — (101 5*1
Censere Corporation: compuicra to run maenma toota capable of menuleciur-
>ng atomic bomo parti (lIUI aatt »il • looped by Prtatdemial ordtr in Juna
i*»0» - ISJliM
Data General Corparailoa: compuicra lor mapping — 1.3 < 000
C*>otr Syatama: compuiert io run mocnine tooli capable et manufacturing
atomic Mme and mitiile parta — HIT. 431
Hewlett Packard: compuicra lor maamg molda; Ire-juancy lyniheauara and
other eouirmrm uaclul lor operating aecured mimary communtcailona
lyitemi — 11 Ot) MM
Honeywell Inc.: compuiera — U33 333
International Computer Syaiema: compuicra (or mami(aciuring. tool dealgn
■ ••d gf ipnwi — It '*> '00
Intemationai Compuiera Ltd.: computer* — IUT I9<
Lr>boid Viruvim Syitemi computer coniroticd welder .icd bv Iroqii io
praouct crmrKugtt far mabang aiomac baeab luart — Il.aM.fJOO
Uaaaataaa C real : Kadkaiparinjraiatialytrri. dntfn computer!, compuiert lor
factor*-, producing muitard gaa i/igrcdMTMa — 1330.000
Racharwil Cellini lattrmauaaaal: eq uipme nt lor navigation, directional finding.
radar comirrunicaiiona or aUborna comraiwucaiinaaa — 1117.514
Sacbmao AaaacUiaa: compuiera and matrumema capdMa at analyilng met
*M aad po-ed a ra (or aiomtc bomb and mnuie manulaciur* — IdO.OOO
3 1 a mean Canaaiailaaii computeri and bujirtjineTHa capobta ol analyilng
rmnals and pew ear a lor ata«a.ic bom a and miaiUa maaawlactura — II 00B
Soacara Phyoica: laaara datactaon and iracbknaj equrpmem lor laaart -
lit 000
Umiiy. CaraMHaihaai: comeMtari - II.M0OO0
Wild Magnavaa laialHle Survey: compvtera lor proreaamg aaiellite lm«|rt
Uiai are uaa(ul tor military mapping and eurveHlanre — 1370 000
In. Laboratartea: quani crynala lor milHary radar — 11.104000
Missile Builders
Sofea io 5o*d II ine motn mtaitlr reiraurn me. Hair OrgaMiatlan far
Trthmlcnl Indttiiry. Hie prontremrM organtrainan for mlilila Hlfl tnot
bouffii moil Scud miiiile pcvrii and rowtpmem
■ DM torpor.ii... compuiera lurarrconducttng enrcironKa — lltaOS
Carl Schenck: computeri — 1 1 III
£1 Logic Data: computer! — IJT ioo
naalga* MAT: computera that U N Inapoctora be he** monitored uranium
enrichment lor atomic bomb (uel — I *1J 0O0
llawleit •■ekard- elecironic leating cqurpment; cemputeri: frequency if"
ImTiuera radio inecirum anaiytfra — lit* Z3)T
laiarnaiHMal Computer Syliemo: computers — 11.373 000
laiarnatUMai Imaging Syaiema: compuiera lor protesting aaieilHe dua
infrared equipment capable ol aerial reconamance and military aurveii'antr
- till 000
Lvmmua Crttl' compuiers to aid factory dattgn — 111 330
Parfcln.eimer- compuiers — 111 MO
Scientific Atlanta rqutpmeni lor producing radar eniewnea - U30 000
Sametea Corporaiian: compuiers — 13 133 711
Spoetral Daia Caroaraiiwn: latellite data pruceasine. equ»pmem — It* ••*
Tebtrania: nigh speed elmronKi uieful in developing aiomK bomPt a-w
misitiei radio ipccirum anaiytcrt lor dr*eloping microwave equipment
II01000
Thermo Jarrell Aah Corporation: compuiera lor truing materieia — H30 III
Unlaya Corporation- computrri (or ptoduction control — 17 TM
Voeeo Inairumeoia Inc : compuicri lor fectory deugn — H •«•
win ton Company: cquipmeni lor fn.i*in« radar *™rnn»» - 1*1 W
140
SljeJfeUf JJork Sime* JHagarine
MARCH
BUILDING SADDAM
HUSSEIN S BOMB
BY GARY MILHOLLIN
"ABOUT THIS BIG" HIGH IN THE UNITED
Nations building in New York, a U.N official is
holding his arms out in a circle, like a man
gripping a beach ball "About a yard across,
weighing about a ton "
This is the Iraqi bomb — slightly smaller than
the one drupped on Hiroshima, but nearly twice
as powerful — packing an explosive force of at
least 20.000 tons of TNT The official is dramatiz-
ing a drawing he has made in his notebook, based
un documents seized in Iraq He is sure that the
bomb, if built to the specifications in the drawing.
will work
At the bomb's center is an explosive ball of
weapon-grade uranium Around this is a layer of
natural uranium to boost the yield and a second
layer of hardened iron to keep the core from
blowing apart prematurely If the bomb is In
jjctnuule properly, these pans must have just the
right dimensions, and there must be a firing
circuit accurate to billmnths ill a second Docu-
ments in the United Nations' possession show
that the Iraqis have all the right dimen-
sions and the necessary firing circuit
This is the bomb that, according to
U N estimates. Saddam Hussein was 18
to 24 months from building when the gulf
war started It is the bomb he is still
likely to build, despite the war and the
most intrusive nuclear inspections in
history, unless the United Nations
changes its tactics
"They are pouring concrete as we
speak." says a U N official at the next
desk Saddam, he says, is rebuilding the
bombed nuclear sites in plain view of
UN inspectors "He is even planting
tiees and re-landscaping." he adds, "to
boost employee morale" Another UN
ollicial has a similar story During a
visit io the Iraqi nuclear weapon testing
site at Al Alheer. he says, his Iraqi hosts
looked him in the eye and said. "We are
waiting for you to leave "
Since the inspections started last spring,
the iiaqi disinformation specialists who
serve as guides have done their best to
oullox the inspectors In one instance, the
Iraqis hid reactor fuel by loading it on the
back of a truck and driving it around the
reactor Mi'-, always staying about 200
\ ml. in [null ol the inspection team The
fuel contained weapon grade material
limy Milhulhn directs t/ie Lmnersifi of
Wisconsin's Project on Nuclear .Arms
Control, no orgriMirtinon in IVcisniiMjfun
(lint trots", nuclear exports (ind (lie
spread of nuclear ucupons
I'erhaps the most notoi iims conlrun-
lalion occurred when inspectors fol-
lowed an intelligence tip to a cache til
sensitive documents In an attempt to
elude the Iraqis, each of the -14 team
members hid a stack of papers inside
his clothing Rather than strip-search
the inspectors before video cameras.
the Iraqis simply forbade them to
leave, leading to a four-day standoff in a Baghdad
parking lot under a scorching summer sun. Only
after a unanimous vote ol suppoit by the Securiiy
Council did Iraq finally relent
That spn ited encounter is now as nun h a pan
of history as the briel triumph ol the 100-hour
war Under the cease-fire terms, inspectors for a
UN. Special Commission were charged with the
"destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of
Iraq's nuclear weapon potential But after
months of chasing increasingly fruitless intelli-
gence leads, morale on the Special Commission is
scraping rock bottom
The Iraqis know it. too. "They've suited laughing
at us." one U N. official says, adding that the I raqis
have even threatened individual inspectors "They
have basically told our people ihat ihey know where
we live." he says in exasperation
The problem is that the inspectors have ex-
hausted their information I he first mspc is
were fueled by leads from Iraqi defectors and the
chance discovery of the sensitive- .Jo. uincilt i in
Baghdad But that luck has iuii out just as the
Iraqis have organized their resistance to the
inspections Recently, in fact, they told the inspco
tors that "you won't find any more documents in
this country."
Th4i remark came after a IJ N team had
chai-ged into several suspected reactor sues,
following intelligence leads that turned out Io lie
duds. "All we found were empty warehouses,
cement factories making real ccinenl .mil pris-
ons with real pi isooers," one inspector .ays I he
inspectors believe they have reai lied a dead end
The inspectors' deleat raises a chilling pros-
pect: In the absence of a major new U N efliilt,
Saddam Hussein is still likely to get ihe bomb
Thos./tTaq Uas become a lest case (or nuclear
proliferation If war and a full-COIII't press b) the
United Nations cannot stop an outlaw nation like
Iraq from making the bomb, what will it take to
stop countries like Iran. Not Hi Korea ami I ibya '
In a sense, what is being played mil in Iraq is
the first battle of a new cold war, fought with
spies, i me i national pressure anil export controls
The West may have won Ihe lirsl i <il.l war .n: linsl
Ihe Soviet Union, but it is lnsin h ihe se< olid In Iraq
and inner nations that want tu get ihe boiuli
SADDAM HAS HAULED HIMSU.I-' UP MIL
nuclear mountain on a .ham of high tech expm is,
sold by the very Western countries whose inspec-
tors — now on loan Io the United Nations — are
141
142
trying tu find (hem. Other similarly
(avored nations could easily follow
Saddams example, given existing
export laws. Iran and Libya are now
maneuvering into this position.
Iraqi scientists know, (or exam-
ple, how to cast uranium metal into
bomb parts in a vacuum furnace.
The vacuum prevents molten ura-
nium from burning in air. At Al
Atheer. U.N. inspectors found vac-
uum furnaces made by a German
firm. Arthur Pfeiffer Vakuum Tech-
nik. The inspectors rejected Iraq's
claim that the furnaces were for
scientific research.
The inspectors also found a large
"isostatic" press, made by a Swed-
ish-Swiss firm, Asea Brown Boveri.
This, too, the Iraqis claimed was for
research. But the U.N. team thinks
the machine was for shaping the
high-explosive charges that set off a
nuclear chain reaction. These spe-
cially shaped charges are wrapped
around the bomb core and set off
simultaneously, creating a shock
wave that travels inward, "implod-
ing" and compressing the core.
When the core is compressed to suf-
ficient density, the nuclear chain re-
action begins.
How did the Iraqis learn to use
such specialized equipment? In
large part from the United States
Government. In August 1989, the
Pentagon and the Department of
Energy invited three Iraqis to at-
tend a "detonation conference" in
Portland, Ore. Financed by Ameri-
can taxpayers, the meeting brought
together experts from around the
world to explain to the Iraqis and
others how to produce shock waves
in any desired configuration. There
were even lectures on HMX, the
high explosive of choice for nuclear
detonation, and on flyer plates, de-
vices that help produce the precise
shock waves needed to ignite A-
bombs Both HMX and flyer plates
have turned up at Al Atheer, which
should surprise no one. The three
Iraqis who attended the conference
came from the laboratory that even-
tually provided Al Atheer with its
first shaped charges.
To design a successful bomb, the
Iraqis also needed computing power
to solve the hydrodynamic equa-
tions that predict the behavior of
shuck waves. The inspectors discov-
ered that Iraq was running the equa-
tions on a mainframe computer
from the Japanese company NEC.
Another Japanese firm, Hamama-
tsu. sold Iraq two "streak cameras,"
sensitive instruments that can pho-
tograph a high-speed shock wave as
it implodes. The inspectors confis-
cated both cameras after determin-
ing that they were rapid enough for
nuclear weapon work
Altogether, the Iraqis carried out
20 detonation tests before May 31,
1990 — the date of the last Iraqi
progress report on Al Atheer found
by the United Nations The Iraqis
had winked their way through five
versions ol the bomb design, cutting
the weapon's total weight from one
ton in the first version to about half a
ton in the last — light enough to go
on a missile
After May 1990 the Iraqis worked
unimpeded at Al Atheer for eight
more months. No one knows how
much more they achieved. The
Iraqis started relocating vital equip-
ment before allied bombing began in
January 1991, and as late as last
summer tore out concrete floors to
prevent inspector^, from determin-
ing which machines were used
there. They even ripped out electri-
cal hookups to hide power usage.
Now that Al Atheer is "sanitized,"
inspectors fear the bomb work has
moved elsewhere.
Wherever the work is going on, the
Iraqis still have plenty of equip-
ment. During the late 1980's, Bagh-
dad bought ^machines by the factory
load, few of which have been found.
The purchases included additional
vacuum furnaces, from the German
firm Leybold; plasma-coating ma-
chines, which could be modified to
coat the surfaces of the molds into
which molten uranium is poured,
from the American company Tl
Coating; high-speed oscilloscopes,
needed to develop tiring circuits for
nuclear weapons and for nuclear
tests, from the American company
Tektronix; and two X-ray diffraction
systems, capable of analyzing weap-
on-grade uranium during produc-
tion, from the German firm Sie-
mens. TI Coating sold directly to an
Iraqi factory charged with making
A-bomb fuel; Tektronix sold to an
Iraqi procurement agent for a
string of nuclear and missile sites;
Siemens sold to the Iraqi Ministry of
Industry and Military Industrializa-
tion, which set up Al Atheer
These purchases followed Iraq's
policy of "parallel sourcing." The
Iraqis never buy just one machine or
build a single plant. If the item is
important, they buy or build two' So if
one vital machine or plant is bombed
or surrendered to inspectors, they al-
most always have another.
The inspectors found out one other
thing about the Iraqi bomb — it is
highly unstable. The design calls for
cramming so much weapon-grade
uranium into the core, they say, that
the bomb would inevitably be on the
verge of going off — even while
sitting on the workbench. "It could
go off if a rifle bullet hit it." one
inspector says, adding: "I wouldn't
want to be around if it fell off the
edge of this desk."
Even a "fizzle.'' when the bomb
explodes too soon to get a full chain
reaction, would be serious The
minimum blast effect would be
equal to filling 20 semitrailers full of
TNT, parking them side by side and
setting them off simultaneously
The full yield would be like selling
off 1.000 semitrailers' of TNT
WITH A WORKABLE AND MOST-
Iv tested buml) design. Iraq faces
only inie more barrier: weapon-
grade uranium fuel. Iraq started
producing (his precious substance
before (he war. but never got close
to making enough for a bomb
Wheiher it finally succeeds will de-
pend on us foreign suppliers.
The key will be the centrifuge By
spinning uranium gas at high
speeds, centrifuges separate light,
unstable uranium iso(ope that ex-
plodes in an atom bomb from the
heavy, stable one that doesn't. A
spinning tube called a rotor propels
the heavy isotope to the outside wall
and leaves the light one at the cen-
ter. As the gas is run through a
series of centrifuges called
a cascade, the concentra-
tion of the light isotope is
gradually raised from less
than 1 percent in natural
uranium to over 90 percent
in uranium of nuclear
weapon-grade. This techni-
cally demanding process is
called enrichment.
Iraq's centrifuges are
based on German designs
and were built with Ger-
man help. Iraq somehow
got German blueprints in
the 1980's. By 1988 it was
already running experi-
mental models. When one
model developed a hitch in
late 1988, Iraq summoned
Bruno Stemmler, an ex-em-
ployee of M.A.N., the Ger-
man company that makes
centrifuges for the German
national enrichment effort.
After studying Iraq's illicit
blueprints, Stemmler re-
moved the hitch.
Iraq's next goal was
mass production. It takes
from 1.000 to 2.000 German-
style cenlnfuges to
produce a bomb's worth of
enriched uranium each
year. German firms again
obliged. From H & H Metal-
form — a company subsidized by
the German Government — came
"flow forming" machines that are
specially adapted to produce rotor
tubes, the most difficult part of the
centrifuge to make. From Leybold's
American subsidiary came a giant
electron beam welder, equipped
with custom-made fixtures for weld-
ing the rotors to their necessary end
caps. From Dr. Reutlinger & Sohne
came macfiines to balance the ro-
tors vertically and horizontally
From Neue Magdeburger came oth-
er specially adapted machine tools.
And from Degussa came an oxida-
tion furnace to (rea( the surfaces of
parts so they could withstand corro-
sive uranium gas.
After surveying this glittering
array, the UN. inspectors conclud-
ed (ha( Iraq would be able to
produce more than 2,000 centri-
fuges a year, enough for a full-
fledged bomb program. From a re-
cent inspection, we know that Iraq
ordered parts for ID. ODD centri-
fuges, although it is noi known how
143
manv parts wore arm. illy deliv-
ered, or hnw many centrifuges Iraq
may have made
I'lie U N teams have nnw de-
stroyed all Ihe centrifuge parts it
could find But Ihe inspectors don't
know how many more centrifuge
parts there are. because Ihey don't
know how many were sold to Iraq by
Western companies. They are espe-
cially worried about a "missing cas-
cade." They assume that Iraq would
not have built a plank^to mass-
produce centrifuges without first be-
ing able to connect them in an ex-
perimental cascade. No cascade has
Saddam permanently tin-re must lie
"strict maintenance of export con-
trols by the industrial nations." But
mulling in recent history suggests
that the industrial nations will exer-
cise such restraint.
In Ihe five years before the Per-
sian Gulf war, for example, the
Commerce Department licensed
more than $1.5 billion of strategical-
ly sensitive American exports to
Iraq. Many were for direct delivery
to nuclear weapon, chemical weap-
on and missile sites. Companies like
Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell. Inter-
national Computer Systems, Rock-
THE IRAQI BOMB
-Anil Where ti Came Front
BelJedor:l00fo250fcg
bt natural urani
MACE WITH HELP FBOrl:"
Germany: Arthur PfeHfet- '
Valftium technlk
ttigk e«t>JoJl»«r -
2S0l»S00kg ._
MADE WITH HELP FBOH:
Sweden/Switzerland:
Asea Brawn Boverl
United States:
Departments bi
Energy and Oefense-
betanators: iA '
HADE WITH HELP FBdH:
United States: Departments bt bierfly and befehst-
Firing set: Energy source, liner-, switches
MADE WITH HELP FBOM: United Statesr
Departments of Energy and Defense
s. j — Core: 15 lo 18 kg or-
\/ high-enriched uranium;
\ \/\\ HAn E WITH HELP FBOH:
yV Belgium: Sebatra
"h^ , / ^C^sAX Brazil: Atomic Energy Comirtalon
Germany: Arthur Pfelffef Vakuunt
'4 1 1 \ 1/ Technilt*. Degussd, Flnnlgan-MATi
>T I HsHMetalform.lnwalcO.leybold;
/\ // NeueMagdeburger,
/ \/l Dr.BeutllngefASohne
/ Niger Oranertt
Poland: Chemadex
Switzerland: Acomel. tSalzer.
Schmledemeccanlca, VAt
. United States: Flnnlgan-HAf;
Leybold Vacuum Systems
Sources Wisconsin Protect on Nuclear Arms Control and U.N Insocctlon reports
Tim is the actual Iraqi bomb design described in secret documents seized in Ba
Saddam was within 18 to 24 months of producing this bomb before the g
been found As the inspectors warn
in their report, Iraq "may still have
an undisclosed program."
The inspectors are also worried
about a possible cache of weapon-
grade uranium. Last July, they
found four traces of this material in
samples taken from Tuwaitha,
Iraq's primary nuclear site. Be-
cause of the possibility that the sam-
ples were contaminated after they
left Iraq, however, the evidence was
not considered conclusive New
samples were taken in October, but
Ihe test results are still not nf Thus,
the UN inspectors cannot pursue
the lead
There is also the matter of a hid-
den reactor Western intelligence
sources believe (hat the Iraqis have
at least started to build one. but the
inspectors have not been able to find
it Even a small. 20-lo-tO-megawati
reactor would be large enough to
fuel a few nuclear weapons a year
And. finally, the inspectors are
worried about outside suppliers
They have concluded that In stop
well and Tektronix sold high-per-
formance electronics either to Saad
16, Iraq's major missile research
center; to the Ministry of Industry
and Military Industrialization,
which set up Al Atheer: to Ihe Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission, re-
sponsible for atomic-bomb re-
search; or to Nasr State Enterprise,
in charge of Iraq's missile and nu-
clear procurement Honeywell even
did a feasibility study for a powerful
gasoline bomb waihead. intended
for an Iraqi-Egyptian missile
The computer giant Speny and its
successor. Unisys, also hoiielited
They got licenses to sell multimillion-
dollar computers designed to handle a
"personnel data base " The powei ful
machines — ordered by Iraq's Minis-
try of the Interior, which houses the
secret police — are ideally suited to
tracking and suppressing civilians
The Commerce Depaitmenl ap-
proved all these exports despite
strong warnings from the Pentagon,
the first coming in November l'jsii
concerning Saad IH Commerce nev-
ertheless permitted the sale of hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars' worth
of sensitive computers and electron-
ics to Saad lf>. all after the warning.
