A submission to Salafi thought,
wishy-washy attitudes vis-à-vis social protests, the adoption of a rural
culture. With these three inflammatory headlines, a remarkable book had
hit the market in summer 2012 highlighting the internal politics of the
Muslim Brotherhood on the eve of the January 2011 revolution.
In eight academic articles, “The Muslim Brotherhood: Pre-revolution
Years” provides an intricate dissection of the social dynamics and power
struggles that had rocked Egypt’s oldest Islamist organization in the
last decade. At certain points, Hossam Tammam, a seasoned expert on the
group who died in October 2011, goes further back in time to explain
certain contemporary traits of the country's largest sociopolitical
organization and de facto ruling group.
Leaning right
One of the text’s compelling stints is a
chapter that traces how Salafi doctrines have penetrated the
84-year-old organization. The author's main argument is that the
Brothers had deviated from the initial doctrines of the group, as laid
out by founder Hassan al-Banna, with their submission to Wahhabi Salafi
thought.
Tammam begins his chapter with a flashback on the organization’s
early days, drawing an intriguing portrait of Banna. He contends that he
showed more tolerance of the other and more openness to different
Islamic schools of thought. Banna never meant for the organization to
draw on Wahhabi intransigent thought, according to the book.
To prove his point, Tammam highlights the Sufi component of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s identity in the first half of the twentieth
century. This Sufi element is enough to convince readers that Banna did
not envisage a Salafi organization as Sufism and Salafism are two
dichotomous paradigms. For, Salafis, Sufism bears several heretical
elements.
Besides, the book says, Banna had discouraged his followers from
adopting a special appearance that would distinguish them from the rest
of the society. While Salafis have to grow their beards, Banna advised
his Brothers against beards, out of fear that such an appearance would
contribute to building a psychological barrier between them and their
peers outside the organization. Meanwhile, Muslim Sisters of the early
days did not use to dress so differently from other women. A headscarf
was the only addition to their modern outfit, according to the book.
For Tammam, this relative openness had faded away since the 1950s,
in wake of former President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s ruthless crackdown on
the organization. While thousands of Brothers languished in Nasser’s
prisons, many others had to flee.
“Saudi Arabia represented the main refuge to Muslim Brotherhood
leaders and cadres who fled Nasser’s regime,” wrote Tammam. “The
Brothers who settled in [Saudi Arabia] were not immune to the influence
of the Wahhabi Saudi environment. It was a closed environment that left
no room for religious pluralism, let alone ideological pluralism,” adds
Tammam.
Eventually, the Brothers perceived Saudi Arabia as the perfect model
of the Islamic rule, concludes the author, who dubbed that period the
“first wave of Salafization" of the Brothers.
As for the second wave, it kicked off in the aftermath of the 1970s
oil boom. The lavish Saudi resources lured thousands of Brothers, who
were just released from jail by former President Anwar Sadat, to fly
eastward. Meanwhile, the petrodollars helped the Saudis spread their
Wahhabi thought beyond their boundaries and influence the religious
sphere in neighboring countries, namely Egypt, according to the book.
The failure of Nasser’s Arab nationalist project, manifested in the
1967 defeat in the war against Israel, gave enough leeway to the Saudi
Wahhabi project to fill the ideological vacuum, argues the author. Saudi
Wahhabi books invaded Egypt and influenced the ultraconservative
Islamist youths who had formed the Jama'a al-Islamiya on Egyptian
campuses at that time.
Meanwhile, the embattled Muslim Brotherhood leaders were trying to
revive the organization after Sadat had allowed Islamists back into
politics. To rejuvenate their group, they sought to recruit Islamist
university students who became steeped in Wahhabi thought. The new
comers ended up reinforcing the Salafi component within the
organization.
These youths “had accused the Brothers of giving up on religious
matters, neglecting creedal issues and not adopting Salafi positions on
growing beards, art, morals, etc.” the book reads.
To appease the new recruits, the group’s old guards gave up the
group’s identity as defined by the early founders and surrendered to
Salafi doctrines, writes Tammam.
“The group’s leaders had to grow their beards and to commit to all matters of appearance,” Tammam writes.
Besides, the group’s official discourse
had shown obvious Salafi traits. For example, the Brothers' mouthpiece
dismissed the construction of churches as haram, contended that
Christians should pay Jizya, opposed music and and held that Sharia
should be implemented regardless of the ruler’s or the people’s will,
adds the book.
With the 1990s satellite media boom and resilient Saudi attempts to
spread their beliefs, Muslim Brotherhood preachers with Salafi leanings
began to make use of satellite channels to propagate their understanding
of Islam. Eventually, they became very popular and influential among
Muslim Brotherhood rank and file, according to the book.
“It is clear that symbols with dual identities, Salafi and Muslim
Brotherhood, have become the most important sources of education among
the Brothers,” writes Tammam.