And there was the strange case of
(he Badr General Establishment, a
factory outside Baghdad. In the sum-
mer of 1989 it wanted to bdy a com-
puter-controlled lathe from Cincin-
nati Milacron and a high-accuracy
measuring system from Brown' &
Sharpe. Badr said the equipment
would make "crankshafts, camshafts,
and gears" for automobiles. But the
Pentagon was skeptical. Commerce
therefore agreed to a "pre-license
check," in which an Ameri-
can official would actually
visit the site.
After a 30-kilomcier trip
out from 'ae capital, two em-
bassy officials loured Badr
with its production man-
ager. Salam Fadl Hussain
The verdict was unanimous
The American Ambassador.
April Claspie. cabled the
good news to Commerce on
Sept. 13. "We believe thai
Badr General Establish-
ment is a tellable recipient
of sensitive United Stales or
igin technology and techni-
cal data " We now know that
Badr and another organiza-
tion were jointly in charge ol
all the centrifuge production
in Iraq
As bad as the American
record is. Germany's is
worse Germany supplied
more of Iraq's mass-de-
struction machinery than .ill
oilier ( oiiiin us i oinbuieil
Germany not only sold liaq
most of its centrifuge equip-
ment, it also furnished an
entire (heoin.il woutMiii in-
dustry amj was Iraq's i;ie.il
glidad. est supplier of missile lorn-
If war. niilngy. including a flood of
parts that enabled Iraq lo
extend Ihe range of its Scud missiles
During the Persian Gulf war. en-
hanced Scuds hit Tel Aviv and a Unit-
ed Slates Army barracks in Saudi
Arabia, killing 2H sleeping soldiers
To develop an even longer-range
missile. Iraq turned to the German
armament giant Messersi hmilt,
now doing business as MBB (Mes-
serschmittBolkow-Blohm) MBB
supplied (he know-how lor a filll).
mile nuclear-capable missile called
the Condor II that Iraq tried to de-
velop jointly with Egypt and Argen-
tina before (he war I lie missile's
range and configuration an 1 similar
to that ul the American Pershing,
which MBB worked on at the Penta-
gon The same MBB employee who
worked on the Pershing at the Pen-
tagon also represented MBB in Iraq
for the Condor, and (hus was in a
position In transfer American mis-
sile technology In Baghdad
SINCE THE INSPECTIONS BE
gan. critics have quest toned wheth-
er < ivilian volunteers winking iiu-
144
United
Nations inspectors
Uncovering
Weapon-grade
reactor fuel in a
pit Hear Til waitha,
Iraq's primary
nuclear site. The
fUel had been
hidden 16 avoid
allied bombing
during the Persian
Gulf war.
Above: A United
Nations inspector,
Douglas M. .
Englund, chief ...- .
of operations
of the Special
Commisiioh, "■*.
confronts the
Iraqis at a ballistic-
missile inspection ■
ilTaji.One-
U.N. inspector was
(old. "We are
waiting for .
VoU to leave."
145
ilcr United N.ilicins auspic-
es could eradicate Iratj's
weapons of mass destruc-
tion Tliat question has now
been answered. Despite
great courage and enthusi-
asm, (he inspectors . still
have not found the hun-
dreds of Scud missiles Iraq
is known to be hiding, or the
headquarters of the centri-
fuge program, or exposed
the supplier network. NSr
have they solved the mys-
tery of the weapon-grade
uranium. Obviously, strong-
er methods are needed.
First, the United Nations
has to change tactics. "We
have diplomats when we
should have detectives,"
says a knowledgeable Unit-
ed States official. "It's like
looking for an escaped mur-
derer You question every-
body who might have a lead
and you keep on asking until
you get answers."
In other words, shift to po-
lice-style investigations.
Only the Iraqis know where
their nuclear treasure is
buried; only they can reveal
it. To make headway, the
United Nations will have to
deploy inspectors by the
hundreds, station them in
Iraq instead of New York,
and use soldiers as well as
civilians. The inspectors
must be free to interrogate
every Iraqi scientist or engi-
neer who might have rele-
vant information and to fol-
low Up the leads immediate-
ly^ And they must have the
power to push aside Saddam
Hussein's disinformation
specialists
The inspectors also need
to know exactly what Iraq
has bought. So far, though,
not a single country has
been willing to tell the in-
spectors what its companies
sold. Only Germany has pro-
vided leads, and when it did,
the inspectors quickly
turned up centrifuge parts.
As lung as other suppliers sit
nn their export data, the in-
spections will be reduced to
lishing expeditions, wnh the
liaqis steering the boat
The United Nations must
also put Us own house in or-
der While the Special Com-
mission has run the missile
and chemical inspections
wnh great zeal, the nuclear
inspections are assigned to
the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the equiva-
lent of an oxcart with its
brakes on.
In late September, lor ex-
ample, the agency seized
more than 60,1)1)0 pages c>[
Iraqi documents, many of
ilicm describing the supplier
nclwoik l-"ive months later
practically no translations
have been done
The agency is also timid
about destroying illicit
equipment. While the Spe-
cial Commission is destroy-
ing every machine it can
find that the Iraqis bought,
built or used to make chemi-
cal weapons or missiles, the
Atomic Energy Agency has
been willing to destroy only
small parts of the machines
used to make nuclear weap-
ons. For example. Iraq
bought a giant electron
beam welder to fabricate
centrifuges, but the agency
destroyed only the small fix-
ture that holds the centri-
fuge in place, leaving the gi-
ant welder intact. This
means that if the Iraqis have
extra fixtures — which is
likely, given their parallel
sourcing plan — they can go
back into the bomb business
with the same machines.
Assuming the United Na-
tions does manage to eradi-
cate Iraq's nuclear, chemi-
cal and missile programs, it
still faces the problem of
preventing Baghdad from
starting over. One solution
is to expose Iraq's supplier
network, which is still in-
tact. The United Nations
has compiled lists -of the
companies in the network
and what they sold, but it
has furnished them only to
the involved governments
The United States is report-
ed to (avor making the lists
public, but Germany and
France are said to be
resisting
Another way to defeat the
network is to toughen export
laws Most of what Saddam
bought was licensed. Gov-
ernments knew he was get-
ting dangerous equipment
but hated to see their com-
panies lose a sale. The re-
sulting debacle should have
taught the world a lesson,
but Western export controls
are no stronger now ihan
they were before the gulf
war. In fact, wnh the end of
Ihe cold war, the NA fO
countries and the European
Community have been eas-
ing export controls.
The outcome in Iraq is
now in Ihe hands of Presi-
dent Bosh and Ins gulf war
allies If they are willing to
turn the United Nations into
a vehicle for curbing the
spread of the bomb, the bat-
tle in Iraq can still be won
If not. Iraq's bomb makers
will pick up where they
left off, and the new world
older will fail Hs first im-
port. nil lesi ■
146
Written statements submitted by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) at the hearings jointly held by
three sub committees of the Committee of Foreign Affairs
of the 1 03rd Congress of the United States - Washington
29 June 1993
Question
How successful have the efforts of the international community since the Gulf
War been in identifying and rendering unusable Iraqi resources and capabilities
to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction?
Answer
Insofar as UN Security Council resolution 687 [1991] assigns to the UN Special
Commission the tasks related to ballistic, chemical and biological weapons,
these remarks will be limited to the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme.
The IAEA has been successful in identifying, destroying, removing or otherwise
rendering harmless the key components of a hitherto secret and broadly-based
Iraqi programme aimed at the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities.
1. Identification
The identification of the various elements of the clandestine Iraqi programme
was largely completed at the end of September 1991, i.e. six months after
the adoption by the Security Council of the cease-fire resolution. Charting
the map of this programme has entailed a number of difficulties, including
dramatic confrontations on several occasions between Iraqi authorities and
IAEA inspection teams. The Iraqi government has employed a strategy of
obstruction and delay in its efforts to conceal the real nature of its nuclear
projects, while, on the other hand, demonstrating a level of co-operation in
some less sensitive areas.
As to the completeness of the picture obtained, it is the considered opinion
of the IAEA, based on the results of nineteen inspection missions, the
analyses of thousands of samples, the evaluation of several hundred
documents confiscated in Iraq, the assessment of procurement and other
information obtained from Member States of the IAEA, that the essential
components of the clandestine program have been identified. Even if the
picture lacks detail in some areas, the efforts in identifying the scope of the
147
Iraqi nuclear weapons programme have been successful.
While leaving the summary description of the Iraqi nuclear weapons
programme to a fact sheet appended to this statement, this is maybe the
appropriate occasion to place on record that success in the rapid
identification of the secret Iraqi program is due, in no small measure, to the
support extended to the IAEA by its Member States through the provision of
intelligence information and of experts who expanded the competence of the
IAEA inspection teams in particular areas. The combination of intelligence
information and experts with rapid and intrusive field inspections to verify
and follow up intelligence leads has proved to be the most powerful tool in
achieving success. This is an important lesson learned from the Iraqi
experience.
2. Destruction
The second main task laid upon the IAEA by resolution 687 concerns the
destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the essential ingredients of
the Iraqi nuclear weapons development programme, including the nuclear-
weapons-usable material known to have been in Iraq in the form of
safeguarded reactor fuel.
Extensive destruction of Iraqi nuclear installations occurred during the Gulf
War as a result of the air raids by Coalition forces. Additional destruction of
equipment and material was carried out by the Iraqi army at the end of the
war and prior to the start of IAEA inspections, in an attempt by Iraq to
remove evidence of its secret programme. Also, important equipment,
machine tools, instrumentation, spare parts, stock materials and components
were salvaged and hidden by Iraqi personnel. An important exception was
Al Atheer, the site where weaponization activities (i.e., activities relevant to
weapons design development and assembly, as distinguished from activities
for the production of nuclear-weapons-usable material) had been planned
Facilities at this site were still under construction at the time of the war,
which is probably one of the reasons it went practically unscathed through
the conflict The association of this site, as well as several others, to the
clandestine Iraqi programme were not known at the time of the Gulf War to
either national or international authorities The role of these facilities was
only uncovered through the inspection process. Since September 1991, i.e.
"7i_/in/i n
148
when the scope of the clandestine Iraqi programme came into focus, the
IAEA has been supervising a systematic destruction of facilities, technical
buildings, equipment and other items proscribed under UN Security Council
resolution 687, which had escaped destruction or which had been only
slightly damaged. Details on the destruction activities may be found in the
attachment to this statement This process cannot yet be considered
complete as the possibility of finding more items cannot be ruled out and
surprises are always possible. As to the quantities of weapons usable
nuclear material (highly enriched uranium in the form of reactor fuel
elements) known to have been in Iraq under IAEA safeguards, these were
found untouched and have been fully accounted for. The removal operation
has involved extensive negotiations with Member States, who have recently
agreed to accept this material. The task has entailed a complex technical
effort by Iraq to clear part of it from the rubble of a bombarded research
reactor. The removal of this material will be completed by February 1994 if
funds, in the order of US$20 million, are made available.
3. Is the job finished?
By no means. The IAEA and the Special Commission are facing increasing
resistance by the Iraqi authorities to compliance with Iraq's obligations under
resolutions 687, 707 and 715 in two areas which bear particular importance
for future monitoring activities aimed at preventing a resurgence of the of
activities proscribed by the cease-fire resolution.
Since the beginning, Iraq has refused to disclose the names of foreign
suppliers and intermediaries, including the network of front companies
established abroad, which provided materials, equipment and technical
know-how essential to Iraq's weapons programme. This information is
necessary to permit verification of the completeness of available
declarations and information, to provide adequate basis for the long term
monitoring activities and to ensure that any loopholes in export regulation
are identified and closed. The persistent refusal of Iraq to disclose the
sources of supplies is a breach of its obligations under the Security Council
resolution 707.
A second important obstacle that must be overcome is the refusal of Iraq to
accept resolution 715, which approved the plans for long term monitoring of
compliance by Iraq with the limitations imposed under resolution 687
149
Resolution 715 also established the rights of the IAEA and of the Special
Commission which are deemed essential for effective application of this long
term monitoring.
Effective measures on Iraq applied by the UN Security Council has, in the
past, played a decisive role in modifying the attitude of the Iraqi Government
when it has refused or resisted compliance with its obligations. These
measures should be maintained until full compliance with all of Iraq's
obligations is obtained.
Question
How well has the International Atomic Energy Agency accomplished the tasks in
Iraq that were assigned to it by the United Nations Security Council?
Answer
In response to this question, it might be more appropriate to recall that full
satisfaction with the IAEA's activities in Iraq under UN Security Council
resolution 687 has been expressed on a number of occasions by members of the
Security Council and by IAEA Member States' Governments.
Some considerations may assist the Congressional Sub-Committees which are
holding these hearings in formulating their own judgment of the effectiveness of
the IAEA's response Nine days after the adoption of the cease-fire resolution
by the Security Council (6 April 1991), the IAEA established an Action Team,
reporting directly to the Director General of the IAEA, to implement the tasks
assigned to the IAEA by the Security Council under that resolution. The team is
composed of five senior and experienced professionals of the IAEA, headed by
a former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, and is empowered to draw on any
necessary IAEA resources on a priority basis to discharge its duties. The first
on-site inspection team was ready to enter Iraq as of 1 May 1991 , less than four
weeks after the adoption of the cease-fire resolution. To date, 19 inspections
have been conducted for a total of over 2000 inspector days (the 20th inspection
team is at this moment in the field). Appropriate links and close co-operation
have been developed with the UN Special Commission The Security Council
and the IAEA's Board of Governors are kept constantly informed of the results of
inspection activities as they develop Assistance has been sought and obtained
150
from a large number of IAEA Member States. Intelligence information has been
shared with the Agency on an unprecedented scale.
The tasks entrusted by the Security Council to the IAEA are essentially
threefold: search, destroy and prevent any reconstitution. The IAEA has
searched, has found and has destroyed. The basis has been established for
preventing a reconstitution of the Iraqi nuclear programme. Effective control of
future Iraqi activities can be put in place if adequate measures are maintained at
the political level and sufficient resources continue to be provided.
Question
What steps can be taken in the future, to strengthen the ability of the IAEA in
dealing with such challenges in Iraq and elsewhere?
Answer
The events in Iraq have not only highlighted the need to strengthen the IAEA
safeguards system - and, in fact, the non-proliferation regime as a whole - but
also have heightened the readiness of Governments to contribute to these
improvements.
During 1992 and 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors supported proposals for
strengthening safeguards and increasing the ability of the safeguards system to
detect the existence of, and gam access to, undeclared nuclear activities in
States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. The proposals relate to:
access to carry out special inspections at any location which the IAEA has
reason to believe it needs to visit to obtain additional information relevant to
safeguards;
the early provision of design information about new facilities or modifications
to existing facilities as soon as the decision is taken to construct or modify
the facility. The IAEA's authority to verify design information is a continuing
right that extends throughout the facility life cycle;
the reporting of exports, imports and production of nuclear material, as well
as exports and imports of certain equipment and non-nuclear material which
could be relevant to a weapons programme
151
The use of environmental sampling as a tool to help assess the completeness of
a State's declaration regarding its nuclear activities has been implemented in
particular situations (including Iraq) and its applicability in the broader
safeguards context is being considered. Additional changes involving increased
intensity of safeguards in countries with more than a significant quantity of highly
enriched uranium and/or plutonium distributed among small facilities is being
implemented.
These measures are intended to improve and broaden the scope of the existing
safeguards system. This system has worked well in verifying the non-diversion
of declared nuclear material at declared nuclear installations. The system was
not geared to provide assurance that no undeclared nuclear installations
existed. Although the safeguards system, as originally designed, provided for
the legal authority to do this, the Secretariat lacked the information needed to
implement this authority. Therefore, it was not timidity but the lack of information
about undeclared sites meriting inspection that prevented the discovery of Iraq's
clandestine programme. This situation is being corrected through actions by the
Secretariat with the support of Member States.
The discoveries in Iraq highlighted the importance, for effective safeguards, of
three types of access: to information, to sites and to the Security Council of the
United Nations.
In using inspections as a tool for verification, the first basic requirement is for
information regarding locations which might have undeclared nuclear-related
items or facilities, requiring inspection. In this context the IAEA gathers much
information of its own from its general verification activities, from States
themselves, through in-depth analysis of information about nuclear activities
obtained from the media and other open literature and, now, through more
detailed reporting by States on nuclear material, equipment and relevant non-'
nuclear material. Additionally, the IAEA now receives information obtained by its
Member States through national intelligence means, the IAEA is of the view
that no information relevant to safeguards, whatever its provenance, may be
ignored but all information must be critically analyzed to determine its credibility
The second basic requirement is for unlimited right of access for inspectors to
locations which the IAEA considers to be relevant to safeguards, even at short
152
notice. Where IAEA access to information and to sites is not forthcoming, then
access to the Security Council becomes of particular importance. The
Relationship Agreement of 14 November 1957 between the United Nations and
the IAEA contains provisions allowing for prompt interaction between the United
Nations, including the Security Council, and the IAEA If a State fails to comply
with its safeguards agreement, the IAEA is obliged to refer the matter to the
Security Council, which may decide to take enforcement action to induce a State
to accept inspection
In its statement of 31 January 1992, the Security Council emphasized not only
the integral role of fully effective IAEA safeguards in implementing the NPT, but
also its readiness to take "appropriate measures in the case of any violations
notified to them by the IAEA". All this attests to the fact that the Security Council
is conscious of the risks inherent in proliferation. It is also sensitive to two
specific requirements: that IAEA safeguards must be sufficiently effective to
detect any breach or concealment with a high degree of probability; and that the
international community needs to be able to continue to trust in the credibility of
the safeguards system.
153
IAEA Action Team for Iraq
(Attachment to the written statements submitted by the IAEA)
FACT SHEET
25 June 1993
The IAEA Action Team was created to manage the UN Security Council Resolution
687 as it relates to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. This resolution mandates the
destruction of all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The IAEA has the sole
responsibility under this resolution to destroy, remove, or render harmless all nuclear
weapons and prohibited precursor materials.
RESULTS TO DATE
19 IAEA nuclear inspection teams have visited Iraq to inspect facilities, interview key
personnel, inventory nuclear materials, identify prohibited items and carry out
destruction and removal operations.
The Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Programme consisted of eight dedicated sites. There
were dozens of major processing buildings that represented an investment (in US
equivalent) of several billion dollars. Most of these buildings have been destroyed by
the war or under inspection team supervision. The remaining facilities consist of
offices, warehouses and light industrial buildings with no unique capabilities.
The programme involved millions of dollars in specialized equipment. Much of this
equipment has been destroyed by the war, by inspection teams, and by the elements
as the equipment is left outdoors or moved around. The teams have inventoried
hundreds of pieces of equipment that may fall into prohibited or monitorable categories.
The clandestine Iraqi nuclear programme consisted of a tremendous and well-financed
approach to redundant and multiple paths of production of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
The Gulf War and the subsequent inspection effort stopped this production effort well
before any significant amounts of such material was produced. All known activities related
to fissile material production were destroyed or rendered harmless either during the War or
under the supervision of IAEA Inspection Teams.
Significant quantities of HEU in the form of fresh or unirradiated fuel were in Iraq under
IAEA safeguards and there was concern in some quarters that this material could have
been diverted to produce a nuclear explosive. Pre-war estimates that Iraq could produce a
nuclear explosive within a few months explicitly assumed that this material would be
diverted It was not All of this material has been accounted for by the IAEA. The fresh
fuel has been removed from Iraq and the removal of the irradiated fuel is imminent.
154
Another concern is a possible clandestine stockpile of illicitly obtained HEU or plutonium.
This has neither been reported nor uncovered. The existence of such an undeclared
stockpile would, however, be a major concern. It was a major consideration in deciding to
destroy facilities and equipment that could fabricate HEU or plutonium into a nuclear
explosive.
All of the comments regarding times to completion of an explosive device are based on the
assumption that the program would have continued along the same lines, keeping its
original goals This would have taken several more years to complete because much of
the program was just being put together and many pieces were missing. It does not
appear that these pieces were coming together in a well-organized way. Even before the
embargo began, it appears that the program had a long way to go both in terms of
organization and technical progress.
Actually, the facilities and plants are suggestive of a grandiose and over-designed
program. If a political decision were taken today to produce a crude weapon (source of
fissile material unspecified), it could be done without many of the specialized facilities that
had been built for weaponization. Good equipment would be needed, however, and much
of what Iraq had acquired has been destroyed.
The theoretical aspect of the program is the largest worry under the current sanctions
regime. This is an ideal time for the low visibility theoretical work to progress. It could
lead to a more efficient experimental program in the future if, for any reason, Iraq were to
resume. While more visible activities, such as fissile materials production, fabrication
studies and testing, are impeded or deterred by the inspections, improved codes and
design efforts could run on small computers even today.
The key remaining element is the technical experience that has been gained to date. If
this expertise is held together, the design and organization process, and possibly small
scale research activity, may continue with a low probability of being rediscovered. These
are low signature activities not likely to be revealed to inspectors without extraordinary luck
or the defection of knowledgeable Iraqi personnel.
The key to monitoring and inspecting Iraq's programme must be preventing access to
fissile materials, either by diversion or purchase. It is also important to prevent any
reconstitution of indigenous programmes for uranium enrichment or plutonium production.
Such programmes are high profile in terms of cost, visibility, and foreign procurements. All
require continuing observation.
155
Appendix A
STATUS OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT USED IN THE IRAQI NUCLEAR
PROGRAMME
Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Centre - Headquarters of the programme and site
of many R&D functions. This site was devastated and much of the equipment on
this site was destroyed during the war Little additional destruction was
necessary
Al Qaim uranium concentration plant - Destroyed during the war.
Al Jazirah feed materials plant - This plant manufactured UO2 and UCI4 to the
EMIS 1 programme. The buildings were destroyed during the war. Most
equipment has been accounted for and has been destroyed or is in very bad
condition.
Tarmiya EMIS Plant - This site was largely destroyed during the war. The
electromagnetic separators were destroyed by the Iraqis in attempts to conceal
them. The inspection teams supervised the destruction of the remaining process
building (the beta calutron building) the utility system and a few other structures
so that the site cannot be used for its original purpose.
Ash Sharqat EMIS Plant - This was a twin of Tarmiya that had not yet been
completed when it was heavily bombed during the war. The IAEA teams
requested and supervised additional destruction along the lines of that carried
out at Tarmiya. No process equipment had been installed yet at Ash Sharqat.
Al Atheer Materials Centre - This was a partially completed nuclear weapons
development and production site. It was virtually untouched by the war. The
eight specialized process buildings comprising some 350,000 square feet of lab
space were blown up by Iraqi demolition teams under IAEA supervision. A
significant quantity of high quality fabrication equipment which had been
installed or stored there was destroyed.
Al Rabiyah Manufacturing Plant - This was a plant with large mechanical
workshops designed and built for the manufacture of large metal components for
the Iraqi EMIS programme . The main function had been to support the EMIS
programme. The plant had high quality, but not unique, machine tool
capabilities The IAEA inventoried the plant and has been inspecting it
regularly. Several pieces of equipment in the plant will be monitored under the
^MIS = ElectroMagnetic Isotope Separation
156
terms of the on-going monitoring plan The plant was severely damaged by a
cruise missile attack in 1993.
Dijila Electronics Plant - This plant supported electronics fabrication activities for
the IAEC. It has almost no unique pieces of equipment. The plant was not
damaged, and will continue to be monitored by the IAEA .
A ninth site was under construction close to Al Walid to house the centrifuge
manufacturing facility of the Al Furat project. This was also the site where Iraq had
planned to establish its first pilot cascade of 100 centrifuges, scheduled to start
operations in mid-1993. At the time of the Gulf War most of the key buildings at this
site were still in an early construction stage.
A number of other manufacturing workshops were contracted by the Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission for the production of components relevant to the weapons
programme. All these workshops have been identified and are subject to IAEA
monitoring.
APPENDIX B
ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREAS
Nuclear materials: All highly enriched uranium in Iraq under pre-war safeguards has
been accounted for. About one third, in the form of fresh reactor fuel, has been
removed from Iraq and the balance, contained in irradiated fuel, is awaiting removal. A
contract for removal has been signed and an approximately eight-month effort to
remove the irradiated uranium fuel has begun.
About 500 tonnes of natural uranium has been identified and tracked through the Iraqi
uranium processing system. Teams are currently reviewing whether the Iraqi
declaration of uranium is complete and credible. The IAEA removed six grams of
plutonium produced in Iraq (roughly two-thirds of which had been produced illegally).
Assessment: Hundreds of tons of low value nuclear feed materials are under IAEA
seal. There remains, however, accountability problems which make it difficult to
conclude that all known nuclear materials in Irao have been discovered or reasonably
accounted for.
Electromagnetic Isotope Separation: This clandestine program was discovered early
in the inspection process Most of the now known EMIS equipment was damaged in
the war. The IAEA inventoried EMIS items, destroyed the remaining pieces, and
verified quantities through suppliers. Several facilities that had not been completely
destroyed during the war were destroyed by Iraq under IAEA supervision Equipment
utilized in the manufacture of EMIS components remains under seal A cruise missile
attack on the Al Rabiyah facility in January did additional damage to equipment which
157
could have been used in the future to reconstitute EMIS. Reconstitution of this
programme seems unlikely insofar as it was a large programme that had relied on a
blind spot in Western intelligence to get as far as it did.
Assessment: The EMIS program is completely destroyed. It was an indigenous
approach to isotope separation that escaped detection. The program was facing
serious difficulties in start-up and implementation due to a lack of technical depth
among Iraqi technicians. It would have been several years before it produced enough
uranium for military purposes.
Centrifuge Program: Irag declared its facilities and much of the centrifuge eguipment
in July 1991 . Two centrifuge prototypes had been tested with some success in test bed
experiments. All known centrifuge components and specialized tooling were destroyed
in 1991. Other specialized, but dual use, equipment is now under IAEA seal. The Iraqi
government has made a political decision not to name suppliers of sensitive equipment
and materials. This complicates verification, but should not prevent it. Suppliers of
carbon fiber centrifuge rotors have recently been discovered by German authorities.
Iraq eventually admitted that the Rashdiya facility has had a design role in the
centrifuge program. This disclosure came after over a year of pressure from the IAEA.
Assessment: The Iragi centrifuge program was in a very early stage, using
clandestinely obtained European designs and illicitly obtained materials to build a few
research machines. The procurement of hundreds of tonnes of specialty metals and
components, enough to build thousands of machines, was discovered. These materials
have been seized and destroyed.
Uranium Ore Concentration: The ore concentration plant at Al Qaim was completely
destroyed during the war.
Assessment: No capability to indigenously process uranium ore now exists in Irag.
The Iragis have taken no steps to rebuild this plant.
Nuclear Material Conversion: The nuclear materials feed plant at Al Jazirah was
completely destroyed during the war.
Assessment: This key capability is completely destroyed at the production plant level
No back-up capability is known or suspected
Nuclear Reactors and a Plutonium Program: The two nuclear reactors at Tuwaitha
were totally destroyed in the war by aggressive bombardment. They cease to exist.
Suspicions of the existence of an underground reactor have existed since before the
war. All information specific enough to be checked out have proven to be negative.
Assessment While suspicions of an underground reactor are vague and seem to be
premised on circularly repeated rumors, the IAEA continues to search for any evidence
158
for an underground reactor and the requisite peripherals such as irradiated fuel
reprocessing and nuclear waste handling. No information of any verifiable quality
exists at this time to support the existence of such a facility.
Nuclear Weapons Design: A program to assess a nuclear weapon design existed in
Iraq before the war. It consisted of a plan to investigate all of the practical elements of
designing and building a prototype nuclear weapon. A number of specialized facilities,
including buildings for high explosives testing and radioactive materials handling, had
been built at Al Atheer to support this programme. These facilities have all been
destroyed by Iraq under IAEA supervision. The Tuwaitha nuclear research site was
largely destroyed during the war as well. Continued speculation about the existence of
a plutonium program in Iraq is uninformed, given the complexity, high visibility and
difficulty of the plutonium route.
Assessment: The Iraqi nuclear weapons design effort was at an early stage and
consisted of a broadly based study of all aspects of producing a uranium core
implosion weapon Sophisticated concepts for the future were under consideration. A
practical design had not been achieved as a number of problems remained to be
overcome. The hardware and facilities to support this program have been destroyed,
but the concepts remain.
Programme Documentation and Personnel: One of the early IAEA inspection teams
seized about 50,000 pages of documents from the IAEC. A substantial fraction of this
material consisted of technical progress reports. Correspondence found in this
material indicated that other documents had been taken away and hidden by the Iraqi
security services just before the team arrived. The Iraqis claim that all programme
documentation had been destroyed much earlier. Virtually all of the scientists
associated with the nuclear programs remain in Iraq. Captured documents show layoff
records for hundreds of people whose work places were destroyed in the war.
Assessment: Irag could reconstitute a weapons program faster than another state that
had never tried. The capable scientists remain. How they are currently employed is
difficult to ascertain because they have been dispersed It seems highly probable that
a set of documents about the program remain safely hidden away The important
physical facilities are all destroyed, however, and would have to be rebuilt at great cost,
in order to revive the weapons programme.
LONG TERM MONITORING
The Action Team will monitor equipment and facilities that remain after the war and
Inspection Team destruction activities. The first phase of a waterway monitoring
programme has been completed with the cooperation of the Iraqi government. This
programme is sensitive enough to detect very small quantities of radionuclides and
other chemicals used in the nuclear industry. The first series of results show that no
159
unknown nuclear facility has been operating in Iraq in the last couple of years. Based
on verification activities and available information, it is reasonable to conclude that Iraq
is not operating clandestine nuclear facilities, especially a reactor, or a reprocessing
plant.
An essential prerequisite for effective implementation of the Agency's long term
monitoring plan, is the unconditional acceptance by Iraq of UN Security Council
resolution 715 [1991], which determines the rights of UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors
and the corresponding obligations of Iraq. Iraq has so far refused to formally accept
this resolution.
Outstanding Tasks:
Remove the highly enriched irradiated uranium still in Iraq.
Aggressively follow-up any serious reports of clandestine facilities, especially nuclear
reactors and their required support such as fuel reprocessing.
Resolve remaining accountancy differences in the nuclear material balance.
Continue periodic surveys of the waterways monitoring program and phase in gradually
other elements of the long term monitoring plan.
Identify suppliers and middlemen:
centrifuge components
explosives
dual use equipment
materials
Resolve issues of dual-use industrial equipment in Iraq.
160
NUCLEAR CONTROL
institi n:
June 24, 1993
Representative Tom Lantos
Chairman, Subcommittee on Arms Control,
International Security and Science
House Foreign Affairs Committee
2401 A Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6129
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since I will not be testifying as originally planned at your hearing on June
29, I wanted to share with you an exchange of correspondence I have had with
IAEA Director General Hans Blix concerning his misleading statements about the
effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards on Iraq's bomb-grade uranium prior to the
Gulf War.
In preparation for my testimony. I wrote to Dr. Blix. asking him to correct
these misstatements and to set the record straight so that 1 could insert our exchange
of correspondence into the record of your hearing. Enclosed you will find that
correspondence, which I submit for the record.
The Nuclear Control Institute has long sought to direct attention to the severe
limitations on what IAEA safeguards on bomb-grade nuclear material can deliver in
problem NPT states like Iraq. In our view, the principal lesson of Iraq (and more
recently of North Korea) is the danger of allowing highly enriched uranium and
separated plutonium into civilian nuclear programs on the grounds that IAEA
safeguards are adequate to detect and deter misuse of these materials in nuclear
weapons.
So long as the agency misleads the public into believing that its safeguards
on these materials "work"— precisely the twaddle that Dr. Blix and his spokesman
put forth in the context of Iraq— it will be all the more difficult to eliminate these
materials from civil nuclear programs, for which they are uneconomical and
unnecessary, in any event.
Export controls and other nuclear non-proliferation undertakings become
wasting assets in the face of growing stocks of safeguarded, "peaceful" bomb-grade
nuclear materials. Civilian nuclear power and research programs run quite well
without these materials. With them, these programs pose an undeniable proliferation
161
threat because the materials can be converted into nuclear weapons in a matter of
days or weeks. This is true in major industrial states as well as nuclear threshold
states. Nonetheless, the IAEA continues to perpetuate the myth that its safeguards
on these materials are effective.
The most glaring proof that these materials are fundamentally
unsafeguardable came at the time of the Gulf War when Iraq secretly removed most
of its supply of HEU research reactor fuel from the Tuwaitha facility near Baghdad
and hid it. Iraq, in direct violation of its safeguards agreement under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), did not inform the IAEA for over three months — ample
time to convert this material into one or two first-generation fission weapons. As I
wrote to Dr. Blix, the fact that Iraq chose not to attempt to use its hidden HEU in
weapons should not be twisted into proof that safeguards "worked."
Dr. Blix still refuses to acknowledge that Iraq's relocation of the HEU fuel
was a safeguards violation, and he insists that any diversion of the HEU to non-
peaceful uses would have been "immediately discovered." Given that IAEA did not
even know of the fuel's relocation for months, this claim borders on the absurd. He
also stands by his statement that the IAEA never gave the Iraqi nuclear program a
"clean bill of health" despite the comment of the Agency's safeguards chief that
Iraq's cooperation with the IAEA had been "exemplary."
Since Dr. Blix's spokesman has pronounced "this particular exchange of
correspondence closed" without acknowledging or correcting any of Dr. Blix's
misstatements, I hope you will pursue the specific matters I raised with him when
you question witnesses from the IAEA and other witnesses that defend IAEA
safeguards on bomb-grade materials as effective.
Also attached to this letter are some articles I have written on the subject of
Iraq, the IAEA and the NPT. In addition, I have enclosed the testimony I presented
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee over 10 years ago on "what steps are
needed and being taken to ensure that our safeguards goals can be met." As you
will see from this earlier testimony, things haven't changed much: our safeguards
goals are still not being met and there remains a need for forceful leadership, such
as you can provide, on Capitol Hill.
I appreciate your interest in these urgent matters.
Sincerely.
Paul I.eventhal
Enclosures
162
M CLEAR CONTROL
INSTITITE
-a uH s\\ Mm "ii, iAsniM.iDMii :imUi :o;«h2-»ttii i\\:i»o>-
June 4, 1993
Dr. Hans Blix
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna, Austria
BY FACSIMILE: 011-431-234-564
Dear Dr. Blix:
I am writing to ask that you correct certain statements you made at a press
briefing sponsored by the Atlantic Council in Washington on May 20. It is
important that the public record be set straight on Iraq's violations of IAEA
safeguards.
At the press briefing, you stated that during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iraq
"did not touch" the highly-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for its research reactors, or
violate IAEA safeguards on that fuel. This is quite similar to the following
statement you made the previous month to the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum
concerning Iraq's HEU fuel: "What had been placed under safeguards inspection had
been left untouched presumably in the awareness that any violation in this regard
would have been reported immediately and led to some international reaction." (Dr.
Hans Blix. "IAEA Verification of Non-Proliferation." Panel on Non-Proliferation,
JAIF Meeting. Yokohama. April 16. 1993. p. 3)
In fact. Iraq moved almost all of its HEU fuel-enough for about two
weapons-in January 1991, in anticipation of coalition air strikes. Some of the fuel
was secretly relocated within the Tuwaitha site, and some was removed from the site
entirely. In a letter to Mauricio Zifferero. leader of the IAEA Action Team, dated
April 27. 1991. the Iraqi government confirmed that "nuclear material has been
shifted during the war from the locations known to the Agency to nearby locations
..." Further, the Iraqi government refused to disclose the location of this safeguarded
material to the Agency for several weeks, insisting upon guarantees that the fuel
would not be subject to further attack.
Iraq's failure to inform the Agency promptly of the movement of the HEU
fuel or of its new locations violated the safeguards requirement of "[i"| nventorv
chance reports showing changes in the inventory of nuclear material . The reports
shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the end
of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established ..."
(INFCIRC/153, paragraph 63a).
163
Further, the fifth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security' Council Resolution
687 reported that "[d]uring item-counting of the fresh [HEU] fuel, two of the Soviet-
type fuel assemblies were found to have had the top and bottom inert parts cut off
(Report on the Fifth IAEA On-Site Inspection in Iraq Under Security Council
Resolution 687 (1991), 14-20 September 1991, p. 4). The Iraqis insisted that the
cuts were made in a panicked attempt to fit the fuel elements into shipping
containers prior to coalition air strikes. However, according to the fifth inspection
report, "[t]he evidence is inconclusive as between the Iraqi explanation and the
hypothesis that the cutting was a preliminary to removal of the highly enriched
component of the assembly" (ibid). Regardless of the purpose of the cuts, however,
you cannot accurately claim that the Iraqis "did not touch" the HEU material during
the Gulf War.
In addition, you said that the IAEA had never given the Iraqi nuclear
program "a clean bill of health" prior to the Gulf War; rather, that it had only
certified that all materials under safeguards were accounted for. This claim ignores
the statement by Jon Jennekens, then-director of the Agency's Safeguards Division,
made soon after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Mr. Jennekens stated that the
cooperation of Iraqi officials with IAEA had been "exemplary," and that they "have
made eve y effort to demonstrate that Iraq is a solid citizen" in the nonproliferation
regime ("No Bomb-Quantity of HEU in Iraq, IAEA Safeguards Report Indicates."
NuclearFuel. August 20, 1990, p. 8). This assertion, made by the Agency's top
safeguards official, certainly gives the appearance of a "clean bill of health" for Iraq
by the IAEA.
I hope you will promptly correct the above-cited statements, as they have the
unfortunate effect of misleading the public about the effectiveness of Agency
safeguards. I have been invited to present testimony to a Congressional
subcommittee hearing late in June on the lessons of Iraq for the IAEA safeguards
system. I would appreciate receiving a response from you in time so that I may
insert our exchange of correspondence into the record of the hearing.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. Copies of all materials cited
above are attached to this letter.
Sincerely.
Paul Leventhal
Attachments
164
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
ACENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE
M£)KflyHAPOHHOE ATEHTCTBO no ATOMHOH 3HEPTHH
ORGANISMO INTERNACIONAL DE ENERGIA KTOMICA
15 June 1993
Dear Mr. Leventhal,
Your letter of June 4 to our Director General has been passed to me for
The first is a remask
s former Deputy
reply.
You ask for comments essentially on two points,
reportedly made to an individual journalist by the IAEA!'
Director General for Safeguards, Mr. Jennekens, in August 1990. The second lie
the Director General's reference to highly enriched urarijium (HEU) fuel
elements in Iraq as being "untouched" when speaking in Hlashingtoo on May 20
this year.
I will not comment on the personal quote attribuoec to Mr. Jennekens.
I would point, however, to the prudent line of the IAEA jin its public
pronouncements on safeguards inspections in Iraq. After inspections conducted
in both April and November 1990, for instance, we issued! carefully worded
press releases (attached) stating, in November, that "baised upon the
information collected during these inspections it has bieen concluded that no
change has taken place in the status of nuclear material under safeguards in
Iraq since the last inspections ... At that time it was concluded that all
nuclear material under safeguards was accounted for." No more, no less.
As for the Director General's remarks, I do not think it reasonable eo
try to construct a case concerning the failure of the safeguards system, on
the grounds that the IAEA was not "promptly informed" of! the movement of HEL
fuel to a hurriedly improvised location, ignoring the highly dramatic contexit
of aerial raids in which this took place. It is also capricious .to interpret
the Director General's reference to the HEU having been ''untouched" as
implying that none of it had been physically moved, when! what he clearly meant
was that none of it was ever diverted to non-peaceful use.
Mr. Paul Leventhal
Pres ident
Nuclear Control Institute
1000 Connecticut Avenue N.
Suite 704
Washington D.C. 20036
fax 202 452 0892
165
As you know well, all the HEU supplied to Iraq was
for. The fresh fuel was removed from Iraq in November 199
fuel is expected to follow in the second half of this yeari
and is accounted
and the irradiated
By way of further clarification, let me correct you
Iraq moved almost all of its fuel "in anticipation of coal
(third paragraph of your letter). The transfer of part of
after the first bombardment of the Tuwaitha Centre (17 Jani
resulted in the destruction of the Russian supplied IRT 50
with fuel inside. It is worth noting that when the first
Tuwaitha occurred during the night of 17-18 January 1991,
in full operation, indicating that no coalition air strike
Removal of the irradiated HEU fuel elements from their ori
the Tammuz 1-Tammuz 2 complex to an Improvised location nej
out under continuing air raids in which bombing might have
radioactive contamination of the area at any time.
statement that
tion air strikes"
the fuel occurred
iary 1991), which
)0 research reactor
iir raid against
he IRT reactor was
were expected,
inal location at
irby, was carried
caused serious
As to the episode of the two Soviet-type fuel assemblies which were
found without top and bottom fittings, and irrespective of] the explanations
for this unusual operation, the fact remains that the HEU Contained in the two
assemblies in question was still there and had not been diverted to
non-peaceful uses.