Among the hybrid preachers Tammam lists are two currently
controversial figures: Safwat Hegazy, who had promoted President Mohamed
Morsy as the only leader capable of reviving the Islamic caliphate and
retrieving Jerusalem during the presidential race, and Hazem Salah Abu
Ismail, the Salafi presidential hopeful who was kicked out of the race
because his mother held dual citizenship.
In the lead-up to the revolution, this Salafi mood has resonated
with the group's hawkish figures, who used to subscribe to the radical
thoughts of Islamist thinker Sayed Qutb. Qutb, a Muslim Brotherhood
leader, was executed by Nasser after having drafted an incendiary book
that promoted jihad against the ruling regime and accused society of
languishing in heresy.
Although Qutb's ideas were later
dismissed by the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders, the Guidance Bureau still
has members who, despite their renunciation of violence, still believe
in Qutb's radical views on politics and society. Mohamed Badie, the
supreme guide, and his deputy, Mahmoud Ezzat are considered among the
representatives of Qutb's wing within the group, says Tammam.
For Tammam, this conservative context, coupled with Mubarak's
crackdown on the group in late 2006, paved the way for the
marginalization of reformist Brothers and a takeover by the hawkish
wing.
This takeover was first manifested in the group's political platform
released in 2007, says the book. Although reformists had been making
statements suggesting that the group had fully espoused democracy and
several liberal values, the Brotherhood's political program came to
refute all these claims. Three controversial clauses proved that the
conservative wing was in full control. A provision stipulating that all
bills should be approved by a clerical body and two clauses denying
Copts and women the right to run for president were enough to elicit the
stir of liberals and Christians.
The hawkish control was asserted further in the 2009 elections of
the Guidance Bureau, which culminated in the exclusion of progressive
voices such as Abdel Moneim Abouel Fotouh and Mohamed Habib, says
Tammam. Then, the conservative incursions reached their peak with the
election of Badie, who belongs to the Qutb's school, in early 2010.
Discomfort over labor unrest
Another insightful chapter dissects the group’s position on the
labor unrest that had rocked Egypt during the last five years of Hosni
Mubarak’s rule. Tammam described the Brothers’ stance on the matter as
"highly perplexed" and "hesitant." Throughout the chapter, he lists the
reasons why the group refrained from supporting the social discontent
triggered by Mubarak’s neo-liberal policies. First, Tamman contends that
the group’s paradigm differs entirely from this kind of protest
movements. While social protests are preoccupied with precise issues,
namely salaries and working conditions, the Brothers hold a
"traditional" perception of political action that gives priority to a
comprehensive agenda for political reform.
Second, the group's "introversion" and "snobbism" made it hard for
it to open up to these movements, wrote Tammam. Third, the Brothers are
inherently averse to protests that invoke economic rights as they feel
they are influenced by leftist ideologies, contends the author.
Historically, Islamists have been hostile to leftist paradigms for their
critical stance on religion.
Fourth, the Muslim Brotherhood is more of a middle-class project
that has been always distant from the poor and marginalized classes.
Fifth, the Brothers could not throw their backing behind these protests
because they themselves have been supportive of a free-market economy,
privatization and economic restructuring since the 1970s, concludes
Tammam.
The group's ruralization
Finally, the book, authored before the revolution, includes an
intriguing chapter on the assertion of a rural culture within the ranks
of the Muslim Brotherhood in recent years.
“Upon initiatives from the Guidance Bureau, the influence of rural
provinces has increased in recent years," wrote Tammam. “The recruitment
and promotions within the organization have been favoring those coming
from the countryside at the expense of the indigenous urban population."
The influx of Brothers with a rural baggage has culminated in the
weakening of internal institutional channels, the proliferation of
patronage and the reinforcement of traditional norms, according to the
book.
“The influence of governorates such as Daqahlia, Sharqiya, Gharbiya,
Assiut and Minya has increased. These governorates have controlled most
of the key positions in the group," reads the book. Tammam goes on
listing the Brothers with rural culture who had risen to senior
positions in the last decade. Morsy and Saad al-Katatny, former speaker
of the now-dissolved People's Assembly, are among the names listed.
Meanwhile, the representation of "urban cosmopolitan" centers such as
Cairo and Alexandria has decreased, adds the author.
Despite the smart observation, the author fails to provide a precise
definition of "a rural" background. Being from outside Cairo or
Alexandria is not enough evidence of bearing a rural culture because
many of Egypt's governorates have full-fledged urban centers. Meanwhile,
a Cairene or an Alexandrian Brother does not necessarily come in with
an urban culture because he may belong to one of the many rural areas
that surround both cities.
It remains to be seen if the Brothers would be obliged to reverse
some of the attitudes laid out in the book after their ascent to power.
Upholding the same averse position on social protests, neglecting
economic rights, and pursuing neo-liberal policies may be politically
costly for a government presiding over a large disenchanted poor
population.
On another front, proceeding with
Salafi thought and adhering to a traditional rural culture would not
serve the Brothers' attempts to open up to the west and prove themselves
as a moderate force capable of maintaining domestic and regional
stabilit