Yours sincerely.
David R. Kye
Director
Public Information Division
IAEA
166
NUCLEAR CONTROL
INSTITUTE
June 23, 1993
Dr. Hans Blix
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna. Austria
BY FACSIMILE: 011-431-234-564
Dear Dr. Blix:
I am writing with regard to David Kyd's letter of June 15, responding to my
letter of June 4 to you.
I had written you in the hope and expectation that you would correct certain
misstatements and set the record straight concerning the serious shortcomings of
IAEA safeguards in Iraq prior to the Gulf War. Based on Mr. Kyd's response, I
find it remarkable that the Agency seems incapable of acknowledging specific,
significant limitations to what its safeguards on bomb-grade nuclear material can
deliver in problem NPT states like Iraq.
On the issue of whether the IAEA gave a "clean bill of health" to the Iraqi
nuclear program. Mr. Kyd declines to comment on former Director of Safeguards
Jon Jennekens* November 1990 statement that Iraq's cooperation with the IAEA was
"exemplary" and that Iraqi nuclear experts "have made every effort to demonstrate
that Iraq is a solid citizen" in the NPT regime. In Mr. Kyd's words, this was a
"personal quote" and presumably not of the same weight as two Agency findings
that vear in Iraq that "all nuclear material under safeguards was accounted for."
An on-the-record comment made by a high-level Agency official to a leading
nuclear trade journal cannot be dismissed in this fashion. Mr. Jennekens made his
statement just after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, when world attention and concern was
focused on the Iraqi nuclear program. In this context, Mr. Jennekens was surely
aware his statement was bound to carry a lot of weight. Also, the Agency did not
issue any statement distinguishing its official position from Mr. Jennekens', as it did
last September when Mr. Zifferero stated that Iraq's nuclear program was "at zero."
Mr. Jennekens had been speaking in his official capacity, and the Agency did
nothing to dispel the clean bill of health he gave to Iraq.
167
As to the central question of whether Iraq violated IAEA safeguards on its
HEU fuel without being detected, surely it is Mr. Kyd, not I. who is "capricious" in
characterizing your remarks at the Atlantic Council press conference in Washington.
Mr. Kyd claims that when you said Iraq "did not touch" the HEU fuel, what you
"clearly meant was that none of it was ever diverted to non-peaceful use." This is a
conveniently revisionist interpretation that is not supported by the transcript of your
remarks, as follows:
And the Iraqis never touched the nuclear highly-enriched
uranium which was under our safeguards, which in some
ways indicate also that the safeguard had an effect. Had
they toached anything - (inaudible) — immediately
discovered, and these would have been reported, and they
would have evoked a governmental opinion and
governmental action. They didn't want to do that. So
they never touched the material which was under
safeguard ...
Thus, as with your earlier remarks in Japan, the clear meaning of your
comment was that Iraq had not touched the HEU fuel, that safeguards on that
material had in no way been violated, and that the safeguards had effectively
deterred Iraq from attempting such a violation.
In fact, the contrary was true. Iraq removed the HEU to locations unknown,
and this was an indisputable safeguards violation. Paragraph 63a of INFCIRCT53
clearly requires movement of safeguarded materials to be reported "as soon as
possible." Rather than acknowledge this violation, Mr. Kyd seems to bend over
backward to make excuses for Iraq by suggesting that an emergency in response to
coalition air raids impeded prompt notification of the IAEA. Yet. Iraq did not report
the relocation of the HEU fuel until more than three months later, well after the
cease-fire took effect, and under duress. The NPT safeguards agreement requires
that such reports be made " in am event within 30 days of the end of the month"
when the safeguarded material is moved [emphasis supplied]. Nor are NPT parties
permitted to place conditions upon their disclosure to IAEA of the location of
special nuclear material, as Iraq did in its April 27. 1991 declaration.
Moreover, you are surely aware that no Iraqi diversion of its HEU fuel could
have been "immediately discovered" by IAEA. This material was only being
inspected twice a year, despite the fact that it amounted to more than two significant
quantities. Agency safeguards agreements currently allow many significant
quantities of weapons-usable special nuclear material to be treated for inspection
purposes as less than one significant quantin. provided that the material is split up
in smaller amounts among several different material balance areas. This is true even
if these material balance areas are all located at the same site, as was the case at
Tuwaitha.
168
The key point is that Iraq could have quickly gathered and diverted all its
HEU fuel for use in weapons without the Agency discovering this diversion for at
least several months. The fact that actual use in weapons did not occur in no way
alters the fact that safeguards were so weak that Iraq could have diverted the
material and incorporated it into one or two first-generation fission weapons without
detection by the Agency. Since the conversion time for HEU is on the order of days
or weeks, this makes clear a major gap in IAEA safeguards, and it also makes a
strong case for the Agency to acknowledge the obvious limitations of safeguards on
direct-use material rather than to continue to obfuscate them.
Regarding the two Soviet-type HEU fuel assemblies, Mr. Kyd sounds as if he
is describing some mys\ery when he says that they were "found without top and
bottom fittings." They were "found" this way because the Iraqis cut off the top and
bottom fittings, as they later admitted. The UN Special Commission inspectors,
realizing that this could have been the first step toward diverting the HEU for
weapons, were not satisfied with Iraq's innocent explanation of why this was done.
Yet, Mr. Kyd seems satisfied by the fact that "the HEU contained in the two
assemblies in question was still there and had not been diverted to non-peaceful
uses." Given that the IAEA was not informed of the removal of the fittings, on
what basis is the Agency confident that it would have "immediately" discovered the
diversion of the HEU subsequent to such removal?
The Iraqi case makes clear why the Agency should not continue to perpetuate
the myth of "effective" safeguards on weapons-usable nuclear material. The fact
that Iraq chose not to use its hidden HEU in weapons should not be twisted into
proof that safeguards "worked."
Continued use of HEU in civil nuclear programs on the assumption it can be
effectively safeguarded— to borrow the warning by former IAEA Deputy Director
General William Dircks about surplus plutonium— "poses a major political and
security problem worldwide." Better that you acknowledge that weapons-usable
nuclear materials are fundamentally unsafeguardable. given how swiftly they can be
converted for use in nuclear bombs. Such a warning by you would lift the cloak of
legitimacy that now obscures these exceedingly dangerous materials: it could hasten
their elimination from civil nuclear programs, for which they are uneconomical and
unnecessary, in any event
Therefore. I respectfully repeat my request that you correct your
misstatements and set the record straight. The public should not be misled on this
urgent matter. I would appreciate having your reply in time to submit it. as part of
our exchange of correspondence, for the record of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee hearing on June 29.
Sincerely,
Paul Leventhal
169
INTLKNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
ACENCE INTERNATIONALE DE l.'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE
MDKflyHAPOflHOE AFF.HTCTBO HO ATOMHOfl 3HtPrHM
ORCANISMO 1NTERNACIONAL DK ENERCIA ATOMICA
24 June 1S93
Dear Mr. Leventhei,
In the absence of the Director General, Dr. Bans Blix, who will be away
from Vienna until July 1. I an again replying to a letter of yours, dated
June 23, on the same subjects you chose to raise in your letter of June 4,
1993.
Having given your views due consideration, I regret to inform you that
there is nothing more of substance I can add to my earlier reply and 1 must
therefore consider this particular exchange of correspondence closed.
c*
Yours slnceiely
Vf*
David R. Kyd
Director
Public Information Division
Mr. Paul I.eventhal
Pres ldent
Nuclear Control Institute
1000 Connecticut Avenue N.W.
Suite 704
Washington D.C. 20036
170
!;hc^cUfJ3orkeimc)5
MONDAY, AUGUST M, 1990
M'CUA« CONTROL
INSTITUTE
The Nonproliferation Hoax
By PauJ L. Lcventhal
WASHINGTON
rhe Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons is now
being reviewed in
Geneva bv many of the
142 nations that have
ified it. Like three previous review
lerences held since the treaty
ne into force in 1970. this one is
■ly to extol the virtues of nonprolif-
tion — the next best thing to moth-
ooo — and ignore flaws that make
treaty dangerously out of date In
present form in a rapidly changing
rid. the treaty, lor til as good in-
(ions, invites catastrophe
fhe Nuclear Nonproliferation
?aty is regarded as an interna-
nal firebreak against the further
-ead of nuclear weapons. But Its
'visions for containing prohfera-
n are like the hospitals that Flor-
:e Nightingale so abhorred. They
ve served to spread the disease
rag. for example, is a treaty party
good standing despite Saddam
issein's decade-long pursuit of nu-
■ar weapons His exercise in bla-
ii proliferation does not run afoul
the treaty because only the receipt
assembly of a complete nuclear
vice not the acquisition of the in
edients needed to build one. would
olaten
Iraq's continued nonnuclear-
eapon status is attributable pnnci-
illy not to its treaty membership
it to Israel's bombing m 1961 of an
ifimshed research reactor near
ighdad That reactor was capable
producing plutonium in quantities
rge enough to make at least two
omic bombs a year. It had been cer-
'ied •■peaceful" by inspectors from
e International Atomic Energy
gency. the U.N. group that polices
>e treaty. Israel remains outside the
eaiy and is hardly a pillar of non-
roliferation. but its pre-emptive
nke capacity and undeclared nu-
lear arsenal reflect a lack of faith in
ie treaty's guarantees.
Japan is a treaty member in good
.anding It plans to recover from the
as '.ps of its reactors more plu-
!num than the United States and the
ovtet Union now have in all their nu-
lear arms combined. This plan does
ot run afoul of the treaty because the
lutonium is to be used as fuel for
c*er reactors, not bombs
No matter that Japan will have far
^oj! L Leventhal is president of the
Vuciear Control Insntute
more piutoniurr. than it needs, be-
cause it has postponed into the next
century the new reactors for which
the fuel was intended No matter that
current reactors do not need this
highly toxic, bomb-grade pluiomum
at all but can continue to function on
plentiful low-grade uranium that can-
not be made Into weapons. No matter
that IAEA Inspectors are unable to
know m a given year, because of
measurement uncertainties, whether
600 pounds of plutonium (enough for
50 bombs) has been simply lost In the
pipes of a large processing plant or
has been diverted. No matter that
these uncertainties and other vulner-
abilities make plutonium susceptible
to theft by terrorists as well as diver-
sion by nations intent on making nu-
clear weapons Its all O.K. Com-
merce in tons of surplus plutonium —
though it u a latent form of prolifera-
tion — is not a treaty violation
West Germany is a treaty member
in good standing. Its nuclear exports
to such non-treaty countries as India
and Pakistan which do not require
them to accept the same all-encom-
passing IAEA inspections that are
required of member countries, do not
run afoul of the treaty There are
loopholes that even permit West Ger-
many to export some items essential
to producing nuclear weapons ma-
Even Iraq
complies with
the treaty.
tertals. like heavy water and process-
ing equipment, without being in tech-
nical violation of the treaty
The U.S. and the Soviet Union are
treaty parties in good standing de-
spite their 50.000 nuclear weapons be-
cause they "pursue negotiations in
good faith." as the treaty requires
Certainly, recent negotiations and the
political realignment In Europe serve
to make possible the first substantial
cuts in nuclear arms by the super-
powers But their quantitative nu-
clear arms race Is fast being eclipsed
by a qualitative one. Continued test-
ing of weapons, pioduenon of materi-
als for weapons and modernization of
warheads and missiles keep the su-
perpower nuclear rivalry alive with-
out violating the treaty.
Two aets of improvements io the
treaty are needed. First, the tripwire
for a treaty violation should be pos-
session of weapons-grade materials.
not possession of a weapon
Second, the treaty must obligate
the superpowers to curtail, qualita-
tively as well as quantitatively, the
nuclear rivalry that still serves as the
ready excuse for other nations to
ktep their nuclear options open. The
superpowers could well hall all test-
ing and weapons-materials produc
uonas they reduce their nuclear ar-
senals.
Failure to consider these improve-
ments now may make it impossible to
upgrade and update the treaty by
1995. when the parties must meet
again to extend it. If the needed
changes are not yet in place by then
the treaty should be extended for sue
cessive short periods only
There should be a longer extension
only after the treaty has been made
relevant to the real-world dangers of
proliferation and terrorism, and to a
nuclear arms race that grows more
lethal even as the superpower ar
senals are reduced
Unfortunately. US policy, shared
by the U.S.S.R. and mosi industrial
nations, is to paper over the Nonpro
liferation treaty's problems Thai
avoids raising concerns about the nJ
clear industry and does not challenge
the nuclear-weapons status quo. But
the time has come to view the treaty
without rose-colored glasses C
171
VIEWPOINTS
Expose All Secret Nuclear Stashes
Rigid inspections and export controls can stop a future Iraq.
By Paul Leventhal
and Sleven Dollcy
IN 1979. THE partially melted
core of the Three Mile Island
reactor showed the world tlidt
a major nuclear-power accident
was mi imaginary threat Now the
discovery of a huge Iraqi nuclear
weapon^ program, built right un-
der the noses of international in-
spectors, has presented the global
non proliferation system with iu>
own kind of Three Mile Island
Bui iusl as the Chernobyl melt-
down followed Three Mile Island,
the spread of nuclear weapons will
proceed apace unless real reforms
are put in place
Until the gulf war, Iraq had al-
ways been treated as a model citi-
zen by the International Atomic
Energy Agency Now, however.
the agency and its boosters in the
nuclear industry and burcuueracy
worldwide have had to eat crow
over a succession ol humiliations
at the hands of the Iraqis First
Iraq denied having any weapons-
usable material or bomb-building
plants, despite the UN ceasefire
resolution requiring it Lu turn over
all such materials to the Atomic
Energy Agency and to allow the
agency to destroy all such plants
missed by allied bombings
Iraq eventually agreed to reveal
the w hereabouts of its bomb-grade
uranium and other nuclear materi-
als, but denied having other weap-
ons-grade materials or weapons
plants Then, alter a defector from
the Iraqi nuclear program Inld
what he knew LolJ.S experts, Irjq
tried in conceal and then grudging-
ly showed inspectors evidence • >'■ u
secret indu=tn lor producing il.-
own bomb-grjde uranium
Then, in what must have been
the cruelesl blow for the international in.-ruvlor-
Iraq admitted that U had been producing plnloni-
um. undetected in direu violdt I Ihr Nuclei
NonprolilciiiLi'iii Treaty, of which lr,iq i- ,i iigtu
lory Alihough the three grams ol pluionium
shown tu the Aionnc Energy Ageiuv was l.ir lc--
than the few kilograms needed l.n .1 weapon, it
demonstrated Iraq s capability to recover pi u Ioni-
um from spent luel and raised concerns thai Iraq
might have hidden awav a plutonium production
program
In the interest of world peace, then, we must
learn some lesson? Irom tins "Three Mile Island'
of nuclear prolileration
First, there may be far more In Iraq s nucleai
program Iraq cannot be expeiied t- volunUt'l
Paul Leicnthal directed ihe I'S Senate !»■
vesligalton uf the Three Mile Island nuclear
QCtldcnt He is now president uf the S'ui fair
Control Institute in Washingum, D( iVeVC'i
Doltn is the institute's research direi Mr
^■^flS^
ments and results must be lifted
The Atomic Energy Agency
should be empowered to conduct
snap inspections — now they
must give notice — and be autho-
rized to look wherever they sus-
pect violation-, (Now. if a build-
ing is declared free of nuclear
material, it is ofT limits, and in-
spectors may not even report sus-
picious activities observed be-
tween declared sites i Inspections
also should be more frequent. In
Iraq, inspectors were checking
twice a year on fuel that could be
converted into weapons in one to
three weeks
Of course, a stronger inspection
system will not help without
stricter controls over nuclear ex-
ports U S law permits many nu-
clear components and other items
useful to bomb n-jking to be ex-
ported to slates that do not ad-
here to the nonproliferation irca
ty or accept in-»peclions
The Nuclear Proliferation Pre
veniti.n Act. recently introduced
by nVp Edward Markev D
Mass i and Sen Timolhv Wirth
(D-Col >, would close ihi» and oth-
er major export -control loopholes
It also directs the president to im-
pose trade sanctions on nations
transferring nuclear items under
less stringent controls and to ne-
gotiate stronger Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards
Also, there musi he a suhstan
tial upgrading ol I' S intelligence
gal hen ng on nucle.ir proliferation
— an area neglected when vj-l n-
-,ourie> were being S"'"i on .inli-
Sovii'l intelligent Now that the
i DldWai h , reveded major pow-
ers cm turn .mention in tho-e
amth.ngwc
A partly d.
released to I
ample, dvsc
building a c
War. I! built
Iraq was km
before- Ihr w
don't know or suspect
cla<*ilivd I'S intelligence document.
ri. Nuclear Control Institute- I'm i •
iln - ,i Chinese ici.-abihu >tudv fi-ir
unoulliigod reactor in Iraq by. IH9JI
Where are i he weapons components
wil in have been making or acquiring
ir and ihul have vet lu -url..,.-'
lnlenialiun.il inspection teams should i
full time pri"»tng iiu information and look
material and production sites Even il the
lind everything thi'N call keep the Iraqi pi
disarrav, minimizing chances uf a hum
Also, the Atomic Energy Agency ni
its safeguards in determine whethe
spec! inn Imdings in other countries v
liable as those in Iraq Until now
safeguards were assumed lo be slri
deter nations from cheating Iraq
cheating is possible and a far stricter system i>
needed This will require more staff and funding
for the Alum It* Energy Agem j
For openers, the secrecy of inspection arrange-
!iv> dm
-OgTHIII
■mghui
■ agem ■■ ■
•nougb to
whn w iiu Id have nuclear weapons
"** L "■*' '*'• '■ and threaten world order
Then .ilsn must be the political
will, thus far lacking lu confront wayward nucleai
juppliei s and i usiomci - uliki li .iq ha.- taught u-
ihe danger o! looking thculhm -.i.
None of these reforms will Hup ilu spread of
nuclear weapons, however unli-- the glowing
trade in h.imh-grade nucle.ii fuels Ittr civ il nuclear
power and research program? is ■•topped Plutoni-
um and hlghl) enriched omnium ui wlmh only a
few pounds are needed lor a bomb are traded b) the
tun in world commerce The United Slate- the
principal exporter ol bnmi gradi uranium tor re-
search reactors, hat developed substitute, low-en-
riched luel- unsuitable lor weapons hut rdu&ei in
finish the program thai could eliminate the bomb-
grade material from commerce Ihe United Stales
also agreed Lu lei Japan recover from V S -supplied
nuclear fuel more plutonium lhan u contained in
ihe U S arsenal even though lh. re is no short age of
low-enriched uranium to fuel Japan's electrical
generating reactors A nuclear nunproliferation re-
gime (hat tolerates, indeed promotes, use of bomb-
grade nuclear fuels is a recipe for catastophe — ihe
ornhferalion equivalent of Chernobyl, or worse
l.iumhd in lilii i,. -jrnw * I* Im.
tlra IWImnn tnA Wn»ni«ii*i**
H»rf> ► Luirr""" "•> Ji.ii- r'urgmrid
K.t*n M Mi
I'uMuh-r «. <
-
Kmpbnr krblMta
I'uH* Affair*
UwrU»ii hi
I'midcN 4. '
in
Uilu> ind s.nn I r
Mux M..-.,,
TIM!
Hti
IM I llMI'lM
m-m
..j.
"
u
'*"
"
'"""
Iwun m>^. ™
l.,,_M H.. m ,li...
i Ihel i.vim-.
UjiKfl 1 ILi ~
|-r.4u.l>» l'.f»H.«
■■■ | II . ..,■
...,j Is . .
-vlhdb VI, fW"
MVHKI IIM
•urn. r>
K.i.,l Muuctn
• J... M.K,..
. . ... 1
ImIukhI «Liwh
. IIMMl vm
ill »IK.-
MISHV
CnnHun l>.no-
172
M CH\R(.0\TR(H
IVMITl Tt'
Hcralo^agifceribimc.
rabi.hnl m ith TW V. tort TW.aidTVlMfeiigionPoM
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 1991
17i€ Nuclear Watchdogs Have Failed
CAMBRIDGE, England — The
International Atomic Energy
Agency has just completed its annual
conference in Vienna After the agen-
cy's failure to detect a multibilhon-
dollar nuclear weapons project in Iraq.
the Dutch proposed, on behalf of Eu-
ropean Community members, an
emergency overhaul of a failed safe-
guards system. The agency's powerful
board of governors has put off action
until February and shows every sign of
acting like the nuclear faithful failing
to see that the emperor has no clothes
The 23-member board, dominated
by industrial states concerned about
eroding public acceptance of nuclear
energy, is ill-equipped to recognize the
nakedness of IAEA safeguards in the
presence of a determined proliferator
To do so risks acknowledging that
there is no effective bamer between
peaceful and military applications of
nuclear energy. This admission could
threaten extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferauon Treaty when its 25-
year charter runs out in 1995 — as well
as the lucTauve commerce in atom-
bomb materials, and the technologies
for producing them for civilian uses,
now made possible by the treats
Perhaps that explains why agency
inspectors were making only twice-a-
year calls ui Iraq on the bomb-grade
fuel that could be converted into
weapons in two to three weeks
Worse still was the failure of inspec-
tors to find or even suspect secret
nuclear weapons plants, or to detect
secret production and recovery of
pluloruum in safeguarded faciuues
To his credit, the IAEA's director-
gencral. Hans Blix, has reported ex-
tensively to the board on safeguards
weaknesses exposed by Iraq The
Dutch proposal picks up on several
of Mr Bin's points about the need
for surprise inspections, more fre-
quent and more intrusive regular in-
fections, and broader coverage of
IAEA safeguards to include natural
Mraruur thai cannot be used di'rciN
By Paul L. Leventhal
in bombs but is used to produce
bomb-grade uranium and plutonium.
But may of the safeguards weak-
nesses addressed by Mr. Bin and the
Dutch are of the governing board's
own making. For example, the board
has refused to authorize snap inspec-
tions of safeguarded facilities to
check for unauthorized activities, or
to authorize entry by demand into
unsafeguarded facilities to determine
whether nuclear materials are in pro-
duction or storage, or to authorize
safeguards on natural uranium
The IAEA's model safeguards
agreement with Nonproliferauon
Treaty members authorizes these in-
spections, but the board of governors
has not permitted them because of
objections from members that they
would be too extensive and intrusive.
The combination of a board that ap-
plies a lowest-common-denommator
principle to applying safeguards and
a nuclear technocracy that applies
safeguards to explosive materials that
are inherentK unsafeguardable is a
presenpuon for catastrophe Five
fundamental reforms are needed
• The IAEA membership should
vote to amend the agency's statute to
relieve the board of governors of its
safeguards authority and limit the
board to pursuing the agency's nucle-
ar promotional activities.
• The director-general should be
authorized b> vote of the members to
report to and serve under the direction
of the UN Security Council on all
safeguards matters, via a permanent
form of the UN Special Commission
to. up to oversee removal of weapons
materials and plants from Iraq.
• Proliferation-related intelligence
should be channeled by the U.S and
other governments to the Security
Council via ihe new, permanent Spe-
cial Commission, which would autho-
rize IAEA challenge inspevuons or
other UN-sponsored actions in any
country in which safeguards violauons
or weapons activities were suspected.
• Since there is no way of knowing
whether the IAEA has been effective
in verifying that countries other than
Iraq are not diverting nuclear materi-
als or building bombs, all of the agen-
cy's inspection reports should be re- .
viewed by an independent, blue-
ribbon panel named by the Security
Council, and the results should be
publicly reported.
• The Security Council should au-
thorize the IAEA director-general to
propose international arrangements
for supply of low-enriched uranium
unsuitable for bombs and for custody
over reactor-spent fuel and any re-
covered plutonium. This method of
minimizing weapons-capable urani-
um and plutonium in civil programs
is an important "atoms-for-peace"
approach long abandoned by the
IAEA board of governors, but one
that could still work.
Changes in the IAEA statute,
which require a two-thirds vole of
countries attending the annual con-
ference and acceptance by two-thirds
of all IAEA member states, arc need-
ed to deal effectively with a govern-
ing board that seeks to keep safe-
guards as weak as possible.
Experts argue the fine points of
safeguards, but the public simply
wants safeguards to delect nuclear
bomb-making The public does not
misunderstand safeguards, as some
defenders of the IAEA suggest; the
agency misunderstands what the
public rightfully expects of «afe-
guards as the pnee of continuing
with atoms for peace and the Non-
proliferauon Treaty.
The writer, president of the Nuclear
Control Institute in Washington, a »
railing fellow at Cambridge Unmeni-
ty's Global Seewlry Programme Me
contributed this comment lo the Inter-
manorial Hcroid Tnbnne
173
•- ft: S
=5 E
£ a.
£ -a
c
E «
o >.
w o
B "
2 "
c -a
IS
o =
■5
- c
3 u
1?
3 E 1
| S «
O 3 *
W E "
8.2 E
!; Of
a
e S
E E ■= ^ »e
j?2^6u
z. re o «i = >-
3C « C 5 ?
_ _ g 3 £ o
t( _ "" — (-1
"s = -o 2
</> jr —
3 O 3S '
■" = S
BE*
O 3 _ O "O
3 = =t a£
«= * 2
— - E -3
2 * ? 9.
o f rez >* o
4= i5 5 u
o *
i 82
■b; re
■a j,
■o S
8 = i =
6 £
•a ■=
re re
- -
3 Si E
■= O t- 3
C-3 .3
= :s| s..
. - o B =
u-2 i- c £
f o ? " 2 "
re o o
' — F
■ C 3
OS
C3
t/3
S
o
z
3
o
-4-J
O
a
o
O
.£3.
> eg
w n. —
t> « 3
2 = 9
E O 3
.5 .E -
re — 3
0- - c
N
3 | o
o u '£.
£ re ■./■.
a - ■
»o £
i- £ it,
re c ^
i
c.
M
3 "3
- " >,
r v> _
£ n
— o 33
r CJ 5 C
re »- re C
O O A re
re 3 X -y,
«of c
f =•! *
3 -a yl
2 i c i.
~° 8.1 =
3 £ ■= i/>
o ^ — re
|=I re
!i o£
2E= .
;3^
5 ?
re ^
3 3. E I
3C
'- C <*
E 3 i
3 2 E
= d =
3 O 3
— So
i-°Ss.= i
E o - ~ c
i_ : w tA c
» 1 § I S I
r x j g c
S - £ = | B
c = ^.C 3 3
5 £ - s. •; -
_ re C 3 3
=• i i ? ; 5 :
irl j;
C
a
•a
o
- « ■
= ? re 2 5
3 = o a
5^ = =
£.3
3 a
2. e
^ 3
•B ^
: C 3
z
ei £
b5-
ji •* 3 =
t a .-. C - «
■= Z i <- 3 ._
re S - - - =
J= 9 • 3 C .
E 3;
S
8
— "3
* £ - =3
^ z * > C 45 •
= = ;->.?
£■«>>=■"
>• = ■=- 3 3 ^ "=
a
c
<u
"O
03
(A
'—
fauD
nj
6
o
£1
u
a;
s
E r - *- b
i
§
>■
3
i
3
—
C
D
3
1
t.
E
3
B
2
3
B
-3
(A
i
-
3
E
£
u
a
5
"3
£
u
5
a
c
c.
C
E
3
U
B"
u?
>,
C
T
>»
3
(A
E
E
S
3
a
CI
C
3
a
>,
c
c
C
>
■1
c
r*
r
c
^
=
-
-
•
£
.
-3
_ o
sag
lE£ i 18
= J
e'2 *
=-2
3 C
-3 3
|e
^^
^^
re o
£■=
3 sfl w —
B - _ E 3 re ■=
U -
S E
re E
E 3
O _
? = :c
E = u i
. E. o "3
= M 11
_ O E
re r B
jE 2 E
•- i » Z
i!e 2 J
>. >■ re
'- - 3 3 3
■3 E r >>re3 "3 '
w= C = re = £ re
— -3 i- "3 - '
' 3 r ¥ E I - _
>,E
E s 1 § a
^ w - — 5
S-B)"— >-3E- u
!t S a . w 3-tic|2 •"
.7 i re; - * B 5 ^
e a
= 2-
~-
- «= c* £ -=; a
« B O * 3
B b
•3 t
re o
o _
; £ - I --
^"xreT-BSE
: 3-"= S c c - 3.
i f -a re -3 <r * z.
: i re a, e ^ i
1$^E.3$BJ£
E S
Z «) E ,1 O. .
O -C = — 3
irl 8
o re r
re e c
? Ca re
85 >-*:
Z * m"
o res >-2
TJ 2 = a
12 z §
> I 8
3 3 tfl
"5_ •BE
E" ^ 3. O
i i § u
— = £ s
— - /■
— . to aj
■a u -y
£ -Z,
;2o»
*2 * B
— a _
|l =1 8
fSlreif
££■
*- — * »— *
_ E J o _ .
<u ^ 7 e 2
- £ E 3 ^ '
•--is
i> « ?« o r
1- 41 O ^ ti
*2f re
£ 3 .o
i • 1-
-b res re
£ re c
ZJo
^ - i
5 8
^ 3 E
B ■-
>. 3
-I =
£ * a>
- .Tj
£ li
S - >•
W M o
o " c
■c z: ^
* s a
i£l
*> i
* >>rej
2 » g
«ix
* «l *
M £ »
E ^ O
— e —
"> a o
- j -
a. z
174
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY (IAEA): IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND SCIENTIFIC
AFFAIRS
AND OX
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE
OP THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION-
MARCH 3 AND 18. 1!>M!
Printed for the use of the Committee oil Korean Affairs
D.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1982
175
c 3 a>T°
3 2-S-Sa
-c - _ -_
tj * o. « c "S e ^ "t
3 C* — U O - = 3-5;-
e3>£«=E. < i l^£
5 g«j 3 => ^Esi'-
nt'si^- 3 o — a,
^••s 5S I'
I i i ji 11 IS fc HOT* Oil! i ! W JilfSl !l 1B!H ! I
s !K ;i if il |I l^^lilii^l il-tlia^ ^ilm "a l||i g |«II^
I Slari li ^JTi^-sS sisals J ;s|*^l sislll s- ° 9 -?g!°-s-Is=|
^^2 3 S
= I Uliiiilpn liHtlillJilIili HliiaHliiii 11 UHfUiJiiI
GO
c «. S3iSg| <s ..= |gEg ^^Sui^cS 2 ^?* 5 3
g 3 ffl ' "■ "~*
176
* lit
l ■=»■ =
■i lg|
"5 = "■? =
gl-*,!
*H3? =
: 3 ■ c e
- x — o
• ■"'IS"
8. * a 3 u
1S< C.2
i*sli
= — 3 £."*
P i J & i
* a
l|p
x-p
- * i_
- 3 a
" > = a _
£ 0..2C-S
a = » — 9
= ?*-3 s
I* t ? E
alll|
a" £ 4 =
i » >■ 1 "
a -a 9 =« a,
I B = = -
5 J a * i
a 0-r * 3
£ "". = 5 *
9 J = C u.
4. j £ p i-a a. 2 =
« — ~_ Em 3 *-
g.? 5.5 =■=
;i .-.3 |Z2
ax a.. 2 4, a
1 C • - 4i L a i5 o
-1 3 --o
?x-=5
^ £ n
$ 8 7
— — c c
a
— 1— w tt
2 g» jj
*ssf
33g3lL
■- « a c!a
iS..is.2*|-
j Sia£ 3 ax
•= 55-Sa.H a I
3 3-=3 £ §§,
=■= J 5..S-2 a-23
3 a
i
1 -1 -^ ** :
2 — t: i» 3 e
8**0*
-a ? w. > 3
•sill
E g-
. 5 " * * — ^
: 3 = 2 =£
= a5^i
■o|S<
ill's
x£i£
.3 3 E3
a £7 = 3 >- a-
£,_ c 3 3 >- a
; » o 1 5 >■ « <2
a 3 l.o c * ■¥„
-c — c = x jz £
x a. i> a c o as
3J.SI
3 4, l/> >
■3 5 3 0)
|.a*|
? «x
3X
/l .- -J =£ - w
a„"9S-ol*x a
-3 - 3.2 - i-co a
a^-3 i Z n ^" >
a *
5 «
E-i'S —
? = ^
— -; 3 <a
HP
t 3 aR
0* rence scheinman
proliferation, and facilitate international nuclear cooperation for peaceful pur-
poses. Although non-nuclear-weapon states are obliged under the NPT 'not to
receive the transfer ...of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...;
not to manufacture or otherwise seek or receive any assistance in the manufac-
ture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices', 3 safeguards extend
only to verifying that nuclear energy (specifically nuclear material) is not
diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. 4 Creating confidence involves the capability to detect (and, by risk of
detection, deter) violations of this undertaking regarding the use of nuclear
energy.
As safeguards are carried out by an international organization that lacks
independent political authority, their capability to provide assurance and to
build confidence is largely determined by the authorities, resources, and politi-
cal support that the instituting sovereign member-states provide. The leader-
ship and determination of the international secretariat, which is responsible for
day-to-day implementation of safeguards, also is relevant to their success in
providing the sought-after confidence.
Preventing proliferation is a matter of political will to which the regime as a
whole contributes. But prevention begins at home. The first and most impor-
tant line of defense against proliferation is the political decision that nuclear
weapons do not serve the political or security interest of the state and that they
are not in the national interest. Many factors enter into this calculation, both
domestic and international. 5 Decisions are influenced by perceptions of local
and regional security and stability, the dependability of alliances or security
commitments, and by the general international environment - whether it is
marked by tension and uncertainty, which may increase interest in nuclear
weapons, or by detente and stability, which may diminish that interest. If
nuclear-weapon states continue to emphasize the importance of nuclear assets
to national security, this is bound to affect thinking in other states - just as
progress toward nuclear disarmament as reflected in the INF and START
agreements can encourage reinforcement of the commitment to non-
proliferation, as well as to an extension of the NPT in 1995, and to a strengthen-
ing of the regime. Safeguards contribute to shaping the environment against
which assessments of national interest are made. If perceived as effective, they
build confidence in security and reduce incentives to acquire nuclear weapons,
or to preserve the option of doing so; if perceived as ineffective, they can work
in reverse.
2. Safeguards and Security
While safeguards have always been a critical factor in national assessments of
the value of the non-proliferation regime, they have become even more so in the
post-Cold War period. As long as the Cold War persisted and the superpowers
pursued a global competition, it was always presumed that the United States
and the Soviet Union would control the threat of proliferation among their
71-404 0-93-7
180
Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Prouferation in a Changi ng World Order
allies or clients. To have done otherwise would have been to defeat the purpose
for which the superpowers supported the concept of non-proliferation in the
first place. The security guarantees they provided through their alliance
systems made it unnecessary for those states to acquire nuclear weapons.
Safeguards were important, but they were not alone.
Where alliances or credible security guarantees did not exist - as in the case of
India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa - the situation was more problematic. Since
none of these states contracted non-proliferation obligations, legal restraints on
proliferation were non-existent; but for largely political reasons, including the
probable costs and risks of a regional nuclear arms race and of flying in the face
of strong normative preferences against the spread of nuclear weapons held by
states of importance to would-be proliferators, overt proliferation was never-
theless avoided. Safeguards in these states were limited to material, facilities, or
equipment acquired from outside suppliers; in these situations of only partial
verification, safeguards provided little if any confidence regarding the charac-
ter of national nuclear activity. However, from a political perspective, since
confidence ends where safeguards end, outside states did not harbor false
illusions about the nuclear programs in these countries.
With the end of the Cold War, the situation is different. The changed circum-
stances have brought about new opportunities and new challenges - opportu-
nities to capitalize on the end of bipolarity and ideological conflict, to establish
a new basis for world order and to introduce a measure of collective security;
challenges to ensure that a nuclear multipolarity does not emerge. The United
States and Russia are no longer engaged in a global competition; their active
involvement in regional and local controversies in the Third World has sharply
diminished, and so, in many cases, has their influence. Local and regional
conflicts have displaced the older 'relationship of major tension' on the interna-
tional agenda; and some countries in unstable regions, even though they are
NPT parties, may see nuclear weapons as a means of promoting policies and
interests which in some cases are expansionist, and which in the new situation
become more feasible. This change creates new challenges for the non-
proliferation regime and, as the discovery in the wake of the Gulf War of a
major clandestine nuclear weapons development program in Iraq has made
clear, imposes the challenge of new expectations on international verification
and specifically on IAEA safeguards. It is this latter set of issues that draws our
attention here.
3. Safeguards Before Iraq
Successive NPT Review Conferences have considered and validated the contri-
bution of IAEA safeguards to non-proliferation. The consensus final document
of the 1985 conference offers a succmct statement to this effect in saying that
'IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their
undertakings... promote confidence among States and. ..help to strengthen their
collective security.' 6 These conclusions were echoed in the 1990 NPT Review
181
Lawrence scheinman
Conference draft final document. Of equal significance was the decision of
Argentina and Brazil, two non-parties to the NPT, to accept IAEA full-scope
safeguards to verify their recent bilateral non-proliferation arrangement, 7 con-
firming the perceived security value and legitimacy of the system.
In short, safeguards have performed largely as expected, and the IAEA has
had a believable probability of detecting diversion of significant quantities of
declared nuclear material. What happened in Iraq was not a breakdown of
safeguards on declared material, but a circumventing of the system as de-
signed, and of the regime as a whole. Export controls failed to stem the flow of
equipment relevant to nuclear weapons development, and national intelli-
gence failed to identify clandestine activities.
Importantly, from the very outset, the comprehensive safeguards system
devised in 1970 to implement IAEA verification responsibility under the NPT
had in view the nuclear fuel cycles of the advanced industrial states, which at
the time were the only states capable of mounting any kind of nuclear program.
These states were concerned to minimize the risk that the distinction between
themselves and the nuclear-weapon states inherent in the NPT would extend to
the realm of peaceful nuclear activity and competition. At the same time their
joining the NPT was the main concern of the United States and the Soviet
Union, who were spearheading the negotiation of the Treaty. This led to the
establishment of a verification regime that kept intrusion to the minimum
consistent with credible verification, which focused on the flow of nuclear
material rather than on nuclear facilities per se, and which resulted in certain
constraints on how the Agency exercised the rather liberal rights originally
granted it in its statute. 8
The system is based on material accountancy, supplemented by containment
and surveillance, to verify that all nuclear material under safeguards can be
accounted for. The frequency of inspection is determined by the amount of
nuclear material in a facility and not by the amount of nuclear material in the
state as a whole. Non-discrimination between states is one of the underlying
principles of implementation; the Agency does not make political judgments
about the credibility of a state's non-proliferation commitment.
One consequence of this system is that the amount and the intensity of
safeguards increase with the size of the material inventory being verified.
States with large nuclear programs consequently account for a very large
proportion of IAEA inspection effort. Small programs on the other hand, with
only modest inventories of nuclear material, are subject to only limited inspec-
tion activity. The irony is that the states that have in fact become objects of
proliferation concern in the past few years fall into this category. These new
realities define one of the challenges for future verification.
While the IAEA assumes that states entering into comprehensive safeguards
agreements will declare and submit to safeguards all nuclear material that
should be submitted, it does not discount the possibility of non-compliance, or
that clandestine nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile materials that
182
Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Prouferation in a Changlng World Order
could be used in a nuclear explosive device might exist in a safeguarded state,
and it takes these possibilities into account in establishing its safeguards
implementation plan. 9 On the other hand, IAEA safeguards are not an intelli-
gence or policing mechanism. Agency inspectors cannot roam the countryside
of states in search of undeclared nuclear material or facilities, and the prevail-
ing expectation has been that if there were information indicating the existence
of undeclared activity the state having that information would bring it to the
attention of the IAEA or the UN Security Council, as it saw fit. As indicated
above, the system has generated substantial confidence, and there is no reason
to think that material under safeguards has been diverted from peaceful use.
But it is equally clear that, as devised, the system assumed that all nuclear
material subject to safeguards actually was declared, and it was not designed to
detect fully clandestine nuclear activity; the capability to do so would have
been seen by key interested parties as controverting the objective of minimizing
intrusiveness. It is fortuitous that the countries that could have diverted nuclear
material had no interest or incentive to do so, and hence the need to intrude
further on national sovereignty never arose. This circumstance can no longer be
assumed.
4. The Impact of Iraq on Safeguards: The Emergence of New Expectations
The effect on safeguards of the discovery of the extensive clandestine nuclear-
weapons development program in Iraq was two-fold: First, it underscored that
even under conditions of international treaty obligations and full-scope safe-
guards, a state that was determined to cheat on its undertakings could success-
fully do so by pursuing a strategy of developing a totally clandestine program
that did not rely on material under safeguards. 10 In doing so, it illurrunated
some of the limitations of conventional safeguards and the non-proliferation
regime — the emphasis on nuclear material rather than both facilities and
material, which made it possible to acquire or construct facilities without
informing the IAEA of their existence before introducing nuclear material into
them; determining the frequency of on-site inspections by the amount of
nuclear material in a single facility rather than the amount of material in the
country as a whole; limitations on knowledge about the scope of national
nuclear activities resulting from the fact that NFT verification focuses only on
diversion of nuclear material, and does not subject other NFT obligations to
international verification, thus providing only partial transparency; weak-
nesses in national export control policies and laws, especially for dual-use
items. Countries can get rather close to nuclear-weapons-capability without
being detected in the process, and in certain respects without violating the
black letter law of the Treaty. In a sense, Iraq was an opportune event, for it
directed attention to the limitations and weaknesses of the regime and of
safeguards at the very outset oi the post-Cold War world, and provided the
justification for evaluating what would be required to sustain confidence in the
regime under new political circumstances.
183
Lawrence scheinman
The second effect of the Iraqi affair was to alter political expectations regard-
ing the breadth of safeguards coverage. Hitherto, the expectation was that the
IAEA would verify that all declared nuclear material could be accounted for.
Now, the expectation extends to providing assurance that no undeclared mate-
rial or clandestine facilities or activities exist in states that have ratified the NPT
and have entered into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
Redefining expectations means reassessing the authorities, resources and po-
litical support which the international community that now holds these expec-
tations is prepared to provide to the institutions charged with implementation.
5. Satisfying New Expectations
Since strengthening safeguards is only part of the problem of strengthening
non-proliferation, the issue is how to satisfy this new expectation — whether it
can be achieved within the framework of existing institutions and authority,
whether additional authority needs to be prescribed, or whether a totally new
approach involving new institutions is required. It is imperative to keep in
mind the interdependence between expectations, authority, and resources. To
meet expectations, appropriate authority must be granted and adequate hu-
man, technical, and financial resources made available. In addition, political
support for the responsible implementing institutions is essential — especially
the will to enforce compliance with legal commitments and to take sanctioning
action against violations when these are brought to the attention of political
authority. Of course, the implementing institution must have leadership and
direction from its senior management as well as a professional and dedicated
staff.
6. New Institutions or Strengthening the IAEA?
In response to the new situation, some have advocated establishing a new
verification authority based on the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) that was created pursuant to UN Security Council RES/687 to
carry out the provisions of that resolution for inspection, removal, destruction,
or rendering harmless of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic
missiles and supporting materials and faculties in Iraq. (The tasks related to
Iraq's nuclear activities were entrusted to the IAEA with the assistance and
cooperation of the Special Commission.) Partisans of this approach include (a)
those who are instinctively distrustful of international organizations and prefer
to maintain control through bilateral arrangements or, if that is not feasible,
something closely controlled by, and directly responsible to, a limited member-
ship bodv such as the UN Security Council which is predominated by the major
states; and (b) those who have never had much confidence in the IAEA, because
of its promotional responsibilities which are seen as countervailing effective
regulation, or the emphasis given to cooperation in conducting inspections, or
the large and heterogeneous governing Board through which crucial decisions
would have to pass.
184
Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Prouferation in a Changing World Order
There is not much that can be said to those who distrust anything that they do
not directly control, other than that this is too narrow and unrealistic an
approach to international order. As for those who have reservations about the
IAEA, some of their concerns are legitimate - but in the main correctable - and
others are inherent in any organization. It is naive to assume that by creating a
new institution one will escape attributes of bureaucracy that affect all organi-
zations. As far as emphasis on cooperation is concerned, it is clear that even the
'adversarial' bilateral agreements such as LNF and START require considerable
cooperation to achieve their objectives, and that while they may have more
adversarial roots, they are not necessarily any less cooperative. IAEA coopera-
tion has always been predicated on the principle that, in the final analysis,
nothing less than independent verification will suffice to allow it to reach a
conclusion regarding accountability and non-diversion. The capacity of a
heterogenous Board of Governors consisting of advanced and developing
states, nuclear-weapon and non-weapon states, and both parties and non-
parties to the NPT to take hard decisions swiftly, was demonstrated in July and
September 1991, when the Board twice condemned Iraq for violating its safe-
guards undertakings and reported these violations to the Security Council. It is
also well to remember that governing bodies of international organizations act
on the instructions of governments, and that the actions of representatives to
the IAEA or to the United Nations are defined by the same government. There
is no inherent reason why political determination vis-a-vis non-proliferation
should differ, whether it entails an action by the Board of Governors or the
Security Council acting in response to a report of non-compliance from the
IAEA Board."
The main effort to meet new circumstances and new expectations has focused
on re-examining existing safeguards authority and clarifying or building on it
as appropriate. Considerable attention has been given to the Agency's right of
special inspection which derives from the statutory right to access 'at all times
to all places and data...' 12 and is inscribed in the safeguards document, LNFCLRC/
153, that governs IAEA full-scope safeguards agreements. This is to be distin-
guished from the inspection rights given the IAEA under the authority of
Security Council RES/ 687, which in a number of respects extended beyond the
rules, procedures, and techniques normally applied by the Agency.
7. Special Inspections
Special inspections are normally precipitated by reports submitted by the
inspected state concerning a loss of material or change of containment, or by the
Agency because the information made available by the state is not sufficient to
enable the Agency to fulfill its safeguards responsibilities. 13 Pursuant to a
recommendation of the 1990 NPT Review Conference that the IAEA take full
advantage of special inspection rights to address questions about the complete-
ness of the safeguards coverage of a state's nuclear material, the Agency
examined their scope and applications and concluded that its right to conduct
185
Lawrence scheinman
special inspections was not limited only to other locations within a declared
facility, but also included locations and facilities other than those notified to the
Agency by the state. It also concluded that the request could be based on
plausible information from sources other than safeguards inspections, includ-
ing national intelligence information. 14 The Board of Governors subsequently
reaffirmed this right, and acknowledged the Director General's indication of
how he intended to implement special inspection authority. Given the context
in which the scope of special inspections has been discussed, it is clear that what
had at one time been seen principally as a means of resolving uncertainties and
ambiguities has now also become an instrument to investigate suspected non-
compliance and clandestine activity.
Clarifying the authority for special inspections is one thing; having the
information upon which to predicate a call for such an inspection is another.
The Director General has emphasized that information regarding where to look
in a state has been an even more decisive factor in successfully carrying out
inspections in Iraq under RES/ 687 than the extensive rights of access granted
the Agency under that resolution. Following this line of reasoning, then, if the
IAEA not only makes optimal use of the many sources of information available
to it through its routine safeguards, technical assistance, and safety activities,
but is also assured timely access to information from member states resulting
from their intelligence activities, this can significantly enhance the scope of
safeguards credibility.
However important it is to have information, it also is important to have
assured access to locations that might have undeclared material or facilities.
Access depends on the state. Presumably, a state that has something to hide will
not readily admit international inspectors into its territory even if it is obligated
to do so. 15 Refusal of access can lead to a finding of non-compliance which,
under its statute, the IAEA Board of Governors is obliged to report to the UN
Security Council.
8. Securing Compliance
The convergence of responsibility for enforcing compliance with international
undertakings in the Security Council underscores a third element, along with
information and access, in the equation of effective safeguards. In Iraq, enforce-
ment has been taking place pursuant to Security Council resolutions based on
a finding of a threat to international peace "and security resulting from Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait. Enforcing treaties is not, however, a routine Secu-
rity Council responsibility, and unless the Council were to resolve that viola-
tions of non-proliferation undertakings or safeguards commitments ipso facto
constituted a threat to international peace and security, reports of violation and
non-compliance would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Even so,
the very fact of sustained action to divest Iraq of all capabilities to produce
weapons of mass destruction, puts would-be violators on notice that compara-
186
Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation in a Changing World Order
ble action could be agreed again, even in the absence of a compelling need to
answer an aggression in violation of the Charter.
In January 1992, the President of the Security Council, following a meeting of
Heads of State and Government of Council members, stated that the prolifera-
tion of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international
peace and security. On nuclear proliferation, the members of the Council noted
the importance of the decision of many states to adhere to the NPT and 'the
integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA
safeguards'. It was also stated that members of the Council 'will take appropri-
ate measures in the case of any violations of safeguards notified to them by the
IAEA.' 16 The importance of this step cannot be disputed; nor should it be
exaggerated, given that it was made in the midst of a continuing crisis in Iraq,
and a then present sense of unity of purpose on the Council. What would be still
more helpful, and of even greater deterrent value, would be a formal Security
Council resolution declaring that violations of non-proliferation and of interna-
tional safeguards prima facie will be regarded as threats to peace and security
and addressed under the Chapter VTI authority of the Council.
9. Nuclear Transparency
The second main area of attention has been in enhancing nuclear transparency.
The more that is known about a country's nuclear profile, the more comprehen-
sive the analysis and the verification can be, and the more confidence the
verifying agency can have in its conclusions. The decision of the Board of
Governors to endorse a proposal calling upon all parties to comprehensive
safeguards agreements to inform the Agency of initial design information at the
time of the decision to construct or to authorize construction or modification of
any nuclear facility, and for adapting, where appropriate, the related subsidi-
ary arrangements thus establishing a basis of obligation, paved the way to
developing an early warning system. 17 Access to such information not only
expands the information base upon which the IAEA can formulate verification
strategies for the state; it also provides the IAEA with the opportunity to visit
the construction site periodically, even though nuclear material may not yet be
present, thus getting around the stipulation in the NPT safeguards system that
the flow of nuclear material is what is subject to safeguards.
Another means of increasing transparency is through a comprehensive sys-
tem of reporting exports, imports and production of nuclear material, equip-
ment particularly relevant to nuclear activity, and sensitive non-nuclear mate-
rials (e.g. pure graphite, heavy water). Efforts to achieve consensus on this are
still under discussion at the IAEA. Significant reporting requirements already
exist, but even comprehensive safeguards agreements do not provide for
complete reporting. A system oi obligatory reporting of all of these elements
will require establishing new bases of legal obligation, as would other meas-
ures that, if agreed to, could enhance transparency and build early warning into
safeguards - such as requiring all full-scope safeguards states to provide
187
Lawrence scheinman
complete information on their nuclear research and development activities in
addition to all programs involving peaceful use of nuclear energy; or allowing
for re-verification of design information even in the absence of a change in the
operating conditions of the facility in question (the normal condition calling for
a re-examination of design information).
The point of all of this is that today, confidence in verification is being
measured not only by the ability of a system to confirm that what a state which
has accepted comprehensive safeguards declares to exist can be accounted for,
but that everything that should be declared is known and under safeguards,
and that activities or violations that put at risk the security of others will be
detected before they become an actual threat. Thus far, the means to this end
has been to identify the limitations of the existing safeguards system, to
examine its authority base, to ensure that existing authority will be used to its
fullest, and where necessary to seek to reinforce and expand that authority. All
of this is occurring, or should be occurring, with the understanding that
safeguards - even robust, intrusive, 'adversarial' safeguards - are not panaceas
and cannot prevent a determined state from seeking to cheat and to acquire
nuclear weapons. But an effective system can raise the costs of cheating, and in
doing so, contribute to deterring the effort.
10. Limits of the Possible
As just suggested, even with an optimally invigorated safeguards system there
is no 100% guarantee. If anything demonstrates this truth it is the difficulty
encountered by the United Nations in Iraq in implementing, under exception-
ally favorable circumstances, a draconian verification program and in achiev-
ing assurance that all that should be known about Iraq's nuclear development
program and assets has been discovered.
Even if safeguards are strengthened and reinforced along the lines discussed
above, there can be other problems, such as verifying the initial inventory of a
state that has had an unsafeguarded nuclear program in existence for some
time before accepting comprehensive safeguards. South Africa and North
Korea are current cases in point; while unlikely, it is not completely out of the
question that at some time in the future India, Pakistan, and even Israel might
accept full-scope safeguards as part of a political settlement that removes their
incentive for at least maintaining a nuclear option. How is one to know that the
submitted inventory is correct? To raise a question one must have information;
if there is no information on which to act, perhaps because activities were
undertaken at a time when intelligence gathering was not focused on the state
or in the right place, then one does not know where to ask to go. South Africa
operated an enrichment facility for a number of years before joining the NPT
and accepting full-scope safeguards. North Korea operated a 5 MVV
unsafeguarded reactor for a penod of six years prior to completing its safe-
guards agreement with the IAEA. Records and reports may provide a picture of
apparent completeness, but there will always be a measure of doubt. At some
188
Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation in a Changing World Order
point, it must be decided to accept the risk of incompleteness and, as political
relationships improve and the sense of security increases and normalization
sets in, the possibility that the initial inventory was incomplete becomes in-
creasingly irrelevant. If the world ever were to adopt agreement on zero
nuclear weapons, this risk would have to be factored in: one would never be
certain that all the weapons were accounted for; one only could hope that
political relationships were moving in a direction that would make irrelevant
any weapons that might never have been reported.
11. Regional Approaches to Safeguards and Non-Proliferation
Finally, there is the question of how relevant regional verification arrange-
ments are to the efficacy of international safeguards. In some regions like the
Korean peninsula, the Middle East, or South Asia, additive regional measures
may be not only desirable, but in fact necessary. In South America, where
Argentina and Brazil have long been engaged in a political competition involv-
ing a threatening development of nuclear capabilities that could have been
converted into a local nuclear arms race, a move to democratization, as well as
changes in national political leadership and in the broader international envi-
ronment, have led to mutual pledges of non-proliferation, progress toward
ratification and implementation of the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone, and the establishment of a regional verification regime that relies sub-
stantially on the safeguards system of the IAEA. The regional system is both a
stepping stone to assimilation into the broader international verification sys-
tem and a necessary element to support and to consolidate the foreclosing of
nuclear weapons as a way of achieving security or promoting political status.
In the Korean peninsula, where tensions have been high for the past four
decades, the governments of North and South Korea in December 1991, con-
cluded an agreement on a non-nuclear Korea. This involved commitments not
to receive, possess, produce, test or deploy nuclear weapons; to ban both
enrichment and reprocessing; and to establish a mutual inspection regime to
verify implementation of the agreement. In April 1992, North Korea also
ratified a long-overdue safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While the IAEA
agreement is now being implemented, at the time of this writing there has been
less progress with respect to the bilateral agreement than had been anticipated.
Questions continue regarding the status and future of the partially completed
reprocessing facility in North Korea which already served to produce a gram
quantity of plutonium, and the bilateral verification system is yet to be acti-
vated. A robust regional inspection arrangement in Korea would help to
increase openness and transparency in what has been a very closed society; it
would also serve to complement and reinforce IAEA safeguards. With a two-
tiered inspection arrangement, each system could not only add to the credibil-
ity of the findings of the other, but difficulties encountered in implementing
one system would put the other on alert regarding its completeness and its
integrity.
189
Lawrence scheinman
The Middle East today, as in the past, poses a particularly dangerous prolif-
eration situation. It is widely assumed that Israel has produced nuclear weap-
ons; and the discoveries in Iraq revealed a long-standing and extensive nuclear
weapons development program. Other countries in the region including Libya
and Iran, both NPT parties, and Algeria, a non-party, are frequently mentioned
as sources of proliferation concern. The challenge here is not only how to avert
further proliferation in the region, but how to facilitate nuclear reversal by
states which have taken steps toward weapon development. The verification
measures incorporated in UN Security Council Resolution 687 are often cited as
precedent for a region-wide arrangement, and language suggestive of such an
approach is to be found in the resolution. However, 687 is more a punitive
instrument than a precursor for verification among states that have voluntary
negotiated a non-proliferation or nuclear weapon-free zone agreement. On the
other hand, here as in the Korean peninsula, it seems evident that some kind of
regional verification system providing for very liberal, swift, and assured
access by nationals of states party to such agreements will be essential to
securing any such type agreement. Here also a two-tiered system of verification
could be mutually reinforcing and provide the level of assurance and credibil-
ity necessary for confidence-building to take place.
Whatever their value, regional verification arrangements should not be con-
sidered as substitutes for international verification, which should remain a sine
qua non. Rather, they should be seen as parallel structures, endowed with an
authority which goes beyond what could reasonably be expected to be granted
to an international organization, but which is necessary in situations where
mistrust is the essence of relationships and mutuality and reciprocity the only
basis for agreement. Regional arrangements can include measures beyond
what can plausibly be agreed for an international authority which must neces-
sarily approach its responsibilities in a nondiscriminatory fashion and which is
unlikely to be granted the depth of authority that might be granted to a regional
institution. Among the measures that might be included in a regional arrange-
ment are challenge inspections in which no justification may be required and
which may be carried out at any location designated by the challenger, and /or
quota inspections involving a designated number of inspections at either
previously specified sites, or at any site selected by the inspecting party.
Regional investigative arrangements conducted by nationals of directly con-
cerned states will enjoy a higher political credibility in the latter than even the
most rigorous international verification system. However, international verifi-
cation remains the only means by which to satisfy out-of-region states, many of
whom may have fundamental interests in regional security and stability.
190
Nuclear Safeguards and Non-proliferation ln a Changlng World Order
NOTES AND REFERENCES
* Lawrence Scheinman is Professor of Government (International Law & Relations) at
Cornell University and Associate Director of the Peace Studies Program. He has served
in senior posts in the United States Department of State (Principal Deputy to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology) and
Energy Research and Development Administration (Head of Office of International
Policy Planning) as well as in the International Atomic Energy Agency (Special Advisor
to the Director General). He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Washington Council on Nonproliferation, the National Council of the Federation of
American Scientists, the Core Group of the Programme on Promoting Nuclear
Nonproliferation, and the Advisory Committee on Nonproliferation of the Atiantic
Council of the United States. His most recent book on the subject of non-proliferation is
The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order.
1 For a general discussion of the concept of regime see Stephen Krasner ed. International
Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Oran Young, 'International
Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation', World Politics, 32, April 1980, pp. 331-356.
For a discussion of regime as applied in the case of non-proliferation see Lewis A.
Dunn, Controlling the Bomb, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981); Lawrence
Scheinman, The Nonproliferation Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1985).
2 For a comprehensive introduction to the nature and scope of international safeguards
see David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal (Stockholm
and London: SIPRI and Taylor and Franas, 1985).
3 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, A. II.
4 Ibid., Article III.
5 For analysis of the decision-making in several critical non-nuclear weapon states see
Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1988).
6 Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT as reproduced in Jozef
Goldblat, Twenty Years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Implementation and Prospects (Oslo:
PRIO, 1990), Appendix XII.
7 See John R Redick, 'Argentina and Brazil's New Arrangement for Mutual Inspections
and IAEA Safeguards', (Washington DC: Nuclear Control Institute. February 1992) for
a discussion of the Foz de Iguaca agreement and the Argentine- Brazil Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material.
8 See Jon Jennekens, IAEA Safeguards - Emerging Issues', Fourth Internanonal
Conference on Facility Operations - Safeguards Interface', (Albuquerque, NM,
29 September-4 October 1991).
9 This is managed in the case of safeguarded material by use of interim inspecnons
conducted at sufficiently frequent intervals to be able to detect a diversion of such
material. The timeliness goal for detecting the diversion of spent nuclear fuel which, if
reprocessed, would yield separated plutonium, is currentiy three months.
10 It is significant that Iraq chose a totally clandestine approach rather than relying on
diversion of safeguarded nuciear material. This suggests that Iraqi nuclear personnel
were of the view that IAEA safeguards would detect a diversion.
11 It cannot go unsaid that the Iraq situation was exceptional in the sense that its action
against Kuwait had been universally condemned, and it was under severe Secuntv
Council sanctions when the Board met to consider findings regarding the Iraqi program,
and that under more ambivalent circumstances Board action might not have been so
clear. But neither might Security Council acnon be as determined and unanimous
under less egregious conditions. It may also be noted that while the Board of Governors
191
Lawrence scheinman
has endorsed a number of measures to strengthen safeguards, a number of states have
done so grudgingly and with concern that they may be opening a Pandora's box.
.2 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Article XII.A.6.
13 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between
the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), para. 73.
14 GOV /INF/6 13, June, 1991.
15 In some cases, access may be denied for reasons other than non-compliance with
safeguards undertakings, such as safety-related considerations: but this does not release
the state of its obligation to satisfy the verification authority that all material and
faculties that should be reported and placed under safeguards in fact have been.
16 United Nations Security Council, S/23500, 31 January 1992.
17 See IAEA Press Release PR 92/12, 26 February 1992.
192
Lessons From Post- War Iraq for the
International Full-Scope Safeguards Regime
Lawrence Scheinman
The discovery after the Gulf War of
an extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon
development program severely
shook public confidencein the nuclear non-
proliferation regime in general, and the
safeguards program administered by the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) under the nuclear Non-Prolifera-
hon Treaty (NIT), in particular.
This questioning of IAEA effectiveness
contrasts sharply with the judgment
rendered by the NPT parties as recently as
1990 Repeating almost verbatim the con-
clusion reached in the 1985 NPT Review
Conference, the final draft document of the
Fourth Review Conference reaffirmed that
the NPT "is vital to preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons and in providing sig-
nificant secuntv benefits" It stronglv en-
dorsed the effectiveness of the IAEA.
saying the agency's safeguards "provide
assurance that States are complving with
their undertakings and assist States in
demonstranng this compliance," and that
these safeguards "promote further con-
fidence among states and, being a fun-
damental element of the Treatv, help to
strengthen their collective security."
Original Safeguards Political Factors
If there is now a diminished con-
fidence in some quarters in the effective-
ness of the IAEA, it stems from a basic
change in the expectations brought on bv
the Iraqi experience about what degree of
non-proliferation assurance safeguards
should provide. When the svstem was
devised in 1970 to implement IAEA
verification responsibility under the NPT. it
wa> locused on the nuclear tuel cvcles of
the advanced industrial states, which at the
time were the onlv states capable oi mount-
La'wrence SchenimtDi i> professor of $ovem-
tnent and associate director of the Peace Studies
Program lit Cornell Umvenitv.
"[Iraq] provided the
justification for
evaluating the
safeguards regime
under new political
circumstances, so that
appropriate corrective
measures could be
taken when necessary.
It is now up to the
individual states
within the
international system
to take advantage of
this opportunity."
ing anv kind of nuclear weapon program.
The United States and the Soviet Union,
which were spearheading the negotiations,
were chiefly concerned about ensuring the
participation of these states in the NPT
Even conceding the political and
secuntv benetits of non-proliferanon. the
advanced non-nuclear-weapon states were
intent on guarding against the nsk that the
distinction between weapon and non-
weapon states inherent in the NPT would
extend to peaceful nuclear achvitv and
competition. In particular, thev wanted to
ensure that in agreeing to forswear nuclear
weapons or explosives thev would not
hamper their ability to make full use of
nuclear energv and technologv for peaceful
purposes, and to compete in what was seen
js .i growing international market tor
nuclear energy. For these states, the sa
guards system devised toensure their coi
pliance would have to be crafted careru
to cause as little interference as possib
and protect as far as possible their comnu
cial interests and proprietary informaho:
Limited Intnisiveness a Coal
These considerations led to tl
development of a venhcation system th
kept intrusion to the minimum consiste;
with credible verification, and to tf
development of certain constraints on ho
the IAEA exercised the rather liberal ngh
granted to it in its statute. In contrast wi-
the IAEA's pre-NPT system, NPT sat
guards focus on nuclear matenals rath
than on nuclear matenals and facilities i
the theorv that with total coverage
material there is no need to sateguar
facilities per se The NPT system err
phasized establishing material balam
areas and designating kev measureme:
points where sateguards could be applie
and the flow and inventory of nucle:.
matenal could be determined. It stresse
the importance ot using instrumentatio
wherever possible so as to minimize th
extent ot human inspecnon
Routine inspection activines were :
be supplemented by excepnonal measuri
(namelv "special inspections") onlv i:
cases where the IAEA was unable to inch
pendentiv venrv that all nuclear mater:
under sateguards could be accounted fo-
ot where it was informed of the existence*
undeclared nuclear matenal. A few speci.
inspections were earned out under th
former provision but none on the basis <
special information, because the IAE
never received intormanon regarding pi
sible undeclared nuclear matenal upo:
which it could act.
Legally, states entenng into full-scor
safeguards agreements with the IAEA. ^
part ot their \PT undertakings, w-er-
193
obligated to declare all nuclear material
being used in peaceful nuclear activities. In
practice, while the IAEA assumed that
states would comply with this obligabon, it
did not discount the possibility of non-
compliance, or that clandestine nuclear
facilities capable of producing fissile
materials that could be used in a nuclear
explosive device might exist in safe-
guarded states, and it took these possi-
bilities into account in establishing its
safeguards implementation plan.
It is worth noting that because of the
concerns of these states, the system, from
the outset, was not focussed on ferreting
out and detecting fully clandestine nuclear
activities that did not rely in any way on
safeguarded nuclear material. It was as-
sumed that states would declare all their
material. When the NPT was being created
and consensus was being solicited, the level
of intrusiveness necessary to find hilly clan-
destine nuclear activities would have been
seen by the key interested non-nuclear-
weapon states as controverting their objec-
tive of minimizing intrusiveness. It was
thus generally assumed that the IAEA
would detect the diversion of any declared
nuclear material, but that any undeclared
or clandestine activity would be detected
bv other means, primarily intelligence
sources, and presumably brought to the
agency's attention.
Iraq as a Case Study
Until Iraq, safeguards, although not
trouble free, performed largely as expected,
and the IAEA had a reasonable probability
of detecting diversion of significant quanti-
ties of declared nuclear material. On bal-
ance, the system was consistent with the
expectations of the states that designed it.
with the dispersion of capabilities neces-
sary to acquire nuclear weapons, and with
the bipolar political environment domi-
nated by two superpowers w'hose alliance
structures and nuclear umbrellas deterred
most states from seeking to acquire nuclear
weapons. What happened in Iraq was not
the breakdown of saieguards on declared
nuclear material, but a circumventing of the
system, and the regime as a whole. Export
controls failed to stem thee flow ot equip-
ment and components relevant to nuclear
weapon development. Safeguards, which
were not geared to cope with a totally
clandestine nuclear program, failed to
identity theexistence of undeclared nuclear
activities. Moreover, national intelligence
apparently tailed to identify the extent of
clandestine acnvities
Iraq's Impact on the Regime
The impact of Iraq on the safeguards
regime was twofold: first, it underscored
that even under conditions of verified inter-
national treaty obligations and full-scope
safeguards, a state that was determined to
cheat on its undertakings could successful-
ly do so, developing a totally clandestine
program that did not rely on material or
facilities under safeguards. This reality
highlighted some of the limitations of a
system that placed primary emphasis on
nuclear material accounting when, for ex-
ample, there was the possibility for a
country to acquire or construct nuclear
facilities without informing the IAEA until
it was ready to receive nuclear material.
Another limitation illuminated by the
Iraqi experience was the practice of cou-
pling the frequency of inspection to the
amount of nuclear material in a particular
plant or material balance area rather than
in the country as a whole, a practice which
could and did result in less frequent inspec-
tions than might have been warranted by
political concerns about the safeguarded
state. As an international organization it
was not feasible for the IAEA to overtly
discriminate in the application of
safeguards between states under a com-
mon system.
Moreover, there were limits on how
much knowledge the IAEA had about the
scope of national nuclear activities because
NPT verification focused only on the diver-
sion of nuclear material and not on the full
range of obligations implied by a commit-
ment to non-proliferation.
In a sense, the Gulf War was an oppor-
tune event because it directed attenhon to
the limitations and weaknesses of safe-
guards and of the NPT regime at the very
outset of the post-Cold War period.
Moreover, it provided the justification for
evaluating the safeguards regime under
new political circumstances, so that ap-
propriate corrective measures could be
taken when necessary. It is now up to the
individual states within the international
system to take advantage of this oppor-
tunity.
The second effect of the Iraqi affair was
to alter political expectations regarding the
breadth ot safeguards coverage. As already
noted, until now the expectation was that
the IAEA would verify that all declared
nuclear material could be accounted for.
Now the expectation extends to providing
assurance that no undeclared material or
clandestine facilities or activities exist in
states that have ratified the NPT or
equivalent non-proliferation agreements
with the IAEA Redefining expectations
means reassessing the authority, resources
and political support that the international
community, which now holds these expec-
tations, is prepared to provide to the institu-
tions charged with implementation of this
broader safeguards regime."
Focus on Special Inspections
Thus far. the mam effort to meet new
circumstances and new expectations has
focused on re-examining existing safe-
guards authority and clarifying or building
upon it as appropriate. Considerable atten-
tion has been given to the IAEA's right of
special inspection, which derives from the
statute allowing access "at all times to all
places and data." and is incorporated in
safeguards document DMFCIRC/153 that
governs IAEA full-scope safeguards agree-
ments.
This special inspection right is dif-
ferent from the inspection rights given the
IAEA under the authority of UN Security
Council Resolution 687, the Gulf War cease-
fire resolution. In a number of important
respects, resolution 687 extends beyond the
rules, procedures and techniques usually
applied by the agency, and cannot realisti-
cally be viewed as the new standard prac-
tice for safeguards activities in normal
circumstances.
The IAEA Board of Governors has con-
firmed that the right ot special inspection
extends not only to additional locations at
declared sites, but also to undeclared loca-
tions and facilities if there is plausible
evidence that undeclared nuclear material
may be present at these sites
While the IAEA and the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM), the UN body
tasked with eliminating Iraq s weapons of
mass destruction, have been publicly
ennazed as having not done the job in Iraq,
or for having done it poorlv an examina-
tion of the facts leads to the conclusion that
the IAEA adapted well to the newlv im-
posed mandate from the Security Council
UNSCOM's executive chairman said in a
statement before the Security Council,
"IAEA inspections have been very success-
ful ... the nuclear area is the most emo-
tional and political ot the Iraqi weapons
programs. One should not believe all that
he reads in the media on this issue."
The decision to invoke a special inspec-
tion rests with the IAEA director general,
although in all probability he would first
consult with members oi the Board of
Governors If an inspection team is denied
access it would be reported to the board.
194
which, based on the evidence, would call
upon the state to comply with the request
If conditions require it, the request for spe-
cial inspection can be declared urgent and
the state in question must then respond
very quickly Failure to provide access
would result in a finding of non-com-
pliance, which the board would report to
the Security Council (as it did on two oc-
casions with respect to Iraq in 1991).
This idea of confirming the right of
special inspections at undeclared locations
at the initiative of the safeguarding
authority establishes an authoritative basis
for a more robust safeguards system in
which states presumably can have more
confidence. Whether such a system actual-
ly emerges in the near future depends on
several considerations that can be divided
into two components: external and inter-
nal.
The Need for Information
From an external perspective, as the
IAEA director general has noted, success
depends in the first instance on the
availability of information upon which to
predicate a request for a special inspection.
Primanlv, but not exclusively, this means
the availability of national intelligence in-
formation, which, as noted below, must
also include safetv analvsis, research and
development cooperation, technical assis-
tance and so on, if the IAEA is to have a
comprehensive information base.
With regard to the issue of the sharing
of intelligence information, the iurv is still
out on the extent to which relevant infor-
mation would be shared, and whether, as
some contend, another institutional filter
such as UNSCOM is needed to receive and
evaluate such information-
Even now. however, some mvthology
can be dispelled In the case of Iraq, al-
though intelligence information was
provided to UNSCOM for the purpose of
site selection, virtually the same informa-
tion was shared with the IAEA, which was
responsible tor conducting the actual in-
spections. In the case of the IAEA visit (not
inspection) to Iran in February' 1992.agencv
site selection tor that visit was based in part
on information provided from national in-
telligence sources While it is true that
intelligence authorities are inherently un-
comfortable about sharing information
with international institutions, there is no
basis for the argument now made bv some
that an institutionalized UNSCOM would
be provided with relevant information
while the IAEA would not There mav be
nuances between the two, but it is too facile
a proposition to argue that the IAEA would
a pnon be excluded.
The possibility should not be ruled out
that as a result of the integration and
analvsis of information drawn from routine
safeguards activities, coupled with infor-
mation derived from technical cooperation
programs, nuclear safety activities, pub-
lished material and the like, the agency
the previously mentioned NTT review cc
ferences, there also has existed a cert.
sense that the IAEA is perhaps more a
servative or more cautious than it should
or need be. Over the past two decades i
agency has experienced restraints on
rights of access, on the intensity a
frequency of inspection efforts, and even
the extent to which it could exerase
discretionary judgment in planning, schi
". . . winning the non-proliferation battle is a
multifaceted proposition involving a range of
national, regional and international policies,
processes and institutions of the states involved.
could acquire a plausible base of informa-
tion to justify a request for further inspec-
tion in a state. In this regard, measures now
in place to establish country officers with
the responsibility to assimilate and eval-
uate information concerning the nuclear
programs of inspected states, to brief in-
spectors before they go into the field and to
participate in their debriefing upon return
from an inspection, are excellent steps
toward the goal of achieving increased
knowledge and sensitivity about the char-
acter of national nuclear activities. How
well these measures are implemented
remains to be seen. One concern is that
while there is now much greater attention
to country analysis, this responsibility
comes in addition to existing IAEA ac-
tivities, but without the additional resour-
ces to do a proper analytical job
Several other external requirements
are necessary for robust and credible
safeguards These include assuring the
IAEA the right of unimpeded access to
designated locations to carry out anv spe-
cial inspection, and, related to this, the sup-
port of political authorities (primarily the
Security Council) to ensure that this right is
respected.
'Organizational Culture' Problems
The internal component to successful
implementation of a regime involving a
higher reliance on special inspections in the
tuture involves the mind -set. attitudes and
behavior — what is being called the "or-
ganizational culture" — of the agency and
of those responsible for implementing in-
ternational safeguards While the IAEA has
earned the confidence of its membership in
implementing safeguards, as reflected in
uling and conducting inspections. Patter
of conservatism and self-constraint becar
internalized to the extent that the agen
occasionally gave more ground than nect
sary in negotiating subsidiary arranj
ments that regulate the operational side
safeguards agreements.
Moreover, the emphasis on mater
accountancy has led to an almost obsessi
focus on sharpening and improving the .
tainment of quantitative goals, as
precision and objectivity alone provid
credibility This came all too often to t
exclusion of any awareness of the setting
which nuclear activity was taking plai
This has led some observers to right
criticize the IAEA tor having satisfied its.
regarding Iraq s nuclear compliance bv a
counting for declared nuclear mater
while ignoring the obvious large-scale 2
tivity going on around the safeguard,
facilities.
Overcoming Past Limits
Toovercome these limitations requir
two things: leadership at the level of t:
Board of Governors and leadership in t:
secretariat. The board is a reflection ot tl
political will and interests ot memb
states If the political will is present at tt
national level to ensure that the IAEA
fullv effective in carrying out its respo-
sibilities. there is no reason such a sentime
should not be represented in the governir
board. If this assumption is correct, ti
IAEA should be able to implement a me 1
far-reaching and intrusive safeguarc
regime, not onlv with respect to speci
inspections, but lor routine inspection ,i
tivitv as well. However, it should not :
forgotten that it took extraordinary cr
195
cumstances to move the board to endorse
the Secretariat's proposals accepted so far
(special inspections, early reporting of
design information, universal reporting of
nuclear material and equipment particular-
ly relevant to nuclear activity). More to the
point, the endorsement was granted with
some anxiety because sovereignty remains
a vigorous and contradictory force against
empowering international institutions
with far-reaching authority. On the other
hand, if governments would be willing to
institute strong non-proliferation measures
at the Security Council level, they should be
equally willing to support vigorous
measures by a technical international or-
ganization whose conclusions regarding
treaty compliance may ultimately be the
source for forceful action that is then
needed at the polibcal level. To act other-
wise would be not only illogical but
counterproduebve. For this reason, con-
cerned states such as the United States
should be taking active leadership roles in
bringing increased political and other sup-
port — including intelligence support — to
the IAEA and to the Security Council (see
p. 3).
Strong Leadership at the Top
Leadership within the Secretariat is no
less important Here, the director general
has set a tone bv making dear his intention
to invoke agency authority where ap-
propriate. He is also seeking to inculcate
new values bv encouraging the staff to be
more sensitive to the new political condi-
tions in which the IAEA wiU operate in the
future and to be more aware of the relation-
ship between its technical responsibilities
and the overriding political purpose of
safeguards. But it is difficult to sav whether
the necessary coherence of mission, morale
and team building that is fundamental to
an effective new orientation toward
safeguards has taken firm root. Leadership
bv example at all levels of management,
rather than leadership bv directive, is what
is ulhmatelv required to inspire and sustain
a sense of purpose and to achieve the neces-
sary' integration and coherence. The IAEA
nas operated heretofore pnmanlv on the
principle of leadership by direchve.
All of this suggests what lessons the
!AEA has — or should have — drawn (but
not necessarily internalized) from the Iraq
experience On one level, there is the need
to integrate method and purpose more sys-
tematically, to be more probing, more alert,
more sensitive to the political environment
and to the risk of change and unpre-
dictability The IAEA Secretariat must un-
derstand that achieving quantitative goals
of accounting for declared nuclear
materials and equipement is only one step
toward attaining international credibility; it
is also necessary to be aware of the total
context in which safeguards are applied.
On another level, member states must
also draw lessons from the expenence with
Iraq if international safeguards are to be
truly effective. The idea that access to infor-
mation and political support for implemen-
tation of authority are prerequisites for
effectively meeting political expectations
must be incorporated into the consensus
among member states in their support for
the Secretariat. It cannot be underscored too
heavily that the IAEA is not just a
secretariat, but an international organiza-
tion consisting of sovereign states that
define the Secretariat s authority, furnish its
resources, and provide the polibcal support
that enables an international institution to
function credibly and effectively Interna-
tional organizations are the creatures of
their constituent member states.
A determined Secretariat can influence
the understanding and the behavior of its
members, and the process of interaction the
institution can provide a learning exper-
ience that changes how states perceive and
interpret their national interests. But there
are real limits to what even the most en-
lightened and persuasive Secretariat
leadership can achieve, and judgments
about international institutions and their
perceived weaknesses must keep this
reahtv in perspective.
These limitations and weaknesses not-
withstanding, it must be stressed that the
IAEA over its lifetime has done, and can
continue to do, critical service in support of
non-proliferation The consensus on this
conclusion, consistently restated by the
\PT membership at virtually all quinquen-
nial treaty review conferences, is one to
build upon The existence of flaws is not a
reason tor abandoning the agency in favor
of the uncertainties that any new institution
would inevitably bring, or even necessarily
to create additional institutions to support
it, although that possibility should not be
ruled out. Furthermore, those who favor
alternative institutions that would threaten
draconian action against delinquent states
rrom the outset should recall that the UN
action against Iraq was based on aggres-
sion, not NTT violations, and that ultimate-
ly legitimacy, not torce, is the soundest basis
tor a long-term, stable order IAEA safe-
guards provides a foundation for achieving
non-proliteraoon legitimacy and should
therefore be preserved and strengthened in
the interests ot establishing universal non-
proliferation and moving us closer to an
eventual nuclear-weapon-free world.
Lessons for the Future
In making anv assessment about the
IAEA, its safeguards and its role in the
post-Cold War era. three factors must be
considered: First, the international environ-
ment is still very much in transition. The
outcome of the mapr shifts occurring in the
world order will be an important factor in
determining the role and relevance of
safeguards in building and maintaining
states' confidence that their neighbors are
not acquiring nuclear weapons
Second, virtually no acceptable system
of verification will, by itself, ever be enough
to ensure — in anv but the smallest states —
that there is no clandestine activitiy what-
soever Such a system could, however,
provide some assurance that there is no
clandestine activity, and it could confirm or
refute suspicion that such activities exist
when a specific charge or challenge is
raised
Third, winning the non-proliferation
battle is a multiiaceted proposition involv-
ing a range of national, regional and inter-
national policies, processes and institutions
of the states involved While safeguards
have a en tical role to pla v in this effort, they
are not the first or even the second line of
defense against proliferation First come
political decisions bv governments not to
acquire nuclear weapons (a decision that
reflects the security and political assess-
ments of the statel and solemn internation-
al undertakings codifying those decisions
The durability ot these undertakings re-
quires a collective effort in support ot the
totality of measures that constitute the non-
proliferation regime all working m - a har-
monious and mutually reinforcing wav.
Expectations regardins safeguards and the
IAEA must be considered in this light jct
NOTES
1. SeeNTT/CONTrv/DC 1 Add.3 (Al
2 For a comprehensive analysis ot the
problem of post-Iraq safeguards, see Lawrence
Scheinman. Assessing the Xudea* \ on- Pvli 'ora-
tion Safeguards Svslfn; Atlantic Council of the US
Occasional Paper Serte? October W u 2 and
Lawrence Scheinman. Nuclear Safeguards and
Non-Prolileraoon in a Crangine Uorld Order
Security Dialogue. \ 23 No 4 1"";
3 For a useful stud', of UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution bS~ see En: Chauviste "The Im-
plications ot IAEA Inspections Under Secuntv
Council Resolution 6S7 UNID1R. Research
Paper 11.1992
196
August 10, 1993
STAFF STUDY MISSION
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
VIENNA, AUSTRIA
JULY 6-9, 1993
PURPOSE
The primary purpose of the staff study mission by David
Barton and Walker Roberts of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was
to receive comprehensive briefings on all activities, operations,
and decisionmaking of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. There was also a strong interest in
current IAEA activities and inspections in Irag, Iran, North
Korea, and South Africa.
Chairman Hamilton and Ranking Minority Member Gilman had
reguested that staff make recommendations to them regarding ways
to strengthen the role of the IAEA as a part of efforts to
maintain and strengthen international nuclear nonproliferation
controls, enforce and supplement, if necessary, existing treaties,
and establish new stricter norms of international behavior.
GENERAL PREMISE
As the world has had to adjust to a new post-Cold War setting
so the IAEA has had to adjust to new challenges and demands of the
post-Gulf War nuclear environment.
It is clear that the IAEA is changing dramatically as a
result of past and on-going activities in Irag and North Korea.
The Board of Governors, faced with politically difficult decisions
and the need to conclude issues by consensus, is finding the
necessary political will to address new challenges and demands
successfully. It is essential, however, that political leadership
and resources are forthcoming from the United States and other
Member states in order to reinforce the pace and breadth of
continued change.
Since the IAEA has been the subject of criticism regarding
the Iragi development of a nuclear weapons program, it is
important to underline that the failure in Irag was a failure of
the total worldwide nonproliferation regime, including the lack of
stringent export controls and timely intelligence gathering and
analysis, and not a failure of the IAEA-safeguarded part of the
Iragi nuclear program. In fact, the IAEA maintains that none of
the elements of the IAEA-safeguarded Iragi program aided Irag's
undeclared nuclear program.
197
The basic philosophy of the IAEA regarding technical
cooperation with countries around the world which do not have
nuclear technology remains valid and an important motivator for
political cooperation. Current funding levels for technical
assistance should be maintained. Nuclear technology can
accomplish things in the developing world such as the elimination
of flies and worms harmful to domestic animals which would
otherwise not be possible nor available to these countries.
OBSERVATIONS
1. Board of Governors and Decisionmaking
The IAEA was established in Vienna, Austria in 1957.
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program is normally cited
as one of the instrumental factors in stimulating the
establishment of the IAEA.
The IAEA consists of 114 Member States. The Member States
meet together once a year in a General Conference to approve the
budget for the coming calendar year and to provide overall
direction for the agency. In addition there is a Board of
Governors composed of 35 Members who meet five times a year to
approve specific actions and oversee and report on the operations
of the agency. The Board of Governors appoints the Director
General after obtaining the approval of the General Conference.
It is the Director General who manages the daily functioning of
the Agency.
New challenges in nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safety
have faced the IAEA in increasing frequency in the last two or
three years and this has activated the IAEA's decisionmaking
process. The result has been an expansion of IAEA activities, the
exercise of pre-existing authorities which were never before used
such as special inspections, and future planning for a more
action-oriented agency which can address such things as the hard
task of uncovering undeclared nuclear weapons programs, nuclear
safety at previously unsaf eguarded nuclear facilities, support for
implementation of a comprehensive test ban, and supervision of a
fissile material cut-off and long-term storage.
The Board of Governors and the General Conference have made
the following decisions and mandated the following actions which
illustrate the new dynamism and evolving activism of the agency:
o ordered special inspections in North Korea;
o reaffirmed the agency's legitimate right to carry out
special inspections in any facilities in order to verify that
there is no nuclear weapons program operating;
o approved a universal reporting system for the international
trade in nuclear material and equipment;
198
o mandated a thorough exploration of ways in which the agency
can conduct long-term monitoring such as environmental sampling to
detect any undeclared nuclear weapons programs;
o accepted the advisability of having a centralized data and
intelligence-gathering network to maximize the potential for
uncovering suspect activities;
o approved an ambitious program of inspection and destruction
activities in Iraq even though those activities stretch way beyond
the normal safeguards activities of the agency;
o accepted that the IAEA must plan for a long-term monitoring
role in Iraq;
o responded to the South African request to involve IAEA in
verifying information regarding nuclear materials and South
Africa's revelation of a nuclear weapons program;
o mandated that the IAEA's Safeguards Advisory Group (SAGSI)
look into improvements in effectiveness and efficiency for the
safeguards system as it exists today;
o ordered the establishment of a Nuclear Safety Convention
which would facilitate the international review of nuclear safety
and assist the IAEA in responding to numerous requests to assist
in safety provisions for many countries, Member and non-Member
countries.
A clear yardstick to measure the progress of the IAEA in
becoming a more dynamic and action-oriented agency will be the
1995 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. By that time the
IAEA must show that demonstratable progress is being made or one
can expect numerous concerns regarding extension of the NPT to be
raised by both developed and less developed nations.
2. More Aggressive Policy to Detect Undeclared Nuclear Weapons
Programs
In the post-Gulf War environment there has been a basic
change in approach by the IAEA and its Board of Governors to meet
the challenge of undeclared nuclear weapons programs which may
exist in countries which are adherents to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and which have safeguards
arrangements with the IAEA. This change in approach is a result
of the experience in Iraq where the system as designed did not
work. The change is underway to a more aggressive policy by the
IAEA to attempt to detect undeclared nuclear weapons programs
thereby heightening the risks of detection and increasing the
advantages of comprehensive adherence to the NPT.
199
The shared experience of the UN and the IAEA in Iraq has
motivated both international agencies to pursue realistic,
aggressive policies regarding intrusive inspections and long-term
monitoring. The U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. R.
James Woolsey, pointed out in testimony before the Subcommittee on
International Security, International Organizations, and Human
Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 28, 1993
that: "Iraq's harassment of inspectors has not deterred the UN
from continuing to destroy a vast chemical munitions and agent
stockpile, to dig out details about past activity, and to search
for hidden missile, biological, and nuclear capabilities. . .Neither
we nor the UN have lost sight of the basic fact that critical
elements of Iraq's programs remain hidden. Therefore, intrusive
inspections remain an important element of any monitoring regime."
This new approach reflects the view that over two-thirds of
safeguard activities are taking place in countries of less
proliferation concern. While the motto should remain "we do not
trust anyone nor suspect anyone", safeguards activities must be
made more effective and efficient and clearly targeted to
countries of concern. Clearly this issue cuts to the heart of the
debate over apportionment of resources as well: activity must be
kept high on declared facilities but increased resources must be
dedicated to undeclared programs as well.
The IAEA notes that this change in approach involves numerous
aspects. First, greater information is needed by the IAEA through
national technical means, the media, special publications and
scientific journals and export/import data. To access this
information requires interactive relationships with Members
states, non-Member states and organizations such as the Security
Council and London Suppliers Group. The IAEA believes that if the
Member states and international organizations are willing to
provide this information on a timely basis, the intrusiveness of
safeguard inspections can be dramatically increased.
A second central element of this new approach would be
additional training seminars for IAEA safeguard inspectors. IAEA
inspections would reflect this new approach by moving away from a
mechanical, routine, "blinders" type of approach to a rigorous and
intrusive inspection regime utilizing comprehensive inspection
rights provided to the IAEA. The U.S. would be particularly
helpful in this regard given its experience in training On-site
Inspection Agency (OSIA) inspectors to implement U.S. -former
Soviet Union arms accords.
The IAEA acknowledges that it is only in the beginning phase
of developing this new, more aggressive approach to detecting
undeclared nuclear weapons programs. This new approach will
include use of special inspections and perhaps the institution of
other types of inspections to monitor suspicious activities, deter
clandestine programs, and investigate suspected undeclared
programs. The IAEA also would like to increase its ability to do
enhanced analysis of waste products and soil.
200
In addition to special inspections the new approach being
developed by IAEA would also include long-term monitoring such as
environmental monitoring and coordinated worldwide data and
intelligence collection.
3. Long-term monitoring
There must be long-term monitoring in Iraq if the
international community is to deter the Iraqis from recreating
their nuclear weapons development and production program. The
IAEA is currently developing extensive plans to address this need
including environmental monitoring of air, ground, and water
samples; video/ground, aerial, and satellite surveillance; human
monitoring by routine and special inspections; data collection on
all nuclear and dual-use technology and equipment being exported
to Iraq; and oversight of the Iraqi scientific community.
4. Export controls
While both IAEA officials and outside experts stress the
importance of export controls and the need for all countries and
private companies to recognize their own responsibility to
restrict exports which could potentially be used in nuclear
weapons programs, both also underline the difficulties and
limitations of export controls. As difficulties and limitations,
they cite: the desire of all countries to promote their own
manufactured goods and technology in the face of intense
international competition; the dilemma of dual-use items being
crucial to a country's manufacturing base at the same time that
those same items may be the key components for a nuclear weapons
program; the relative ease with which private companies may skirt
export controls by exporting to front-companies, transferring
items to foreign subsidiaries, or disguising controlled items with
false licenses or smuggling.
Therefore, it is clear that export controls should be viewed
as important particularly when adopted at a significant
international level on a multilateral basis, but only as one
element of "arms control" when it comes to controlling the
potential development of nuclear weapons by countries which are
determined to do so.
201
5. International Intelligence-Sharing
International intelligence-sharing and data collection are
essential if the IAEA is to progress successfully from its
traditional role of safeguarding declared nuclear facilities and
providing technical assistance to a new role of uncovering
clandestine nuclear weapons programs, monitoring suspicious
activities in the nuclear field, and enforcing relevant treaties.
The IAEA depends on its Member states for information regarding
each Member states' nuclear activities and now it must expand its
capabilities to create a data base of information which includes
input from a number of Member states about one country's nuclear
program or about nuclear trade and activity in general.
Obviously, the more countries that participate in the
intelligence-sharing and data collection the better the product in
terms of a reasonably accurate picture of every country's nuclear
programs and worldwide nuclear activity. In addition, the IAEA
should work with Member states to promote greater interaction and
access with appropriate international organizations such as the
London Suppliers Group.
6. Fissile material storage and monitoring
Unusual developments in the Ukraine and in South Africa have
created situations regarding nuclear weapons where the IAEA might
be asked to step in and assist with the storage, accounting, and
monitoring of the fissile material in those nuclear weapons. The
IAEA does not have the expertise nor the mandate to actually
handle, transport, or dismantle the nuclear weapons themselves.
That work has to be done by experts from the nuclear-weapon states
such as the United States.
The two cases of Ukraine and South Africa offer an
opportunity to the IAEA to develop some expertise, background, and
experience in managing this fissile material. This might be very
useful in the future in other countries where there are nuclear
weapons to be dismantled or if there is an international agreement
to limit or stop fissile material production and then that
agreement will need to be monitored and "safeguarded".
7. Clean-up, safety, and safeguards at facilities previously
unsaf eguarded
There is an urgent, new concern regarding the clean-up,
safety, and safeguards at nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe and
in the former Soviet Union which were previously unsafeguarded but
which may now be placed under safeguards. The IAEA is addressing
this concern and it has set in motion a series of explorations and
assessments to determine exactly what can and should be done with
these facilities and what role the IAEA can properly play.
202
8 . Iraqi nuclear weapons program
IAEA statements are clear concerning what has been
accomplished in Iraq under UN resolutions 687, 707, and 715 and
what remains to be done in order to provide some assurance to the
world community that Iraq will not succeed in producing nuclear
weapons.
In testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on June 29, 1993 the IAEA stated that it "has been successful in
identifying, destroying, removing or otherwise rendering harmless
the key components of a hitherto secret and broadly-based Iraqi
program aimed at the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities."
The IAEA describes its assessment of just how complete a picture
of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program it judges that it has been
able to piece together by asserting that "As to the completeness
of the picture obtained, it is the considered opinion of the IAEA,
based on the results of nineteen inspection missions, the analyses
of thousands of samples, the evaluation of several hundred
documents confiscated in Iraq, the assessment of procurement and
other information obtained from Member States of the IAEA, that
the essential components of the clandestine program have been
identified." The IAEA credits the success in rapidly unmasking
the secret Iraqi program to the provision of experts and
intelligence by Member states combined with rapid and intrusive
field inspections.
In the same testimony the IAEA describes its mandate from the
United Nations and what it has accomplished in the following
manner: "The tasks entrusted by the Security Council to the IAEA
are essentially threefold: search, destroy and prevent any
reconstitution [of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program]. The IAEA
has searched, has found and has destroyed. The basis has been
established for preventing a reconstitution of the Iraqi nuclear
program. Effective control of future Iraqi activities can be put
in place if adequate measures are maintained at the political
level and sufficient resources continue to be provided."
The IAEA testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
also details two areas which will hinder any future efforts by the
IAEA to successfully monitor Iraqi nuclear activities. UN
resolutions 707 and 715 specify that Iraq should provide the names
of all suppliers and intermediaries who worked with Iraq on its
nuclear weapons program and that Iraq must approve IAEA plans for
long-term monitoring of compliance by Iraq to UN resolution 687.
It is the IAEA's position that the UN must maintain its sanctions
on Iraq until there is full compliance by Iraq with all of its
obligations under all UN resolutions and particularly these two
provisions if IAEA long-term monitoring is to be effective in
detecting or deterring any effort by Iraq to reconstitute its
nuclear weapons program.
As a result of UN Security Council Resolution 687 an Action
Team was established at the IAEA to assume responsibility for
fully enforcing that resolution. The Action Team's report on
203
their activities to fully carry out the resolution's mandate to
destroy, remove, or render harmless all nuclear weapons and
prohibited precursor materials is included as an appendix to this
report.
9. People and books
Much of the press and other media attention to IAEA
activities in Iraq have focused on buildings, reactors, machine
tools and other dual-use equipment. Much of this "nuclear
hardware" has either been destroyed, sealed, tagged, or
inventoried. Obviously, there has also been attention to Iraq's
quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material such as its highly
enriched uranium in the form of reactor fuel elements. However,
several experts at the IAEA pointed out that there has been little
focus on a very crucial element to the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program which has not been destroyed: its scientists and engineers
and the availability of scientific information.
These two elements, people and books, form a crucial part of
any Iraqi ambition to reconstitute their nuclear weapons program.
The objective of mentioning this is to provoke thought in the
international community of ways to address this problem of
scientists and scientific information in order to come up with
creative and effective solutions to diverting these people and
this knowledge into peaceful, civilian endeavors.
10. Technical cooperation
Technical cooperation between nuclear and non-nuclear states
to share the fruits of nuclear energy and power lies at the heart
of the founding of the IAEA. In addition to IAEA's responsibility
to ensure that nuclear energy assistance is not used for military
purposes, the IAEA's Statute describes another basic assignment
for the IAEA: "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the
world."
The IAEA has undertaken a number of projects in developing
countries which apply nuclear technology to resolve development
problems in the fields of medicine, agriculture, health, and food.
For example, the IAEA has succeeded in applying nuclear technology
to the eradication of a number of pests and insects such as the
medfly, screwworm, and tsetse fly in a number of different
locations. This year the IAEA is embarking on a new approach of
model projects which will include a very interesting project in
Sri Lanka supporting a human tissue bank. This human tissue bank
in Sri Lanka has, since the 1960's, supplied over 30,000 corneas
to over 61 countries. With the assistance of the IAEA and new
nuclear technology in sterilization techniques, this tissue bank
may be able to expand its operations.
204
It is interesting to note that the technical cooperation
activities of the IAEA only absorb about $42-$45 million of the
IAEA budget but that amount funds approximately 1,000 technical
projects per year many of which have a very rapid and high impact
on the development process in developing countries.
11. Iragi Action Team and Future
In order for the IAEA to successfully continue the work of
the Action Team in Irag and to be able to apply it elsewhere it is
essential that the concept and practice of long-term monitoring be
firmly established as standard operating procedure for the IAEA,
that the strongest possible political will be maintained to
pressure for the establishment and sustaining of long-term
monitoring, and that substantial resources be devoted to this
effort and remain committed for some time to come. The long-term
monitoring in Irag will allow the IAEA to refine many monitoring
technigues such as human and satellite intelligence, special
technigues such as remote sensors and environmental sampling, and
surveillance by video or aerial surveillance.
The best way of getting a true picture of exactly what the
Action Team is accomplishing in Irag is to include here the last
full report of the Action Team (see below) .
12. IAEA and CTB
The IAEA is aware of the proposal made at the UN Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva to have the IAEA implement and oversee a
comprehensive nuclear test ban. The proposal would have the IAEA
coordinate different national centers of detection in order to
establish a worldwide system for monitoring the test ban. The
IAEA representatives seemed open to this proposal and predicted
that the Board of Governors would probably also be open to the
proposal. These positive responses to this proposal can be seen
in the same light as the other new challenges and demands being
addressed by IAEA. The IAEA appears to be adapting and responding
in a thoughtful and positive manner to these multiple
proliferation challenges, demands, and needs that are being thrust
upon it.
205
13. Safeguards vs. Technical Assistance
It is essential that the IAEA do more to involve developing
countries in safeguard activities. Rightly or wrongly, the
perception remains within the IAEA that the U.S. and other
developed nations are interested only in safeguard side of IAEA
activities. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the
U.S. and developed nations fund 98 percent of the safeguards
budget. In this regard, IAEA officials indicated that it would
not be helpful for Member states to earmark additional funds for
safeguards activities without addressing the technical assistance
funding as well.
In order for LDC's and technical assistance recipients to be
more involved in safeguards activities, it is important that these
nations view nonproliferation as a major issue. One approach to
this end is to integrate representatives from these nations in the
programs which support safeguards activities, at more senior
levels of management and on the technical teams which carry out
the inspections; in short involve them in the management of the
safeguards regime.
206
LIST OF OFFICIALS AND EXPERTS INTERVIEWED AT IAEA
JULY 6-8. 1993
Hans G. Blix. Director General, IAEA
Qian Jihui, Deputy Director General, Department of Technical Co-operation. IAEA
Sueo Machi, Deputy Director General, Department of Research and Isotopes, IAEA
Bruno PeDaud, Deputy Director General Department of Safeguards, IAEA
David Waller, Deputy Director General, Department of Administration, IAEA
John Tileman, Special Assistant. Office of the Director General, IAEA
Mohamed ElBaradei, Director. Division of External Relations, IAEA
Maurizio Zifferero, Leader UNSC 687 Action Team, IAEA
Robert Kelley, Deputy Leader, UNSC 687 Action Team. IAEA
Demetrius Perricos, Director, Division of Operations, and Deputy Leader, UNSC 687
Action Team, IAEA
Richard Hooper, Section Head. Division of Concepts and Planning, Department of
Safeguards, IAEA
William Lichliter, Section Head, Program and Resources, Department of Safeguards
IAEA
Muttusamy Sanmuganathan, Secretary of the Policy-Making Organs, Secretariat. IAEA
Michael Von Gray and Michael J. Lawrence, U.S. Mission
o
71-404 ) - 93 (216)
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
Hill
39999 05981 620 5
ISBN 0-16-041691-4
9 780160"4169
90000
TRUTH BE TOLD
WORLD NEWS EVERY DAY
Thursday, November 22, 2012
IRAQ'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND IAEA INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment